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Warfare is a complex phenomenon. There have been sufficient
wars in history to suggest that fighting is either a normal human
activity or an endemic human disease which men perpetuate although
they consciously do not desire it. It has become a habit of
humanity and closely woven into civilisationj it has been
condemned as butchery and upheld as a gallant and gentlemanly
enterprise. War and the fear of war are shadows in the
background of life yet close within one's own instincts; war
signifies the safety of defence as well as the danger of
destruction. It is indeed paradoxical.
Although warfare has been and is so much part of life it
is not a human necessity and whatever forces generate it do not
need to express themselves in such murderous ways. Men can live
and die without experiencing it, and when it does happen are apt
to accept it, with the complacency of human impotence, a3 they
do the so called 'acts of God'. For warfare lias something of
the character of an earthquake or volcano, a natural disaster in
which, in one way or another, man is helplessly caught up. It
is indeed only a more violent manifestation of constant struggles
between men and between groups due to natural instincts of
competition and rivalry, but the degree of its physical violence sets
it apart., and modern warfare has succeeded in startling if not
shocking our consciences as never before. It has thought up
disasters so huge and inhuman that they have unnerved our inertia,
and shewn up how suicidal war is.
And so there has been a fresh looking into the problem.
It can be judged as a tragedy, a.3 sin, as catastrophe or sneer
stupidity. In any case its most unfortunate victims ere silent.
o
o
It can be studied from many points of view, political, legal,
sociological, biological, psychological and spiritual. Yet
compared with the advance of these studies in other fields,
research into the causes and prevention and cure of war is, with
the exception of international law, very much behind. At
the same time war is the carrot dangled in front of the technological
donkey. Weapons of warfare are in the vanguard and express more
than almost any other of man's recent creations, the intellectual
perfection of his scientific and technological achievement. These
facts may betray our faith in our own bad instincts, as well as
the immensity of the problem.
Christianity is only one way of looking at life. It is
nevertheless an incarnational religion, concerned with every
aspect of life and every aspect of any human problem. A
consideration of the Christian ethical teaching on war is thus
only a consideration of one aspect of the Christian attitude towards
it, although it is a vital aspect. Christianity is evangelistic
and it3 ethics are influential. Modern warfare has stirred up
thought in theological no less than in other circ ies and has
caused heartsearchings about the generally accepted teaching. The
fact that this teaching stems from a church which reveres tradition
and has the support of its most powerful thinker means that it is
of no little importance and influence.
•1
Whatever the perfect Christian teaching on participation
in warfare, Christians have to live in and confront a largely
non-Christian world. To preach perfection and try to persuade
men to accept it is not enough, and the realist who attempts to
make a dangerous situation safe must not be underestimated.
Whether peace on this earth will ever come about without the
spiritual maturity of the human race might be a good subject for
debate between lawyers and theologians. The claim that the way
of Christian love is the only true and sure way even in the midst
of human wickedness is one that has been sometimes perhaps too
summarily dismissed as ineffective and a little nebulous. On
the other hand it may be because law is confessedly such a secular
activity that many Christians have perhaps undervalued and made
insufficient use of the contribution made by international lawyers
who, by building up a tradition of faith in reasonable and just
dealings between nations and a technique of dealing with dangerous
situations and disputes, have already done much to prevent and
assuage outbreaks of hostilities. Lawyers have hbove all experience
of the world and wisdom in accommodating affairs to wlxat is humanly
possible. The founders of international law were professedly
Christian, as are many international lawyers in the modern world,
and although the foundation of modem international law, which iias
to be acceptable to all, including non Christian states, is no
longer professedly Christian, this does not mean that its
work is less vital or less the concern of Christians and
churches.
Although in some matters there may be disagreement and
the need for delicate discimination as to the grounds and degree
A
of co-ordination, there should be considerable mutual appreciation
and co-operation between theologians and lawyers. Both must have
to acknowledge uncertainties and inadequacies in their positions,
and some understanding of these might be gained by looking into
the work of one who has been acclaimed as the 'Father of International
Law' and whose labours were inspired by Christian faith.
CHAPTER : ONE
fl*-'
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHRISTIAN
ATTITUDE TO WAR BEFORE AQUINAS*
The early church did not encourage an elaborate theology
of war. Christian communitiaswere * busy growing* durinthe
persecutions, and intellectual discussions wor© focussed on the
trinitariar and Christologlcal heresies. Under the Pax Roaana.
the repression of barbarians at the frontiers had the ciaracter
of police action against brigands rather than tra© warfare, while
civil wars among aspirants to the emperor*© throne could be more
aptly termed insurrections. The problem first arose for
Christians as a question of whether or not Christians should
serve with the Imperial forces, aid at first only a few were
faced with the difficulty. The problem developed gradually.
Imperial servicewis for a period of aaout twenty years.
Jews, and therefore Christiana, with whoa they were generally
identified by the inspire, were exempt from military service,
and the emperors obtained allthe soldiers they needed by
voluntary enlistment, many of the volunteers being sons of
soldiers. And it was the Christians, sons of legionaries,
or legionaries converted wldle they were still in the array,
who first faced the dilemma, which does not appear in any
significant dimensions until the second half of the second
century. There is no evidence of soldiers entering the ohurch
before the time of ;sarcu3 Aureiius (161-180 A.D.).^ And the
lepgoaohea of Celsua (C.177 - 170 A.D.) prove that it was usual
at tnio time for Christians to refuse to serve in the array.
1'here is proof rather that many soldiers left the ar.ay after
conversion, although, in the writings of TertuLlian, there is
also evidence that son© Christians did join the army after
conversion. Some church orders such as the Cyrian 'Testament
of Our Lord*, the .Egyptian Church Order and the Italian 'Canons
of lippolytus' required magistrates and soldiers to abandon
their calling before baptism, and oxommunicatod Christians who
(i) Tertulliaj; mentioned toe testimony of Marcus Aurelius to the
efficiency of toe prayers of Christians who were fighting
under him (Apolo^eticus 5»)
s
insisted on joining the array.^
Tu© question is discussed by ooat, of the prominent early
Fathers of the Church and the majority of opinions appear at
first sight to be completely pacifist. Professor Ferguson cites
as evidence for strong Christian objection to military service
on the grounds of its sinfulness in involving the shedding of
(2)
human olood, statements of many church leaders. He also
refers to paragraphs in canonical letters, and concludes that
there is a strong and definite rejection of warfare among moat
of the influential Christian thinkers of the early Church.
This is also the opinion of Cadoux. He stresses that the
Church Orders of the third century forbade Christiana to be
soldiers, points out that no Christian author of this period
undertook to deferd Christian participation in war, and concludes
that the strong testimony against war justifies one in accepting
it as an expression of the general attitude and position of the
(1)
early Church. From about the fifth centary there was unanimous
objection to the participation of the clergy ir, war.
(1) Although in their present form these church orders date from
the fourth century, they vere probably earlier in origin, and
may have been drawn 14) in the time of Tertullian.
(2) John Ferguson. The ..ntaroneaent of love, pp.37-50. Ignatius
(d.100 A.D.), Tatian (second centBPy A.D.), Athenagoraa (second
century A.C.), Justin Martyr (second century A.D.), Irenaeus
(second-third centuries A.D.), Clement of Alexandria (second
century A.C.), urigen (secan -third centuries A.C.), Tertulllan
(second-third cei turl.3 A.D.).Cyprian and Lastar>tius(fourto century
(3) C.John wadouxi The *arly Christian Attitude to Far, dp. 2. lb-7. '* *'
1 ,nim W iaAnvnr « 0*7.
This pacificism, however, was not absolute or unvaried#
Some historians and theologians mantain that at this time the
real and most fundamental objection to a Christian's participation
in the army was that ad a soldier he had automatically to take
part in idolatrous ceremonies, whatever the stronger reason,
other factors contributed to the development of a different
attitude widen accepted warfare. Aaon those factors were the
impression gained from the Old Testament that warfare could be
divinely sanctioned! the employment of a number of military
metaphors and illustrations in the Bible, particularly in the
hew Testament; the conception of God as a God of history who
had revealed iils purposes in the midst of and by means of certain
vara, as, for example, the Jewish Wtar of 67-71 A.D., which was
regarded by many Christiana as a divinely ordained chastisement
of the Jewsf and the Christian absorption of Jewish apocalyptic
beliefs which resulted In the conception of the Messiah warring
victoriously.^ Thus many Christians considered toleration of
any unjust aggression as at least foolish if not evil.
iuven those writers who speak most strongly against war
appear occasionally to tolerate it. One may wonder, therefore,
if the denunciation la at some times an expression of fine feeling
^jlbid., pp.247 - 252
which at other times cannot meet the practical dilemmas or
situational at if some of the writers are thinking of defensive
war when they gi/o their assent aid of aggressive war i&en they
condemn* This uncertainty is much increased in the light of
the political tiiought of the period* The Pauline justification
of oivil government as instituted by God,^ it justification which
wa.3 written before the outbreak of imperial persecution, in 64 A*D*
with the object, in the main, of counteracting anarchy, was
accepted by most early wrtiers, including Clement of home, Polycarp,
Athenagoras, the Apocryphal Acts of John Theophilos, Hipiolytus,
Minucius Felix, Origan, bionysius of Alexandria, hactantius
and ousebius* It was not easy to distinguish between internal
and external defence, and this acceptance of government as an
institution ordained by God implied that not only judicial
penalties but war also was right* 14>st Christians, then, believed
that the state was divinely ordained in order to repress crime
and violence with force, and at the earn© time that they, as
Christians, must never harm or inflict suffering on their fellows,
but must love and forgive. Tills contradiction was open in the
writings of stony of the Church Fathers, who in one place appeared




f@rtid.liar. considered th© cmastion of whether Christians!
should enter military service moat diroctly in he Idololatria and
he Corona ilitia; he was concerned about whether a believer
3iiould enter the army, aid whether a soldier might become a
Christian, and specifically noted that he was thinking of 'the
rank and file*, or 'each inferior grade',^ i3ho would not
necessarily have to take part in sacrifices or capital punishments.
He was here concerned therefore with warfare rather than idolatry.
He stated boldly that 'there is no agreement between the divine
(2)
and the human sacrament, th© standard of Christ and the
standard of the devil', and although he referred to the warfare
of the Israelites, found it impossible for the Christian to serve
(3)
even in peacetime, 'without, a sword which the Lord has taken away'.
he oorona Militia was written in his later years in defence of
a Christian who was imprisoned for refusing to wear the soldier's
coronet. In it he argued that military service meant bowing to
a master other than Christ, and again he referred to Christ's
wan ing that he who takes the sword stall perish by it, as refuting
the whole business of warfare, and questioned the right of a man
who ia forbidden to avenge even Ms ows. wrongs, 'to apply the chain
and the prison, and the torture and the punishment,'^ Since a man
ia not to fight even for Christ himself, how can he do it for others?
1) l)Q bp..CU. """ —-
2) 'Sacrmaentum in Latin has among its meanings 'a military oath'.
(3) XMdt
(4} He Corona Ch.Xl.
After having discussed the appropriateness to a Christian of
the various crowns of worldly glory, he concluded that
*... there la not one which lias any place
with usJ all are foreign to us, unholy,
unlawful, iiaving been abjured already once
for all in the solemn declaration of the
sacrament# Dor they were of the pomp of the
devil and his angels, offices of the world,
honours, festivals, popularity huntings, false
vows, exhibitions of human servility, empty
praises, base glorias, and in thera all Idolatry,
even in respect of the origin of the crowns
alone with which they are all wreathed1.(1)
And yet in defending the usefulness of Christians to the
£*apiro, he claimed that they take part in many important
services,
',** we are but of yesterday, ai d we have
filled every place among you - cities,
islands, fortresses, tovase, mrxet-placea,
the very camp, tribes, companies, palace,
seriate, forum - we have left nothing to you
but the temples of your gods...' (2)
This baa been generally and often quoted as evidence of
Tertullian's acceptance of Christian participation in warfare,
but in the next breath he appeared to deny this by pointing
out that it is only becausa their religion teachos that It is
better to be slain than to slay that Christians were not 'fit
(1)
and eager' for the wars.
On the other hard, again in claiming that Christians play
(1) j;o Corona Oh. ail.
(2) Apolo ieticua. 37.
(3) Ibid.
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a full part in t o life of the inspire, Tertullian mentioned
that they 'fight with you*.^ And in discussing Romans aIII.
he did not ouarrel with the office of the ruler as the executor
(2)
of 'wrath upon iilra that doeth evil.'
In rtany of his writings, Tertullian praised and upheld
the position of the Emperor and the stability created by the
Roman Empire. Christians be said regard the Emperor as a
human being act next to God who has received his appointment
ai d power from God, to whoa alone Christians will pray and
(3)
sacrifice on Ms behalf#w/ To c©.ll the emperor God is to
rob him of his title of Saperor, for if he i3 not a man he cannot
be an -Emperor*^ And all reverence must be given to God if it
is wished that He be propitious to the .Emperor. The Christian
treats the Emperor and his fellow-citlsens with equal kindness
and by regarding the emperor in his true light and placing him
in subjection to the true God, the Christian is in fact doing
(1) *se wo sojourn with you in the world, abjuring neither forum,
nor shamble*, nor bath, nor booth, nor workshop, nor inn, nor
weekly market, nor any other places of commerce. ye sail
with you,and fight with you, and till the gound with you.••'
Apol«12.
(2) ocor&iage 1L,
(3) M .Gcapulaa a. A.po4tt2?, ?o, ??, "There is also another and a
greater necessity fbr our offering prayer in behalf of to©
emperors, nay, for the complete stability of the eapire, and
for ©roan interests in general. For we know that a mighty shook
Impending over the whole earth-in fact the very end of all things
threatening dreadful woes - is only retarded by the continued
existence of the Roman inspire". (Apol.32)
U) Apol.33
more for Ms welfare than are those who idolatrously worship
him, for they thus 'commend him more to the favour of Deity*
... 'so that on valid grounds I might say Caesar is more ours
than yours, for our God has appointed hira'.^
Nevertheless, God was placed above the Emperor and
(2)
claimed final allegiance from the Christian.
It is generally thought that a similar ambiguity of
attitude is found in Origen. In replying to the challenge of
Celsus that Christians should help the Emperor with all their
power and
"... fight for Mm and be fellow soldiers if
he presses for this, and fellow generals with
Mm"
Origen claimed that while, it is against the faith for Christians
to fight for the community and to kill men
"... Christians also should be fighting as
priests and worsMppers of God, keeping
their right hands pure and by their prayers
to God striving for those who fight in a
righteous cause and for the emperor who
reigns righteously in order that everytMng
wMch is opposed and hostile to those who
act rightly may be destroyed."
(1) Apol.??.
(2) 'We have no master but God#' (Ad.Scanulam 5.)
i I)
They form a special army of piety through their
intercessions to God.^ He acknowledged that the Jews
(2)
had found it lawful to fight in defense of their families
but contracted this with the teaching of Christ which entirely
forbade the taking of human life in any form at all however
(3)
wicked men might be. In another often quoted passage
he remarked that the so-called wars of the bees may teach us
U)
that if wars 'are ever necessary they should be just and ordered,'
and later rebukes Celsus for his 3cant respect for governments and
(5)
defensive wars.
KLsewhere, however, Origen wrote more unequivocally against
warfare. The time of Jesus'birth during the reign of Augustus he
thought providential, because if there had been many kingdoms 'men
everywhere would have been compelled to do military service and to
fight in defence of their own land.* The lax Romana ensured the
success of 'this teaching which preaches peace and does not even
allow men to take vengeance on their enemies. Christians obey
Jesus in bending the spiritual swords that fight and insult them
into ploughshires, and the spears into pruning hooks.




(5) "... he treats as of no account the cities, state positions of
authority and leadership, and wars fought for one's country not
only of us Christians but of all men..." (Ibid., IV.83.)
(6) Ibid.. 11.30.
•No longer do we learn war any more, since we have become
(1)
sons of peace through Jesus who is our author...'
In replying to the argument of Celsus that if all behaved as
peacefully as Christians profess to, the mperor would be deserted
and fail a prey to barbarians, Qrigen pointed out that indeed
Christians do wish all including the barbarians to behave in this
(2)
way. But even if only the Romans were to be converted they
(3)
could by the power of prayer overcome their enemies.
Cadoux refers to the interpretations which have been put
upon such passages, and acknowledges that many regard Origan as
inconsistent or as justifying Christian participation in warfare
even while holding up non-participation as an ideal. His own
opinion is that Origen clearly believed that Christians should
never fight. He notes that apart from the analogy drawn from
the bees which does not specifically refer to Christians, all
of the passages in which Qrigen approved of fighting explicitly
refer to the warfare of non-Christians. Origen completely accepts
the charge made by Gelsus 70 years before that Christian? refused




he was not aware that Christians ever took another line.'^
Gadoux also points out that, unlike many of his contemporaries
Origen did not believe in the imminent return of Christ and
that his eschatology did not therefore invalidate his witness
(2)
on this point. Only once did Origen allude to the
connections between idolatry and military service, which,
Gadoux tiiinks, confirms that he objected to it because it
involved killing. If he praises the Emperor and his righteous
war3, he is only praising them as relative to a sub-Christian
standard of morality.
Whatever the true opinion of Origen and Tertullian,
however, there is no doubt that the church as a whole soon
withdrew from ar. extreme position.
One explanation of these contradicting lines of thought,
particularly when they occur in the same writer, is that the
existence of Christians serving as soldiers in peace time was
regarded as permissible, but not their fighting violently in
time of war. Henri Secretan based this argument on the
difference between 'militare'. to be a soldier in peace time,
and'bellare', to fight.^ A less subtle and more lixely
(1) p.l40.U)(c.f. Professor Reinhold Iviebuhr's interpretation of
pacifism as an interim ethic in An Interpretation of Christian
Ethics.)
(3) i.e Ghristianisme de3 premieres siecles et le Service militaire.
referred to by J.M. Hornus, in La pensee politique de Tertullien. p.144-
solution is suggested by Cadoux. He claims that God's
appointing a particular person or institution for a particular
work does not necessarily guarantee the goodness of that
person, institution or work, that the just ruler thought of
by Paul is always a pagan ruler and his actions and position,
since he is a pagan, are justified in a way that would be
impossible were he a Christian. His theory is that the Christian
justification of coercive government, and therefore of war, was
only a justification relative to the non-Christian state of the
agents concerned, and that it in no way prevented the Christian
from behaving quite differently, and in accordance with the
Sermon on the Mount.^ And he remains convinced that in spite
of the contradictions and confusions which did exist with regard
to the matter in the early Church, the majority were opposed
(2)
to Christian participation in warfare. ' Certainly no church
writer before Athanasius ^ ventured to say that it was not only
permissible but praiseworthy to kill enemies in war, without the
qualification, expressed or intended, that he was speaking for
pagans only.
Mgr. de Solages^ sees in these two opposing tendencies
(1) pp.211-214.
(2) pp.245-6.
(3) Athanasius pronounced the legality of killing in warfare, as
did Ambrose of Milan. (Ath. Letter to Ammonios Migne PG XXVI
1173. Ambr. Exposition of Luke II Migne PL XV 1580.)
(4) De Solages: La Thfeologie de la Guerre Juste, p.29.
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forces which were both influential in the eventual formulation of the
doctrine of the jU3t war. Whether this doctrine did more to encourage
rather than to prevent war in general is an interesting if un¬
answerable question, but in theory it was intended to limit and
condition as much as to justify warfare, and this responsibility for
controlling war might have been stimulated by the more pacifist
thought within the church. The problem of reconciling these two
differing standards and attitudes, God's sanction of at least the
pagan 3Word, and His forgiving love revealed in Jesus, seems indeed
to be a perennial one, and to be particularly connected with the
question of the reconciliation of the gospel with reverence for the
divinity of the Mosaic Law.
Gradully, however, the toleration of war increased. There
developed a moral laxity within the Church which encouraged compromise
with secular practices, the hope of the immediate return of Christ
faded, and with it a certain unworldline3s.^ The accession and
conversion of Consta-itine are rightly regarded as the events which, in
a dramatic and ironic way, dictated a solution to the problem by more
or less eliminating pacifist witness. The Church bowed to that vision
of the cross which Constantine believed had helped him to military
victory, and it could not but be grateful for the most obvious
fruits of that success? the nmperor's blessing, protection and
support, which gave her honour, eminence and power.
(l) Cadoux, pp.24.8-50
Uncertain, divided, intellectually immature and
inevitably imperfect, she was in no position to denounce
that military power which God Himself had apparently blessed,
or to condemn so good a friend as Constantino. And so she
managed to forget her hatred of warfare, carried the cross
into battle as the imperial military emblem, and saw nothing
incongruous or tragic in the fact that the supposed nails of
the cross, sent to Gonstantine by his mother, were made into
bridle bits and a helmet, which were used in battle.
Christianity became the official religion of the state,
and the Church paid for her position by compromising the purity
of some of her ideals, particularly her pacifism. The usual
interpretation of the third canon of the Synod or Aries
J
(314. A.D.) is that Christian soldiers were either to be ex¬
communicated if they left the army, or at least that Christians
could now freely undertake military service. In 416 A.D. non-
(2)
Christians were forbidden to serve in the array.
J.M. Hornus, however, contends that the command of the
third canon, "lit qui in pace arroa pro.jiciunt. excom iunicentur"
means that soldiers who threw away their arms, that is, refused
(1) Cokrate3J ^ccles Hist. 1.17.(quoted by Cadoux, p.256.)
(2) Codex Theodosianus XVI.X.21. The title of the. canon is "Ut
qui in pace, arisa pro.iiciunt. excommunicentur", and the test is
"De his qui arena pro.iieiunt in pace, placuit abstineri eos a
coramunione."
to serve, in peacetime should be exommunicated, because then
they would be creating a scandal unnecessarily, but that this
rule does not forbid a Christian refusing to fight in war. He
interprets the canon quite literally and believes that the usual
inter rotation is the fruit of the later and more militaristic
attitude.
It is interesting to note that such a strong pacifist as
Dr. George MacLeod claims that this compromise protected the
•fragile flower' of the Church, and indeed preserved it, to
root and spread and blossom in a wider field than if it had
remained isolated in its purity and in danger of destruction.
If the Church is to permeate society it will be touched and
corrupted in return, and its own temptations and imperfections
may well be magnified. But it must risk this for the sake of
achieving an influence and a witness impossible to an inflexible
perfection. Dr. MacLeod is satisfied that although the "Church
got shackled... the otate tfot tamed," and thinks that
'... if for the Church to be set up near
the Lmperor's palace wa3 to risk being
dictated to by the wisdom of this world,
it was also a hardy place when totally
heathen hordes came down.'
lie also believes that the first act of union with the state,
(1) La pensee politique de Tertullien. p.l4-B.
although a primitive, imperfect and faltering one, was yet a
vital stage in the evolutionary development towards the
spiritualisation and santification of society.^
Pacifism, an even frailer flower than the Church, perhaps
deserving, indeed, to be described only as its tiniest unripe
seed at this stage, was not dead. Apart from the Church orders
which forbade participation in war for Christians, writers and
martyrs, although in a minority, continued to bear witness to
an ideal which was not in itself insignificant. St. Gregory
Kazlanzen (3 2.^-3??) and gt. John Chrysostom (347-407) wrote against
military life, as did Basilius the Great, (330-37?) who
recommended that those who had shed blood in war should be
(3)
denied holy communion for three years.
As Pierre Lorson^ emphasizes, the lives of the saints teach
and establish traditions as authoritatively as do theologians and
preachers. The Church venerates both military saints such as St.
Maurice, St. Louis, and St. Joan of Arc, and also those who were
martyred for refusing to take up arms. Maximilian, a young man
of twentyone years, made his stand against war because he believed
that it vra.3 the right way for him, although on its being pointed
(1) The Church Prospect, p. 8.
(2) Migne PG XXXV. 608 & LVIII.590.
(3) Migne PG XXXII.681.
(4) Pierre Lorson S.J: Un Chretien peut-il etre Objecteur de
Conscience, p.81
out to him that other Christians willingly served as soldiers
he accepted their right to think differently. He was martyred in
295.^ On the eve of the battle of Worms in 341» St Martin
confessed to the emperor himself that he could no longer fight,
He said that it was impossible to serve God and fight for the
emperor. When challenged that fear rather than sanctity was
inspiring him, he offered to go into battle armed only with a
(2)
cross, but was prevented by a sudden truce. / A few years later
St Victrice made a similar dramatic gesture in demonstration of
(3)
his faith, and he was martyred. ' Throughout history, whatever
the fashion in political or theological thinking, such individuals
have offered a solitary and independent witness to a certain truth
which possessed them. Thus, alongside the orthodox, authoritative
and majority teaching and attitude of the Church, there has always
existed this other thread of tradition, slender, apparently
insignificant, but from time to time manifesting itself.
It is obvious that in the absence of any unambiguous tradition,
and in face of the apparent uncertainty of the Scriptures (for
those of both persuasions could use simple and isolated quotations,
from the Old and New Testaments, with appropriate discrimination,
(1) Lorson, pp.82 - 4*
(2) Lorson, p.84.
(3) Lorson, pp.84 - 6. He refers to the historian M. Vacandard
and to Collection "Les Saints", Paris, Lecoffre, 1902, as
the sources of his information about the life of Victrice.
•> J
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to support their own opinions), it was easy for the Church,
perhaps with relief, to accept the more definite and straight¬
forward secular ruling expressed in firm legal language. This
was most adequately represented by Cicero, whose main virtue,
according to De Solages^ was to combine the accurate legalism
of Rome with the universalisrn of the Creeks. Cicero made an
explicit relation between the doctrine of natural law and that
of a just war. The law of reason is so universal that it is an
international bond between men, it contains and lays down the
rules of justice which should regulate the relationships between
(2)
nations, including that of war. That war is not unjust in
itself is assumed by Cicero, but the conditions which should
regulate its occunsenceand conduct spring from international or
universal reason, identifiable with the principles of justice.
The unique aim of war is peace; it should not be undertaken if
its end can be achieved by negotiation, and it should be carried
out with moderation. It must also be preceded by a formal
(3)
declaration. ' Justice, however universal its theme, did not
mean for Cicero exactly what it does for us. Imperial glory, for
instance, was for him, a legitimate motive for war, although such
a war must not be fought with such intensity as others.^ And
it is interesting to note, in view of a distinction of central
(1) p.33.
(2) Be Officiis. III.6.
(3) De Officiis. I.11.
(4) De Officiis. 1.12.
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importance which will be investigated later, that de Solages
considers that the Roman conception of justice wan mainly
formallstic.^ He goes on to suggest that the
theologians, notably St Augustine, accejited these outward
principles, but managed so imperceptibly to suffuse them
with the spirit of the Gospel and of inward justice that they
became transformed into the Christian doctrine of the just
U»T. Wwar*
St Ambrose (333-397) had already written on the justice
of war. It is interesting that at one point he excused
himself from a consideration of the question because he was
(3)
writing for clerics. Many other ecclesiastical writers
of the patristic age who had treated the question more or less
indifferently probably accepted the ruling of Cicero because
they respected his thinking in general.
It was St Augustine, then, who first firmly established
the Christian doctrine. Whether or not he did thoroughly
and rightly spiritualise the secular doctrine and the extent
to which this was made possible by the Christian acceptance
of the doctrine of natural law are indeed questions of vital
importance* Augustine's firm and frequent treatment of
(1) p*39
(2) pp. 39 - 4-5.
(3) he officiis ministrcrum.
• > n
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the problem wa3 categorical enough, and sufficiently weighted
by his own eminence, not only to champion one side of the
dispute but to silence those who held a more pacifist position.
Nevertheless, he sought to comprehend the pacifist position
within his own arguments. Thus was established a teaching which
remained, with some slight alterations and additions, mainly
unchallenged. It became the official doctrine of the Church
and was often repeated, in slightly different words and forms, by
the various theologians who inherited his thoughts and convictions.
Many of the theologians, indeed, quoted Augustine word for wordf1^
often without acKnowledgement.
Augustine gave scant consideration to a war of defence,
presumably because he took it for granted that such a war is
(2)
immediately and obviously justifiable, and even obligatory.
He neither seriously doubted the permissibility of war in itself,
nor was he shocked by its intrinsic evil. A just war of aggression,
however, must be carried out by authority of the prince, and must
have both a just cause and a right intention. Mgr de Solages,
although he attributes an important spiritual!sation of the doctrine
to Augustine, pays no attention to this third condition as such, and
even explicitly omits it by speaking of the two conditions of the
(1) Augustine's main discussion on the topic is to be found in the
following works: Contra Faustum. Ad Marcellinum. Ad 8onifaciura.
De Civitate uei, Quaestiones in Heptateuchum.
(2) he Civitate Dei. III.10. ~ " * *
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(l)
just war in Augustine's teaching. Hegout, though he seems
to think it of little importance, does take into account the
(2)
third condition, It is undoubtedly present in Augustine,
who emphasized that a war inspired by a wrong spirit is not
(3)
really a war but brigandage.
Apart from the direct command of God, an injustice or wrong
caused by the enemy is the only sufficient justification of war.^
One example of such an injury which Augustine gave is that of the
refusal of the Amorites to allow free passage through their
territory to the Israelites. Mgr de Solages notes this as for its
time a unique recognition of a wider right coming into conflict
with a narrower national claim, and says that we must wait until
(5)
the time of Vitoria for a development of this theme. Regout
allows that Augustine accepts punishment as an important element
in the just war. However, although the only justification of war
for Augustine - an injustice or wrong on the part of the enemy -
would seen to imply the right of punishment, and in spite of
Augustine's acceptance of war as a means employed by God to chastise
(6)
and punish the .just as well as the unjust, 'Regout states that
this element was not centrally necessary to Augustine, and that
(1) pp.41-2.
(2) La Doctrine de la Guerre Juste, p,LL
(3) Quid aliud quam grande latrocinium?" quoted from De Civ.Dei IV,1.
(Mlgne P.L.41,117) by Regout, p.-42 •
(A) In Pentat. VI.10.
(5) p»4A*
(6) De Giv. Dei XIX.15.
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he was more concerned with defending and maintaining the objective
order of justice than with an anlysis of, and ruling for, the
(1)
subjective spiritual issues. The fact that Augustine found
a just cause of war in the refusal to restore property unjustly
stolen, and his whole concern for and love of order, appear to
Regout to prove this.
St. Augustine certainly insisted on war as a means of
restoring order and of achieving peace, and this latter aim sounds
like a refrain throughout his writings. Since however, the precise
relation between the actual horrors of war and this aim of peace
were not discussed by him, his frequent references to peace in the
midst of war must seem contradictory and unrealistic. War is
fought for the sake of peace, but there is no recognition of the
inherent contradictions in such a proposition. The importance of
a right intention is pcerfully in evidence here, but as merely
colouring the motive with Christianity, while leaving the outward
form of justice untouched. Is this a true spiritualisation of the
pagan doctrine? Another two complementary factors which Augustine
mentioned as essential for the justice of war, were that it should
be 'necessary* and that it should be carried out with mercy. St




with loving the enemy, and such love and consideration oven
for the man one is planning to kill, though it little affects
one's behaviour towards him, may be regarded by some as a
Christianising of the spirit in which war is to be carried out.^
Pie noted that the just are not always victorious, but his answer
to this was the rather unsatisfactory one that war is God's way
of punishing the wicked arid chastising the just,^ for it may
happen that, speaking generally, a war punishes the just and
regards the wicked.
From Augustine's time until the twelfth century there were
few developments in the doctrine of the just war. St Isidore of
Seville (5&0-626) introduced a term which was to become very familiar-
•Justum bellum est quod ex praedictis geritur de rebus reuetitis
(3)aut propulsandorum hostium causa. He repeats later that ham
extra ulcisc end! aut propulsandorum hostium causam. bellum justum
geri nullum potest.^ and Regout, while admitting that is is
possible to interpret 'de rebus repetitia* as punitive action,
nevertheless thinks that it is more realistic to regard it as
(5)
appropriate to a war of objective adjustment of rights.
(1) "Bellum geritur ut pax acquiratur." Such a peace is "tranqulllitas
ordinis." (Ad Bonifacium. 189) "Ordo est pariurn discariunque
rerum sua cuique loca tribuens disiositio." (Be Civ. Del. XIX.13.)
(2) "Ham et cum iustua geritur bellum. pro peccato et a contrario
dimlcatur; et omnia victoria, cum etiam mails provenit divino /
jfiudlcio victos humlliat. vel emendas peccata vel purdens."(De Giv.Uei.IlX
(3) htvmol. XV111. 1.
(4) ^tvmol. mil. 3.
(5) p.46.
Pope Nicholas I. (858) elaborated the appropriate objects
of defence. One can fight for the defence of oneself, of one's
country and of one's laws. He added that to refuse such defensive
action would be to tempt God.^
Rufin's (1056) theories followed closely those of Augustine.
Regout interprets them as justifying above all and in all
circumstances the defence of order and legality, but he also
maintains that such defence is in fact to be considered as a form
(2)
of penal sanction against criminals. Yves de Chartres (1040-1116),
the most important canonist of his time, made no original contribution.
Although he referred to Isidore, he is mainly dependent on
Augustine, and so witnesses to the predominant position of the
latter up to this time. Abelard (1079-1142) was likewise a
traditionali3t•
The most important writer on war in the eleventh century was
Gratian (1150), who not only wrote directly upon it but also
collected and edited the writings of others on the subject. He
arranged his material according to six main questions: whether it
is a sin to make war; which kind of war is just; whether on should
by force of arms avenge a wrong suffered by one's allies; whether
an act of vindication is permissible; whether heretics can be
(1) Responsa Nlcolai ad consuite Bulgarorum. 46 (iiigne, P.L. 119, 998)
(2) p.47
converted by such a method; and whether clerics should fight.
Using the sholastic method, Gratian limited all the objections
to the points in question, quoted the traditional answers, mostly
from Augustine, and usually added brief conclusions of his own.
By explaining that the Gospel recommendations of patience
were meant to apply to spiritual attitude rather than to bodily
action, Gratian accentuated in a new way the separation between
subjective attitude and external act.^ Regout naturally
interprets Gratian'3 attitude as similar to his own, that is, that
(2)
Gratian did not think of war as necessarily punitive, This
impression is supported by the fact that Gratian elsewhere
{3)
distinguished between punishment and vindication, and Regout
thinks that this distinction, together with the consideration of
vindication as a tiing in itself,^ marks the beginning of a
tendency to treat punishment and vindication separately as
elements not essentially involved in war, but sometimes accompanying
it, or additional to it. This is connected with another later
development of attitude wherein the punitive element was entirely
(1) Gan. 7. C. XXIII. Q.l.
(2) p.63.
(3) Can. 2, C. XXIII, Q.2.
(4.} Regout as usual, maintains that the object and justification of war
is the organisation of justice, no matter how abstract such
justification might seem to be. (p.66.)
eliminated from a defensive war and reserved only for some
offensive wars of aggression. As the punitive element, if
it exists at all, is related to the sin or moral guilt of the
enemy, this distinction seems illogical, since one is more
justified in punishing those who attack one than in attacking
others in the name of punishment. Gratian himself was little
interested in the punitive element in war, for in the fiftyfour
canons of Question IV, in which he treats of vindication, there
is no mention of its relevance to war. Nowhere did he give a
clear answer to the simple question of whether one people iias the
right to inflict punishment upon another either during or after
a war.
A special study of the doctrine during the eleventh century
has been made by Dr. Gorris in Denkbeelden. and the following
summary of the essential conditions for a jU3t war (war not being
considered as wrong in itself) reveals that by then the only new
element, and a controversial one at the time, was the idea that
war should be fought in defence of the church:
1. It should be absolutely necessary and the
ultimate resort.
2. It should be undertaken for a just cause, or -
which amounts to the same thing - with a pure
motive.
3. It should be authorised by the proper public
authority.
The defence of one's native land and of the Church were thought
to be particularly strong justifications for making war.
Op to the twelfth century, then, only Isidore had contributed
(2)
anything significant to the Augustinian doctrine. Historical
events such as the Moorish invasions brought no significant
alterations into it, nor did the social and political conditions
of the middle ages, such as the feudal system, the lack of a
centralizing authority and the actual prevalence of continual private
wars. Such things are not even reflected in its development.
But in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries social and
political conditions did influence the evolution of the attitude
to war, although they never influenced Aquinas's thinking on it.
After the weakening of the empire under Charlemagne's
successors, imperial power disintegrated and fell into the hands
of a multitude of dukes, counts and barons, who used it partly to
withstand the Normans, Hungarians and Saracens, and partly to fight
each other. The feudal system which was at its zenith in the
tenth and eleventh ce turies, liad contributed to such a situation.
Efforts such as the 'Treve de hieu et de la Paix' were sometimes





themselves, to limit these conflicts, but in the absence of any
superior and acknowledged centralising power which had the powers
of arbitration, they could not, according to the popular doctrine,
be condemned; any injury was sufficient to aggravate a just war.
From the twelfth century onwards there was a considerable
change. During the thirteenth century the king of France became
a real power. Energetic action was taken, in collaboration with
merchants and municipalities, against these private civil war3 and
this centralisation of national power became manifest and
influential in international relations too. The great sovereigns
such as Phillip Augustus, St Louis of France, Ferinand III of
Castille, and Henry II and Henry III of England, by becoming more
free and independent in their strength, solidified the unity of
their nations. The modern national states were, in fact, in the
process of being born.
At the same time, the idea of the unity of Christendom under
pope and emperor was developing, even though it was an idea somewhat
contrary to the facts. The memory of the glory of the empire had been
stimulated by the careers of Charlemagne and such lesser rollers
as Otto I ar^d Otto III. The pontificates of Gregory VII, Innocent
III and Innocent IV also helped to revive the idea of a united
Christendom. The intense study of Roman law begun at Bologna in
*3 *"
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the first half of the twelfth century furnished new arguments
for imperialism, and although by the middle of the thirteenth
century imperialism as a reality was broken, and although in the
fourteenth century the powers of the popes were diminished, the
conception of imperialism was deeply rooted and still found
advocates from time to time.
Nevertheless, liegout claims, quoting Ohenon, the study of
Roman law in the long run encouraged the development of petty
autonomies, and in tne twelfth and thirteenth centuries real power
passed from the hands of emperor and pope into those of independent
princes.^ At first the French kings feared that the claiming of
•sovereign rights* by a multitude of petty rulers might challenge
the authority of the crown, but by 1303 they had discovered in the
concept that "he roi de France est empereur dans son royaume" a
means of entrenching and reinforcing that authority. While such
theories ware unpopular with canonists and theologians, they
certainly helped forward the establishment of national kingdoms.
Regout thinks that the opposition between the diverse princely
autonomies, which existed in fact, and the idea of a politically
united Christendom under pope or emperor, which existed only as an
(2)
abstract notion, affected mediaeval theories of the just war.
Most of the writers of the period, including Innocent IV
(1) Chenon: His^oire genferale. tom.l.pp.506.SS, referred to by Regout,
(2) p.54. P«54-
and Aquinas, accept the autonomy of a multiplicity of petty
princes as quite natural, but not all of them did so.
Hostiensis (c.1200 - 1271), for example, considered that it
was the duty of pope and emperor to co-operate in maintaining
justice and law throughout Christendom. They alone, he held,
should have the power to authorize war, whether against infidels
or against subjects and suborinates who had broken some internal
law of the 'state*. A subordinate prince, therefore, could only
take up arms with the permission of, and consequently, on behalf
of, emperor or pope. To Hostiensis the term 'war' could be
properly applied only to act3 of aggression against his ideal
unified Christendom. He did, however, make certain exceptions.
A war of self-defence and the killing of assassins and those who
had giver: refuge to criminals he thought permissible even without
t e authority of emperor or pope.
Otherwise, the major writers accepted the situation in which
the emperor was too weak to exercise power throughout Christendom
and in which the princes were too strong and too accustomed to
administering their own versions of justice ^ to submit to the
(2)
emperor3. Their writings, therefore, are grounded in this
accepta*.ce.
(1) Katural. as opposed to the particular legal .justice of the
emperor, dee Regout, pp.55-6.
(2) Opposition between the fact and the ideal is perhaps most clear
in some of the writings of the Italian canonists and moralists
of the fifteenth century, who speak of the right of undertaking
war as belonging de jure to the emperor and de facto to the
petty princes. Such confusions were matched by general lack
of distinction between the various 'types' of war - insurrection,
defensive war, individual defence, and so on.
e> i
A flirther divison among the writers of the time is noted
° * (1)
by Regout. ' The imperial unity envisaged by Hostiensis, he
says, was fundamentally a politcal one made complete and explicit
in the supreme integrating power of the emperor. The theologians
as well as the canonists, however, had a notion of unity, and for
Aquinas this was based on the natural equality and brotherhood
of man before God, particularly as realised in the Christian
community. For Aquinas, the independence of separate states did
not contradict their subordination in the hierarchy of the
international community. And in spite of the conflicts of ideas
and confusions of facts, the religious unity in mediaeval times
was a very strong binding force. War, however and by whomsoever
justified, was always regarded a3 tragic, and many writers stressed
the need for finding ways of preventing it. In fact many outbreaks
were prevented by the intervention of popes who, by virtue of
their material arid spiritual authority over various states and
rulers, contrived to make their arbitration effective.
In several ways the doctrine of the just war itself underwent
some "Ghristianisation." It was often repeated that clerics shoufci
take no part in war but that the Church has a right to declare war
(2)
equal with that of a prince. ' Such views were held by Raymond
(1) p.56.
(2) Raymond of PennafortJ Gumma. Lib.II.?.12.Q.5.
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of Pennafort (1180 - 1275), for example, who wrote that
just intention is essential for a war to be just and that such
a 'just1 war must be conducted in a spirit of piety, justice
and obedience. He made the usual allowances for acts of self-
defence - where life is at stake it might be defended without
waiting for direction from the supreme authority - and went on
to distinguish an ordinary war of deforce from one for the
recovery of goods (repetere res), which he regarded as a continuation
of defence and quite distinct from a war of aggression.^
iiegput thinks that the recovery of goods is to be distinguished
from defence only in so far as it is regarded as a continuation
of it, and that a war of aggression is a quite different matter.
It is in Raymond, he thinks, that there appears for the first time
this idea of a continuation of defence (in continenti) which may
(2)
have the appearance of an agressive act.*
Innocent IV, another influential thirteenth century canonist,
wrote of war from a legal rather than from a moral point of view.
Although he sometimes affirmed papal pretensions to spiritual and
temporal power with vigour, he did not really believe them to be
practically efficient or strong enough to limit the actual and
practised princely right of declaring war. In justifying the latter
he no doubt took into account the actual weaknesses of the empire.
(1) Ibid.. Summa, Lib. I, G.Q.5.
(2) p.68.
Although he did not say so explicitly, a defensive war seems to be
deprived of its punitive character mainly because in some circum¬
stances it is legitimate even without the authority of the prices,
and because it may have a spontaneous, impulsive character which
doesnot lend itself to the proper administration of punishment. He
regarded neither personal defence nor the judicial action of prince
or sovereign against a subordinate as coming under the heading of
warfare. War, properly speaking, is an action carried out by a
prince who is answerable to no higher authority than himself against
strangers not normally subject to hira. Although he regarded the
recovery of goods by action in continenti as permissible in itself, he
though that after the lapse of a certain interval of time such action
amounts to a fresh act of aggression and requires fresh justification.^
Alexan er of Hales (1170-1245) raised the interesting question
(2)
of whether or not soldiers should obey an unjust prince. He not
only discussed the 3tock question of whether or not clerics ought to
fight, but decided that a war-making party required right sentiments,
as well as a right intention. Regout remarks that although for
Alexander an offensive war has a strongly punitive character, a
defensive war is for Mm withoutthis element.
By the time of Aquinas the Church had come to a more of less
unanimous opinion on the most vital questions associated with the
morality of war. The matter did not disturb many consciences, although
the canonists and theologians continued to devote a certain amount of
space to it.
(1) Regout maintains that Innocent IV makes the necessity of defending
one's proper rights primary, punishment secondary.(p.72.)
(2) Summa. Pars.111.
CHAPTER TWO
THE DOCTRINE OF THE JUST WAR IN AQUINAS
In the Second Part of the Second Part of the Sumraa
Theological Aquinas dealt with war as one of the sins
contrary to charity and peace. He first considered discord,
an inward sin; secondly contention, a sin of the tongue;
and finally those sins which result in actions - schism,
quarrelling, war arid sedition.
Aquinas first discussed whether war in itself i3 wrong,
and, if not, in what circumstances it can be justified. He
then went on to deal with the questions of whether or not
clerics should fight, whether it is lawful for belligerents to
lay ambushes in war, and whether fighting on holy days is
permissible.
The first two objections noted against the justice or
(1) Q.xl.Art. 1 - 4.
4 1
righteousness of war in itself claim that Holy Scripture
reveals that it is so, in the following texts:- "All that
take the sword shall perish with the sword"{^ "But I say to
(2)
you not to resist evil"j "Not revenging yourselves my dearly
(3)
beloved, but give place unto wrath". ' The third states that
war is contrary to the virtue of peace, and the fourth that
warlike exercises, being already forbidden by the church in
tournaments, are obviously sinful. Aquinas then gave a
preliminary general answer by quoting Augustine's argument^that
(5)
John the Baptist would have counselled the soldiers to throw
away their arms and give up soldiering altogether if warfare had
been essentially against the teaching of the Gospel, instead of
recommending them to be content with their pay and to do no
violence.
Aquinas's answer, which includes his particular replies to
the objections, revolves round the three main conditions of a
just war, right authority, sufficient cause, and right intention.
(1) Matt. XXVI. 52.
(2) Matt. 7.39.
(3) Rom. Xll. 19.
(4) Ep. ad llarcellinum. GXXX7III.
(5) Luke. III.I4.
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He argues, quoting from Augustine, that to take the
sword means only to take it unlawfully, but that to use it in
obedience tothe proper and appropriate authority of sovereign
or prince is just and not sinful. These words must be
interpreted spiritually, for even where the sword is wrongly
talcen. the opportunity of repentance may intervene between the
sin and its punishment, which in any case, as the natural death
of many such sinners proves, is not necessarily death by a
literal sword, but spiritual death by a sort of spiritual sword.
The importance of a right authority is paramount. No
private person has the right to assemble troops and ofeclare a warj
if such a person ha3 a serious grievance it is his duty and
opportunity to apply for just vindication from the appropriate
political authority superior to him. Those in power, whether
sovereign or judge, have the responsibility of defending the
/
common good of their subjects against both internal and external
enemies] this duty is pre-eminentj "Rescue the poor and deliver
(2)
the needy out of the hand of the sinner". ' They are thus
(1) Contra Faust. XXII.
(2) Psalm LXXX1. 4-.
I •>
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justified in killing and in ordering to kill, and in fact
any 'public person' can, even without any superior human
authority, have recourse to the sword if he be truly inspired
by a zeal for justice. His authority, like that of the
sovereign, comes ultimately from Gods- He beareth not the
sword in vain; for he is God's minister, an avenger to
"(1)
execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.
Such authority however must be exercised for a good
reason and in a righteous cause. Aquinas stated that the enemy
must be attacked "because they deserve it on account of some
fault", but was otherwise satisfied to give Augustine's
definition of the just cause:- "A just war is wont to be described
as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be
punished for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted
(2)
by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly".* '
Such action is deemed and intended to bring about the good
of either the community, "the common good", or those against whom
(1) Pwomans. XIII.4*
(2) Q.Q. in Kept., qu.x., in Jos.
■i i
one is fighting, and this in itself proves that non-resistance
is only occasionally appropriate and is not intended by God to be
always practised. Augustine was quoted again to prove that
resistance is often better for the enemy as well as for oneself,
"since nothing is more unhappy than the happiness of sinners". ^
Aquinas and Augustine agreed, however, that the Gospel precepts of
non-resistance should be kept in mind, and that we should be ready
to obey them except when they contradict the common good.
In his reply to the third objection, Aquinas distinguished
between true and false peace, and argued that Jesus did not come
d (2)
to bring the latter and that war can be transformed into true
peace by the spirit in which it is fought. Just as the absence of
war can be evil in some circumstances, so war's obvious horrors
can be redeemed by a purpose of bringing peace to both sides. One
( 3)
can be peaceful in warring. ' A good intention, one of securing
peace, punishing evildoers, and helping the good, is essential for
a just war. A wicked intention can render wars which, have a just
cause and being declared by the right authority, are otherwise just,
(1) bp. ad hareellinurn GXXXVIII.14.
(2)Matt. X.34-
(3) Aquinas quoted Augustine - Ep.CLXXXIX ad Jonif.
unjust
A reply to the fourth objection is that only those warlike
exercises which result in death or plunder are forbidden.
Interestingly enough, the objections to the non-participation
of clerics in warfare, the topic dealt with in the next article,
are all based on the assumption that war is justifiable for
Christians. It would seem even more justified therefore for clerics,
since they have the particular duty of protecting and defending
their flocks, and by not merely allowing but encouraging their
people to fight they share with them the responsibility for such
action.^ Since war has been accepted as not only permissible
but as worthy of praise and heavenly honour it is surely an
activity in which clerics should be privileged to join. And in
fact on occasions they have done so, as is shewn in the writings
(2)
of Pope Leo IV. ' Aquinas noted that the outstanding argument
against such objections appears to be the incident in the Gospel
where Peter, representing bishops and clerics, is, on drawing his
sword to defend Ghrist, told by him, "Put up again thy sword
(3)
into the scabbard".
(1) "They who do such things, are worthy of death and not only they
that do them, but they also that consent to them that do them"
Romans 1.32.
(2) XXIII.,Q.VIII., can. lgitur.
(3) Matt.xxvi.52 cf. John.XVIII.il.
The centre of Aquinas's argument against the participation
of clerics in warfare was that they have a particular vocation,
a uniquely spiritual and a spiritually superior vocation which
precludes it. Even the emergency of war which certainly
revolutionises the organisation of society and interferes
drastically with the proper vocations of other men, and even the
urgency of having to defend one's life, does not justify them in
fighting. Literal military activity would prevent a cleric from
his proper duty at that time, which is to pray for victory, to
contemplate God in peace, and to fight in every way with
spiritual weapons. St Paul's words, "The weapons of our warfare
are not carnal, but mighty through God",^ were here made to
apply only to clerics, as were "ho man, being a soldier to God,
(2)
entangleth himself with secular business," ' the word 'soldier'
obviously being considered purely metaphorically. Clerics are to
exhort and encourage their flocks to fight materially, absolving
them from their sins and praying for victory, end using their own
divine methods and instruments as did the priests of Joshua, who
were at the forefront of the march only for the purpose of blowing
(3)
their sacred trumpets. Such spiritual work is ranked as
(1) 2 Cor. x.4
(2) 2 Tim. 11.4.
(3) Jos. vi.4.
transcending in virtue and by no means contradicting the
material activities of warfare as the effects of the trumpet
blasts onthe walls of Jericho shew.
On the other hand Aquinas allowed that there is something
essentially unchristian in the diedding of blood, even in a just
war or cause, since in itself this act is completely incompatible
with the administration of the sacrament of Christ's body and
blood. Instead of engaging in earthly warfare clerics should
be willing rather to shed their own blood for Christ's sake.
Oven those who shed blood sinlessly become irregular:
"Wherefore it is altogether unlawful for clerics
to fight because war is directed to the shedding
of blood."
All the faithful should have as their end in warfare the Divine
spiritual good. Therefore clerics who encourage men to partake
in a just war are as sinless as those who engage in it. Neverthe¬
less different means are appropriate to different personalities
and orders of society, since 'every power, art or virtue that
regards the end, has to dispose that which is directed to the
(1)end.'v 7 And warfare does not become the personality of a
cleric.
(1) 3.T.11.11. Q.XXIII., Art.4-, ad2
In the third article Aquinas considered whether it is
in war ever lawful to deceive the enemy by laying ambushes,
since deception and lies appear to be opposed to the virtues
of faithfulness and justice, and to contradict the precept that
one should love one's neighbour, which includes one's enemy, as
oneself. Aquinas remarked that in spite of this Augustine had
already claimed,^ on the Biblical evidence that the Lord
(2)
commanded Joshua to lay ambushes for the city of Ai, y that it
is no concern of justice whether ajust war be carried on openly
or by ambushes.
Aquinas himself made a distinction between the deliberate
and explicit deceit expressed in an external deed, such as a lie
or the breaking of a promise?^,hat which is effective through
silence, whereby we withold certain facts and ideas from our
neighbours. The first he condemned outright for we have the duty
of preserving the rights even of our enemies. These rights, however,
do not include our telling our neighbour everything we are going
to do to him. Concealment of intentions, therefore, is permissible,
and since Aquinas gave in definition of 'ambush' nothing more than
'concealment of plans' (apparently ignoring the more positive
aspects) he would allow ambushes to be lawfully employed in a just
(1) Q.Q. in Heptateuch, qu. X.t in Jos.
(2) Jos. viii.2.
wax. He quoted Jesus' warning that we ought not to give that
which is holy to dogs^ and stressed that it is even more
important for a soldier to loam the art of concealing his
pur ose from the enemy.
The fourth article is concerned with whether it is lawful
to fight on holy days. The main objections to the idea arise
(2)
from the Old Testament attitude to the Sabbath, which
prescribed rest and rejected strife. Again there is an allusion
to fighting as itself an intrinsically wrong activity which
should not be participated in on a Sabbath, even for the
avoidance of material harm. The most obvious Scriptural evidence
against this attitude is the decision of the Maccabees to fight on
(3)
the Sabbath. Aquinas further pointed out that Jesus himself
healed a man on the Sabbath, and that his answer to the questioning
of the Jews on the matter is sufficient answer to this question.^
For the good end of safeguarding the commonwealth (whereby many are
saved from being slain and innumerable evils both temporal and
spiritual prevented) is even morejustified than the saving of the
life of one individual. Neglect of such a duty said Aquinas, would
be to tempt God.
(1) Matt.vii.6.
(2) Sxod.xx.8. Isaiah lviii.3.
(3) 1 .riacc.xx «4J-«
(4) John, vii.23.
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A summary of Aquinas's pronouncements on the subject
is given by Mgr. de Solages, who places his consideration of
Aquinas's thought at the beginning of his book because, as he
says, most theologians connect the doctrine withhim.It
should not be forgotten, however, that the importance of the
doctrine of the just war in Aquinas is due rather to his general
eminence and that of the Summa Thsologica in which it appears
than to any original or outstanding treatment or exposition of
the subject by him. The subject of war had not been included in
(2)
Peter Lombard's Sentences. the accepted theological handbook
for three centuries during the middle ages, and it is likely that
this is why leading scholars such as Albert the Great, Bonaventure
and Duns Scotus ignored it. By introducing it into a work which
in fact replaced the Sentences, Aquinas ensured for his treatment
of it a certain importance and authority.
Mgr. de Solages is surprised that Aquinas's only discussion
of war occurs in a treatise on charity, wherein Aquinas considered
war as one of the sins opposed to this virtue, rather than in
relation to justice, his point being that war is more related to a
(1) La Theologie de la Guerre Juste, p.9.
(2) Ibid. p.17
natural virtue such as justice than to a supernatural one
such as charity.^ However, Aquinas said nothing at
all about charity but referred to justice some thirteen
times. Mgr. de Solages also regrets that Aquinas considered
war as an individual, subjective, religious problem.
Assuming a clear ethical distinction between objective and
social justice, and subjective individual morality, Mgr. de
Solages reckons war as essentially a problem of the former.
it is for him, therefore, only indirectly a question for
(2)
strictly religious casuistry. Mgr. de Solages complains
that later theologians turned the question of the third
condition for the just war, the fulfilment of a right
intention, into a consideration of the manner in which it
is carried out. Mgr. de Solages thinks this alteration
unjustified. Clearly, he 3ays, Aquinas is not here writing
a treatise on natural law or politics, but is touching on





(3) p«19. Yet note Mgr. de Solages's own omission of the




Another common complaint is that Aquinas'a doetrine in
no way reflects or is adapted to contemporary political,
ecclesiastical and social conditions or ideas, such as feudalism,
Christianity and imperialism. The abstract and impersonal
style of Aquinas reinforces this impression. Certainly the
first condition, that war must be declared and conducted by the
authority of the sovereign, is inadequately related to contemporary
political conditions. It means, of course, in a general way,
that war must be wa ed by the person or persons who hold
appropriate political authority, but who, in the thirteenth
century, such persons might be, was a rather delicate question
needing serious discussion. To assume that the 'prince' is meant,
in a society so abounding with princes and petty rulers that they
might from an international point of view be considered rather as
private than as public entities, while in fact an emperor did
exist, was paying tribute to or at least acknowledging the
existing state of affairs as ideal or acceptable rather than
trying to outline a better one. He ignored the fact that at the
time all kings and princes were subject to the emperor and could
not officially make war without imperial sanction. The emperor
and. his pretensions to imperialism may not have been in faot
effective, but they wer©highly developed in theory. Aquinas,
however, passed over them in silence even though they were
mentioned by contemporary canonists. By allowing the sovereign
the ultimate power to make war, Aquinas, in his own political
tontext, was admitting war between equals, that is, war between
cities and provinces as well as kingdoms. That such should
be legitimate when war between private persons is not so may
be due to the fact that in the former case there is no effective
higher authority having common jurisdiction over both parties,
whereas local or national government supplied a means of resolving
individual conflicts. It was also held that princes, unlike
private individuals, derive their power from God.
Aquinas also ignored the Church's growing effort to
prevent wars and to reduce their cruelty, and the Pope's and
others' intervention and arbitration in dispute. Indeed,
Aquinas's most serious omissions were that he did not deal with
the question of arbitration, in spite of the many contemporary
examples and theories in civil and canon law, and that he did
not relate the question of warfare to that of the inter¬
national community, to the world, or even to Christianity as
a whole. And indeed the •common good' of which Aquinas wrote
and which must be the aim of a just war, was rather a limited
good, that of a city or province, and never the international
good of all. Such a wide horizon was not visible from Aquinas's
viewpoint, although he did mention once that war should be
fought even for the good of those against whom one fights.
Another criticism is that Aquinas did not distinguish between
defensive and offensive war, presumably assuming that the former
can be taken for granted as legitimate in any circumstance .,
and that only the latter need be restrained by conditions.
There is, except incidentally in considering whether fighting
on feast days is legitimate^ no stipulation that it must be
the only possible and therefore the ultimate means of restoring
justice. Neither did he say that the means must be proportionate
to the end.
There are certainly inadequacies and omissions in Aquinas1s
thinking on war. Some of them, no doubt, were encouraged by the
(l) Q.XL. art 4., in corp.
conventions of the scholastic method, which, by allowing the
expression of a certain number of objections, contrives to
give the impression that an open debate is in progress. However,
the objections stated could be selected with the greatest care,
so that what seems to be a contest of opinions is more like a
ventriloquist's performance insofar as the proposer and opposer
are in fact one person. This "one person", therefore, is in a
position to conclude the "debate" at whatever point he chooses
with the complacent and dogmatic pronouncement: "This suffices
for the replies to the objections". Aquinas did not undertake
a really thorough, all-round examination of this most complicated
ethical question, but was content to treat it with a somewhat
facile formality. His treatment was viaoily abstract and shews
no awareness of the many incidental problems which are hardly
covered by his very general rules. There is no indication in
his writing that he ever felt personally moved or even slightly
touched by the horror of war, or that he ever thought of it as
(1)
in any sense a tragedy or calamity rather than as a sin.
(1) Partly accounted for no doubt by the intellectual fashions
of the day. Gordon Lefft Medieval Thought, p.l69»
However, it may well be that Aquinas would have made good
these omissions if he had been giventhe task of reaching
decisions in particular cases.
Yet it is hard to believe that Aquinas could have escaped
all knowledge of war in his own day even had he wished to do so.
His ignoring the arbitrational activities of the papacy may 3ay
something for Aquinas's honesty as well as for his prudence,
for it was only just before his death that the empire and the
papacy came to terms. In a period in which the popes were most
anxious to exert their secular powers, even to the extent of
supporting underlings against the emperor, in which the emperors
were rather frequently excommunicated, and in which Gregory IX
actually preached a crusade against Frederick II, Aquinas may
have found the evidence too confused for immediate summary.
Moreover, for the period 1243-54* "the Church's case was in the
hands of a pope, Innocent IV, who had been trained in the school
of Bologna. Whether or not such circumstances account for
Aquinas's brevity on the subject of war is a matter of considerable
interest.
The criticism that Aquinas, as a theologian and metaphysician,
considered war from a religious and individual point of view
i
rather than from an objective and social one raises
important questions. For instance, can there be a distinctively
Christian attitude to the problem of war, and, if there is, is
it likely to give a deeper insight into it and lead to a
demonstrably oetter answer? Again, is the etnical problem
involved best regarded from an individual or from a social point
of view, and which of these points of view is most properly
adopted by Christians? If it should seem prudent to take
both these points of view into account, along what lines is a
synthesis to be sought? And can there be any affinity between
the Christian attitude, whatever it might or ought to be, and the
secular, and if there is difference rather than affinity how far
is it possible to achieve a compromise? A careful study of
such questions should throw some light on the propriety of
making a firm boundary betweenthe realm of subjective, individual,
religious morality and that of objective, social, and political
morality.
However, it can be said straightaway that the criticism
I
that Aq inas dealt with war as a purely individual problem is
itself very questionable. And the further critcism that
Aquinas dealt with war as a theologian and metaphysician
rather than as a sociologist is, to say the least, rather
unimaginative. It is true that the doctrine as it stands
seems perfunctory and quite unrelated to the rest of his
thought. It is also true that he leans heavily on Gratian's
Decretum and Augustine, whom he even quotes without acknowledgment,
nevertheless, as the rest of Ms thought is open to scrutiny,
it can be used in an attempt to assess Aquinas's true position
in relation to the war question. In any such attempt it is
particularly important to discover whether or not Aquinas's
treatment of war has about it anything specifically Christian,
and this calls for a careful study of Ms use of Biblical
revelation and teacMng and of the vortMness and adequacy of
Ms exegesis in the light of modern Catholic teacMng.
I
CHAPTER THREE
AQUINAS'3 UNDERSTANDING OF REVELATION
AND HIS USE OF Til* SCRIPTURES IK HIS
WAR ARTICLES, IK THE LIGHT OF MODERN
CATHOLIC THOUGHT.
The supremacy of the Scriptures as a source for the
understanding of God and of the purpose of human life had been
upheld by the whole of the Christian Church up to the time of
Aquinas. There had been differences of opinion as to the
correct way of interpreting them, ana, in this matter and in
other spheres, of the right relation between revelation and
reason, but reverence for the Bible as the inspired word of
God was constant.
Aquinas, whose greatest task was the harmonising of
revealed truth and natural reason, acknowledged, the Scriptures as
the work of the Holy Spirit, and as teaching some truths in¬
accessible to human reason alone; but although he distinguished
reason and faith he laboured to emphasise that they themselves
and their object often coincide, and mutually support or
supplement each other.
The nature, extent and purpose of revealed truth is the
first topic discussed in the Summa.^ Because God surpasses
human reason, truth about Him had to be revealed. Man's whole
salvation, which is in God, depends upon this truth, and although
certain aspects of it can be grasped by the unaided reason, they
are inadequate and available only to a few superior intellects;
therefore it was important that God should make Himself and His
plan of salvation plain to all men. God reveals those truths
such as the Trinity which must be believed by all men and which
surpass natural knowledge because of some deficiency in it. He
also reveals higher truths, mysteries of wisdom which can be
understood only by the perfect; some things may be unknown or
unknowable only to particular individuals, because of their
circumstances, and these too may be revealed; others, such as
(2)
future events are thoroughly unknowable until revealed. God
reveals everything necessary for salvation, but the Divine
revelation will only be perfected in heaven.
(1) First Part. Q.l-10.
(2) Second Part. II Q.171. Art.3.
The 'Sacred Scripture or Doctrine' is based on this
Divine revelation. Divine science or theology is based on
principles revealed by Godj it is both speculative and
practical, though predominantly the former, as it deals more
with divine things than with human acts. It does, however,
concern itself with the latter since they lead man to that
perfect knowledge of God which is eternal bliss. This is
the supreme end of man and thus theology is the highest of all
sciences. Its starting point, principles coming straight from
God, surpasses that of other sciences in irrefutable certainty,
and its subject matter, God himself, could not be higher.
Philosophy sheiks God as He is revealed in creation, but
theology treats Him as He is known to Himself alone and revealed
to others. The principles of other sciences are either self-
evident or provable by reason, but theology derives its principles
from the divine knowledge which is given in revelation. Therefore,
if the other branches of knowledge contradict the latter, they
are false. But in order to ma.ce a true and full judgement about
any divine matter it is necessary both to study theology whose
principles are obtained by revelation, and to have that wisdom
which is the gift of the Holy Spirit.
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The subject of theology is God Himself. Everything else,
such as things, symbols, the works of salvation, 'or the whole
Christ* is dealt with, but only so far as it refers to God. It
is true that we cannot know the Essence of God, but we make use of
His effects of nature and of grace, just as in'certain philosophical
sciences the effect is used to demonstrate something about a cause
and also to take its place.
Reason cannot defend or argue about the principles of
theology, for these principles are Articles of Faith giver by
revelation; but it can argue from these to prove other things.
St Paul thus reasoned that the general resurrection follows
from the resurrection of Christ.^ Since the principles of
bases of theology transcend the highest human reason, it is
impossible toconvince an opponent of their truth unless he is
willing to give up some of his own metaphysical principles, arid
to believe at least some of the truths given in divine revelation.
The articles of Faith cannot be proved by reason, but since
they are infallible and are superior to reason they can never
be disproved by it. The authority of those to whom the reveLation
(1) l.Cor. XV.
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was made is sufficient guarantee for our faith. Nevertheless,
human reason is used by theology to make itself clear, for grace
does not destroy faith but perfects it. Natural philosophers
indeed are quoted in the Scriptures but are allowed only a
prooable and extrinsic value.
Sacred doctrine holds the canonical Scriptures to be
incontrovertible, whereas the authority of the Doctors of the
Church is only probable. For faith rests upon the revelation
made to the apostles and prophets who wrote the canonical books
and not upon the revelations - if indeed there have been such -
made to others.^
In spite of the doctrine of the infallibility of the
Scriptures however, metaphor is quite rightly found in them, for
material images help the simple and unintellectual and are in
accord with the sensible basis of truth. Their presence stimulates
(2)
thought and is a defence against the ridicule of the impious.
And since what God is not is clearer to us than what He is, it is
more appropriate for Divine truth to be illustrated by examples
(1) Augustine is quoted: Only those books of Scripture which are called
canonical have I learnt to hold in such honour as to believe their
authors have not erred in any way in writing them. But others I so
read as not to deem anything in them to be true, merely on account




taken from tiiings which are furthest away from Him, so that His
transcendence may be more obvious and preserved, and so that we
may appreciate that 'God is above whatever we may say or think of
Him*. The author of Holy Scripture is God Himself, who reveals
his meaning through "both words and things, and in the study of
Holy Scripture it must be remembered that not only words themselves,
but what lies behind them, what they describe or signify, has
meaning. Here Aquinas might seem to come near the modern
Protestant stress on the evaluation of revelation as at least
part event.^
The most oovious meaning of Scripture is the literal or
historical interpretation. The spiritual interpretation Aquinas
divided into three types, the allegorical, the tropological and
the anagogical. The allegorical is applied to the understanding
of Old Testament passages which signify the spirituality of the
Hew Testament; the tropological or moral, to the understanding
of how we ought to follow the deeds and teaching of Christ in our
(l)"This Word of God, he teaches, always reaches lis in a threefold form as
preached, as written, and as revealed. In order of knowledge the preaching
comes first, but all Christian preaching is dependent upon the witness of
prophet and apostle as handed down to us in Scripture. This prophetic and
apostolic witness is, however, in its turn to be distinguished from that
which alone is the revelation itself, and which is essentially event, l&at
Scripture does is to recall and attest an event which is prior to and to
be distinguished from its own existence.•Revelation is therefore originally
and directly what the Bible and the Churches proclamation are derivatively
and mediately - the yford of God.' " (John Bailliei The Idea of Revelation
in itscent Thought, pp.63-4* He quotes Sari Barth; Die Kirchlich Dor-mati.,.
1, pp.118 - 120.)
own lives; and the anagogical to the understanding of how to
apply the words of the Scriptures to the belief in an eternal
Kingdom of God. Truth is always conveyed to us through Scripture
in order to is-order-tii stimulate right belief or right conduct.
In matters of right belief it has to be remembered that the Church
is midway between the Jewish Synagogue and the Church Triumphant.
Thus there are types in the Old Testament which prefigure the
Church on earth, and types in both Old and New Testaments which
prefigure the Church Triumphant in heaven.Therefore one word
or text in Holy Scripture can have several interpretations. The
number of interpretations does not result from mere ambiguity
but because the thing which the word signifies, what lies behind
the word, has meaning. All interpretations are based on the
(2)
literal sense and argument can be based on that alone.
Aquinas discussed the difference between the Divine Word
(3)
and the human word. ' He distinguished the interior word, which
is inwardly conce-ived, from the exterior word which is its sign.
The inward word which proceeds from and is in the intellect, is
the idea and likeness of what is understood. Since there are
(1) Quaast. Quodlib* VII. XV. in corp.
(2) Quaest. Quodlib. /II. XI/ ad.4-
(3j Gcusc. AIII.
three intelligences, Divine, angelic and human, there is a
Divine Word an angelic word and a human word. The Divine
Word is heard in Genesis 1.3. and referred to by St. John -
In the Beginning was the Word. The Word of God of which Join
speaks differs from the human word in three ways. Firstly the
human word is the achievement of reasoning except for the first
principles which are known without rational activity. Our
human word is in potentiality before it becomes actual, and it
is in fact thought. 3ut the Divine Word is always actual and
is preceded by no thought. Secondly our human word is imperfect,
whereas the Word of God is perfect. For we are not able to
express all that is in our soul by one word. But one Divine
Word expresses all that there is in God. So the Divine Word is
but one - God speaks once. Thirdly our human word is not of the
same nature with ourselves, whereas the Divine Word is of the
same nature with God and subsists in the Divine Nature. The word
formed by our intellect does not belong to the essence of the
soul, but is an accident to it. The Word formed by God is
identical with the Nature of God.
The Word of God, therefore, is always to be considered
personally, since it is an expression of the person of God Himself.
(1) John 1.1. if.
It is indeed God Himself and is the Son of God. Aquinas does
not here discuss the precise relationship of the Divine Word to
the inspired human words in the Scriptures, but it seems that he
would see the supreme revelation of God in Jesus, and that
therefore he might have agreed with Brunner that the personal
God Can reveal Himself supremely only in a person, that whereas
our words are signs, 'God's Word is the actual meaning itself',^
that not even the human words, the preaching and teaching of Jesus,
although part of His person and work and an essential element in
revelation, are the Word of God as a whole. That in fact Jesus
is a 'silent supposition for a right understanding of His teaching'.
(?)
In his discussion on the inspiration of the prophets,
Aquinas made a distinction between two ways in which revelation
can be given. In one way by an express revelation, in another and
more imperfect way, by a mysterious instinct to which the human
mind is subjected without knowing it. In the latter case the
prophet is not able to know with certainty whether his thoughts
come straight from God or are merely inspired by his own spirit.
This ignorance which endangers the truth is, however, quickly
corrected by the Holy Spirit - presumably before the message is
permanently enshrined in writing.
(1) Emil Brunner: Revelation and Reason, p.119.
(2) Ibid., p.121.
(3) SjT. 11.11. Q.171. Art. 5.
Aquinas is respected by modern Roman Catholic
schol-ars as the 'Prince of medieval exegetes' ^and
his work as having power, thought arri thoroughness, but
even so it is estimated that patience might be needed
if its excellence is to be appreciated by modern readers.
(2)
Tribute is paid ' to his terminology and analysis of
the various interpretations of Scripture. It is
doubted whether they have been bettered and they are
still in current use, though no such clearcut distinctions
can contain all the shades of meaning in Scripture.
Aquinas's rule that argument can be based only on the
(1) William Leonard and Dora Bernard Orchard: A Catholic
Commentary on Holy Scripture, p.4-.
(2) R.C.Fuller: A Catholic Commentary on holy Scripture. p.56.
G 9
literal sense, is, however, questioned today. He made this
rule with the reassurance that there is no spiritual truth
which is not also contained in a literal sense somewhere in
the Scriptures, but today it is regarded as perfectly legitimate
to use any spiritual interpretation for the demonstration of
truths, as the New Testament writers themselves did so, and
since the spiritual interpretation, coming straight from the
Holy Spirit, has the highest authority.^"
The modem Catholic understanding of the Holy Scriptures
is in theory fairly clearcut, but in fact it is somewhat le3S
certain.
The Bible is revered as recording a supernatural progressive
revelation of Cod's purpose, but the written word, though fixed,
is not the final evidence of God. The oral message and teaching
which lies behind it ore thought to be just as important, and it
is stressed that 'a living teaching authority is prior to every
(2)
single book of Divine Scripture.1 The experience of Pentecost
proves that the spirit and the living voice transcend the merely
(1) R.C.Fuller: A Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture, p.57.
(2) William Leonard and Dom Bernard Orchard: A Catholic Commentary
on Holy Scripture, p.l.
written word: 'It is absurd even psychologically that the grace
of Pentecost should be dominated by the letter of a book'.^1;
However the latter is a valuable treasure of the Church,
her valid possession since she inher-ited the Jewish Scriptures
(21
and herself created the Christian literature, and it is a
wellspring for the preaching of the living word. Tradition is a
second source of revelation, and this too has been inherited and
created by the Catholic Church in her doctrine, teaching and
practice. The particular character of the written Scripture is
that it is the inspired word of Cod, 'a letter written by our
Heavenly Father and transmitted by the sacred writers to the human
(3)
race in its pilgrimage so far from its heavenly country.1
Tradition harmonises easily, with Scripture because the Church
which holds this tradition gives life to the dead letter of Scripture;
only in the life of the Church does Scripture become 'living and
effectual and more piercing than any two-edged sword.'^
(1) William Leonard and Dom Bernard Orchard: A Catholic Commentary
on Holy Scripture, p.l.
(2) Ibid, p.8."The N.T.Scriptures being written within the Church
bj? some of its members for the benefit of all (or more precisely,
within the society of the Catholic Church by Catholics and for
Catholics) are likewise her exclusive property, of which she is
the absolute Owner, Guardian, Trustee and Interpreter."
(3) Ibid. p.2. (from Chrys. In Gen, hom.2.2.)
U) Ibid, p.2. (Hebrews IV 12)
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It is reckoned that because Tradition has equal authority
with the Scriptures theCouncil of Trent rightly refused to
recognise the Bible as sole arbiter in matters of faith and
morals, and the individual as its proper interpreter. The
Church is superior to the Bible because she is the living voice
of Christ and thus the only infallible and authoritative
interpreter of Scripture. The Church alone can decide what is
Scripture, and can discriminate between uninspired and inspired
books. The infallibility of the Church only extends to those
matters of faith and morality necessary for salvation, although
all Scripture statements are in themselves infallibly true.
There is 30rae uncertainty about whether or not there is a direct
Biblical basis for all the traditional doctrines of the Church.
However, it is not possible to say that certain truths are
nowhere found in it, because some doctrines are based on the
implications or syntheses of various texts.
Bible study should be aided by the grace of God, and helped
also by such sciences as philology, archaeology and Church
Tradition, in order to discover the spiritual content or message.^
We should read the Bible on our knees, in a spirit of humility and
(1) Such studies are in themselves quite secular and the investigation
of such questions as the Synoptic problem lias no more spiritual
value for the student than the Baconian theory of Shakespearian
authorship.
submission to Christ, and to the teaching authority of the Church
of Christ, serene in the certainty that since both Bible and
Church are infallibly directed by the Holy Spirit, they will
never contradict each other.
Up to modern times Catholic scholarship concentrated on the
doctrinal content of Scripture and rather overlookeiliterary
origins and oriental idiom, the progress of Old Testament
revelation, and ethnic and political environment of the Hebrews,
and other such philological and historical questions, but this
is no longer so. Tribute is paid to the critical and historical
methods developed by non-Catholic writers of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries in the fields of textual criticism,
linguistics and ancient history, but much of this was tinged with
rationalism and had a corrupting influence even on some Catholic
scholars. The 'Broad School' even allowed that the Bible, contained
errors in matters of history and natural science, and this line of
thinking led to a crisis which was finally resolved by Pope ~.eo
Xlll's^ Encyclical Providentissimus Seus of Nov. 1893. This has
become the 'Magna Carta' of Catholic biblical studies. It was
confirmed and elaborated by the Encyclical Spiritus Paraclitus of
(1) A strong Thomi st - largely responsible for reviving Thomistic
study in the church.
Bendict XV in 192u and by the Encyclical Divino affiante Spiritu
of Pills Xll in 1943*
The i'rov. heus.declared in the plainest terms the absolute
inerrancy of Holy Scripture. The virgin M3S were entirely true
it said, as God was their Author, although certain scribal errors
ana
and faults of translation may have crept in since rthe meaning may
at times be doubtful. The Bible iso-human book written by men
in contemporary literary forms and language, and consequently the
particular circumstances and temperaments of the different writers
are frequently reflected in it. The Church allows open-minded
enquiry on many points, for it is appreciated that the Scriptures
are wrapped in a certain religious obscurity to stimulate scrutiny.
Above all things God wills men to understand that He has delivered
the Scriptures to the Church so that in reading and using His
sacred word they must follow the Church as their most certain guide
arid teacher. The Church jealously guards and defends the Bible
but in fact is often hesitant and uncertain about its interpretation.
Much scope, therefore, is allowed to the private scholar, who can
help towards the formation of the mature judgement of the Church.
It was emphasised in the Pivino affXante Spiritu that among the
many matters in the legal, historical, literary and prophetic
books of the Bible there are only a few whose meaning has been
irrevocably confirmed by the authority of the Church and only
a few about which the Holy Fathers are unanimous. Less than twenty
texts have been infallibly interpreted, and even an infallible
interpretation is not an exhaustive interpretation. Some
interpretations, wrought by decrees of councils or commissions,
have high authority and the traditional view should be adhered
to until a better one develops. There are many important matters
about which much wisdom and ingenuity of exegesis is needed. The
Church pronounces on the meaning of a text only when it concerns
matters of fatxh and morals, arid even here oft©-, gives only
negative guidance, by warring against wrong views, or by helping
us to ensure that the interpretation is in harmony with the
general rules of faith. There aremany secular matters, such as
details of archawlogy, geography, and 30 on in the BibleJ the
Churcn upholds their inerrancy but has no authority to define
their meaning, unless they are connected with doctrine. The
Church for instance has no views on the controversial question
of the chronology of Kings.
Among such important questions is that of the extent to
which literary forms ^ in the Old Testament are to be taken
into account. It is admitted that objective fact and truth
are often presented in the shape of fantasy and that an
understanding of literary forms helps in distinguishing objective
truth from the manner of presenting it. If well understood
this principle can enlighten the interpreter but
— badly understood, it can be the occasion for
all sorts of fantasies and guesses. Doubtless,
this disturbing alternative is the reason why there
was so much delay on the part of ecclesiastical
authority in the clear assertion of the principle,
and ever today in this, the outstanding page of
the encyclical (Piv. affl.Spir.) there is, probably
by design, a certain obscurity — We have to conclude,
it seems, that while clearly approving the principle
of distinguishing literary forms, the encyclical does
not intend to give interpreters a free hand to decide
how widely the principle may be applied. The task
remains for Catholic interpreters to work out for
themselves a way so true and exact that it will not
have to be laid down all over again later.'
Consequently, the first eleven chapters of Genesis are accepted
as Primitive History, whereas the great lifespans of the patriarchs
are contradicted by the conclusions of the study of palaeontology.
The prophets spoke under the divine influence of inspiration, but
(1) Fable, Parable ^pic History, Religious History, Ancient History,
Free Narrative, Popular Tradition.
(2) D.J. Leahy; A Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture, p.42.
as it issued more genuinely as a spoken rather than as a
written word, we must take pains to distinguish the prophet's
message from the 'envelope' in which it is contained. This
envelope is itself truly inspired, but its only purpose is to
contain and deliver the message, and when this has been done
it can be discarded. This distinction enables us to understand
why secondary features, such as the national and material
restoration associated with certain Messianic prophecies,
were not fulfilled to the letter.
Form criticism is understood as a development of Source
criticism, and as containing both truth and error. The
importance of the oral tradition behind the gospels is rightly
stressed, as is their unique literary and apologetic character.
But the motive of the writers, and the form which they use to
express it, does not falsify what they report, and we can find
in the gospels objective historical facts about the life and
sayings of Jesus. There is also a considerable amount of
comparatively 'formless' matter in the gospels, which escapes
the criteria of the form critics, who also have a strange and
unjustified understanding of the early Christian community.
The concept of inspiration has been deepened in modern times.
The encyclical of Leo XIII taught that the human author was as
an instrument in the hand of the Holy Spirit. Those things
only and wholly which He wished were written down. According
to the modern Thomist theory of inspiration God and man do not
write separately but together. 'There is not in the effect
produced anything that belongs to the one cause and not to the
other: the whole is due to each, but in different senses.*^
This modern Thomist view is, however, not accepted by all
scholars, especially as the Pivino afflante teaches that the
spiritual significance of Scripture is entirely and directly from
God, and may not be apprehended by the human writer. But it is
generally accepted that God acted both in and through the human
author, and did not use him as a mechanical and unconscious, but
a creative and conscious instrument, and so by Divine condescension
certain human devices are permitted. The human author is allowed
to use pseudepigraphy. The differences in the gospe Is, it says,
complement each other to give a complete picture of Christ. The
humanity implied in the Scriptures must be without error. Plus
(2)
XII underlined a comparison found in Rabanus Maurus ' between the
Incarnate Word and the written word;
(1) J.H.Crehan, S.J: A Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture. p.43.
(2) EL.106, 248.
Just as the substantial Word of God became
like to men in all things sin excepted, Heb.4»
15, so the word3 of God, expressed in human
language, became in all things like to human
speech, error excepted."(1)
God, however, transcends the human author; everything in the
Scriptures is from God, but not everything from the human author.
Inspiration i3 a mystery. Aid Catholic theologians agree that
the aid given to an inspired writer is greater tnan that enjoyed
by a General Council, which, however, does publish infallible
decrees. It is not allowod that divine inspiration reaches to
matters of faith and morals and no further.
It is admitted that however strictly the doctrine of the
'
inerrancy of the Scriptures has been upheld by tradition, the
application of the principle to individual texts gives rise to
difficulty and debate. Wherever possible, apparent discrepancy
between the divinity and humanity of Scripture is reconciled.
The language of 2. Macc.2 ^ ~ ^ and 15 ^ ^, which
depict the author as contemplating(cS^ hi3 lauours of writing and
lamenting over their difficulty, is no proof against inspiration.
God could inspire a man to write, and by condescension could allow him,
(l) Pivino afflante, par. 4.1* A Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture.p.49.
unconscious of his own inspiration, to express his weariness.
And when Biblical authors appear to be wrong they may be
quoting profane authors without acknowledgment. Whereas
Anglicans, for instance, believe the Bible to be a book of
unique and permanent value written by human beings, Catholics
firmly believe in God's authorship.
The Church has never ruled out the possibility of
inspiration of books later than those of the canon, but it
has declared that Church approval does not make a book inspired.
In supporting the doctrine of inerrancy, the purpose of
the human author is of the first importance. Leo XIII answered
the common objection that many facts found in the Bible contradict
modem scientific knowledge by pointing out that the Holy Ghost
had no intention of teaching men matters which are not profitable
for salvation. Pius XII, however, thought that very often an
historical inaccuracy or inexact recording of events arose from
the use of contemporary human literary expression.^ The
doctrine of inerrancy implies an absence of immoral teaching,
and the apparent presence of such, particularly in the Old
Testament, certainly needs some explanation. ThctGod should have
(l) Piv. affl. para. 39.
8 0
even inspired the writing down of the Jewish code of law
may seem strange. Catholics hold that it has to be
remembered that some of the laws are conditional and not
absolute - if there are slaves, them it is best that there
should be a regular way of dealing with them; if divorce
takes place, then it is best that it should be dealt with
in a regular way.^ This may not be perfect law, but it
does, they claim, prevent hasty action which might masquerade
as law. The Mosaic laws are clearly more mild and religious
than those of Hammurabi and the Assyrians, and if it has to
be allowed that the Jews werestill in a state of minority, then,
.... that God should choose to leave them so,
while providing the means of escape to higher
ideals, is really his business and not ours. (2)
Acts of slaughter especially need explanation. The
(3)
command to despoil the Egyptians seems at first sight quite
immoral, but, apparently, it is possible to see that command
in 3uch a light that it may appear to be wholly compatible
with the morality of both God and man. The Israelites had
earned compensation by their labours in Egypt and God, the
Lord of all creation, could tell them to take it wherever he
(1) Dent. XXIV. 1 - L
(2) J.H. CrehanJ A Catholic Commentary, p.52
(3) Ex. Ill, 22; XI, 2; XII, 35 - 6.
willed. Immorality, too, can be suggested by a mistranslation,
(1)
as when Agag is described as having been hewed into pieces,
(2>"which looks like sadism". The better translation would
be "put to the sword," which is, presumably, morally more
wholesome. Although the sanctity of human life was safeguarded
in the decalogue, the Hebrews, like the Assyrians, were quite
merciless in war. However, such acts as Moses* order for the
(3)wholesale slaughter of the lidianites have to be seen in their
historical context. Such events are explained - and, for
Catholics, presumably, excused - as revenge. The Jews, in fact,
were right to take such terrible revenge because the Midianites
load influenced them in the direction of idolatry. Nor are
the Israelites blamed for acting in this unchristian way in
pre-Christian times.
The Israelites, moreover, had a strong sense of collective
responsibility. Christianity centres responsibility on the
individual rather than on the group, and stresses the eternal
value of each God-created soul and its individual responsibility
to God, but Christianity has never repudiated the justice of
collective responsibility and collective retribution unanimously
(1) 1. Samuel XV.33.
(2) J.H.Crehan: A Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture, p.52.
(3) E.F.Sutcliffe S.Jj Ibid., p.138.
admitted and acted on in Old Testament times. The Church has
sought, rather, to add gentleness to justice. Hebrew
legislation, according to Alt and Jirku, has two principle
divisions. The first is casuistic, conditional, and secular,
and derives from the codes of neighbouring lands, which go back
to the Oumerian laws of the third millenium. The Hebrews took
it from the Canaanites during the period of Judges and the early
monarchy. The second division, the apodictic, has no parallel
outside Israel and derives from Moses. The phrase 'Thou shalt
not1 is thought to be the result of Moses' own religious
experience, and its urgency and transcendence as an expression
of God's will permeate this wholly new kind of legal obligation.
The growth of the Mosaic code in later times is accepted as a
natural development, and belief in Moses' authorship of the
Pentateuch is giving way to an understanding of Mosaic influence.
The 'ill-fitting nature of the parts of the Pentateuch' is seen
as a result of Oriental peculiarities of procedure, thought
and expression rather than of the different sources from which
the parts derive, however.
For although the Church recognizes the growing and
(l) R.A.Dyson and R.A.F. Mackenzie, S.J: A Catholic Commentary,p.66:
Catholic scholars are formally invited to undertake... 'further
study', which will no doubt demonstrate in the Pentateuch 'the large
contributionand profound influence of Moses as author and as legislator'
developing nature of Old Testament revelation, it is always
on guard against easy acceptance of an evolutionary theory of
religion. She does not believe that monotheism evolved from
polytheism because she maintains that it has been proved that
polytheism is itself a degeneration from monotheism. Above
all, an evolutionary theory would imply that the human mind is
left to its own resources in its understanding of the divine,
and if this were once accepted it would be impossible to deny,
as the Church does, the efficacy of individual interpretations.
The Church itself does little more than take into account
local and temporal conditions in its interpretations of
revelation in the light of the notion of development. It sees
no limit to the ways in which the Old Testament car. prefigure
the New and look forward to the future. In so doing, the Old
Testament may often seem to reveal religious, legal and moral
teaching of a comparatively low order. Nevertheless, it is
held, such teaching was perfectly adapted to the mental and
spiritual condition of the Israelites at the time. Its value
was temporary, and in matters of doctrine and morality it has
to be supplemented and perfected from the New Testament. Many
of the old prohibitions, such as that against consuming blood,
reflect an attempt to deal with temporal circumstances.
In some respects too, God condescended to the low
spirituality of the times by making laws which seem to have
little to do with the immutable principles of right and
wrong. But although the Old Testament often failed to
forbid what New Testament revelation shewed to be sinful,
other parts of its teaching are of the highest aaiding truth.
Its positive commands, for example, even when they have little
to do with right and wrong, are never evil in themselves.
To outsiders, much of this kind of thinking within the
Church might well seem, in the common sense of the term,
equivocal. Although the Church has succeeded in making sure
of the meanings of less than twenty texts in 2000 years, it
still claims to be the one divinely appointed interpreter of
the Bible, and in fact claims to be superior to a book which
it does not fully understand. It pronounces all Bible
statements inerrant, but professes infallibility only in
dealing with those which are matters of faith and morality
necessary to salvation. By holding tenaciously to its own
tenets, therefore, the Church may seem to be in the position
°f knowing something which it does not know in such a way as
<•1
to pronounce infallibly upon it. This same tenacity nay also
lead to what may seem some overlooking of the human responsibility
for such errors and inaccuracies other than scribal and
translators* failings as are to be found in the Bible. It is
one thing to think that God wished men to write honestly of
their thoughts, feelings and religious experiences, and that in
doing so He became responsible, in some way or other, for their
expressions of weakness and sin, but it is quite another to think
that God is the 'Author' of such 'a letter*. ^ The seeond
view, indeed, implies that God allows man to dramatize his
faults in the full light of Heaven and under the wing of His
Divine Inspiration. God in His condescension allows man to
use pseudo-epigraphy, but surely His condescension does not
stoop so low as to permit the use of His own name. This is in
fact implied if the human errors in the Bible are not taken
seriously. For not all the historical inaccuracies and tokens
of personal prejudice to be found in the Bible can be written
off as mere aspects of literary form. It is hard to believe
that all Old Testament incidents of immorality which seem to
happen with God'3 will can become by interpretation Divinely
(2)
inspired and moral or that God would so far condescend as to
(1) Seeabove pp. 70-72.
(2) e.g.''The righteous shall rejoice when he seeth the vengeance
He shall wash his feet in the blood of the wickedI'rs.LVIII.10
See also Ps LX1X and Ps. L1X.13."Consume them in wrath, consume
them that they may not be."
condone and encourage the low spirituality of His people by
adapting His morality to theirs. Such difficulties must face
any attempt to reconcile human error with a rigid doctrine of
Divine inerrancy. Similar difficulties beset Church teaching
on the authority assigned to tradition, for it has the same
origin as, and much of it is grounded in the Scriptures
themselves.
Thinkers who are not bound by the doctrine of the inerrancy
of the Scriptures have mostly come to see revelation as an event
in which God and man play complementary parts. Its medium of
expression is that of personal relationships, for true
knowledge about God must be personal knowledge of Him. Such
knowledge, however, is limited or corrupted by the inadequacy
of a man's response, so that only in Christ, whose human response
to God was perfect, can be found perfect knowledge of God.
Christ is the criterion of all other revelation. Accordingly,
when such thinkers come upon a picture of God which, morally
and spiritually, falls 3hort of the perfection revealed in
Christ God in the Old Testament, apart from the war texts
themselves, often seems crude and cruel they do not hold




Since the Roman Church pronounces authoritatively on
matters of morality as well as of faith, it would be natural
to expect that it would have made a careful study of all the
Bible texts which deal with war and that, even if it had
failed to harmonise them, some kind of guidance which would
produce less conflict of opinion on the subject than is found
in the protestant churches, would have been given. In any
case, a more complete unanimity on the interpretation of
independent texts, would be expected. The Roman Church appears
far more confident that the words and life of Jesus as given
in the gospels are absolutely authentic, and this might lead
it to allow the greatest weight to His few statements which are
relevant to war. However, the doctrine of inerrancy would make
it allthe harder to explain the "God of Battles" and the divine
sanction of war and vengeance in the Old Testament as the
result of a human misunderstanding of God's real nature and will.
For although the Church now believes in a progressive moral
development, such progress and development is held to be controlled
and ordained by God. So far from leading to the prohibition of
war, it is not impossible that careful adherence to the doctrine
of inerrancy should allow that, as Divine condescension and
8
human imperfection are eternal, God could command vengeance
and slaughter for an imperfect people today just as He did
in the past.
In fact the Church makes no extravagant claims for its
own exegesis, and admits that it is far from complete, so
that, as the Scriptures and tradition are held as equals in
matters of revelation, there might well be a tendency to stand
by tradition. And a doctrine so firmly enshrined in the Roman
Catholic tradition as that of the just war would presumably
be ever-present in the minds of Church thinkers seeking by
further examination of Scripture to deepen understanding of
the subject. Since the Church teaches that there are truths
of faith which cannot be reached by reason, and which, therefore,
have to be revealed, it might be expected that the same would
be true of certain moral truths, for experience certainly proves
that some moral dilemmas wholly overwhelm human reasoning powers.
As the articles of the Roman faith are found in the Bible, it
might perhaps be expected that the Church would find supernatural
truths of morality there also, and that it would regard obedience
to them as just as essential to salvation as belief in the
doctrines of faith. War is a moral problem of such gravity
that the mind that labours with it might well hope for enlightenment
from revelation. It is therefore natural to seek how far
such minds within the church have taken into the traditional
doctrine the help that revelation can give, and whether or
not the authority of tradition can be regarded rightly as
separable from the authority of the Scriptures.
Some answer to such questions might be found by looking
carefully intoAquinas's exegesis in his commentaries on Bible
texts used in the war articles of the Summa Theologies and into
modern Roman Catholic interpretations. The commentaries do not
deal with all the text3 used in the war articles, but they do
set down Aquinas's thoughts on the most important of them and
on some of the less important too, and it is therefore possible
to see the relationship of his thinking to that of other writers.
Aquinas's exegesis and use of Gospel texts is particularly
interesting because he recorded not only what he thought about
many of the verses of the Bible but also his understanding of
the writings of the many earlier writers on the New Testament to
whom he went for help. The prince of medieval exegetes was not
without fame in his own day and he was asked by Uroan IV to
produce a catena of the patristic interpretations of the Gospels.
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This vast compilation was finished while he was travelling
tdth the curtain Italy after his first return from Paris, and
(l)
was named the Gatena Aurea. Marie Pattison held that Gregory
the Great was the last of the original patristic commentators
and that after his time exegesis had been carried on by means
of catenas or selections from earlier writers. The Gatena Aurea
(2)
is essentially made up of selections, and Aquinas's
contribution to it must be sought, on the whole, in the manner
of dealing with diverse materials. The occasional glosses, which
often introduce new topics or sections, have not been traced to
earlier writers arid were written, presumably, oy Aquinas. A few
of the glosses are not simply introductory but are made up of
short explanations such as a twentieth century writer would drop
into footnotes, and these too, presumably, were written by
Aquinas. The rest of the Gatena Aurea. however, he drew from
earlier writers.
Despite the diversity of the materials which he had to work
into the selections, Aquinas set them down in the most straight-
(1) Introduction to the Gatena Aurea.
(2) Origen, Pseudo-Origen« Gyprian, Lusebius, Athanasius, Pseudo-
Dionysius. Hilary, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa,
Ambrose, Jerome, Nemesius, Augustine, John Chrysostom, Cyril,
llaximus, Gassian, Peter Chrysologus, Canons of the Council of
hphesus. T'heodotus, Leo 1, Gennadius, Gregory 1, Isidore, Beae
John of Damascus, Rabanus Maurus, Haymo, Remigius, Glossa Urdinaria,
Paschasius Radbertus, Anselm, and thetwelfth century Glossa
Interlinearis.
(1)
forward way with concise discrimination. The Gospels were
first marked off into sets of one or more verses, and then each
set was followed by the expositions. These Aquinas placed in
the order of literalness, historicalness and ooviousness, so
that the more recondite expositions, those which gave the mystical,
moral, allegorical, tropological or spiritual sense, came last.
In compiling the Catena Aurea, Aquinas seems to have
(2)
leaned most often on Rabanus Maurus, for many quotations are
to be found in the works of both of them. It is Pattison's
opinion however that it was not directly grounded on any earlier
compilation. It shows a very wide knowledge of ecclesiastical
thought, and the skill and integrity with which Aquinas summarised,
paraphrased and ran together his countless bits and pieces is
remarkable.
The sections of the Catena Aurea which deal with the Gospel
texts quoted in the war articles shew that at some time or other
Aquinas sifted and summarised impartially rather diverse views.
The same would appear from his commentaries, on Matthew, John and
the Pauline Bpisties. But in the Gumma Theologies itself, which
(1) The chronology he took from Augustine's De Consensu ^vangelistarum.
(2) See p. 77 above.
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was the work of Aquinas's later years and which should have
benefited from the wide reading behind the Catena Aurea and
the commentaries, he seems to have decided upon a single
meaning for a text and then to have applied it rather narrowly
in a dogmatic and final way without considering the relevance
of alternative interpretations. This was in part, at least,
the outcome of his working in traditional literary forms. A
catena was a catena, a commentary was a commentary, and a summa
was a summa. and each had its own shape. But perhaps it might
arise also from Aquinas considering that, as he had dealt with
the textual minutiae and variant meanings in the Catena Aurea
and the commentaries, he was free to use the wisdom won from his
years of study in selecting the one right meaning for the Bumma
Theologica.
Whether or not this was so, it can be taken that the
interpretations of the texts used in the war articles were chosen
with the greatest care and applied with a deliberation which, in a
sense, was thought to be the same thing as certainty, and so it
can be said that in the Bumma TheologicaAouinas set down his
final thoughts. But perhaps other things should be taken into
the reckoning also. There seems to be a gap at times between
the understanding brought to the exegeses of passages in
the Catena Aurea and the commentaries and the use made of
them In the war articles. The gap may have come about because
Aquinas had lived so long on familiar terras with his texts that
in his own works he used than rather conversationally! but
when all such allowances have been made it is hard not to find
part of the cause of the gap in the nature of the works themselves.
As commentator, Aquinas had the texts before him and his treatment
of other matters had to be related to the particular texts in
hand. In writing the Suraroa Theolo%ica. however, the line of the
relationship ran the other way. In the war articles, for example,
his task was to bring his reason to bear on the material and
contemporary fact of war and to show that the Bible can throw
light on it. In doing this he must have been hampered by the
rarity of New Testament references to the morality of warfare and
very much aware of the kind of warring clashes always likely to
break out in his own day.
But although the nature of the writings themselves and the
circumstances of Aquinas's time should not be overlooked, it is
still true that his works set before the reader a record of Church
doctrine on war which has been the groundwork of all later Roman
Catholic thinking on the subject. The strength of his
shaping hand is to be found everywhere in the central tradition
of twentieth century Roman Catholic thought epitomised in A
Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture. There are of course
Roman Catholic 'pacifists' but they, like Roman Catholic non-
pacifists, seem to concentrate on justifying their position out
of Aquinas's teaching. There are few of them however, and
the general modern Roman Catholic attitude to the Bible text3
quoted in the war articles of the Cumma Theolonica can be fairly
gathered from A Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture.
Of the hew Testament texts quoted, the one from Luke III.M-
can be regarded, in a sense, as pre-Christian. The command to
a soldier to do no violence is in itself rather paradoxical.
(2)
In the Catena Aurea Augustine was the only commentator who
saw in this command of John the Baptist a direct justification of
Christian warfare. Most of the other commentators rightly or
wrongly regarded the publicans and soldiers as rather low
classes of persons. Theophilus noticed that the multitude alone
are given a positive command, and thought that this is because
they were not living in an evil condition, whereas the publicans
(1) Quoted in the Westminster Confession par. XXIII.
(2) pp. 117-120.
and sinners, presumably because they were so living were given
a merely negative warning that they should abstain from evil.
Bade thought that the fact that such men as publicans and
•even the soldiers' asked John about salvation, proved the
power of his preaching. Chrysostom stated that John taught to
the publicans and soldiers only common truths which they could
understand, and which could act as a preparation for a higher
wisdom for which they were yet unready.
Augustine thought that this command proved that John
appreciated the soldiers as ministers of the law and defenders
of public safety, and did not merely regard them as anarchic
homicides. Otherwise he would have recommended them to put
away their arms, abandon warfare and never fight. The evil of
warfare lies not in the fact that men die in order that the
conquerors may rule in peace - this he said is a coward's view -
but in 'the desire to hurt, cruelty, revenge, a savage and
pitiless disposition, fierceness, rebellion and lust for power.1
Wars which punish the violence of the enemy and which are carried
out by good men by the 'command of God, or some other lawful
authority', are justified.
Aquinas has loft no commentary on Luke. A Catholic Commentary
on Holy Scripture^ regards the counsels of John as thoroughly
in accord with the spirit of Jesus, and John's kindness to
publicans and soldiers as anticipating the attitude of Jesus.
It is thought likely that the soldiers who listened to John
were used to enforce the demands of tax-gathereis and that they
were therefore J ews.
(2)
Professor Macgregor ' connects this incident with Jesus'
(3)
praise of the faith of the centurion, as both have been used
to prove that Jesus condoned or justified warfare. Professor
Macgregor argues that, in praising the centurion, who was
presumably a heathen, Jesus was congratulating the man for his
faith, and not giving assent tohis profession. He says we should
not ground an argument on the silence of Jesus about the latter,
particularly as modem scholarship tends to shew that Gospel
material was strictly determined by the particular motives of
the Gospellers. Their great theme was salvation and they focussed
attention in the first place on those sayings of Jesus which were
in any way germane to it. The form of the story is relevant, too.
The story of the centurion's faith is a 'pronouncement story',
(1) pp. 944-5.
(2) G.H.G.Macgregor: The New Testament Basis of Pacifism, pp.18-20.
(3) Luke Vii. 1-10.
ending in a saying of Jesus which has a special religious or
moral content. Other sayings which seemed irrelevant or
incidental to this main purpose might have bean left out of
it. There is no more reason for thinking that Jesus approved
the man's vocation than for thinking that He condoned the
vocation of the 'woman in the city which was a sinner',^ or
the deceitful vocation of Zacchaeus the tax-gatherer about which
Jesus is also silent. The New Testament is silent about slavery,
but no-one would argue from this that slavery is Christian.
Professor I-iacgregor goes on to argue that the Roman soldiery
in Palestine was in effect a police-force, and that if Jesus had
openly condemned it he would have come into premature conflict
with Rome, arid by thus associating Himself with violent revolt
(2)
would have stultified His own pacifist ethic. ' Besides, the
fact that Jesus and the early Church expected the imminent
coming of the 'Kingdom' would have made a condemnation of Rome
unnecessary at such a time. Macgregor's first point appears to
have the nature of special pleading, inasmuch as he assumes
Christ's pacifism in making this interpretation. Jesus never
denounced the Roman soldiery as such even at a later and more
(1) _,uke VII. 37•
(2) The Hew Testament Basis of Pacifism, p.19.
appropriate time. Nor is it likely that His denunciation of
the Roman solidery or police force would result in His identifying
Himself with violence. Professor llacgregor's point raises the
question of whether or not Jesus taught an 'interim ethic'. He
supports his general interpretation by quoting the 'militaristically
minded but honest Harnack' who, in writing of the three centurions
in the Gospels, declares,
'These stories are not told with a view
to glorifying the soldier's profession.
In allthese cases it is of secondary
importance to the narrative that the men
were soldiers. It i3 very true that these
stories have since been exploited again and
again in the interest of the profession of
war." (l)
and Windisch's remark that''Here again the attitude of Jesus
*
(2)
gives no sanction to militarism.*
It is important also to remember that in Luke III.14-• it is
John the Baptist and not Jesus, who is addressing the soldiers.
Even if the words suggest approval of just warfare, as Augustine
thinks, it is John who approves, and not Jesus Himself. Jesus
of course had the greatest respect for John but He spoke quite
openly of the limitations of his authority:
(1) Harnack: Militia Ghristi. p.52. quoted by Macgregor, p.20
(2) Windisoh: Theologische Rundschau.1915.n.343. quoted by
Macgregor, p.20
"Verily, I say unto you, among them
that are bom of women there hath not
risen a greater than John the Baptistj
notwithstanding he that is least in the
kingdom of heaven is greater than he.
And from the days of John the Baptist
until now, the kingdom of heaven suffereth
violence, and the violent take it by force." (l)
Aquinas quoted John's remarks to the soldiers as a
contradiction to the idea that warfare is unchristian, but he
did not himself comment on them. It is obvious, however, that
he agreed with Augustine's interpretation and ignored the other
commentators who did not agree that John's remark amounts to
God's blessing on warfare.
The only aspect of warfare in itself that Aquinas considered
directly is the laying of ambushes. This he did in the light of
the teaching that one should love one's neighbour as oneself,
(2)and do unto others as one wishes they should do unto oneself.
He apparently thought that the main evil inherent in ambushes is
the deception involved, for this was the only aspect that he
discussed. Apparently he regarded the rest of the moral aspects
of the actual activity and methods of warfare - of which ambushes




that we should love our neighbours as ourselves. At the
same time he did not quarrel with the definition of the enemy
as the neighbour.
Perhaps Aquinas focussed his thought on deception, not
merely because it is so essential to the laying of an ambush
but because Augustine^ ext oiled the command to do unto others
as we wish them to do unto us as the climax of Jesus' teaching
about the way of wisdom, purity and simplicity, and he added
that no man would wish another to act towards him with a double
heart.
The writer of the Glossa Ordinaria pointed out that since
the command follows the promise that God will answer prayer,
God's help in obeying it is assured. Another suggestion was
that the command supplements the teaching on prayer by encouraging
man's co-operation with God in doing good, and yet another was
that God's goodness to us must be reflected in our actions to
others. Excellence is required. Me should behave as a servant
to our neighbours, and Augustine stressed that the word 'would'
proved that we must do only good things to our neighbours as we
can will only good for ourselves. Will exists only in the good,
(2)
in the widked it is desire. '
(1) Catena Aurea, pp.276-8.
(2) This distinction is clearer in Latin: "Aiiqui apposuerunt omnia
bona: sed non oportet. quia dicit Yultis. Voluntas autem oonorum,
et cupidltas malorum; ideo non est necessarium addere bona."
(Commentaria in Lvangelia 3. Matthaei et S. Joannis, Tomus I,p.111.)
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This commandment is supreme and sums up all the teaching
of the Law and the Prophets. It comprehends the love of God since
(1|
he who loves his neighbour must love love itself above all things.
Its content is plain. We all know what is proper and how we
would wish others to behave towards us, and therefore we cannot
be prevented by ignorance from doing our duty. And it plainly
(2)
includes that we should return good for bad and better for good.
(3)
In his own commentary on this passage 'Aquinas repeated
Augustine's affirmation that the will always mils what is good,
and that evil is the object of desire, so that it is not necessary
to add that we should will 'good things'. Ke pointed out that
whereas Jesus said that all the Law and the Prophets hang on the
commandments 'Thou shalt love the Lord th-y God with all thy heart
and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind'^and 'Thou shalt
/r\
love thpr neighbour as thyself here He was careful to omit vj
the word all, and said simply 'This is the Law and the Prophets.*
This suggests that this command is less comprehensive than the
(6)
others. ' This last opinion is not mentioned in the Catena Aurea
(1) Augustine.
(2) Gregory.
(3) Gommentaria in .jyangelia 3. . jatthaei et 3. Joannis Tomus Primus, p.111.
(4) Deuteronomy VI.5.
(5) Leviticus XIX.18.
(6)"Haec est enim lex et prophetaej et non dicitj Tota lex et prophetae,
sicut in primis praeceptis (infra c. xxll.40)
indeed it appears to contradict Fseudo-Chrysostom and Augustine.^
A Catholic Coramentarf^onfirms that the whole message of the
ancient Scriptures which Jesus had come to fulfil is summed up in
this commandment to love others as oneself. In all relationships
our best available standard of conduct is to give to others in
charity, forgiveness and kindness the treatment which we ourselves
should like to receive. We thus 3hare our interest in ourselves
with our neighbour, and this love we bear for him includes the
love of God, which is its true motive. The original setting of
the commandment is, perhaps, as in Luke VI.31 where it comes as
a climax to the teaching forbidding retaliation, though it would
follow equally well after the exhortations not to judge in
Matthew Vii.
Aquinas did not reply to the real point of the objection
that
•since no man wishes ambushes or
deceptions to be prepared for
himself, it seems that no one ought
to carry on war by laying ambushes*.
Taking one's own will for oneself as a standard, it might be
taken for granted that, even if one were a wicked aggressor one
would neither desire nor will that one might receive a blow from
(1) Pseudo Chrysostom! "For all the teaching of the Law and the Prophets
is summed up in this one 'compendius precept," Augustine: "This
commandment comprehends that to love God, since he who loves his
neighbour must love love itself above all things. But God is Love;
therefore he loves God above allthings."
(2) p.864..
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a halberd^ or be finished, off by a morning star,^ but one
would prefer the enemy to give, in or at least go home. It might
be questionable whether this command of Jesus is universal
enough to be obeyed literally in such a situation, but the
difficulties of applying it should at least have been discussed
or realised. Since many of the enemy are not really wicked but
possibly only frightened puppets of circumstance or of some
(3)
unscrupulous lord, ' the right attitude towards them is not
easily arrived at. By concentrating on the deception involved,
Aquinas avoided the more terrible results and accompaniments,
such as individual wounding and killing, which are not so easily
reconciled with the love of others, particularly as this includes
non-retaliation and love of one's enemy.
(1) Eight feet in length with a heavy head which ended in a sharp point
and bore on its front a blade like that of a hatchet, on its back
a strong hook.(j3ee Oman: The Art of War in the Middle Ages, p.77.)
(2) The morning star was a club five feet long, set thickly at its
end with iron spikes, fIbid, p.78.)
(3) Infantry was in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries absolutely
insignificant: foot soldiers accompanied the army for no better
purpose than to perform the menial duties of the camp or to assist
in the numerous sieges of the period. Occasionally they were
employed as light troops, to open the battle by their ineffective
demonstrations... Indeed, their lords were sometimes affronted if
they presumed to delay too long the opening of the cavalry charges,
and ended the skirmishing by riding in and over their wretched
followers. At Bouvines the Count of Boulogne could find no better
use for his infantry than to form them into a great circle inside
which he and his horsemen took shelter when their chargers were
fatigued and needed a short
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In the war articles Aquinas justified the deceit of one's
neighbour which is involved in laying an ambush by quoting Jesus'
advice not to give that which is holy to the dogs, or to cast
pearls before swine.^
In the Catena Aurea^all the fathers agree in interpreting
the holy thing and the pearl as spiritual truths or sacraments.
As pearls are enclosed in shells and hidden in the depths of the
sea, so the divine mysteries are enclosed in words and lodged in
the deep meaning of Holy Scripture. The more mysterious such
mysteries are the more they attract reverence from those without
understanding. Baptism and the sacraments should be given only
to the faithful, and the pearls only to those who love truth.
Pseudo-Chrysostora thought that this conditions our love of our
enemies, for although we should not be indiscriminate in spiritual
love of our enemies, we should be in loving them in material ways.
Our enemies, he said, are our brothers by nature and not by faith,
and God Himself does not give spiritual graces equally to the
worthy and unworthy, but only material blessings.
The dogs and the swine are the enemies of truth. The distinction
betweenthem is that the dogs are unclean in every respect, whereas
(1) Matthew Vll. 6
(2) pp. 268-272.
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the swine appear to make some shew of cleanliness. The dogs,
therefore, represent the Gentiles, who are unclean in life and
faith, while the swine represent heretics who make a shew of
calling upon God. The dogs, by disputing, destroy the truth,
while the swine are the disobedient.
Pseudo-Ghrysostom thought that pearls must be held from
dogs and swine alike, but he alone noticed that sometimes it is
necessary to give that which is holy to the wicked. Benediction,
for example, is given even to Christians who live as heretics, not
because they deserve it but to prevent them perishing utterly.
Augustine shewed that Jesus sometimes rightly concealed the truth^
but he noted also that Jesus said some things which many of those
who heard Him did not receive, but rejected or despised. In doing
thi3 He did not give holy things to dogs or cast pearls before
swine, however, He simply gave to those who were able to receive,
since it was not right to penalise them for the uncleanness of
others. And so, said Augustine, silence should not be held if
the matter is about salvation and of urgency even to some only of
those present. Nothing should be said of things superfluous or
harmful.
(2)
In his own commentary, Aquinas summed up the words as
(1) John XVI. i2:"I have yet many things to say unto you, the which
ye are not now able to bear."
(2) Gommentaria in mvangelia 3. Hatthaei et G Joannis. Tomus Primus,p.110,
mailing that judgement should he discreet. He understood by
the dogs who tear with their teeth, heretics, and by pigs, who
trample with their feet, the unclean and the lapsed believers.
A dog, he said, is a totally unclean animal, whereas a pig is
only partly unclean. The holy thing is a sacrament, and the
pearl, the spiritual sense and mystery of the truth. He quoted
I. Corinthiansll.14.^ and Proverbs XX711.7.^ to shew that
such truths are wasted on those who live as animals. Aquinas
took over Augustine's explanation of Jesus' speaking good things
in the presence of unbelievers, that is that His audience included
the good people as well as the bad. Aquinas, in his commentary,
(3)
quoted Augustine and followed the interpretations of Augustine
and Pseudo-Chrysostom as given in the Catena Aurea, almost
completely.
The Catholic Commentary^states that in this text Jesus
was recommending prudence in expounding the mysteries of the
Kingdom. In the early Church this principle applied in the
question of the admission of the unbaptised to the Holy Eucharist.
The comparison between this and the giving of precious things to
(1) "Animalis homo non percipit ea quae Hei sunt."
(2) "Anima satiata conculcat favum."
(3) "Sancta sunt inviolata et immaculata conservanda; margaritaeque
pretiosae nori debent contemni." (p.110.)
(4.) p.864.
animals is only a general one, it says. The animals represent
the religiously unappreciative, but it is not possible to take
the swine as pagans or the dogs as lapsed Christians.
In using this saying of Jesus to lay down that it is there¬
fore even more right not to let one's enemy know of one's plans,
Aquinas seemed somewhat guilty of misunderstanding the nature
of the holy thing and the pearl. If it were clear that Aquinas
were tagging the text to his argument as a conversational whim
or joke it would not be necessary to weigh it so carefully. The
nature of the Summa Theologica. however, would seern to allow
little scope for jests. He implied that Jesus' recommendation
of one kind of discretion justifies the kind of deception which
is so much part of war as to be almost war itself.^ The
comparison is inappropriate however, and his own exegesis shows
that the saying had never been interpreted or applied in a
material sense, but had been always strictly limited to spiritual
things.
Aquinas has here answered the claim of one text from the
(l) A.P. Wavell describes the best soldier as having in him a
'seasoning of devilry,' the ideal infantryman as 'cat-burglar,
gunman, poacher' because whatever his skill he must risk
nothing. The good soldier will soon learn the tricks of the
trade, some useful, some bad, such as scrounging or looting.
(The Good Soldier, p.10.)
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New Testament by quoting another. He did so again in answering
the objection that anbushes are opposed to justice as well as to
love of one's neighbour, except that this time the texts are from
the Old Testament. Following Augustine, he thought that the
fact that God commanded Joshua to lay ambushes for the city of
Ai^proves that the deceit involved is no concern of that
(2)
justice which in Deuteronomy XVI.20, we are bidden to follow.
There can be no doubt that such a faith as Aquinas must have had
in the literalness of such warlike commands in the Old Testament
must have profoundly influenced his general attitude to war, and
to believe that God has often or even once, commanded war in the
past must make the believer, to some extent, willing to believe
in the likelihood that God might sanction it at any other time.
The modern Catholic understanding also accepts such Old
Testament wars as literally commanded by God. The first
unsuccessful attempt on Ai is accepted uncritically as the
certain result of Achan's violation of the herem. and is followed
(1) Joshua V111.2.
(2) "Thou shalt follow justly after that which is just." It is
difficult to understand what A.C.F. 3eal.es means, therefore,
when he writes that *3t. Thomas... in answering whether
ambushes, etc., may be used in war, and in answering with
an emphatic negative,... amplifies St. Augustine*s point
about keeping faith with the enemy.* (The Catholic Church
and International Order, p.104.)
by God's commanding a second attack, by laying an ambush of
3,000 men^ on the west side of the city.
(2)
Father Stratmann's attitude is not perhaps typical of
that of most Roman Catholics, but if such an exceptionally
•pacifist' thinker can hold on to the Godliness of Old Testament
wars it seems doubtful whether any Roman Catholic can reject it.
He is in fact however, not completely satisfied as to the exact
interpretation of the relevant texts. He refers to certain
interpretations of the Old Testament which would remove or explain
away the conception of a warlike God, such as Origen's typical
and allegorical interpretation of the wars as shadowy pictures
of spiritual battles against sin and darkness, he quotes Origen's
(3)
refusal to find in the Old Testament a God of war, and notes
that Bishop Ulfilas left the war books out of his translation of
the 3ible, but he himself accepts them as God's doing because God
may command a thing which is wrong in itself for the sake of
achieving His own good purpose. A 'wrong' so commanded therefore
becomes good. Whether or not the Old Testament battles were moral
only because they were exceptionally authorised by God in some
special circumstances, or whether or not they were authorised by
(1) A Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture■dd.2C3wU Note the Catholic
Commentary says the 30,000 of the usual translations is too many for
an ambush; 3,000 is better.
(2) Stratmann: The Church and Jar, pp.80-84.
(3) "Unless the terrible stories of war in the Old Testament are to be
considered allegorical, the Disciples of the Lord Jesus who came to
teach peace, would never have allowed them to be read in Church,1!(p.81)
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God's ordinary laws of morality, Father Stratmann holds that
they did not establish a precedent which guarantees the
justice of war for all times. 'It is not fair, on account of
the Biblical wars, to justify war for all time as people are so
fond of doing.'^ The Old Testament wars must be understood
in their proper context. By suppressing idolatrous and wicked
nations they furthered God's plan of bringing His knowledge and
government to the whole world. Such a hard conversion - which
must often have proved fatal! - was meant to teach fear and
atoning justice to the heathen and to lead them thereby to a
knowledge of peace and love. The Israelites themselves did not
escape the punishment they administered.
Father Stratmann calls the Old Testament wars a divine
school particularly fitted for toughening up a'sensuous '®tion,
and particularly suited to its stage of development. They were
an expression of God's judgement, and the continual success of "the.
Israelites proved their divine calling and protection. Old
(1) p.82.
(2) p.82 Victor White agrees: "We need only recall that
had not the Children of Israel fought some uncommonly cruel
and unsporting wars, and at the behest of their God, they
would not have survived, and Christ, the Prince of Peace
would never have come from their stock. There would be no
Hew Testament without the Old, and no Old without war."
(The Morality of War, p.4«)
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Testament warfare, like the rest of Israelite history, is
unique in that God was specially involved, interested, active
and busy in commanding and controlling all activities. The
war3 were absolutely religious with God the Supreme Commander,
(l)
and human leadership quite subordinate. ' Therefore they can
never justify irreligious wars. Their expression of religion
and of divinely inspired patriotism, ennobled and beautified
by divine poetic songs and culminating in the sacrificial death
of the enemy, makes them incomparable with modem militarism.
Nevertheless,' Father Stratmann believes that the most
perfect periods of Old Testament historg, those which reached the
highest and most universal conceptions of God, were the ear.11est
and the prophetic, and that these were also the times of peace
and peace theories. God condescended to be a national God and
the ally of a single nation, when the people were very imperfect
in mind and faith, and when they were hardhearted, but even then,
he 3ays, God, as the prophets declared, was more interested in
overcoming war than in merely advocating it. Still, Father
Stratmann do93 not give up the principle of did Testament wars.
(1) The enemy was not always so subordinate however. To the Jews at
this time their God was a national God, and His limitations were
recognised frankly when He came up against the superior weapons
of other peoples. Joshua 1. 19: "The Lord was with Joshua: and
He drove out the inhabitants of the hill country; for he could




Their goodness lay in the fact that they were commanded by
God and 'Would that we could call forth the noble ethos and
aim which lay beneath the Old Testament wars!'^ liven though
(2)
he condemns modern warfare as of an utterly different nature
he holds that if God commanded a war today that war would be a
(3)
righteous one. Father Hislop 'thinks that the lesson of the
Old Testament idea of holy warfare is that it was undertaken by
God and not by man. As morality develops, man, he hopes, should
be able to abandon physical warfare and to rely upon weapons of
the Spirit. This interpretation leads to the awkward alternative
possibilities of man evolving a higher morality than God's or of
the ways of God being so unlike the ways of man that what is
moral and good for God is immoral and bad for man.
The Protestant attitude toward the Old Testament notion of
God as a God of battles, and the relevance of the Old Testament
wars to the question of the righteousness of war today is rather
less serer.e and unanimous.^ It recognises that the warlike
morality of the Jews moved towards a more peaceful notion of
their mission, and that their understanding of Jahveh as a national
god of battles gave way to a notion of God as a universal God of
(2ti) p.83.
(2) "Would anyone dare to compare what Benedict XV calls the 'suicide
of a modern European war, caused as it is by capitalism, imperialism
and militarism, with the conflicts of the Jewish Theocracy."(pp.83-4.)
(3) Pax. October 1957* Report of an address by Very Re.v.Ian Hislop
(4) See below pp. 118-119.
love and mercy. Protestant thinkers, however, differ aoout
whether or not all the brutal and cruel incidents of Old
Testament warfare can be explained as wholly the outcome of
man's misunderstanding and sin. Some of them see the wars as
partly, at least, an instance of God's adapting Himself and
His commands to a particular stage of human imperfection.
Whether or not God did literally command Joshua to ambush Ai,
therefore, is for them an unsettled question.
It is difficult to sort out what may be of genuine spiritual
value in the conception of Holy War. Dr. Kaufmann thinks that
the Jews were possessed by a master-idea of God fighting their
battles, which was 'not superimposed on to the legends by a
later literary redaction'^ but which actually shaped the
(2)
narratives of the events as they happened. The imaginative
strength of this master idea moulded real events into a
manifestation of itself. The defeat of Ai, therefore was the
punishment not only for the material and tactical mistake of
the spies who said that a mere two or three thousand men would
be enough to carry through the attack, but also for the spiritual
(1) lehezkel Kaufraanns The diblical Account of the Conquest of
Palestine, p.74*
(2) The account of the events was 'idealistic', 'legendary',
right from the start. See Kaufmann, p.75.
sin of Achan, and victory came only after both errors had been
put right. Dr Kauffman points out that although the story of
the natural events at Ai is in a sense detachable, that story
is itself shaped by the master idea of the Jews,^ inasmuch
as the error of the spies is regarded a3 the beginning of
punishment. He shows how the 'natural historical story* and
the 'religious story' are woven together; the Bible seems to
shew that the fate of Ai was decided by God's commanding Joshua
to raise his javelin as a sign to his troops rather than by
mere soldierly skill. As God was thus directly involved in,
and, in fact Commander-in-Chief of the military tactics, the
natural and supernatural in the story are closely related.
Indeed, by looking further into the story it appears that they
are very intricately intermingled, even more so than Dr Kaufmann
has suggested, so that it would seem unwise to think of
separating one from the other.
One of the rules of the Holy lifer, for example, was that as
few troops as possible should be 3ent into the field so that the
expected victory could be attributed to God rather than to
superior numbers. The simple-hearted spies who asked for a task-
force of no more than two or three thousand troops to deal with
resistance at Ai seem to have been willing to work by the mile.
(1) Ibid., pp. 76-7.
As the two or three thousand were unequal to the task, however,
natural common sense would suggest that when they had failed, a
bigger force might succeed. As the Bible says God commanded
Joshua to take all^ his people to the attack, it would seem
that God Himself worked through natural and overwhelming material
forces eventhough by so doing He went against an important principle
of the Holy War, for the psople of Ai were only 12,000 against
Joshua's 30,000.
What followed the overwhelming victory is perhaps even more
interesting. Achan is the most important human figure in the Ai
story insofar as he signified the cause of the Jewish defeat in
the first battle. His sin was that he broke the hsrem by keeping
for himself some of the spoils from Jericho. But after he and
all his family had been executed because he had caused the
defeat to his people and as breaker of the herem. God commanded
Joshua to make the second attack on Ai. He was to raze it to the
ground, but to bring away the spoils and cattle; The Jews, there¬
fore, did well out of poor Achan's sin. It would seem hard that
God should be thought contrary for allowing later what had been
forbidden in Achan's lifetime, but as the story stands the
(l^ 30.000 men in the Authorized Version.A Catholic Commentary however,
says such a force would be too unwieldly for an ambush and alters
the figures to 3000. Ho authority is given, but the alteration
would bring the story more into line with the rules of the Holy
War mentioned above. But the ambush force was only part of
Joshua's army.
(2) Joshua V111.27
command to take spoils and cattle does come before Ai had
been razed. After the people of Ai had been killed, Joshua
might have found good reasons for gathering spoils and cattle.
His people may have needed food and other supplies and he
must have realised that Achan was not the only parson to
consider the herem rather wasteful. Acton's 'sin' may have
made him realise too, that although razing instead of taking
over conquered cities stopped his troops settling down to the
business of their own lives and kept them loyal, the wholesale
waste of cattle and spoil could only be a temptation to his
people and a threat rather than a help to their morale. Achan
and his household therefore, might seem to have been martyrs in
the cause of good sense. However, as Joshua's easing of the
herem followed God's command, it might also seem that not only
did Achan's sin bring material goods to his feilow Jews and
more cunning to the mind of Joshua, but that it sharpened the
wisdom of God Himself1
Joshua's care for the morale of his people was, says Dr
Kaixfmann^a sign of God's grace and of his own dominating
personality. It was to help morale that Joshua kept war and
land settlement strictly apart. To do this he held his own
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people in a kind of captivity for the whole length of the
war, for if they had been allowed to settle on the conquered
lands they would have been beyond Joshua'sreach when he wanted
to call on them to undertake further conquests. "Throughout
the whole war," writes Dr Kaufmann,
"Joshua does not occupy a single city,
nor does he rebuild a single city.
He only destroys and lays waste." (l)
He thinks that the ruthless destruction and cursing enjoined
by the Jericho ban may be directly linked to the need to thwart
the satisfaction of the real motive for the people's going to
war, which was the hope of winning a settlement on the land.
Land starved as the Jews were, settlement would have broken
(2)
their unity, and this had to be maintained at all costs.
It is obvious, therefore, that a strange mixture of material
motives and religious preconceptions and fanaticisms lay behind
the battle at Ai, which ended in a destruction 30 ruthless and
wholesale as to be wholly satisfying to all who believe it was
the will and work of the Almighty:
(1) p.92.
(2) Some have thought that the Jews, leaders as well as people,
fought for wholly material ends. "... The long line of Hebrews
whose exploits adorn the pages of the Biblical books of Judges
did not fight, in the first place, because they were worshippers
of Jahveh. They fought because the economic and political
conditions of the time weraintolerable. They fought because
the Philistines and Uanaanites together could not evolve an
order that made life bearable for such as the Hebrews then were."
(Graham and My: Culture and Conscience, p.177.)
"... And it came to pass, when Israel had
made an end of slaying all the inhabitants
of Ai in the field, in the wilderness wherein
they chased them, and when they were all
fallen on the edge of the sword, until they
were consumed, that all the Israelites
returned unto Ai, and smote it with the
edge of the sword. And so it was, that
all that fell that day, both of men and
women, were twelve thousand, ever, all the
men ef Ai. For Joshua drew not his hand
back, wherewith he stretched out the spear,
until he had utterly destroyed all the
inhabitants of Ai. Only the cattle and the
spoil of that city Israel took for a prey
unto themselves, according unto the word
of the Lord which He commanded Joshua. And
Joshua burnt Ai, and made it an heap for
ever, even a desolation unto this day. And
the king of Ai he hanged on a tree until
eventide: and as soon as the sun was down,
Joshua commanded that they should take Ms
carcase down from the tree, ana cast it at
the entering of the gate of the city, and
raise thereon a great heap of stones, that
remaineth unto this day..." (1)
The majority of Protestant thinkers, even non-pacifists,
would not see in such a wretched story ground for the morality
of war today. let Old Testament influence has been so strong
for so long in the past that it still lingers. Canon Raven is
a pacifist, but Ms complaint would be echoed by many non-pacifists
"... Until lately the Old Testament stood
alongside the Hew as inspired, authoritative,
inerr ants and large portions of the Old
Testament glorify the God of Battles rather
than the Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ. A
(1) Joshua. Vlll. 24.-9.
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people brought up at home and in
Sunday Schools upon the legends of
Israel, taught to reverence Jael,
the murderess of Sisera, and Samuel
hewing Agag in pieces and David "the
bloodthirsty and lascivious brigand"
absorbed the outlook of these savageries
and failed to realise that they represented
a time and a faith utterly remote from that
of Christ. Protestantism lias not yet out¬
grown its bibliolatry: Catholicism still
professes it. If Scripture as a whole is
infallible, then warfare has its sanction..."(l)
He thinks the traditional doctrine of the just war is based above
all on this uncritical reverence for the Old Testament.
In the war articles of the Summa Theologica. however, Aquinas
referred more often to the New Testament than to the Old
Testament in Ms proofs that war is compatible with Christianity.
Jesus said
"Think not that I am come to send peace
on earth. I came not to bring peace
but a sword" (2)
Aquinas did not directly quote this saying in full but in
answering the objection that war opposes peace, and must
therefore be a sin, he claimed that those who wage war justly
aim at true peace and are opposed only to that evil peace which
Jesus did not come to bring. Thus he implied that a just war
(1) Ravens Mar and the Christian, p.51.
(2) Matthew, X.34.
participates in the sort of warfare which Jesus did come to
bring, and that it leads likewise to true peace. The nature
and occasion of such Christian warfare as Jesus was talking
about are therefore of great importance in coming to an
understanding of the whole just war theory.
In the Catena Aureal Jerome said that the warfare
Jesus stimulates is the result of His teaching. Every
commentator quoted interpreted the sword which Jesus brought
as the word of God. Hilary described the sword as the sharpest
of all weapons, the emblem of the right of authority, of the
impartiality of justice and the correction of offenders, but
he noted also that the word of God is likened to a swor4 in
(2) (3)
^phesians VI. 17 and Hebrews 17.12, and concluded that
the sword means the preaching of Jesus. Augustine accepted
this interpretation. Chrysostom explained that Jesus used
such sharp language in order to warn his disciples of the
difficulties which they must endure, and that this warfare
is not of his making. Augustine also remarked that the
conflict which Jesus arouses is 'not of His setting', but
that of the wicked who react towards hira in a warlike way.
(1) pp.394-7.
(2) "And take the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the
Spirit, which is the word of God."
(3) "For the word of God is quick, and powerful, and sharper
than any twoedged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder
of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a
discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart."
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Chrysostom added that in saying that He brings the sword,
Christ is using metaphorical language and speaking "according
to the manner of Scripture."
This warfare is always interpreted as the war of faith
against unbelief and sin, which permeates all other divisions
and societies and sects. It invades and divides the intimate
unity of the family and even the personality itself. Jerome
pointed out that every household in the world was divided about
faith in Christ,and Chrysostom said that this warfare is more
dangerous even than civil war because it is a warfare not merely
between acquaintances but between near kindred. Such enmity
within families was found -ven in Old Testament times. Rabanus
Maurus held that in differences about creeds it is impossible to
preserve mututal rights. The devil, said Gregory, particularly
likes to take the opportunity of making his thrusts through
those who are in relationships of love and affection with the
Christian.
Augustine made an allegory in which such warfare seems to
work at two main levels. On the higher level the conflict of
father and son represents that of Christ and the Devil, who was
His sonj that of the daughter and mother represents the conflict
of the people of God and the city of the world; which is the
wicked society of mankind often symbolised in Scripture as
i •> o
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Bab ylon, Egypt or Sodom; and the conflict of daugher-in-law
against mother-in-law that of the Church and the Synagogue.
On the lower level this conflict exists in man's own
nature. Man's carnal affections represent the foes of Ms
own household, and the divided house represents the divided
soul in which sin and unbelief war against those parts which
have been regenerated. After discussing the reconciliation
of this warfare with the peaceful teaching of Jesus, Augustine
decided that the most perfect peace is acMeved when that which
is diseased and which causes strife is cut away. The wreck
of Babel brought to an end a bad union, and St.Paul had to
'divide' those who conspired against Mm.
(1)
In his own commentary* ' Aquinas distinguished between
good peace arid bad peace. The good peace, of wMch the angels
(2)
sang, and Paul spoke* ' is the peace achieved by Jesus in His
Atonement which abolished the enmity of the law and wn for
man the possibility of reconciliation with God. The bad peace
is that which arises from carnal affection and is only
(1) Gommentaria in Evans:elia S.Matthaei et S. Joannis. Toaus Primus,pp.14.9-50<
(2) Ephesians 11.14 - 18* "For he is our peace, who hath made both one,
and hath broken down the middle wall of partition between us; having
abolished in his flesh the enmity, even the law of commandments
contained in ordinances, for to make in himself of twain one new man,
so making peace; and that he might reconcile both unto God in one
body by the cross, having slain the enmity thereby; and he came and
preached peace to you which were afar off, and to them that were nigh."
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apparently tranquil. Jesus came to remove this latter peace
from the earth. Aquinas interpreted the sword as the word of
God in spiritual warfare, and the warfare as the conflict
between those win believe and those vb do not. In. this sense
the conflict is occasioned by Christ who is the Word of God,
but caused by the malice of those who do not believe. However,
it is also caused by Christ because He permits it, just as God
causes the lacked to be abandoned to their own chosen ways.^
The two sides in this warfare are believers and unbelievers.
The sword divides not those things which are diverse and
extraneous, but those which areiaost closely joined together.
The closest unions are the natural ones of friendship and
marriage, and those domestic and social ones which are founded
(2)
on community of interest. Against all of these Jesus sends the
sword. The meaning he gave is that since Jesus said that He
had come not to destroy the law but to fulfil it, and since
the law commands all to 'honour thy father', one ought to obey
one's father unless the obedience goes against love of God.
Aquinas had folbwed quite closely the general interpretation
(1) "Hoc tamen causatur etlara ab eo, quia permittit. sicut habetur
ad Rom. 1. 26. Propterea traditit illos Deus in passiones
ignominiae."
(2) "Duplep est enim maxima con.iunctio: quaedam est con.iunctio
naturalisi guaedam domestica. vel oeconomica; ideo contra
utramque mittit gladium". (p.150.)
given in the Catena Aurea. A slight inconsistency which
appears in his exegesis is that, quoting Paul, he seemed
to identify the evil peace wnich Jesus abolishes, with 'the
sanity, even the law of commandments contained in ordinances'
and yet claimed, on the baUS of Jesus' own words that He came
to filfil the law. He dia not appear to lean on any
particular commentator, and more tlian any he emphasised the
responsibility of God for this war fare.
The Catholic Commentary^ recalls that Jesus was
introducing an important modification into the Messianic
expectation of His days. The peace He brought was that
between God and man, not that which the world might bring,
between man and man. The sword is lis doctrine and its
spiritual edge 'cuts if necessary through the natural
domestic loyalties.' In this spiritual warfare Jesus was
prepared to suffer and die.
In suggesting that Jesus was using a tragic irony for
expressing his purpose in terms of war rather than of peace,
Professor Macgregor agrees with the Fathers who, because of
the wickedness of men, see the 'warfare' as the inevitable
(1) p.870.
and involuntary result of Jesus' mission of peace. Aquinas,
however, thought Jesus 'causes' it. But all agree that it
takes place in a wholly spiritual dimension which is quite
unlike that of material warfare, hone of them, for example,
aspects members of a household to smite each other with
literal swords.^ The conflict is spiritual and its object
is to mark off good from ill in all things.
When, therefore, this saying of Jesus was used inthe
war articles to justify physical warfare, it would seam that
Aquinas made an uncritical, clumsy and one-sided application
of the truth which Jesus was trying to make clear. Neither
his own exegesis nor that of earlier and later times, apart,
perhaps, from Augustine's, whose suggestion that peace is
achieved when that which is diseased is cut away appears to
refer to war, gives any support to such an application. If
the evil against which Jesus has brought his sword is so
pervasive as to divide man himself and his closest relation¬
ships, it must be present on both sides in any physical warfare.
The evil peace and the good peace permeate and divide all
societies, so that it is impassible to imagine a war of states
(1) Kaegregor (p.20} notes that Luke XII. 51• has 'division'
instead of 'sword': "Suppose ye that I am come to give
peace on earth? I tell you, Nay, but rather division."
which would shew all the good peace on one side and all the
bad peace on the other. The only war in which this could
occur would be one in which one society was composed of
perfect Christians and the other of wicked pagans. Aquinas,
presumably, did not think that the only just wars were those
in which Christians alone fought on the just side and pagans
on the unjust, and yet by justifying war on the ground that
the just side always aims at the peace Jesus came to bring,
he did, in fact, identify a just war with a Christian war,
and justified it on the ground that it is Christian. This
would certainly eliminate the possibility of justice in any
war in which Christians fought on both sides.
In the war articles, however, Aquinas was little concerned
with the peace between God and man which, as A Catholic Commentary
stresses, was the peace which Jesus came to bring. On the oth^r
hand, there is some truth in Aquinas's understanding that a good
motive of creating peace really can exist in those who fight in
war. Many who fought in the last war were at least partly
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inspired by self-sacrificing compassion in their efforts to
stop Hitler's extermination of the Jews.^ But if true
peace has to be brought into being by deeds causing suffering
and slaughter, it must be indeed, in a way Jesus did not mean,
(2)
the peace that passeth understanding. ' On the whole, then,
the highest peace at which even a just war aims seems to be the
worldly peace which Jesus, according to Aquinas, came to remove
(3^
from the earth.
Further understanding of specifically 'Christian warfare'
might be found by studying what Jesus meant when he commanded
his disciples to buy swords.^ Although it seems an obvious
text to quote in arguing that Jesus sanctioned warfare, Aquinas
(1) However, whether or not, for Aquinas, the Jews would have been
worthy of Ghristian compassion and whether or not the compassion
would have been worthy enough to make the war a just one for
those who shewed it by fighting cannot be decided easily, for
the Jews, of course, were heathens. Could Aquinas possibly
have thought their extermination would have brought the peace
Christ came to bring?
(2) Victor White, however, seems to be quite happy about the
coincidence of love and cruelty when he points out that Jesus'
coming was heralded not only by the angels' promise.of peace to
men of good will, but also by man's massacre of the innocents.
(The iiorality rf War. p«4«)
(3) "... Ista pax est carnalium affectuuriu Istag non veni ponore.
Unde Apoc. VI.14: Datum est ei ut sumeret pacea de terra..."
'.Commentaria in Lvanrcelia 5. Matthaei et 3. Joannis. Tomus Primus,
p.149.) The reference, however, is incorrect.
(4) "... And he said unto them, When I sent you without purse, and
scrip, and shoes, lacked ye anything? And they said, Nothing.
Then said he unto them But now, he that hath a purse, let him
take it, and likewise his scrip: and he that hath no sword, let
him sell his garment and buy one. For I say unto you, that this
that is written must yet be accomplished in me,"And he was
reckoned among the transgressors', for the things concerning me
have an end. And they said, Lord, behold, here are two swords.
And he said unto them, It is enough." (Luke. XXll.36.)
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did not mention it in the war articles. He did, however,
mention the incident in which Peter drew his sword to defend
Jesus.^ The two events are connected, since there can be
no doubt that the sword which Peter drew was one of those
produced at Jesus' request at or after the Last Supper. In
the GatenaAurea Chrysostom related the later to the earlier
incident and identified the "swords" which the disciples took
with them to defend Jesus with the knives they had used when
(2)
cutting the paschal lamb.
The Fathers' main difficulty with the command to buy
(3)
swords is that it seems to contradict other teachings of Jesus*
j-arlier he had bidden his disciples take neither purse not scrip
but to rely wholly on God, and he had preached non-resistance.
Some of them suggested that Jesus was indicating that God's
benevolence and protection, which had previously supplied all the
needs of the disciples, would be a little withdrawn after his
death, and that he wished them to experience the hardship of
supporting themselves. In this way they would realise how much
they depended upon God and learn moderation ahd humility. Bede
(1) Piatthew. XXVI. 51-4*
(2) Catena Aurea. pp.918-920.
(3) Ibid., pp. 716-720. e.g. Luke X.4* ff»
noticed that the disciples were not trained alike in times of
persecution and times of peace. During the persecution and
when Christ was near to death the disciples were allowed to
arm themselves with the necessities of life until the time for
preaching the Gospel came round, again. Bede, therefore, would
agree with Augustine that commandments, counsels and permissions
can be changed according to the diversity of the times without
inconsistency in the lawgiver.
The task of reconciling the forbidding of striking with
the command to buy swords provoked a wealth of suggestions. One
interpretation held that the command to buy swords required only
an appearance of a defensive attitude and not physical
retaliation, for which purpose shields and helmets would have
been needed, besides swords. Two swords were insufficient
anyway, for not even a hundred would have been enough for the
disciples' defence. Another interpretation held that Christ
meant to convey that with His own death at hand a time of danger
and death, in which they would suffer much misery, was upon them.
The Scriptures, it wa3 pointed out, often use the prophetic
imperative, and by using it here Christ foretells the time in
which the disciples forget His gifts, His Law and His passion
and take to the sword. Yet another interpretation held that
Chrises words about buying swords were really addressed
to the individual Jews and that He thereby foretold what would
happen to them. By setting before Him two swords, the
disciples shewed that they had misunderstood him. That Jesus
said simply "It is enough" might mean either that He did not
want to rebuke them and so dismissed the subject, or that He
was making an ironic expression about the uselessness of two
swords against the multitude of unbelievers. The incident
of the two swords, in fact, was taken to shew that Jesus
suffered voluntarily and that His cause was not to be won by
physical blows, for one sword wa3 never taken up and the one
which Peter used to cut off Malchus's ear not only shewed the
uselessness of fighting but led to a demonstration of healing!"^
The sword3 themselves may mean the Old and New Testaments and
the words "It is enough" that, although retaliation was lawful
under the Old Law, under the perfect goodness of the H^w taw
the Bible was to be protection enough.
Aquinas left no commentary of his own on Late, but in his




the disciples interpreted the command to buy swords in Luke
XXll to mean that swords were necessary.^
(2)
A Catholic Commentary explains the oontradiciton between
this command to buy swords and Christ's other commands never to
(3)
rely upon material possesions and support 'by saying that
by the former command He meant to forewarn His disciples that,
although the principle of His teaching wasunaltered, there
were dangerous times ahead. Whereas they had so far had all
their needs from the good will of friendly hearers, now they
must be ready to meet scorn, hatred and times in which even the
bare needs of life could be got only by violence. But in saying
"He that hath not a sword, let him sell his garment and buy one,"
Jesus was using a proveroial saw and not recommending His
disciples literally to take up arms, and the words "It is enough"
could be taken as his amused answer to his simple minded followers
and amount to no more than - 0 yes: those two will be quite enough
for what I had in mind. One school of thought, indeed, thinks
that Jesus simply wanted to change the subject of talk.
(1) p.370.
(2) p.966.
(3) (a) "... Carry neither purse, nor scrip, nor shoes: and salute no
man by the way ..." (Luke X.4«)
(b) "... When the;/ which were about him saw what would follow, they
said unto him, Lord, shall we smite with the sword? And one of
them smote the servant of the high priest, and cut off his
right ear. And Jesus answered and said, Suffer ye thus far.
And he touched his ear and healed him.(Luke XXII. 49-51.)
(c)"... Then said Jesus unto him, Put up again thy sword into
his place: for all they that take the sword shall perish with
the sword..." (Matthew XXVI.52. c.f. genesis IX.6. and
Revelation X111.10.)
Such arguments do not seem enough to make good the assumption
that they are an explanation, for even if it is allowed that
Jesus was not altering the principle of his teaching, the fact
that his disciples were to become "like men who have no friends
and can obtain even the bare necessities of life only by violence"
implies that he did sanction violence at certain times. In
passing it is worth marking that if it is allowed that Jesus
was using a proverb when recommending buying swords, the same
could be said of His words in one of the texts which have been
taken to forbid using swords. "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by
man shall his blood be shed"^ and "he that killeth with the
(2)
sword must be killed with the sword" ' point to a traditional
saying which lay also behind the word "All they that take the
(3)
sword shall perish with the sword". There is a possibility,
therefore that Jesus has beenthought both to approve war and
to forbid it simply because he had a way of speech which made
use of the very concrete proverbs of the common folk.
Despite Augustine and Bede, therefore, Roman Catholic
thinkers have never pressed the words about birring swords to
justify warfare. Most have sought to shew that Christ did not-
mean to do anything of the kind even when they have to note that
He was prophesying that some kind of physical violence was only
too likely in the near future.
(1) Genesis. IX.6.
(2) Revelation Xlll. 10.
(3) Matthew XXVI. $2.
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The command to buy swords has often bewildered Protestant
thinkers too, but they, like most Roman Cat ialic thinkers,
generally agree that it should not be used to justify war.
Some of them, however, have taken it literally, and Professor
Macgregor quotes the rousing interpretation of Spitta:
\
"... Seel Jesus lias summoned his followers
to armed defence! He was no tender
pacifist!..." (l)
But he also refers to Weiss, who says the command
contradicts the other texts and goes against the vitole spirit
of early Christianity, and J.M.Creed and F.C.Burkitt, who,
although they are non-pacifists, do not allow that this text
means that Jesus sanctions the use of arms.
Many Protestant explanations of it are very like those
in the Catena Aurea - for example, that it was a warning of
coming disaster which the disciples misunderstood, and that the
words "It is enough" were half rebuke or, as Jesus must have known
the uselessness of two such weapons against the power of Rome,
were uttered ironically. A number of writers accept the
opinion of some schol ars that we owe the command to buy swords
to the Lucan editor's wish to make Peter's assault on Malchus
more understandable. Luke, in general, is rather sympathetic
(l) pp.22-4..
to the weaknesses of the disciples, and in fact, this is the
only place in which this command has been recorded. The
interpretation suggested by Professor W.A.Curtis is that as
there is no evidence that Jesus foroade his disciples to carry
arms when they were beyond the protection of the law on the way
from Galilee to Jerusalem, the command to buy swords was meant
to forewarn them that henceforth their wanderings would take
them far afield in lawless lands where they might find useful
such weapons as were forbidden them in Jerusalem, where they
were under the protection of the law.^ However, the crucifixion
did not mean that the disciples necessarily had to warder
beyond the pax romana and the line between within and beyond the
law would seem rather arbitrary. Although there seems to be
a real link betweenthe command and Jesus' arrest and death,
aid although it may seem that at one point the use of weapons
was authorised, it is clear that the swords were not commanded
for Hi3 own defence as the authority was withdrawn as soon as
it had led to the injury to Malchus.
When he referred to this incident in the war articles
Aquinas quoted from Matthew, which does not name the disciple
(1) ikitthew XXVI. 52. Professor Curtis's suggestion is discussed
in The Pew Testament Basis of Pacifism, pp. 22-3.
who struck the high priest's servant. When he dealt with
this passage of Matthew^; in the Gatena Aurea. however,
his quotation from Jerome gives the disciple's name as Peter
on the Authority of John. According to Jerome, Malchus, whose
name means king of the Jews, was a slave to the ungodliness
and greed of the priests. He lost his right ear to symbolise
the Jews' loss of spiritual insight. Peter represents the
Gentiles who despoil the Jews. His cutting off of the ear
signifies that the disobedient slaves of the priesthood are
prevented from hearing spiritually, while the restoration of
the ear signifies the restoration of spiritual insight to those
Jews who believe. When Jesus hinders Peter, he shews that
he knows he has to die to save mankind. Hi3 example teaches the
faithful to endure adversity courageously, and his words "all they
that take the sword shall perish with the sword" emphasize that
they should not resort to physical self-defence.
Aquinas summarised Augustine's distinction between "to take
the sword" and "to use the sword." Jesus commanded the disciples
to take the sword, but not to smite with it. Peter sinned in
this, as did Moses when he slew the Egyptian, but both actbd
through human love, hatred of injustice and a warmth of spirit
(1) i'lattnew XXVI. 52.
(2) pp. 918-920.
capable of good, so it was quite fitting that Peter should
become ruler of the Church as Moses had been ruler of the
Synagogue.
Hilary became aligorlcal and rather allowed his fancy to
take wings. As all who do take a physical sword, whether under
authority or in self-defence, obviously do not perish by it,
Christ, he said, must have meant by the sword which is to kill
all who take the sword, the fiery sword which waves before the
gate of Paradise and that Sword of the Spirit which is part of
the armour of God. In commanding Peter to put up his sword,
Jesus, he thought, shews that Ms weapon is the sword of His
mouth, while the reference to the legions of angels which He
might have summoned was meant to signify that He suffered
voluntarily. He had no need Of apostles to fight for Him, as
He could, had He so wished, have called upon seventytwo-thousand
angels. This, said Hilary, shows that the armies of heaven have
divisions into legions like earthly armies.
In his commentary^ Aquinas identifiedthe sword used by
{-a}
Peter with the cultellus "" used for carving the paschal lamb.
The ears signified hearing - the right the sensitivity to spiritual,
the left sensitivity to temporal things. Peter, therefore, cut
off the Jew3 from the teaching of the Kingdom of the spirit
(1) pp. 370-371.
(2) cultellus - a small knife
(3) Aquinas here followed Ghrysostom.
and gave it to the Gentiles, to whom he was the first preacher.
Jesus, said Aquinas, first admonished both Peter and the
servants and then gave reason for the admonition with the
words "all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword."
It is clear, therefore, that this reason, whatever its meaning,
was here understood by Aquinas to refer to the weapon used by
Peter, whereas in the war articles he contrived to use the
admonition to shew that war is forbiddento clerics, and the
reason, to justify warfare. Christ's behaviour on this occasion
was meant to shew martyrs that they should not defend themselves,
but 3uffer for Christ's sake. This lesson, said Aquinas, can
be seen in three ways. Firstly, by His warning words "all who
take the sword shall perish by the sword," He eased or saved from
the punishment in store for such misdeeds. Secondly, by saying
that if He had wished he could have asked Cod for help, and by
not asking for it He shewed tixat suffering was His own mil,
and thirdly, by saying "How else shall the Scripture be fulfilled"
He shewed that He had Cod's authority for what He did.
After noting Augustine's remark that not all who bear swords
do die by the sword but that some die of fever,^ Aquinas made
(l) Louis IX died of fever in A.D.1270 while crusading.
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elaborate suggestions about the meaning of the sword itself.
The sword, he said, is threefold and can be interpreted in
three ways. Firstly, there is a material sword wiich has been
(1)
drawn by sinners; Secondly, there is a sword of divine
(2)
judgment . And thirdly, there is a sword of the divine
(3)
word, ' Jesus' saying, therefore, should be understood in
three ways. At taia point the symmetry of the sword play has
been broken, for Aquinas did not make clear how the three ways
arise from the threefold significance of the sword, and, in fact,
he seemed to give only two ways of understanding the saying.
Those who kill with the material sword, he said, shall not only
perish by the sword, but perish by their own swords.^ On the
othe hand, the sword can be understood as the sword of
condemnation, turning this way and that, which God put before
(5)
the gate of Paradise. ' This sword of Judgment fall3 upon
those who condemn others or those who on their own authority take
what does not belong to them. From the text, then, it would
seem that Aquinas, for some reason or other, either did not fit
(l)"The wicked have drawn out the sword and have bent their bow
to cast down the poor and needy, and to slay such as be of
upright conversation.
Their swords shall enter Into their own hearts, and their bows
shall be broken." Ps. XXXF11. 14 - 15.
(3)"And I will make void the counsel of Judah and Jerusalem in
this placej and I will cause them to fall by the sword before
their enemies." Jeremiah XIX.7.
(3) And take the sword of the spirit, which is the word of God.
Iphesians 71. 17.
(4) "De ylaciio material!, quia qui gladio perimit, gladio peribit,
idest suo. non alieno."
(5) Genesis.111.24.
the sword of the spirit into Ms threefold interpretation,
or identified it with the sword of judgement. The clearness
of the threefold division suggests that he would not forget
the sword of the spirit accidentally, and so it can be taken
that he made the assumption that God's judgement and God's
word can be discussed as it they were the same tMng.
TMs broken symmetry is all the more awkward because
Aquinas did not consider how the threefold notion of the sword
was linked on the one side to the sword which was to be 'put up'
and on the other to the sword by wMch those who take the sword
shall perish, that is, he did not say whether or not the sword
divinae sententiae is the sword which is taken up or the sword
wMch punishes. If indeed the same sword is meant, and this
seems likely because Aquinas thought those who take the sword
unlawfully parish by their own swords, it is not easy to see
that the sword divinae seotentiae can have any other meaning
than that created by this identity.
For all Ms elaboration, therefore, Acjiinas did not really
clear up the significance of the swords. It would be hard to
say now whether he was beaten by Ms own elaboration or
whether he ought to have elaborated even more elaborately, but
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it 3eems not to have been an entirely fruitful exercise.
Of the ]egions of angels Aquinas noted that Jesus said
He could have asked^for their help, not that he could have
called or brought them. By choosing this word, He stressed
that His position was that of a man at the same time that He
shewed himself most in contact with the power of God. An
angel, said Aquinas, could be anyone who serves God, "Who
(2)
makath His angels spirits and his ministers a flaming fire"
He thought therefore, that the Roman legions could have been
Christ's Igions of angels, just as later the legions of Titus
and Vespasian ware servants and therefore angels of God when
they destroyed Jerusalem. That Jesus did not ask for help
was taken by Aquinas as answer enough to those who say that
God can do only what He does, for if Jesus did not ask for
the legions for which He could have asked it is clear that He
is likewise able to do many things which He does not do.
Of the third way of seeing this incident of the hindering
of Peter, Aquinas remarked that although Jesus did not say which
Scriptures were to be fulfilled, all the prophets mad his
irpit" quia vldebat eum praesumentem, ideo dicit, Hon possum
rogare Patrem meum? Et non dicit, Jon possum vocare,vel"




meaning more or less clear, and it could be found in the words
of Luke "Ought not Christ to have suffered these things and to
(1)
enter into His glory."
For the majority of his ideas Aquinas had relied heavily
on the fathers before him. He did not, as usual in his own
commentaries, give the whole collection as in the Catena Aurea.
He did not for example mention the remark of Rabanus Maurus
that the ear of spiritual hearing was restored to believing
Jews as well as to Gentilesj perhaps because he thought it
unimportant. It is interesting, in view of his care to
distinguish between the swords, that he did not mention Hilary's
idea that Jesus bids him return his sword into the sheath
because He would destroy them by no weapon of man but by the
sword of His mouth.
He attributed, in his commentary, the observation that
not all those who take the sword sinfully, perish by it, to
Augustine, whereas in the Catena it is first attributed to
Hilary, an older contemporary of Augustine.
One can certainly not criticise Aquinas for such small
omissions and uncertainties; they may or may not be significant.
(1) Luke XXIV.26.
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The notable originality in his commentary on this passage
appears to be in his effort to systematise and integrate,
to divide and subdivide into sections for the sake of clarity.
As has been seen however, this can have its dangers. It
also appears that he alone noticed that Jesus puts Himself
in the position of a man at the moment of revealing His accessibility
to all the powers of God.
A Catholic Commentary^ says that Jesus' rebuke at
Peter's blow shows that violence leads to violence, and that it
is therefore useless. If the question had been settled as a
contest of strength Jesus could have had at His bidding not
twelve powerless apostles but 72,000 angels. 3ut Jesus did not
make even a show of physical strength because it would have
contradicted all the prophecies of a meekly suffering Messiah.
Underlying all Aquinas's elaborations there was perhaps
some such assumption as that it should be reasonable for a
wicked aggressor to be punished by the sword of the righteous
acting in defence, and he sought to shew that this was Jesus'
meaning. But however reasonable the assumption it hardly fits
(2)
the pattern of everts, for, as Professor Macgregor says
(1) p.900
(2) p.25.
Peter's sword was used in defence, and yet Jesus rebuked him
and told him to put it away. Professor Macgregor concludes
that Jesus meant that any use of the sword, defensive or
aggressive, is evil, and that anyone who uses one will 'perish
by the sword' and, apart from Augustine's distinction between
authorized use of the sword and unauthorized talcing of it,
Roman Catholic thinkers have never found in this incident any
justification for war. They have in fact sought much less to
harmonise this incident with other more 'warlike' texts than
to bring the latter into line with what is obviously regarded
as Jesus' normal pacific teaching and example. They have
sought to bring the command to buy swords into line with the
command to put one away.
Despite any underlying assumption, much of Aquinas's
commentary shares this traditional frame of mind. He did not
mention, for example, Augustine's distinction between using
and taking the sword, although he included it in the Catena
Aurea and he quoted arid aeceptedthe distinction in the war
articles. In the commentary he sought to show that Jesus'
thoughtful non-resistance is a pattern for all Christians.
Aquinas did not relate the following of "this pattern to the
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more general and important principles involved in deciding
how far discipleship calls for imitation of Christ or how
far the uniqueness of Christ's being led Him to behave at
times in a way so unique that ordinary folk could have little
hope of truly imitating Him, but he said that Christ meant
the incident to be an example of non-resistance for his
followers? arid by pointing out that Jesus could have prayed
for military aid, as a man to God, and yet resisted in view
of God's purposes he suggested that this is qhat a human being
in the same position might do. The impression is given that
Jesus was throughout acting as a human person and refusing to
rely on special spiritual or supernatural physical help.
liven when he tried to describe the threefold nature of
the sword he did not really relate any of the 'natures' to just
warfare as such. The material sword is the sword of the wicked
and the spiritual sword the word of God, neither of which can
be justly carried into battle in the shape of a physical weapon.
From his references to Jeremiah and to Titus's sack of Jerusalem,
However, it does seem that Aquinas believed that-divine use of
a material weapon was possible to the sword divinae sententiae.
At this point he came closest to Augustine's notion of the
Hawful use' of the sword, although whereas the latter seems
to have thought of the lawful authority for its use as a
judge or sovereign or the appropriate political authority,
Aquinas required for the use of the sword divinae sententiae
the authority of God Himself. In his war articles, a just
war however requires the authority of 'sovereign or judge
or (as a public person! through zeal for justice and by the
authority so to speak of God.'
At the arrest of Jesus, however, this authority was not
forthcoming, for Jesus must speak with God*3 authority and
that authority forbade armed defence. If ever armed defence
had jus'G cause and right intention, it would, presumably, be
in some such situation as that in which Jesus was defended
by Peter, for Jesus was guilt-free and Peter struck his blow
to help the guiliiess and not in selfishness, Met Jesus,
speaking with divine authority, told Peter, who wa3 to be His
representative on earth, to put up the sword. In the framework
of allegorical Interpretation, therefore, it seems that as
Jesus spoke with God's authority and passed on this authority
to Peter, theGhristian Church can have no power to permit war
but may have authority to forbid it.
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The command to put up the sword was quoted in the
Summa Theologica^ as a preliminary answer to the objections
to the idea that clerics should not fight. Aquinas did not
there comment on it but the rest of what he said on the
subject seems to shew that he believed that Christ, by His
words to Peter, meant to forbid absolutely the use of arms
to all clerics, whether the use were considered an expression
of the sword of God's judgement or an expression of just war
in any other sense.
Such a ban, however, was not laid on the laity. To
supportthis hypothesis, Aquinas referred to the distinction
(2)
between using and taking the sword, suggested by Augustine. ,
who said that Peter's main sin was that he too£ the sword without
authority for using it. According to Augustine therefore, Peter
did in fact sin, but God could have gisen authority, and if He
had done so His authority could have justified the use of
weapons. To Aquinas then the incident shews that whereas Jesus
authorised Peter and the other disciples to take swords, but
not to smite with them, so that clerics are forbidden to fight,
Jesus by using the word 'take' to mean take unlawfully did not
(3)
forbid non clerics the lawful use of swords in war authorised by God.
(1) Seeabove p.45-
(2) Gee above p.42.
(3) Catena Aurea pp. 918 - 920.
This Kind of interpretation puts too much strain on one
small sentence, and especially on the word take. No matter
what Augustine and Aquinas made of it, it does not really
mean the same thing as tuse unlawfully', and Augustine
indeed, said that Jesus gave Peter and the disciples
permission to take the sword. Moreover, even if the words
which Jesus used could be understood to mean that He forbade
unlawful use of the sword, they do not at the same time say
anything about or signify approval of any lawful use.
Aquinas also quoted Paul to shew that clerics are not
to fight.^ In his commentary on this passage^ he explained
the meanings of St. Paul's war-imagery. As each warrior has
arms suited to hi3 rank and type of warfare, so has the
Christian. The arms of those who wage war or fight according
to the flesh are riches, honours, pleasures and woxidly and
temporal powers, but 'our arms', said Aquinas, 'are not of
this kind for the arms of our militia are not carnal^ but
powerful from God or to the honour of God. Therefore 'we do
i (/)
not fight according to the flesh, Nevertheless, said Aquinas,
(1) 2 Corintidans X.4-. "For though we walk in the flesh we do not war
after the fleshJ for the weapons of our warfare are not carnal,
but mighty through God, to the pulling down of strongholds.
(2) Oomaentaria in Omnes D.V.Pauli Apostoli vpistorlus. Tomus 11.pp.97-8.
(3) A Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture stresses that 'carnal'
means of human make and strength and raighiy in and through God.
(4.) Aquinas here identified himself with Paul.
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Paul emphasised that spiritual weapons are effective
materially. When he said such weapons were effective in
•pulling down strongholds1, he meant that they can confound
rebels, as God has power 'to pull down and destroy*. Such
destruction is aimed at tyrants who seek to protect themselves
by cunning wiles against God's will for them.
Paul wrote the words of this text as part of a defence
of his own character and authority against the criticisms and
taunt3 of 'false prophets' and their followers in the Christian
community at Corinth. By using the quotation to prove that
clerics should not fight with material weapons therefore,
Aquinas understood that by his use of the plural pronoun Paul
identified Mmself with all the apostles and clerics,although
not with all Christians.
However, a lot hangs on how 'we', which was often used
in Paul's epistles, is interpreted. Moffat, for example, took
into account the practice of Hellenistic Greek, and usually
replaced the 'we', 'us' 'our' pronouns of the A.V. and R.V. with
'I', 'me' and 'mine'. J.H. Moulton thought the papyri usage so
irregular that the right translation was "a problem for the
exegete, not for the grammarian"| "Paul," he says, "used
the first person singular only when he was anxious to make
clear that he was speaking of his own personal attitude.
As, however, the first person singular is often used in this
epistle it would seem that despite Moffat's translation, the
use of the plural pronoun in 'our warfare' might mean that
Paul was not there speaking of himself alone but of a society
to which he belonged.
Right or wrong, therefore, Aquinas's plural interpretation
of the pronoun could be defended. It it were right however,
it would not necessarily follow that by "we" Paul meant apostles
and clerics only rather than Christians as a whole. The
writer in A Catholic Commentary, in fact, describes Paul's
state of mind at the time of writing this epistle in such a way
as to suggest that he meant more than apostles and clerics by
the plural pronoun:
St Paul's recent experience (intense misery
and the triumphant use of it for good) had
stamped on to his mind a new and overwhelming
impression of the meaning of the Cross for the
Christian and the Apostle, the power in and
through suffering, and this thought is so dominant
throughout the epistle that hi3 two immediate
purposes are not only seen in its light, but
are sometimes eclipsed by it".(2)
(1) Crammar of Pew Testament Greek, l.p.87, quoted by Strachan:
The hoffatt hew Testament Commentary on the Second mpistle of
Paul to the Corinthians. p.XXXV.
(2) p.1099.
More than once the writer stresses his belief that
throughout this bpistle Paul meant his descriptions of his
sufferings and way of life as an apostle for all Christians.^
(?)
It is, moreover, quite clear from other apisties that Paul's
"we" was meant very likely to cover all Christians.
Aquinas's understanding of Paul's use of the pronoun "we"
in this epistle, therefore, has not beenwidely followed even
by Roman Catholics. If he was wrong, however, it must be taken
that a right interpretation according to his allegory of the
incident would shew that Paul forbade warfare to all Christians.
Both in his commentary on this passage and in his reference
to the priests who blew the sacred rams' horn trumpets at Jarich<^
Aquinas affirmed nevertheless that clerics can contribute
spiritually and most effectively to a war effort. Their con¬
tributions were not, of course, physically warlike in themselves,
but they could have frightful physical effects. They brought
down reoels and tyrants, for example, and at Jericho the final blasts
on. the priests' rams' hams, helped by a big shout, broyght down
(1) "... It is true that Paul is speaking more particularly of the
sufferings of an apostle, but the principle is in fact the
foundation of all Christians sanctity. This theme appears at
the beginning and remains with us to the end... It is not the
events themselvesbut their inner meaning, the eternal truths
behind them, that fill St. Paul's mind, and above all the truth
that God's power operates through human weakness and sufferings
this appears in every Christian life but most startlingly in
that of the apostles. This is the grand law of strength-in-
weakness, the theme which dominates the whole epistle..." (A
Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture) p.1101.
(2) see for example Philippians III.15-17.,^phesians VI.10-12., Coloss(3) £ee above p. 3.6. HI*/.. bphesians 11.17-18.
the walls.^ A Catholic Commer tar:/ accepts this causal
interpretation, and suggests that the blasts and the shout
and the marching around the walls may have been part of the
ritual of the ban or herem. The hew Testament, it pointe out,
promises a trumpet blast for the victory of the blessed and
the end of the wicked on the judgment day.
Most modern Protestant thinkers would not allow that
such dire physical destruction as befell Jericho was caused
by spiritual weapons. The sounding of the horns, many of them
hold, was a war cry which coincided with an earthquake, and
the cause of the falling down of the walls was the earthquake
rather than the hornblasts. Some hold that the marching itself
may have caused the foundations to shake and the walls to tumble.
When Paul wrote of pulling down strongholds, therefore, Moffatt
took him to mean the overturning of theories which hindered Sod's
(2)
truth, and translated in a way wliich brings out this meaning.
(1) The hams were the Hebrew trumpets of jubilee and used on
joyful occasions! Such instruments were literally "arms" in
the Holy 'Jar, in whicn unusual weapons were used to demonstrate
complete dependence on God. Aquinas should not have said,
therefore, that the priests went to the front only to blow
trumpets and that it is an abuse of their privilege to take
up arms themselves.
(2) "... the weapons of my warfare are not weapons of the flesh,
but divinely strong to demolish fortresses - I demolish theories
and any rampart thrown up to resist the knowledge of God, I take
every project prisoner to make it obey Christ, I am prepared to
court-martial anyone who remains insuborinate, once your submission
is complete..." (II. Corinthians,
The warfare of which Paul wrote, in fact, is widely thought
(l)
to be wholly of the sphere of mind and spirit. ' it cannot
be gainsaid, however, that many Protestant teachers and preahcers
have taught and preached as though they believed that their
spiritual inspirations and exhortations helped to bring
physical and material victory to their own side.
The difference betweenthe two types of warfare was brought
(2)
out more fully in Aquinas's commentary on 2 Timothy II.1. a
passage which he also used to shew that warlike duties, like
commercial enterprises, unsettle the mind and are, therefore,
forbidden to clerics. Physical warfare, he said, seeks to defeat
the enemy, and to this and all who take part in it have to give
up such distractions as commerce and law. Here Aquinas seemed
to assume that war is a calling in the same way as the law or
the Church, and overlooked the fact that as people of different
callings fought in wars they must have been moved by the urgency
of certain situations rather than by a sense of calling.
Spiritual warfare, on the other hand, seeks the defeat of God's
enemies, and to this aid those who take part in it have to give up
all secular distractions such as trade, commerce and the physical
(1) e.g. Strachan in The HoPfatt Pew Testament Commentary on II
Corinthians, pp. 10-11.
(2) TomUS 3. p.126.
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warfare to which these, in the course of things, have to be
sacrificed. For, said Aquinas:
"... the solicitudes of this world
suffocate the word..." (l)
Ther8 is no sign, however, that Aquinas took the fact
that the hpiatle was addressed to Timoth£ to mean that enlistment
for spiritual warfare was open only to clerics or that lay
Christians could not fill at least the non-commissioned ranks,
as they might be called, as soldiers of Christ in the legions
of the spirit. He pointed out that the writer of the mnistle
had used the words "entangleth himself" to warn soldiers of
Christ that if they entangled themselves in distracting
secular affairs they would displease God, but he also noted
that Paul had somewhat justified their taking part in the
(2)
ordinary entanglements arising from office, duty or responsibility.
The extent to which this latter kind of entanglement can be
justified was not settled and Aquinas conveyed the impression
that it was to be tolerated rather than recommended. If, therefore,
as presumably they must, "soldiers of Christ" include "professional
clerics," the latter were rather odd13/ forbidden to entangle
(1) "... quia sollicitudo hujus seculi suffocat verbum..." - ibid.
(2) "... I commend unto you rhoebe our sister, which is a servant
of the church which is at Cenchrea: that ye receive her in the
Lord, as becometh saints, and that ye assist her in whatsoever
business she hath need of you..." Romans XVI. 1-2
themselves in certain parts of the business of being soldiers
;
of Christ whereas the business of being soldiers of Christ was
allowed to entangle them on the ground that they were "professionals"
As this latter entanglement was tolerated, however, rather than
recommended, it would seem that such "professionals," because
of the needs of their calling, might be led to act in ways which
fall short of the highest Christian ideal laid down for soldiers
of Christ.
In the war articles Aquinas went further and tried to set
limits to the extent to which clerics may be entangled in, or
may entangle themselves in, physical warfare. The wolf, the
pillager and the oppressor he should withstand with all the
might of prayer and estcommunication, and he should give all
spiritual help and encouragement to those who withstand them
physically, but he should not fight. In war, therefore, a
cleric's calling both enables him to become entangled in
certain worldly affairs in which, according to Aquinas' commentary,
no soldier of Christ should entangle himself, and at the same
time witholds him from certain deeds, such as fighting, which,
presumably, Aquinas thought a kind of self entanglement.
But if a cleric's vocation allows him to be entangled
in general in things otherwise forbidden him and yet forbids
him becoming entangled in certain of those things, the
criterion of what he can and cannot be entangled in must be
drawn from some higher principle. For clerics such a
principle would be implicated, presumably, in the vocation.
To Aquinas, it would seem, it was that aspect of the priestly
vocation expressed in the ministering of the Sacraments of
the Body and Blood*^ But he apparently felt no similar
incongruity and unseemliness at the notion of the going forth
to war of those to whom the Sacraments had been ministered.
The awkwardness of the distinction arises mainly from the way
Aquinas handled the phrase "entangleth himself." A modern
Roman Catholic would have the passage mean that a soldier of
(2)Christ should be unwilling to be entangled in worldly affairs
and such an interpretation makes Aquinas's seem at least over
elaborate. If a cleric helps the just he can hardly keep
himself free of the entangling cares of the world which Aquinas,
in his commentary, says are forbidden to soldiers of Christ, and
once it is allowed that spiritual help and worldly care may be
(1) "... As often as you shall eat this bread and drink the chalice,
you shall show the death of the Lord until he come..." I Corinthians
(2) Bible^ translated by R.A.Knox. - XI.26.
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the same thing it would follow that where they are, the cleric,
as a soldier of Christ, takes a spiritual part in warfare on
the grounds of his office. He would be justified, therefore,
as cleric and soldier of Christ, in doing certain things because
of his office, but not in doing these same things as arising
naturally from his calling as a soldier of Christ. It would
seem that in going to war spiritually, therefore, clerics act
as though the less important were more important than the more
important.
On the other hand, if it were allowed that a cleric could
self-entangle himself spiritually in physical warfare, Aquinas's
grounds for declaring it "altogether incompatible" for him to
take part in it physically must be questionable, as the motive
and end of the spiritual and physical warfares would be the
same. Aquinas seems to have wanted to shew not that clerics
should not go to war but that their calling allowed them to go
to war only in certain ways. In doing so he seems to have been
unaware that it is just because a cleric's calling is
Cnristianity that it is impossible for him to separate a
vocational justification from a Christian one, and so he states
nevertheless that in practice the ways of fighting for clerics
and laity are poles apart. Whereas clerics are to encourage
the warlike efforts of others, it is absolutely irregular
for clerics themselves to shed blood. Rather than shed
blood, they must allow their own blood to be shed. Aquinas
did not say it was sinful for a cleric to shed blood.
Instead he used the words irregular, and altogether unlawful.
Just what fine line stands between these and sinful he did
not make clear. But it does seem clear that the metaphorical
use of the terms of warfare to describe spiritual things
leads to a cleric being forbidden to be a soldier of Christ
in one sense simply because he is a 30ldier of Christ in
another. And although in his commentary Aquinas contrasted
the ends of spiritual and physical warfare, in the war articles
his reply to the objection that clerics so encourage and permit
physical warfare that there can be no purpose in their holding
practically aloof from it allows that in the eyes of the
faithful the end of just wars is the same as the end of clerics,
that is, the divine spiritual good. And, indeed, the general
drift of his meaning rather suggests that it is in order for
clerics to advise others to fight and the advising is more
meritorious than the fighting.
When in the war articles Aquinas quoted Paul's opinion
that to egg on someone else to do things comes to the same
thing as doing them oneself,^ therefore, it might have
been expected that it would occur to him that the advisers and
strikers ware about the same business and even that, especially
in the light of Paul's words, there might be something
sinful in the business of war. However, he put the quotation
into one of the objections to his own belief that clerics should
not fight, and instead of using it to suggest that cleries
share the sin of warfare he suggested rather that, as they
share responsibility for it, they should also share its
(2)
rewards and privileges. But in his own commentary 'Aquinas
agreed that one who consents to or condones a bad deed and
one vfoo commits it share the sin. Consent he thought
expressed by praise, help, favour, or even neglecting the
chance of correcting a sinner. This last was especially
sinful if it were done by one whose calling took in the
correcting of sinners. Death he believed the fitting reward
of sin and the death of a sinner the worst possible kind of
death.
Anyone, indeed, who fell into the sin of consent or
{l) "... They who do such tilings are worthy of death and not only
they that do them but they also that consent to them that do
them..." Romans 1.32.
(2) Tomus I pp. 4-2-3.
condonation would be in the direst straits. A Catholic
Commentary says that condonation of the sins listed by
Paul is a further sin idriich could be added to the list, but
which Paul set apart as "the climax of all the depravity
mentioned before." The writer thinks Paul did not exaggerate,
"for to abet and to applaud evil is doing the devil's own
work."*1)
(2)
It is true that Paul did not put warfare into his list,
but after comparing it with some of the things he did put in
it might seem not unreasonable to ascribe its omission to
editorial oversight rather than to absence of evidence of
suitable qualifications. And unless the grounds of his
statanents can be shewn to be more sound, Aquinas, by
encouraging clerics to take part in warfare themselves
spiritually and to encourage others to fight physically, may
seem at times to have done precisely what the text condemns.
This is a serious matter. In Aquinas's own view, the sinful
use of the sword unrepented for is punished with eternal
damnation.
But if clerics were too holy for the less meritorious
(1)p.l051.
(2) Unrighteousness, fornication, widkedness, covetousness, malice,
envy, murder, debate, deceit, malignity, whispering, backbiting,
hating God, despitefulness, pride, boasting, inventing of evils,
disobedience to parents, having no understanding, breaking
covenant, faithlessness, lacking natural affection, implacability
and lacking mercy.
work of fighting physically, the same was not true of holy
days. Aquinas thought that the Maccabees' decision to
fight on a Sabbath was meant to teach that such warfare had
bean blessed, although it seems far raorelikely that on this
occasion a natural wish for survival overrul-ed religious
scruples. lot to safeguard the commonweal oi the faithful
on such days, said Aquinas, was to tempt God. Jesus healed
on the Sabbath: ^
"... Hence physicians may lawfully
attend to their patients on holy days.
Yet much more reason is there for safe¬
guarding the commonweal..."(2)
It is perhaps surprising, therefore, that clerics are
forbidden to take part wholeheartedly, or even to take a
leading part, in such an important task.
In deed, in spite of the fact that when clerics were
allowed to take part in war spiritually they have had the
highest methods and aims, they were nevertheless never allowed
to authorise wars. In the war articles Aquinas quoted Romans
X111.4* to shew that the responsibility for doing thi3 must
lie with the sovereign or person or persons in charge of kingdom,
province or city.
(1) John VII. 23.
(2) S.T. II.II. Q.40. Art. 4» See above p.49
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In his commentary^ on this passage he accepted without
question Paul's statement that the ruler has the right to
execute God's judgment, and he added that Paul spoke
according to the practice of princes who carry the instruments
of punishment as their insignia of office, such as bundles of
sticks for scourging and axes and swords for death. It was
the duty of those in authority to lay such punishments on
evildoers, and Aquinas referred to a number of Old Testament
texts to shew that those in authority who were zealous for
justice and wrought God's vengeance on the wicked acted not
only according to law, but in a manner worthy of all praise and
(2)
rewards for themselves and their armies. ' Rather surprisingly,
the text Aquinas quoted was from Psalm LXXX33.(3) The verse he
quoted is addressed to rulers and exhorts them to do justice,
but the psalm as a whole does not guarantee their goodness or
integrity of judgement, and the warnings it heaps upon them
must mean that they had been rather a bad lot. For besides
being advised to act rightly, they are reminded that God is
above them, rebuked for sins and backslidings and threatened
with punishment. The psalmist even prays for their punishment and sings:
(1) Tomus I. p.2A2.
(2) "There will be a reward for his army, and for his labour by which
he has served me against her..." ( Bzek XXtX)
"... Flee from the face of the sword because the sword is the
avenger of evils..." (Job XIS)
(3) Psalms LXXXII.4.
But I, I have said, ye are Gods,
Yes, all of you soas of the Highest.
But yet like to men ye shall die ^
And shall fall like to one of the nobles.
So whatever their divine authority, the nobles are
likely to die the death of the wicked.
A Catholic Commentary says that in Romans XIII .4. Paul
insisted that submission and obedience tothe ruling government
is demanded by divine law. "Leaving all questions of natural
law aside," no government, he thought, could obtain and retain
power without God's will. To disobey the government, therefore,
is to disobey a divinely appointed authority, and so all
governments, however bad or tyrannical, must be respected and
obeyed. Aquinas is quoted as both agreeing with this and making
a different statement on the subject. The writer agrees with
(3)Paul's description of the ideal king and government as a
description of government as it should be, and that the laws
of such a government are moral laws which should be obeyed for
God's sake.
Yet, says A Catholic Commentary, by natural law, as long as
(ITw. 6 Sc 7. The translation is from the unprinted mss of
William Barnes. He added the footnote to v.7: "..."Nobles" -
or Wicked. The word "Princes" of our version does not seem a
likely reading in a parallel with "men" in the former arm of the
twintbought." Barnes probably had in mind the colloquial expression
"one of the wicked" - than whom Falstaff at one time claimed to
be little better.
(2) pp. 1074 - 5.
(3) Romans. XIII.3-4«
the means are compatible with the moral law, every citizen
has the right to resist injustice, even when the injustice is
done in the name of government. It is allowed that in many
cases conscience has to be the final arbiter for the individual
and that no Christian is bound to obey government orders when
they go against the divine law, or support state against Church.
Here Paul did not mean to support one type of government
against another, but simply to justify the divine ordination of
government in general, hvan a pagan government, he thought, is
"power on the side of the good, and the early Church stood
by this principle even during the persecutions. Nor did Paul
mean that all state laws in general are right, and A Catholic
Commentary, therefore, says that it must be allowed that for
Paul not all state laws have power to bind a Christian
conscience. At the same time, however, it says that duty to
the government is both a duty imposed by God and a precept of
the moral law.
Such an understanding of Paul really amounts to allowing
that whereas, in general, government, on the strength of its
appointment and abstract ideals, shares in God's majesty and
(l) Romans XIII. 3-4.»
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divinity, its particular practices often have to be resisted
in natural moral law and the individual
conscience. It is difficult enough to separate the judgment
of an institution from judgment of those who run it, but it is
quite unreasonable to try to justify the latter on the grounds
that they ought to be fulfilling an ideal which they ought
to be aiming at even if they have never heard of it.
Nevertheless, Paul has often been made to teach uncritical
Christian subservience to the state, and this teaching has often
been stretched to justify the state's right to conscript
citizens for the execution of war. Paul wrote before the
persecutions beganand this hpistle was addressed to Christians
in Rome, the seat of the finest kind of civil government known
to the ancient world. Moreover, as Professor Macgregor says,
Paul nimself knew the Roman legions as a police force bound to
the keeping of law and order, and
"... It was thus that Paul knew the
Roman soldier, and doubtless would
approve of ilia..." (2)
Roman militarism, on the other hand, was "both aggressive and
ruthless and anything but just in the Christian sense, as
Chr istians of Paul's time were soon to learn, and so on these
(1) See above p .10.
(2) The New Testament Basis of Pacifism, p.85.
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grounds Professor Macgregor thinks that by justifying the
ruler's right to the sword Paul load in mind the keeping of law
and order, of which he was aware, and not field warfare, of
which he knew nothing.^ This distinction is in itself
worthwhile, but that it makes for a clearer understanding of
the work of the legions may be doubted. The same legionaries
went on to the battlefield as on the beat, and it is, therefore,
very difficult to know vfoen each becomes the other and whether
the different aspects of their activities are separated by
the qualities or by the numbers involved.
But the suggestion that Paul had in mind the keeping of
civil law and order does seem to add weight to the often-made
(2)
remark that these "political" teachings are placed between
two calls for Christian love. From this placing it has been
thought that Paul meant to say that politics should be
conducted with the love which loves the enemy, and therefore
includes non-resistance, and the love which works no ill on
a neighbour, and therefore fulfils the Law. Politics, therefore,
should be conducted in the spirit of Christian love, for:
(1) R.A.linox's translation of this passage assigns responsibility
for wielding the sword to the "magistrate."
(2) Romans XIII. 1-7.
"... Dearly beloved, avenge not
yourselves, but rather give place
unto wraths for it is written,
"Vengeance is mine, I will repay,"
saith the Lord..." (l)
Earth's exegesis of Romans XIII 1-7 amounts to
revealing it as a summary of the undifferentiated and
unrelieved despair of our sin-permeated lives. Distinctions
between government and police force seem irrelevant if the
sword is the sword of God which He wields both as sword of
government and as sword of revolution. The wrath of God
(2)
meets all human endeavours, for, "after all, we are men,"
and therefore sinners. War and peace become almost indistinguish¬
able in the ominous shadow of the sword of God's judgment held
over the wicked.
Aquinas referred to Romans XII.19 briefly in his reply
to the objection that warfare contradicts the teaching of
non-resistance in the hew Testament. He himself followed
Augustine's statement that such teaching should be borne in
readiness of mind, but that it need not be followed in all
(3)
circumstances, in his own commentary ' he tried to set out
his meaning at greater length. He linked the passage with
(1) Romans XII.19. The prophecy quoted is from Deuteronomy XXXII.35.
(2) Barth: The bpistle to the Romans, p.490
(3) Tomus I. p.237.
the servant songswhich predict a suffering Messiah,
and with Jesus' command to turn the other cheek, but added
Augustine's remark that, as Jesus Himself, when struck,
did not turn his other cheek, the command should be followed
in spirit but need not be followed literally. Just as
Jesus offered up his whole body for the true good of man, so
this command aims at the same truth. Augustine argued that
this good may include correction as well as peace. Neverthe¬
less, these precepts should be ever before us so that they
become part of the will and prevent us returning evil for
evil.
Paul, said aquinas, saw non-resistance as part of the
general commitment to God, Who can judge, defend and avenge,
and Who openly made this the ground of His command. Aquinas
also quoted Peter's words about "Throwing all your care upon
(2)
him, for he has care of you." ' Nevertheless, Aquinas
thought such out and out dependence on God called for only
when no earthly ministers of justice were at hand. Indeed,
as long as there is no hatred behind it, recourse to an
earthly judge or authorised opponent of agresssion opens
the way to God*3 judgment arid wrath "whose ministers princes
are."
(1) Isaiah, h and hill.
(2) 1 Peter. V.7.
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There is no doubt that in the war articles Aquinas
professed to give the answer of Christian revelation to the
moral problem of war. In very few pages twertyone Biblical
quotations - seven from the Old Testament and fourteen from
the Hew Testament - are referred to. There are also twentytwo
other quotations, all of them, with exception of one from
Aristotle and an indirect quotation from the Book of Stratagems
by Frontinus, from Christian writers, and most of them from
Augustine. Considering the length of the war articles the
number of texts quoted is large, but there are many other
relevant texts which Aquinas ignored. He did not refer to any
saying of Jesus in which war was mentioned, nor did he remark
that Jesus said nothing directly about the morality of warfare.
This unawareness may account for his not hesitating to pronounce
a Christian answer with all the tones of certainty even on such
little evidence. In fact, the only words of Jesus he actually
quoted in his own answers justifying war are "Give not that Which
is holy to the dogs" and this is only used by way of analogy.
He referred also, indirectly, to the peace which Jesus came to
bring. All the other sayings of Jesus which he quoted as part
of the objections, and therefore on the side of non-participation,
he contrived to his own satisfaction to reconcile with war.
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This he did by applying a particular exegesis of the passage in
question or by quoting the authority of Paul or the Old Testament.
His exegesis in his commentaries shews great learning, and
all the insight and understanding expected from such a scholar.
At times it is too allegorical, oversubtle or literal, but this
was simply a reflection of the times in which he lived. The Catena
Aurea reveals his width of knowledge, the commentaries the
independence of mind with which he applied it. In general it would
seem fair to say that in the Catena Aurea Augustine stands out as
the only commentator who made a consistent effort to reconcile
Jesus' pacific and non-resistant teaching with the justice of war.
In his commentaries Aquinas did not make a point of following
Augustine nearly so directly as in the war articles, in which he
followed him almost slavishly. He applied Biblical texts with
(1)
fchat often amounts to carelessness and unimaginative rationalism.
(l) There appear also to be flaws of reasoning in the war articles,
apart, more or less, from exegesis. To kill a man who is using
the sword unlawfully must be, according to Aquinas's belief, to
despatch him to his eternal punishment, (though if it is done
slowly enough the victim may have time to repentJ) Yet war is
justified on the ground, amongst other grounds, that nothing
is more hopeless than happiness for sinners. Not everyone in
battle can escape with wounds and time to repent.
Aquinas's reply to the objection that since warlike exercises and
tournaments are forbidden by the Church so should war be also, is
that only tournaments which end in plunder and slaughter are
forbidden. This is a contradictory answer.
Aquinas's ethical distinction between the positive lie and
negative deceit is in itself rather dubious. He says that it
is perfectly right for someone to be deceived by what we say and
do because we do not declare our full purpose and meaning to Mm.
The righteousness of this must depend, at least, on the circumstances,
and when not only our silence but our deliberately deceitful action
is involved, this would seem too positive to be justified on the
ground that we are only withholding the truth. This point has to
be considered particularly in relation to Joshua's conduct at Ai.-
Joshua VIII.4..
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Aquinas admitted that Jesus taught non-resistance and
love of the enemy, but it is clear that he thought this
teaching could not be taken at its face value, and that it
was too "vague", "general", or "simple" to be understood
properly. And so he elaborated and analysed it, and surrounded
(1)it with conditions. In fact, perhaps he made it fit more
comfortably into the consciences and circumstances of
human beings. Such a process is quite understandable, but
it runs into many dangers. It was such conditioning of these
absolute demands of Jesus which made it possible for him to
adopt his own position on the question of war.
The main line drawn in Aquinas's thought between
Christian warfare and non-resistance i3 the same as that
which he drew between Christians and clerics, and between
private ethics and public ethics. But from the texts considered
no real basis for such a distinction can be found in the
teaching of Jesus or of the New Testament, except, perhaps
by implication, from Romans XIII.4* But all these
distinctions were applied by Aquinas within the sphere of
Christian and not of secular morality, and in the war articles
he x-jas not talking about the justice of war as a secular
(1) Literal love of the heart is obligatory to all, but only in
cases of necessity is active love demanded. We need not love
other people as individuals, though we can love them as men
capable of happiness. We need not shew the effects and signs
of inward love to our enemies as individuals, but we must shew
the outward signs and effects of our general love.- See ST. II.II.Q.
XXV. Art. VIII. IX.
activity but as an activity in which Christians may
take part.
It is obvious, therefore, that we must look into
Aquinas'3 ethical and political thought for further
understanding of how he came to make these moral
distinctions between individual and public, and lay
and clerical morality. 3o far they appear to have no
basis in revelation, unless certain interpretations of
Romans XIII are accepted. Aquinas, however applied them
to revelation in such a way as to satisfy himself that
he had in no way distorted its spirit and meaning. But
the present examination of his use of revelation suggests
the he might have done so. Whether in fact he did so is
a matter of importance, as the behaviour- required by the
two moralities appear very different.
No judgment can be made without research into other
reaches of Aquinas's thought and without considering some
of the ethical and political matters involved.
CHAPTER FOUR
SUBJECTIVE JUSTICE AND OBJECTIVE JUSTICE.
The most controversial Issue which has arisen in connection
with Aquinas's doctrine of the just war is that of the importance,
for Aquinas and other medieval writers, of a subjective fault in
the enemy, ar.d of a subjectively right intention in the just side.
There are two opposing schools of thought on this issue, one holding
that subjective justice and injustice are not vital, and that
Aquinas, if he had been aware of the distinction, would have thought
so too, the other maintaining that subjective justice and injustice
are vital, and that Aquinas and most other medieval writers most
certainly held this view.
In this distinction between subjective and objective justice,
a man is regarded as being subjectively just if he is acting
innocently or righteously according to his own honest conscience,
inadequate, ignorant or mistaken as it may be, and objectively just
if his action, as judged, apparently, by a perfect and impartial
arbiter, co-operates, whatever the intentions inspiring it, with the
best possible opportunities for order and harmony that the moment
presents. A man is objectively unjust or at fault if his action,
whether in isolation or in co-operation with others, is, whatever his
beliefs or intentions, in fact wrong or unfair, in that it is
causing injustice, distress or harm to others. Regout, while
discussing the importance of this distinction in the doctrine
of the just war, first gives a simple illustration of how it
may occur in ordinary life, and it is interesting to note that
although he recognises the likelihood of there being degrees of
justice and injustice in the same act, he is prepared to class
anything less than absolute innocence as subjective fault or
guilt. In effect, therefore, he makes subjective justice
synonymous with innocence.^ The example he gives is of the
wrongful retention of someone else's goods. It is possible
that the 'thief is under the misapprehension that they truly
belong to him, and in this case, he is only objectively unjust.
On the other hand, if he realises his fault, or is in any degree
culpable because of negligence or simplicity of mind, he is both
objectively and subjectively unjust. A consequence of this
distinction is that where one's adversary is both subjectively
and objectively unjust, one has the right and indeed the duty to
punish as well as to recover one's goods. Where there is only an
objective fault, punishment is not permissible. In the first
case the culpability of the wrongdoer is the first concern;
society itself is menaced, and the ideas of punishment and of
(l) ha Doctrine de la Guerre Juste, pp. 25 - 30.
vindictive justice predominate. In the second case, the loss
suffered by the individual is the primary concern, and
commutative justice demands that the goods should be restored
to him.
He goes on to say that in 'recuperation' the emphasis is on
the thing which should be restored to its owner, and this is
governed by commutative justice, in which the interest of the
person who has been harmed, predominates.^ In punishment,
the emphasis is on the person of the criminal. Here the
general interest predominates, and vindictive justice is applicable.
In every case goods should be restored to the rightful owner, but
punishment is only applicable where there is culpability. However,
the act of restoration, even when it involves violence, and even
when the wrongdoer is culpable and guilty, need not in itself have
the character of punishment *
The significance of this distinction in the doctrine of the
just war is that certain modern writers, such as Vanderpol and
Stratmann, uphold the theory that the medieval thinkers were right
in implying or stating that every just war is necessarily punitive
in character, and therefore that a true subjective injustice or guilt
in the enemy is essential for a war to be just, whereas most break
(1) p.33
completely away from this fundamental principle by deciding that
in certain circumstances a purely objective fault legitimises war,
which thereby loses its punitive character, though not its justice.
Regout allows that there is, for various reasons, a difference
of emphasis between medieval and later writers,^ but says that
since the actual conceptions of subjective and objective justice
were not made relevant to war before Vitoria in the sixteenth
(2)
century, the medieval writers simply did not consider this
question. He therefore does not hold that the difference of
opinion was so radical as some would make it, but that it appears
to be deep because of an omission on the part of the medieval
writers explicitly to consider such a difference. There is no
more opposition between later and earlier opinions than exists
between a tree and its roots. It simply did not occur to the
medieval writers to consider the possibility of a 'fault* being
subjectively justj what looked like a fault they called a fault.
But even they made a distinction between a 'war of recuperation'
and a 'war of punishment', and this, Regout thinks, is the beginning
of the true distinction mads explicit much later by Vitoria and
V
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(1) pp. 25 - 29.
(2) pp. 165 & 300.
others, who use it in determining that a war .against those only
objectively unjust is a war of recuperation, and a war against
those subjectively unjust is a war of punishment. Regout
seems to imply that since a war of recuperation is, before the
twentieth century, universally admitted, the fundamental idea
behind the just war theory is the maintenance of objective right
and justice, whether or not the moral element be taken into
account.
The reason for attributing to medieval writers such a
disproportionate emphasis on both the corresponding elements of
fault and punishment in a just war Regout thinks is due to one
or two factors. The first is the pacifistic tendencies of
Vanderpol, who is the chief misinterpreter in his eyes. The
second is that the word 'vindicare1 does not necessarily imply
vengeance or the act of punishing, but can be used to refer to a
quite impersonal act of reorganising an unjust into a just
situation. He further makes what one cannot help thinking a
somewhat over-ingenious suggestion, that the stress on punishment
in the medieval writers was not due to its importance in their
eyes, but to some uncertainty aoout its necessity or Tightness.
This doubt led to a greater discussion and consideration
of it than of the other reasons for war - defence and reparation-
which were more generally accepted.
Perhaps the soundest explanation given by Regout, however, is
that the medieval writers were considering not exceptional cases
but normal average wars, and the occasions where subjective
justice is simultaneous with an objective fault are rare. This
indeed suggests that there is an air of unreal abstraction about
the whole discussion. Finally Regout argues that the term
•guerre offensive' also made for misunderstanding. The later
writers who talk of a war whose just cause lies in a merely
objective fault avoid the use of the term 'offensive war' because
traditionally this is associated with full penal rights which
are denied in a 'war of mere recuperation'. Vitoria reserved
this term for a war of punishment. Molina was careful to qualify
it and spoke of an 'offensive war of reparation, with limited rights,
(1)
excluding all punishment'. ' The medieval authors, however, used
this term 'offensive war' indiscriminately, or rather with the
emphasis on its distinction from a defensive war, rather than on its
punitive character, and Regout thinks that Vanderpol is misled: if he
(1) p. 302.
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interprets their use of it with this stress in mind.
It is of course significant (as Regout has already noted on
behalf of Vanderpol) that both Regout and Vanderpol interpret
the original doctrines to agree with their own personal con¬
victions. Regout believes that an objective fault is a
sufficient justification for war, Vanderpol does not.
Regout thinks that Aquinas's true attitude might be found by
examining other sections of his workj he stresses that for Aquinas
a punitive war did necessitate culpability in the adversary and
points out that Aquinas was unusual in making the culpability
of the enemy, and not merely the act of injustice or the harm
caused by it, the cause of such a war. This culpability is
certainly not merely internal but extends to its manifestation
in action, but to Aquinas the notion was predominantly subjective.
This however does not mean that Aquinas would condemn a war whose
motive was not to punish but solely to right an objective fault,
or to alter an unjust situation. It might at first sight seem
that war is such a grave evil for Aquinas that it could be
justified only as a punishment. On the other hand a war of
* T Ci
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defence is justifiable quite apart from culpability or punialiment.
The main cause of a war of aggression, the disturbance of
prosperity, order and the tranquillity of the country or community,
would be occasioned as much by an objective as by a subjective
fault, and it is to restore this order - ut suum locum et gradum
teneat unumquodque"^ - that war is mainly justified.
Regout states that Aquinas defined justice primarily as "lus sum
(2)
unicuiaue tribuere". 'and concludes that since respect for order
and justice is one of the most characteristic traits of the
harmonious spirit of Aquinas, he would have agreed that an objective
(3)
fault should justify war.
It will be remembered^ that Mgr de Solages complains that
Aquinas treated the whole question of war too much as a subjective,
individual moral problem whereas it Is truly a matter of social and
objective justice, and of natural law.
Varderpol emphasises that only a punitive war, implying a
serious moral fault on the part of the enemy, is ever justified.
(1) Contra Gentiles. £ib.III.cap.128.
(2) 8.T.11.11.Q.58. Art.l.
(3) pp.90 - 93.
(4) See above, pp.50-51.
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He has no doubt that this was also the opinion of Aquinas and
the other medieval writers# It is as the minister of God that
the king gives authority for a war to be fought as punishment and
for a definite crime or wrong. It is only this which gives him
any right to judge or to condemn, and it is the main requirement
for a just war.^
Stratmann also emphasises tiiat for Aquinas, as for Augustine,
moral guilt in the enemy is the only ju3t cause of war, and this he
(2)
supports by quotations from both. ' He links this condition
with 3t. Paul's teaching on the right of the ruler to administer
God's vengeance by following Vanderpol's interpretation of it as
covering only punishment of evil. The ruler has no power to act
against those who have not sinned. Stratmann regards the idea of
a wrong or injustice which is not accompanied by moral guilt as
•a most doubtful thing', and he judges that later prevalent.
(1) Vanderpols ha Doctrine Scolastiquc du roit de Guerre p.251
(2) "Ut scilicet illi, qui irapugnantur, propter aliquam eulpara
i-npugnationem mereantur." Aquinas also quotes Augustine in
Lib. Qualst, VI.10. when he defines a just war as 'the
agenging of injustice,' when a State or town is to be punished
because its inhabitants have been unjust or have neglected
rightful restitution.
"For the wise 'the just and the pious) it is the injustice of the
opponent's cause which makes a just war" (He civ. Dei.XIX.7.)
"In a just war the other side is fighting on the side of sin"
(De civ. Lei.XIX.15.)
"The good, if they are really good, do not fight against the good.
Those who fight are either the bad against the bad, or the bad against
the good, so never good against good, never the defenders of justice,
against the defenders of justice.(De civ. Dei.mV.5.)
(Stratmann, pp.59 * 62.)
(3) Stratmann. The Ohurch and War, p.64.
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thinking which legitimised it, as a matter of commutative justice,
as a cause of war, as a departure from 'the more perfect teaching
^(li
of St. Augustine and Aquinas, * He himself strictly folloxirs that
teaching and holds it to mean that a war can only be just when the
guilt of the enemy is absolutely proved and is not merely unconscious
or objective. To declare war on those vfoo are ignorant of even a real
guilt is forbidden by the law of nature; to declare war against a
purely material fault is to create greater injustice, though other
means than war may be allowed to deal with it. This insistence on
the necessity of certain moral guilt means to Stratmann that a just
war of aggression is hardly possible. Cut if moral guilt is assured
tnen action against it involves punishment which, to be just, must
'fit the crime'.
Stratmann further claims that Vitoria belongs to the School of
Augustine and Aquinas when he rules that to be jU3t a war must benefit
the whole world of Christendom, This consideration for the community,
rather than for the individual or for individual states, he says
characterises the medieval as opposed to the modern perspective on
the problem. He discusses what might be the Thomist view as to the
possibility of each side having a just cause of war, and recognises
(l) p.64*
that the Thomists do not acknowledge a war to be just on both
sides, but he thinks that this does not mean that they would
not acknowledge a just cause of war in either side, and that in
such doubtful cases would presumably rule that neither side could
fight a just war against the other. He investigates further the
possibility of discovering or achieving an objective judgement of
this moral guilt and innocence of the two sides.
Quite consistently, Regout,MgrAeSolages and other writers who
disregard the importance of subjective injustice in the enemy are
also indifferent to the condition of the right intention. If war
is an impersonal objective adjustment of a situation, the moral
state and intentions of those on either side are irrelevant.
Nevertheless, in order to discover what the medieval thinkers
thought of the matter, some consideration has to be paid to their
writings.
Speaking generally of the traditional doctrine, Regout numbers
only two main conditions, a just cause of war and the authority of
the prince.^ Referring to the third condition, that of a right
intention, he explains that it does not affect the legality of a
(1) p.23.
war. If not fulfilled it does not render an otherwise just war
unjust, and being so closely connected with it it has gradually
become associated not so much with the justification of war itself
but with the way in which war is fought. Since the sixteenth
century it has increasingly lapsed into insignificance and is of
value only in measuring the culpability of warfare, which is quite
unconnected with its justice.
Regout gives an explanation of why some writers have
regarded a right intention as important. It is that they have
treated the question of warfare - apparently wrongly- as moralists
or theologians, and that they have given the word 'justice' far too
exalted and broad a meaning by identifying it with honesty and good¬
ness, whereas its proper and normal meaning is strictly limited to
fair dealings among human beings.^
Speaking more particularly of Aquinas, Regout points out that
all the conditions, including that of the right intention, refer in
any case only to a war of aggression. Aquinas, it is true, doesnot
make any distinction between aggressive and defensive war, but that
(1) pp.23 - 4.
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self-defence was an unconditional right for him is proved by his
acceptance of the idea that one can respond to violence with
violence.^ liven for an aggressive war, Aquinas's condition
of a right intention is, for Regout, of least importance. And
he claims that its absence does not affect the legitimacy of war
in such a way as to suggest that this was the opinion of Aquinas
-j (2)also, '
Horde Solages also treats Aquinas's third condition as of no
(3)
importance, and he connects the unimportance of the right
intention with the reason traditionally accepted for the unimportance
of subjective injustice in the enemy, that is, the objectivity of
the justice of war. But although he himself does not think
that subjective morality is important, he confirms, and indeed
complains as has been already noted,that it was preeminent for
Aquinas, who wa3 not considering this question as one of natural law
or of politics, but as one of individual morality.
Thinkers who stress the importance of moral guilt in the
enemy connect it with the importance of a right intention. A
(1)S.T. 11.11. qu.6A. art. 7 in corp.
(2) p.81.
(3)iAjrdeSolacest La Theolo de la Ouerre Juste, p. 10
(4) See above, p.179 and pp.50-51.
man cannot have a right intention unless his cause is just3
and if the prince does not understand his role as that of an
administrator of God's justice and vengeance he cannot have the
single-mindedness and purity of conscience heeded for just warfare.^
Vanderpol does not minimise, although he does not unduly stress, the
importance of a right intention for Aquinas. He does not distinguish
between 'intention' and 'motive', so the right intention must include
the objective aim and the spirit in which it is carried out, and both
appear to be interdependent conditions for both Aquinas and for
Vanderpol. He points out that only a spirit in which this aim of
doing justice is preeminent is a right one. The sovereign or
f2)
prince must act impartially as a judge^ and should litterly
suppress any other wicked or selfish motives which might accompany
or hinder his intention of achieving perfect justice. The right
spirit, therefore, as well as the right aim is one of impartial
justice. Vanderpol quotes the supporting opinions of other
medieval writers such as Gajetan, Antonin, Hostiensis, Raymond de
Penafort and Bellini. It would certainly seem that for Augustine,
the 'father' of the doctrine, the Tightness of motive is infinitely
more important than any apparently objective justice, at least from
(l)"Only the General and the Army inspired with something like the
Faith of the Israelites of old could let loose so terrible a thing
as war in the spirit of God and not of the devil".(Stratmann, p.61.)
(2N p.88.
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a Christian point of view. For his 'Christianising* of warfare
is solely in terms of motive and intention. What is evil in war
is not that men should die, but that war should be a> nducted in
a spirit of cruelty, vengeance and hatred, and war can be turned
(l)
into 'peace' by the spirit in which it is fought.
Stratmann accepts a right intention as an essential condition
for Aquinas's just war without discussion, and concludes very
simply that this condition would appear at once to condemn most
if not all wars as unjust. In fact he maintains that the
Augustinian-Thomist theory is valuable precisely because it maices
justification of war so very difficult, and is therefore 'the most
practical and useful theory that can be thought out and fits in
with the new moral consciousness which has been bom of the agony
(2)
of the world war'.
In reality, it is difficult to see how this distinction
between subjective and objective justice can be effectively maintained.
The example Regout gives of its occurrence in a dispute between two
persons is so far valid, and it is in accordance with traditional




legal thinking. But it implies applying objective standards
only to one static aspect of a continuing situation. It may
be just for a man whose goods have been taken from him by some
one acting 'under an honest mistake, or even have, been stolen from
him to take measures to recover than,but by standards of objective
justice, it might be decreed necessary to take the respective
needs of the taker and the owner into account, and to make very
sure that no further objective injustice be committed in the course
of recovery. It is this latter condition which makes the relevance
of objective justice to war questionable. An objective injustice
may look like a perfectly legitimate cause of war, but this by no
means ensures that such a war would then in itself be necessarily
just, indeed the impersonal nature of the injustice would weigh
heavily against the justice of injuring and killing persons as a
means of correcting it. To allow an objective injustice as a
sufficient cause of war should imply that objective standards are
paramount, and the objective justice of a war cannot be assured
simply on the grounds that the objectively just side has the
intention of adjusting some objective injustice.
Such objective justice cannot be assessed until a war
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is over, for only then is it possible to balance the deaths
and damages suffered by both sides against the original injustice.
However, the very fact that it is possible for war to be just only
when the objectively just side seeks to right an objective
injustice means that the objectively just side has to act with a
right intention, and a right intention exists subjectively and not
objectively. As the objective justice of war itself cannot be
assured in advance, the right intention must be of great
importance. Moreover, any assessment of the objective justice
or injustice of a situation must be made by a mind, or mind3,
whose terms of reference ar e the fruit of human experience and
opinion. As, therefore, an 'objective' judgement of any
situation must take into account subjective factors, a merely
and wholly objective judgement is virtually impossible in human
terms. There is even a sense in which it can be said that
subjective justice comprehends objective justice, for the
individual human being must take objective justice into account
in determining a right course of action.
A further difficulty arises when the cause of war is
separated from its conduct. If it is legitimate to eliminate
all subjective factors of motive and intention from the cause and
so leave the latter objectively just, the same elimination of
subjective factors might be applied to the separate acts which
constitute a war's progress. If this were done, the progress
of a war would consist of human beings killing and trying to kill
each other without any motive or intention at all.^ This is
clearly absurd.
Looking at the question objectively, it would seem that
nothing less than a crime of the scope of mass murder could justify
war, for it could hardly seem objectively just to kill indiscriminately
to right any lesser crime. Were it otherwise, it would become just
to kill and steal in order to bring down the rich and rescue the
destitute. From a specifically Christian point of view, of course,
the hope of achieving any kind of absolute justice in such an
activity as war is remote indeed. Where much weight is allotted to
the individual personality, and where human nature is held to be
essentially flawed by original sin, justice, insofar as it remains
a wholly human thing, can be thought of only in relative terms
which may present an appearance of disappointing vagueness. It
may be for this reason that some Christians like most secularists
tend to assign justice in war to the objective category.
(l) Any assessment, moral or otherwise, of such a situation, would
be that it was wicked or insane.
Whatever one thinks about the relative importance of and
the relations between them, however, the separateness of the
conceptions of subjective justice and objective justice opens
up a way into the heart of the problem. Justice thus lies
open for analysis. In traditional thinking, the division has
been reinforced by aligning with subjective justice, individual,
inward, religious and self-regarding, as well as other-regarding
morality, and with objective justice collective, social,
political outward-looking and other- regarding morality. Legal
philosophy has always tried to distinguish the boundaries of the
latter group, which concerns the duties of fulfilling the rights
of others who can say they have been wronged if such duties are
not performed. Natural law, on the other hand, because it has
been rooted in human nature, has tried to find eternal and
universal principles from which to deduce that system of duties
whose performance will achieve subjective justice in the individual
or group carrying them out, and objective justice inasmuch as they
fulfil the rights of others. It has often been thought, therefore,
that natural law can bridge the gap between the two kind3 of justice.
Nevertheless, the gap exists, and there has been a natural
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tendency to categorize problems, and their assignment to one
of these partial kinds of justice means that there has been
the danger that they might never be seen in the light of the
overall justice of which the two categories are only subdivisions*
This is what seems to have happened to the problem of war, for
although a passing recognition of the subjective aspects of its
morality has often been made, for allthorough and serious con¬
sideration it has been increasingly assigned to the sphere of
collective, political and secular morality, the sphere of
objective justice.
However, the war articles of the Summa Theoloaica suggest
that Aquinas himself did not consider war from one point of view
alone. From them only it would seem clear that he thought a
just war needed right intention on one side and moral guilt on
the other. It would seem just as clear, however, that he thought
of war as a collective activity, for he never even hinted that war
might be seen not as a matter of just and unjust sides but as one
of just and unjust men. For Aquinas, as long as war was declared
by right authority, the just decision of one man could be held to
comprehend the morality of the individuals in his armies.
Aquinas, therefore, considered war from both the collective-
political and the religious-subjective points of view and
presumably found no conflict betweenthera. He was able to do
this, presumably, becausein fact he saw matters of ethics and
politics from what, in the discussion of subjective and objective
justice, has been called the bridge of natural jaw. For Aquinas,
natural law was the great harmonising principle.
GHAiTLR FIVE.
A SOKMARY OF THE DMEUfcPMENT OF
BATUHAL LAW TEACHING BEFORd AQUINAS
Natural law fco permeates the politcal and ethical thinking
of Aquinas that little is to be won from considering what he
wrote on war without an examination of his understanding of it.
And since by his time it had become an established and at the same
time a complicated way of thinking, this calls first for an
outline of its growth and meaning through previous centuries.
The doctrine of natural law is, broadly, that innately
and ideally, man has an understanding of those moral and divine
laws and principles which are implicit in his vhole make up arid
which should govern his conduct, and that these are made explicit
by his wlole mind but particularly by that most consciously
logical part of it, his reason* TJwse laws arc imprinted in
his very being and in the very construction of his mind, and
by them he is taught what he ought to do in the personal,
social and political spheres. His reason and will are
responsible for achieving such obedience. Just as the eye,
because it is an eye, must see, so the mind, by its very nature
knows In itself that vlilch is good and right.
The doctrine has been the subject of so much controversy
and lias been interpreted so variously th .t it may appear to have
lost much of its authority. Some of the confusion has arisen
from the limitations of huoan speech. Tin, word •nature* for
example, barings into view the possibilities of ambiguity which
are so often met in discussions of theories of analogy. The
confusion reflets the imperfections of the human mind in that
the latter cannot oven create a completely adequate moans of
expression. In one sense the •doctrine' is completely implicit
in man himself; he is necessarily involved in the laws of his
own creation, and since he is naturally a rational being it
might be taken for granted that whenever he thinks about, questions
of right arid wrong he must do so with his mind and that this muot
be the agent and guarantor of his conclusions* Man is not
content to accept such an apparent inevitability without
expanding and exalting it into a doctrine, and in doing tliia
he discovers that it reflects hidden discrepurcies and
difficulties in his own nature*
The idea was first expressed explicitly as a doctrine by
the Greeks, particularly by the Stoics* From then it then passed
into Roman legal thought. Later it is found it; the Church Fathers
the canonists and the theological writers of the early middle ages
In its early stages the divinity of the law of nature is
rarely questioned* There is little insight into the possibility
that the imperfection, as well as the fir.iteneas of mar's reason,
should make him hesitate to identify it with the reason of God,
and to trust its infallibility and power to guide him morally.
The main dispute centres rather round whether it is a law already
and specially adaptud to man's present imperfection, or whether
it is suited only to a state of original or ideal perfection.
This obviously affects the relationship of the natural law to
the iua gentium''^ and to the civil law (wnich more obviously owes
(1) The term iua gentium covers laws obtaining among all peoples
a d is of value in governing relations between states, It
first appeared in the writings of Cicero, and was adopted by
Talus ard i-omponiua* The concept however was not unknown
to the Greeks*
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its origin partly to particular situations and circumstances and
to the more arbitrary and inde endent human will), and also one's
attitude not only to laws but to the authority of the major social
and political institutions such as the family Mid state, with their
dependent considerations of slavery, equality, political authority
and international relations. And altlsough in the early stages it
is little discussed, the question of the metaphysical integrity
of the doctrine of the law of nature is here obviously relevant.
One of the most famous of the early statements of the Stoic
view of natural law was made by Cicero, who wrote:
"True law is right r eason in agreement with
naturej it is of universal application,
unchanging and everlasting! it summons to
duty by its commands and averts from wrong¬
doing by its prohibitions* And it doas not
lay its consiatdB or prohibitions upon good men
in vain, though neither have any effect on the
Sieked* It is a sin to try to alter this law
nor is it allowed to attempt to repeal any
part of It, and it is impossible to ajoLish
it entirely. We cannot be freed from its
obligations by Senate or reople, and we need
not look oirt.aide ourselves for an expound.>r
or interpreter of it. And there will not be
differ® t laws at Home and at Athens, or
different laws now and in the future, but
one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid
for all nations and all times, mid there will be
one master aid one ruler that is Sod over us all,
for Be is the author of this law, its
promulgator and its enforcing judge." (1)
(1) he ,er,ublica. III. xxii.33.
Among the consequences of thia ia a belief in the natural
equality of all man^ with a corresponding freedom and right
of every citiscn to a share in pollteal power.^ He also
(3)
thought of the state as an organic natural growth, but he
is aware that the actual conditions of law and society do not
always embody the ideal. This t pica! Stoic tendency to notice
the discrepancies between the ideal definitions of natural law
and the actual laws of state and society, which ia reminiscent
of the scepticism of the sophists, develops into an attempt to
separate them in definition, care being taken never to use the
term •law' without qualifying it, and to take into account any
discrepancy.
Seneca did not use the terra natural law, but simply 'nature.1
Nevertheless, he too followed the Stoics and held Cicero's
beliefs in the equality of men, in the supremacy of nature and
reason, and in the freedom of the soul. However, he was more
C -reful to allow that existing institutions and laws do not by
any means always witness to their authority, and explains that
only in the primitive and to some extent undeveloped Innocen ce
of mankind was the law of nature fully obeyed and society so
(1) n... by nature w© are disposed to love acaf this is the
foundation of law..." - Be Sealbus. I.xv.43.
(2) "... Dt Oarlyle has rendered a great service by emphasising
the fact that tills is the most important difference between
Cicero and the greatest of the Greek philosophers..• The idea of
the equality of men is the profoundeat contribution of the Stoics
to political thought, that idea has colourod its whole development
from their day to ours, and its greatest influence is in the changed
conception of law that in part resulted from it..."i'cIlwainS The
Growth of > olitcal Thou,; t in the west. pp.114.-115.
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perfectly ordered under the government of the best and wisest
rulers that other conventional laws and institutions were
unnecessary. As things sire, he thought these were necessitated
by the corruption and wickedness of later man, not by the
complexity which is the rich consequence of his creativeness
and progress.
The complexity of natural law theories can be seen most
clearly in Justinian'3 Corpus Iuris Civillis. Professor d'Entreves^1''
maintains that the distinction between the natural and the
conventional is the very backbone of the theory of law laid down
by Justinian, but he also shows how this distinction causes
uncertainty arid controversy, and that such a theory of law in
general is not easily abstracted from the contradictory opinions
in which it is expressed. There is dispute among scholars about
the genuineness of some of the references to natural law. Some
of the most direct and high-sounding of these are thought by some
to be interpolations or, if genuine >to be no more than conventional
rhetoric. The nature of the Corpus Juris Civilis (whose main
part3 were published in 533-534. A.D.) accounts for much of the
difficulty. It consists of the Institutes, a short elementary
book for students, largely based on the four hundred years old
(1) Aquinas. Selected Political Writings. p.XVI.
See also D'hntreves: Medieval Contribution to Political Thought,
pag# 30 and Katural Law. p.23ff.
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Institutes of Gaius; the Digest, a mass of extracts from
juristic writings, representing different schools and outlooks
from the 1st century B.C. to the 3rd century A.D., hastily strung
together by Justinian's commissioners with interpolations to
bring them into line with the law of the 6th century; the Codex,
a collection of previous legislation; the hovels, legislation
from the later years of Justinian's rexgn. Critical examination
of the text may therefore be expected to reveal underlying
contradictions and divergencies of thought.
On this particular question Gaius and Ulpian have often
boen taken as representing two opposing points of view. It
lias been held that Gaius identified natural law with the ius
gentium^ and, while contrasting both with the civil law
which is appropriate only to particular nations and situations,
that he advocated that civil law should also be an expression
of the natural reason which is more universally expressed in
the natural law. It has also been held that he thought natural
law was rooted in the reason of man rather than in his nature
as a whole, and that he thought of it as apprehended by ratner
than created by man.
(1) i cllwain: The Growth of Political Thought ir. the iest. p. 119.
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This interpretation of Gaius, however, can be questioned.
Gaius did say both that the ius gentium has been established
among all men by naturalis ratio^and that it is equally
(2)
observed among all men through naturalis ratio. 'But the only
straightforward identification of the two kinds of law is in a
(3)
paraphrase by Justinian. Iforeover, the true meaning of
naturalis ratio in Gaius is far from clear, for he used it at
times in such a way that it can mean no more than the natural
way of things.^ "Natural" is used of animals^ as well as of
men, and when Gaius described the various institutions which form
the ius gentium as "natural" and so made it possible for his
comae; tators to say that he identified the ius gentium with the
natural law, it may well be that for him the natural law was a
far less predominantly rational thing than it was forother writers.
When Gaius discussed methods of acquiring atod losing
(1) Gaiuss Inst. 1.1. This is repeated in the Institutesof Justinian,
l.ii.l.
(2) Gaiuss Dig.. XLI,1.1.
(3) 'ius naturalu quod sicut diximus at/oellaiur ius gentium1 Where
Gaius says that ius gentium was begotten with the human race
itself, Justinian53 paraphrase says that ius naturale was begotten
by rerum natura with the human race itself.(Justinian. Inst,
ll.i.ll.) This is the paraphrase of the text referred to in
footnote (2) above.
(4) When we capture a wild animal it becomes our property naturali
ratione - Gaius: Inst. 11.66, so too in Justinian Inst. II.i.12.
(5) Animals have their "natural" liberty - Gaius: Inst. 11.66. The
"nature" of bees is wild - Dig. XLI,i.5«
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ownership by iua natural*; aa opposed to the ius civile of
(i)
Home, he replaced the contrast between lua itertlura and lua
£i2Si* b that bet wear lua naturale and iua civilu. Justinian,
paraphrasing in Inst# 11*1. soraetiraus repeated Gaius but on two
points at least (acquisition by capture from the enemy and
acquisition by alluvion) altered the jure natural! o lure gertiua.
This may indicate that for either Gaius, or Justinian's compilers,
or for both, the terms were interchangeable} m the other hard
it .nay indicate that in spito of the ius naturalo quod appellator
ius gentium of JustIniaroInst• II*1.11, Justinian's compilers wore
sore conscious thai Gaius had been of the possible separation of
iua naturale and ius gentium. In Inst* 1.11.(which, however, is
flatly contradicted by 11,1.11.) the separation is explicitly aade
as a logical canseauence of tneir adoption of Ulpian's view of
ius naturalw.
Those who ides tify tho natural law with the ius gentium do
not need to envisage a state of primitive innocence, and they can
accept such institutions as slavery and pri ate property as
rational and just, not because men are by nature unequal but
because such institutions evolve naturally and rightly froa
(1) Gaius. Inst. 11.^5-/9.
certain eircuastarees such as war. Ulpian is usually regarded
as representative of the slightly later view that the law of
nature may not only be differs; t from but even contradictory
to the lus rertiua. Tryphoninuo, iaulus and Florontinus stare
this view, but it is not so certain that Ulpian's identification
of the law of nature with the animal affinities of man, which is
hi a most explicit reason for separating it from the ius tentiua.
(2)
is 30 popular. iaulus, in fact, who does not apeak of reason
at all, clearly says that the ius naturalo is always equitable
(1)
and good. ' iJlplan's opinion that slavery is a result of war
and according to the lus .:,.r.tiura was widely shared, Florentine
going so far as to define it as against nature^lrd Dr Garlyle
suggests that it was tho problem of slavery which first occasioned
the distinction between the ideal law and actual institutions
'd'l')". •'•Private law is threefold; it can Ins gathered from the
precepts of nature, or from those of the nations, or from
those of the city, natural law is that which nature has
taught all animals; this law Indeed is not peculiar to the
boson race, but beio gs to all animals.•• From tids law springs
the union of sale and. female, Which we call matrimony, tho
procreation of children and their education©♦• The law of nations
is that law which laankJU.d observes. It is easy to unuerstaiid
that this law should differ from the natural, inasmuch as the
latter belongs to ail animals, while the former is peculiar to
met-,...11 - Ulpiani Di;..,1.1.1.5-3,
(2) Grotius rejects the notion of a ius naturae which man and animals
share, because those activities comiaon to then have no connection
with justice wiiatsoever* "What the Roman lawbooks say of a law of
nature which we have in common with animals, which they call more
peculiarly iua naturae, besides the natural law which we have in
common with son, which they often call iua Pentium, is of little
or no use. For no creature is properly capable of which does
not by nature use general precepts* as lias been remarked by
ileaiod, Cicero, Lactactius, olybius.tt(Sk»i.Ch»l.Xl»i.)
(3) big. I.i.ll.
(4) "Eastern ag& Sgag&j&a&lft lurls gentium .qqp. qui? dop?ipio aii^ye
gntq natu^ flublcitur.'UDig.l.S.j. probably adopted by Justinian
There Is more uncertainty about private property, Florantinus,
for example, believing it to be natural, primitive and innocent
and iiLpian and Heraogenlanus leaving the question unsettled#
Generally speaking there seems to be agreement that by the
©rid of the second century the belief in the natural ©quality of
men was accepted, and that this led to at least tho theory of
(i)
the right of the people to share political authority# This
theory became on© of the source© of the later theory of social
contract. The a titude of the Roman lawyers to the nature of the
civil law is similarly constant. It might find its direct origin
in the will of an individual and apply only to a unique situation
or particular nation, but it ought nevertheless to embody the
(2)
principles of natural justice. Dr Garlyle, Professor i cllvain
and Professor d'lntrWea agree that the ooraewlat uneasy
consciousness of the difference between the ideal law of nature
and existing institutions of the ius gentlast* is one of the moat
(1) Otherwise, the sovereignty of the people. The theory of popular
sovereignty ws recooeillad with the fact of imperial rule by
reference to the L-jx by w lch the nonulus conferred authority on
the dmperor« It is interesting to note that Gains merely aays
• the wnperor himself receives his imporiisa by a law* (Institutes
of Gains, l.o.) where;is Justinian (Justinian's Institutes. 1.11.6)
says that the oooulus by tho lex re la •yields to iilm and upon him
all its lmporlua and, aaftagiaa1
(2) "... Tho ixis civile is a law which neither departs entiroly from
natural law or tho law of nations, not yet wholly follows it..."
Ulpianj l.i.6#
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striking tendencies in the Gorpuc Juris Givills, and that, in
the words of Professor Mcllwain :
Ulpian and others set forth in
unmistakable terms the idea, nor merely
that tne two are distinct, but that the
ius gentium was of later historical origin
and it3 actual content the result of strife
and war. It was the view3 of Ulpian rather
than of Gaius that later jurists followed on
tills point, as the Institutes of Justinian show,
with the result that the weight of the Roman
lawwas ultimately added to the influence of
the philosophic views of Seneca to combine
with Genesis in forming the theories generally
accepted in the narlier Middle Ages, on the
question of the origin and nature of Social
Institutions such as Slavery and Government,
that is that they are due to a departure
from innocence...3 (l)
and Dr Garlyle writes:
"There can be no doubt that normally the
authors of the Institutes did distinguish
the ius naturals from the ius gentium.
Their formal definition of the ius naturale is,
as we have seen the same as that of Ulpian, that
is they reproduce that definition which suggests
that the ius naturals means little more than the
instincts common to all animals..." (2)
However, Dom. Lottin finds in the Institutes a tendency
to bring together natural law and the ius gentium. He points
out that Justinian leaves out the text of Ulpian which underlines
(1) The Growth of political Thought in the West, pp.119-120 -note,
however, that in the Institutes Justinian starts with lilpians
definition and then follows it with the text of Gaius word
for word, as if there were no contradiction.
(2) R.tf. and A.J. Garlyle: Mediaeval political Theory in the West.
Vol.1, pp.73-4« On the other hand Dr Oarlyle points out the
frequent presence in the Institutes of that other identification
of natural law with the rational and divine nature of man.
(pp. 74.-5)
the difference betveer the two arid uses the same terns to
describe both of them.^' Doa. Lottin also suggests that the
Roman lawyers held a more positivist interpretation of civil
law than of the lua ita; tiua. and that tit© la ter was for
U)
them, therefor®, more closely tied to the iua naturals*
Generalisations cat not be readily abstracted from th®
Qorpus juris Oivill:-» Its text3 raay be interpolated, and eve
where genuine they reflect divis ons arid developments of
opinion on justice. Still, Professor d'hntrevea maintains that,
despite such uncertainties, there is refl cted in it the actual
historic growth of Soman law from narrow to broader and more
(3)
universal conceptions. he points out that to the Somans the
words •nature* and 'natural* tended to mean what was normal and
functional rather than what was divinely ideal, and that the
natural law had no f.ower to overrule established law, its
function, apparently, being its influence as a transcendental
ideal to which the other laws should attempt to approximate
themselves. This, says irofessor d'jwttrWes, supports the theory
that for them the main importer ce of the doctrine of natural law
/1 \ Le Droit l atural chez St Thomas d'Aouin et sea prldlcesseur3.pp.8<-9
Ibid,, p.9.
(3) Natural Law, p.28.
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lay in its practical day to day utility rather than in its
philosophic truth.^ If, however, as has been held so often,
its goodness and compelling power lie in its truth and
perfection, the philosophic truth of natural law can be over¬
looked only at the cost of bringing down the theory to the
level of a description of the ordinary workings out of human
relationships in society.
The early Christian thinkers went to the Bible for
confirmation rather than for denial of the doctrine of natural
law, which had already become weighted with the inevitability
of tradition. The New Testament, although it does not mention
natural law by name, is obviously concerned with the nature of
man and the laws of his human and divine relationships. Christ
shewed that man is essentially spiritual and the spiritual is
in a sense supernatural. The implications of this for any
doctrines of the laws of reason and nature are obviously far-
reaching, and have to be related to the Christian teaching on
human nature and the Incarnation.
The passages which have the closestbearing on natural law
are Romans 11.12-15^ and Romans XIII. 1.^ The Fathers.
(1) Natural Law, p.23. pp.28 - 30.
(2)"For as many as have sinned without law shall also perish without law;
and as many as have sinned in the law shall be judged by the law. For not
the hearers of the law are just before God, but the doers of the law
shall be justified. For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by
nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a
law unto themselves. Which shew the works of the law written in their
hearts, their conscience also being witness, and their thoughts meanwhile
accusing or else excusing one another."
(3)"ijet every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no
DOWer but of Gndi the nouflra that ho aro r>W)o-tno/) nP riorl . w
Caspar d with these many other texts which seem to condition
their authority, such as Romans VII# 22-5^ arid Hark X#<&2.^
In general they adopted the pagan doctrine of natural law and
underlined lt3 essential divinity, id®: tifying it in its perfection
with the osaic law and ever; with the teaching of the Gospel.
Its very excellence, however, means that it is to some extent
irrelevant to man as he now is, and that its authority was
appropriate only to that period of his primitive innocence
which the Fathers ascribe to the time before the fall. They
thought its simplicity and powerless restraint no longer sufficient
to check the wickedness of his ways and organise their complexity.
The iua gentium ard the lua civile must undertake such tasks.
These human laws and such conventional institutions as coercive
government, private property, slavery and war were a parently
regarded and justified by the fathers as not only sinful but
simultaneously a 'remedy for sin,• their genius lying in their
realism. For, as Dr Carlyle says,
slavery, private property and government
are institutions arising from the viclouo
tendencies of human nature as it is, but
they are also thu instruments by which these
vices are corrected.(3)
(1) "For 1 delight in the law of God after the inward mani but I
see another law in ay members, warring against toe law of ay mind,
and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my
members# oh wretched man that I ami who shall deliver mo from the
body of this death."
(2) *¥© know that they which are accounted to rule over the Gentiles
exercise lordship over thaoj and their great ones exercise authority
upon them. But so shall it not be among you| but whosoever will be
great among you shall be your minister. And whosoever of you will he
the chiefest, sisall be servant of all. For eves, the Goo of Han came
not to .e ministered unto, but to minister, ard to give his life a
("3^ rar.aom for raarnr. S
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He suggests that this interpretation by the Fathers is
(i}
"in its own way profound and philosophical."
It is certain ly an explanation which demands much thought"
and analysis, for at first it sotaids like a gross simplification
or a dangerous paradox, implying, among other things, that sin
can be organised to defeat its own ends, and that one of the
arts of living in society is to produce such a state of tension
botwe®; sinful tendencies that they are mutually frustrated.
This might be taken to imply that by eataolis.iing a fitting
organisation of evil man could be said to be imitate 0od, who
brings good out of evil.
jut slavery, for example, carnot be justified - though aary
of the Fathers said that it can - simply as a due and proper
punishment of the slave and as a benefit in that it curbs his
vices, hot all slaves qualified for sueh punishment, and, in
fact, the institution in itself no doubt often fosterad the
vices of gsaed, possess!verse3s and laziness in the slave owners,
besides faults in the slave. In practice, of course, the Ghurch
eventually helped towards the abolition of slavery, but for long
(2)
its clumsy theories had the opposite effect. ' Its support
(1) p.!2u.
(2) eriieval Political Theory in the de3t, Vol.1., pp.123-4.
through many ages of an Institution which sight at one time
have had some remedial benefits to offer led later to a
toleration of the shameful exploitation of the Negro races*
irivate property the Fathers thought of as a human
institution and not essentially sinful. However, they generally
agreed that common ownership and individual me beat accord
(1)
with the natural and ideal order. T day we tend to think of
private property as something which can be redeemed by the use
to which it is put, or justified as the fruits of labour.
iut the most important and complicated development of the
relationship between a human institution and an ideal natural
law is to be found In the Fathers' theories of political authority
ard of the relationship between Church and states. It is
difficult to see the precise relevance of the doctrine of
natural law ard of its exact relationship to the divine will and
to the lua gentium as they are revealed in the political thought
of tiie Fathers. Augustine ard Gregory, for example, agree that
coercive government is both necessary because of ain and a
divinely appointed remedy for it. Ut the difficulty of understanding
the relationship between the divine natural law and the human
(1) Ibid., pp.13S - L46
institution is certainly writ large in the long discussion
of Church and state. In fact, though not in theory, the
Church is an institution having the same status as the
Fathers assign to coercive government, since in one sense the
Church is supremely needed because of omn*s sin and is the
supreme remedy for it. As Christians cannot be excepted from
the general human imperfection, the Church as it is must be
partly caused as well as occasioned by sin, and it is not easy,
therefore, to see that the Church has a batter claim to embody
the authority of the natural or divine law than the likewise
human and imperfect institution of the state.
The Hosaan theory of the political authority of the people
can ue seer as a direct con sequence of the natural law of
equality, and the constitutional cos caption of monarchy can be
seen as a consequence of belief in the universality of law. But
the peculiar doctrine of the divine ordination of government
and of the king, wMch wis the Fathers1 contribution to political
theory, ought to modify profoundly, it seems, their theories of
.natural?, l.ua gently, iqa civile and their interrelations.
Otherwise it car only shew up their intrinsic inconsistencies.
The institutions of the iu.s gentium were previously regarded as
caused as well as occasioned by man's sinfulness. But here
arises the apparent paradox that government, although caused
by sin, is in fact as divine as natural law itself, and far
more relevant. It would seem that only by some miracle could
the same thing be caused both by man's sin and by God's will.
For as long as government is coercive, it is only possible to
reconcile the belief that
"... natural equality which... is contrary to
slavery, is also contrary to the subjection
of man to man in government..." (l)
with belief in the divine ordination of the king and of civil
(2)
government ' by postulating two types of divine law or
institution. These would have to be assumed equally natural,
rational and divine, but whereas the one would be held to be
adapted to apply to a state of universal innocence in the
remote arid imagined past, the other would be held fit to apply
to a present condition of such obvious general imperfection that
(3)
it could be justifiably imposed on all men equally. In this
light the ius gentium becomes simply another type of divine law
in which the comprehensiveness of the power of the king includes
such institutions as slavery, private property and even ius civile,
and would seem, for all humai purposes, more natural, apt,
(1) Medieval Political Theory in the Vest. Vol . I. p.125.
(2)IBid.. p.129.
(3) Troeltsch, in fact, speaks in terms of absolute and relative
natural law, and discusses the difficulties of reconciling
them, (mrnst Troeltschi '. lie -Jocial Teaching of the Christian
Churches. Vol.1.p.154, p.267, p.343
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powerful aid even more divine thai; the nat'iral law itself#
For whilst it pushes the latter further into the background
as ineffective in its irrelevar.ee, the theory of the divine
aright of kings, despite the fact that ova the stoat divine laws
are conditioned by the sinfulness of the human beings to whoa
they are addressed, stands forth as grounded car revelation
and directly ordained by God.
In theory, therefore, the relationshi between the 1lift
naturale and the iua tie tlua is ao confused that it is hard to
separate them. In reality, of course, human perfection and
imperfection are so haphasardiy intermingled and disguised that
no definitions, however tidy, can ever adequately discover,
divide or restrain their dynamic character, ant consequently
instituti ./rs and. orga isations cam:iot separately contain or
embody the i.
The doctrine of the divine right of kings, however, my not
be all that at first it seems. It was partly created to counter¬
act a tendency to anarchy within the Church and state after the
conversion of Constantino, and partly an expression of a
psychological tendency in man to deify a leader, and, rightly
or wrongly, the Fathers thought the Old Testament supported it.
Such origins might well seem to undermine its authority, as,
indeed, might its later history, for it was the imperialist
party which upheld it in its own self-interest, while the Church
became willing to place ultimate political power in the people.
In tho world of affairs its theological and metaphysical truth
was accounted of rather loss importance than it3 political
usefulness to the parties concerned.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the doctrine was
interpreted in diverse ways eve in the early stages of its
growth. Gregory the Great, for instance, followed Augustine^'
and believed that the authority of the king was so absolute and
divine that it oust ir. no olrcuaataces be disobey®!, oven
though in fact it had to be acknowledged that the king himself
bad lapsed from his divine mission. Th^re must have been some
disagreement, therefore, as to whether the institution or the
person was divine and to be obeyed, and as to whether the king
was only to be obeyed when he was acting in accordance with the
divine intention of his vocation. Heat of the contradictions of
t; is kind seen to have some kind of basis in the writings of
Augustine, who believed not only that justice must be founded
on Christian law as well as an tho natural law, but also that
(l) u& oivitute dei. v.21.
the worst kings like the best have Go; 's direct authority,
(i)
and therefore have to be obeyed in all circumstances.
(i2)
By the ninth century, the theory of natural law was no
longer a leading interest araong philosophers. The general view
was that it was meant to apply to a state of innocence. In
the fallen world, however, the best that could be hoped for as
that the ius te> tium. which finds expression in institutions
such as government, and which was still looked upon as both
the result of and as a divinely ordained, remedy for sin, should
be inspired by the spirit of justice. More concern with the
metaphysical truth of the definitions of ius naturale. ius gentium
and ius civile might have led, in this age as earlier, to a
revision or an elaboration of them which might have made it
unnecessary to believe both in the natural equality of all men
and in slavery. Such studies might have thrown some light on the
practical relationship botweenthe ius naturale and the ius gentium.
But the writers were engaged with bewildering political affairs
and gave little space to abstract theories. There is little open
quarrel with the theory of the divine authority of the ruler, but
for various historical reasons both his divinity and his power
became suspect or acknowledgeda3 corruptible. If these are still
thought of as coming ultimately from God, a king, for them, can
only exercise power by consent of his people, and his rule i3
(1) Medieval Political Theory it the West. Vol.1. p.l69, and The
Growth of lolitcal Thought in the West, pp.159 - 1&).
(2) Medieval Political Theory in the West. Vol.1, pp.195-292
subject to the correction and blessing of the Church. The
the _>ry of the natural equality and liberty of man has an
important place in ninth century patristic writings.
Many of the kings, In fact, aeened anything but divinely
inspired, and the revolt of the bishops of Borne against the
iconoclastic emperors car, be regarded as a protest against the
extreme theory of Gregory the Great. Nor were the kings ana
Teutonic ciiiefs any longer high-minded enough to inspire the
respect or reverence needed to foster such a theory, most of then
being uncivilised arid uneducated barbarians. Tho ninth century
thinkers were also influenced by the Teutonic tradition in w dch
moat of thorn had bean bom, a tradition which hnd never allowed
for the absolute power of a ruler, but regarded fclsa as
representative of the people as a whole. The Chare;:, too, was
becoming conscious of the difficulties it had created for itself
in originating the doctrine, end was becoming jealous of the
claims made in its behalf as well as honestly doubtful of its
justice. The conflict between emsira and papacy was growing,
and it was no longer possible for the Church to hold the position
ta.ei by Augustine and Gregory the Great.
The period is inter.sting not because of its philosophical
analyses of political problems but because it illustrates how
hard it is to sift the good from the evil in human affairs,
or, in other words, to define to what extent and where the
institutions of the iua gentium wereln reality sinful, as d to what
extent they were a divine remedy for sin# Whatever the truth
of the theory of natural law, it made for a good deal of
muddle ai d hypocrisy#
The doctrine, then, was little in evidence, it was most
alive, perhaps, in the belief in the natural equality of all awn#
This contributed towards the growing tendency to understand
government as the mutual responsibility of king and people# In
gta.oral it can be said that natural law was still recognised as
relevant and indeed supreme in the Church and in the writings of
the civilians# The division into lua naturalo. lus gentium and
ius civile, and the conception of natural law as the highest
expression of that principle of justice which all bursar, laws or.d
institutions should strive to express and achieve were widely
held# And sometimes the state was understood as an organic
creation, a natural expression of the relations between itself
and its members as between a whole and its parts#
Between the ninth century and the time of Aquinas, the most
interesting writer on natural law^as Isidore of Seville# He
repeated the traditional division of law into las naturale.
iua civile aid lua mMm. but included it witnin a more
comprehensive division of all laws into those which ar© divine
(1)
and natural and those which are human. This is reminiscent
of Aristotle's classification of laws as either natural or
positive, ar.d might be tiiought to have a strong attraction for
renaissance scholars.
jiatur&l law, according to Isidore, is universal because
it is based on the essential, inescapaole nature of man. He
did not say whether or not this 'nature{ is meant to involve
both rational and animal tend® cius, nor did he speak of its
relationship to the 'nature' which finds expression in human
laws, since it is Cbviously 'natural' for jaan to be human. His
distirction, ir fact, implied a discrimination not so much between
shades of morality or of naturalnoss as between degrees of
universality. The civil law is proper to each people, the ius
hentium is in use among the ma ority of mankind, and the natural
law is universally common.
fart of that w. ich is regarded as within the authority of
the iua i?e:.tiua in !woman law Isidore placed within the sphere of
natural law. For him the iua gentium was obviously a human law
(i) «HB&* *ut imams*** Msteai aafesga*
humarae aorifrua constant..» _aty»i. 337.2.
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based upon general recognition and can be applied to relations
between nations in general and to war and its consequences in
particular.
It is not surprising that the first important collection of
canon law, Gratian's Decretuia.^ belongs to a time of heightened
conflict between Ghurch and papacy. In such circumstances the
Church had need of a firmly stated position, and once the position
had been stated the foundations for the golden age of the canonists
had been laid. Throughout the time of Aquinas canon law was a
very living influence, especially in its attempts at defining
natural law and the relation between natural law and itself.
For Gratian, the ius gentium and lus civile were human, and
(2)
natural law divine. This division is reminiscent of Isidore
and often found in canonist thought. At the same time the canonists
believed that all human laws ought ideally to be inspired by the
spirit of natural law. Common ownership belongs to the latter,
but in the fallen state of the world private property has been
instituted by positive law. The fundamental rules of natural law
are those of the Old Testament Law and the Gospel, do unto others
what you would they should do unto you, and do not unto others
(1) C, 114,0.
(#)?rof. Hazeitine Reckons that Aquinas1s great achievement was to
pun jratxan'3 identification of natural law and divine law
upon a theological - philosophical basis (Intro, to Walter
Ullmarm: The Medieval Idea of Law, p.XXI.)
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what you would not that they should do unto you# But the
canonists gave little thought to relating natural law to the
animal nature of mar;. They treated the iua aertiua as a simply
humaf; law while they exalted the excellence of natural law.
The latter they thought most ancient, stable, immutable,
indispensable and conceived as the rational creation of man, and
all other types of law which were not in harmony with it they
called invalid.
Although tnere was little original in this understanding of
natural law, its inoistent repetition by the canonists, the
integration of its strength within their own system of canon law
and the matting explicit of its divinity through its coincidence
with the Gospel gave to it a prominence which almost amounts to
a new interpretation, or at least to a new lease of life. In
the recaiasat ee deoato on the relationship butwear theology and
philosophy, natural law became the moat popular means of creating
on impression of harmony between the u It also became a welispring
from which were drawn many higli-aounding pronouncements on
political attitudes. Up to thi3 time, natural law had been a
somewhat lifeless theory rather out of touch with the realities
of man's present state of existence. Now it was endowed by
some with the immediate divine task of integrating heaven and
ear h.
2 2 0
To wiiat extent this high art inevitably became a
compromise and how this in itself is related to the fundamental
metaphysical and psychological soundness of the doctrine are
difficult questions to answer. It is certainly not easy to
tell whether in its new role it was a tool moro befitting the
hands of lope or emperor. Dr Ullman would see in the widening
comprehensiveness of the theories of natural law and canon law at
this time the strengthening of a bulwark which was to a of
raajor use to the papacy. In its claim to integrate reason and
revelation he would eve see a typo of Christian pantheism
(1)
derived from stoicism. At the same time he finds in it certain
illogicalities. In the canonistic writings of the time confused
and contradictory claims were made for canor law and for natural
law. Canon law was sometimes considered identifiable with natural
law while trarsoending it in its power to comprehend all laws,
human and divine. Its reasoning is moro sophisticated and was
held to be more powerful in that in certain cases it lays down the
(Z)
conditions of papal dispensation from natural law. Jut at the
(1) "...We venture to maintain that it was a species of Christian
pantheism which permeated the canonistie conception of the divine
(natural) Law. And tide was explained and taught as a dogma at the
very time at which the Thomiatic idea of natural law gaisied groimd .
amongst philoso hers and theologians. ••8 (uilraanni Medieval Papalism, p.4b)
(2) t,»». And since the lope was, if no more, the vicar of Christ, it
was consequently if his power to change this law, like any other. The
Roman idea that the pope as a prince was not bound by the laws was mad©
to apply not only to human, but also to divine laws. And this particular
Instance of natural (divine) law provides a fitting occasion to observe,
firstly, how little caror.iatie scholarship was influenced by contemporary
scholastic theology and philosophy, arid secondly, that the Thomiatic
system of law in particular made no impression upon contemporary or later
canonists...Un the whole, the mutual relations betweon it Thomas Aquinas




sa;ae time natural law, either in its own right or transfigured,
transited and controlled by canon law, became something of a
new pattr and guarantee of authority and rcdritude.
Canonists and theologians of the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries took ar increasing interest in the psychological and
metaphysical 'anatomy! of the doctrine of natural law. This
found expression in a proliferation of learned terminology
which, if it does not always explain, does at least make explicit
the difficulties and dangers of inherent contradiction and
complexity. These activities sometimes touched the depths aa
well as the heights of subtlety. Generally the canonists tried
to integrate hiorarchically within their doctrine of natural law
former definitions of it, even those which appear to be
contradictory. In this way they achieved a comprehensiveness
which took in animal tendencies and such specifically human
•natters as the ius civile and iua gentium, as long as these were
controlled by or orientated to the Scriptures.
In the hundred years before Aquinas, interest in canon law
was so widespread and li/ely that it is not always easy to pick
out individual contributions to the study. Nevertheless, it is
not impossible to discover some of the most important contributors
\> v »;>




Among these, one of the earliest was Rufirus. Kis
particular contri bution was the division of the natural law
into mat.data, ;.rohtbitlor.es and da yunatrationea. The latter, he
held, concerns what is convenient, fitting or permissible, such
as ©quality of liberty or common ownership. Only this category
admitted of altera ion. ioaitive law is ideally the ramification
of natural law and can extend it. In arnore genera] way he
thought that natural law was as much a matter of inclination
as of knowledge. This inclination had beer tarnished by the Fail,
but its recovery was guaranteed by the New Testament. Rufln's
terminology was often repeated aid his ideas exerted a steady
influence.
The »U'?<aa ooloniersia adopted Rufin's terminology. It
held that the ins ■ entium is, in a sense nothing other than
the natural law, and suggested tnat the natural lav became
unchar ieable only when lm sortf JLised in the written haw of .loses.
Its moat useful philosophical idea was tisat the law of nature
remains unchangeable when ma ifested in generalities, but that,
(1) For much of the material of the following section I am indebted
to .'OS. 0. Lottinl .-.e droit natural cheg saint 'hoin.-.„ d'Aquin at,
preficcesaeur,;.
(2) juaiaa ueeretorua (115? - 9)
without ceasing to be natural law, it may admit some variation
in application to particular ii stances.
(')
In Ms -jumffia. Mason d© Bisiniano related natural law to,
or even identified it with, the svr.doresia. Although this superior
part of the reason Ms been weakened by sin, Simon held that Ita
power to interpret natural law directly has not been wholly lost
and that it provides the means of our workir g in harmony with
natural law. His understanding of natural law, therefore, applies
to homo sapiens rather than to animals as a whole and the r,st
of creation#
(2)
The >uama .;onaces sis interpreted the same psychological
fact in different words. Natural law was there connected fainy
directly with the divine law - aula orie utem trahit a natur.ll
ratione — while the notion of natural law as "the law common to
men a d m issals" was passed over. Rutin 'a distinction was
accepted ir substance but the deuonatrati^- es were rapiacedby
eonallia and pcrMasionas. The ius gentium was conceived as an
expression of natural law, and a new and yet wider scope ma
givei. to the latter ir recognising it as manifested in the ways
of the universe itself, and therefore as an expression of God's
creativity or will.
(1) C, 1177-79
(2) G.1175 - 8.
In the Gumma hinsiensis. ^Simon's synderesis and the via
insita of Rufinua became the liberum ar jitr'ura. However, the
""■■■ ii ■ ijv— *
(2) c
writer ' in this work limited this faulty to the business of
judgment. Another faculty of human reason, l'operari. he said>
is responsible for putting judgment into action. Huguccio
(3)
ferrare, on the other hand, sought to keep natural law as
simple as possible. Without seeking to refute the elaborations
of it, he thought of natural law as a harmony of animal and
moral tendencies.
Generally, then, the canonists agree that natural law is
essentially the integrating and harmonising principle of reason,
which includes, while it controls, the instinctive and animal
tendencies in mar;, and reverences as its criteria the divine
and rational laws of God.
In the circumstances of the time, theologians could not but
be influenced by the canonists, and in general they made much
use of the Glossa Ordinaria of John the Teuton. Their attention
centred on some of the Old Testament problems such as the
divine toleration, if not command, of polygamy or homicide.
The question of marriage became predominant because it involved
(1) C.1185 - 1186.
(2) Jean Hispanus.
(3) C.1187.
most obviously the relation between the animal and rational
natures of man, as well as the question of God's attitude
towards it as revealed in both written and historical revelation#
for some theologians, polygamy, though not strictly or normally
according to natural law, could be sanctioned by special direct
inspiration from (rod. There is a glimpse here of the idea
that in God's sight the end justifies the means, for the
intention of the polygamy of the patriarchs was the population
of the land with the faithful. There were even occasions when
writers cane near to allowing that on occasion it was within
God's power to dispense with even the great moral laws, but this
was not accepted too naively and was heavily beset with conditio! s
so that God could not be accused of the vice of caprice* Gt#
Bernard, for instance, distinguished between three degrees of
immutability in the precepts, which were either stable, inviolable
or ir.commutaoio# An example of the first were the ecclesiastical
laws. These should indeed have as their end tne reig- of charity,
but inasmuch as they did not they could be dispensed with or
altered by those in authority# To the second group belong the
divine laws relating to Ahicai action such as those in the
Decalogue# "Thou shait not kill," for example, was an inviolable
law as far as man was conerrsod, but it c ;uld be dispensed with
or altered by God in accordance with his best intentions# But
O . > f
-- o
tiie third group of laws even Sod could rot change, because they
so expressed the essence and quality of God Himself that it was
(1)
impossible for them to be revoked. This division tas never
widely held, however, and theologians on the whole took the
much simpler stand that the precepts of the first taole of the
Decakgue were unchangeable*
nevertheless, as among canonists, there ma a growing
willingness to admit that only the general spirit or principle
of natural law remains constant and that particular applications
of it are too conditio! ed by circu.natar.ces to be invariable.
(2)
Wlllia:.; of huxerre ' was one of the most interesting
writers of his day, and his thinking had much influence among
Dominicans. He made new analyses and extended the terminology
of tire subject. By natural reason he understood that first fresh
intuition of the mind which grasps both speculative ar.d moral
principles. He distinguished, therefore, Hitween tne speculative
reason a/d trie practical reason. In the moral sphere he
soearatod the science of the principles themselves from the
moral precepts wnich result from the iiituition of them - sole tla
iaoralilya pragcepforum que aerpjitur ex^rinclpiU luri naturally.
(l) "...Quod dlvlna Ita constat et aet~rna rations flrnatuia. ut
nulla,ey cau^ poasit, vej ipso ^eo,, aliqratgnqg lamutari.
oub [too genera eat oar Is ilia Ser onla doairdci in taonte habit
trpd.it iot et qqid quid do cUiectior,p:Ji^iiitate,
ma- suetudfre qoeterisqua vlrtutiou,;, tan in ovo quam in, 'js&MSX
Testa-sento g|irituaiit.er o.-aerva: dura contr. riltur..." .it. Jernardl
JLbor cie eraseeito et disu^.satione. r.L.182,ca .2-3, col.86,3-5.
^2) c.1220 - 1225
William also stressed the innateneas of natural law. Hot only
has God created man, be aald, but God has created mat' In Ms our.
Image. Man, therefore, can know God uitidn idmsoLf, and, knowing
God, understands justice. And he anticipated and an:soared the
objection that sucn original knowledge is impossible by holding
that experience a d sensation are the condition an d not the
origin of Knowledge. This innate knowledge of natural law is
acliieved by the sanduresis, that superior part of the reason
which also hits a knowledge of the sensible world. In the latter
the aynduresis cas be deceived by appearances, but since -C the
sphere of natural law its object is God or truth itself, it Is
there infallible. Its own purity and perfection in mirroring
this truth William see ed to take for granted. However, ho
did distinguish the precepts of natural law from those of the
Decalogue. The latter, he said, are to control our spiritual
and supernatural destinies, the former to achieve moral and
political virtues, widen are a necessary oasis of the supernatural.
illian accepted the the traditional division into praeceota.
prohibition03 aid demonstratior;o3. Private property, therefore,
is related to natural law through the deronstrationea. Common
ownership say be more ideal, but can be applied only to the
gold® age of the past or to some Utopian future. He used a
special terns - iua natural© s sc ale - to cover particularly
faumr: institutions such as marriage. A further innovation
was his distinction between different degrees of necessity in
the precepts, eert&in acts, such as lo e of God, are irdispensaoie
and of first necessity. Others, such as monogamy, which are
not absolutely and intrinsically required but which are in the
main assertial to some further end, are only <f second necessity.
God can dispense with acts of second but not with acts of first
necessity, riad actions car, be correspondingly separated into
those which are bad in. ae and those vlcit are bad secundum se.
God cannot command man to commit such acts as usury, for insta ce,
as they must be intrinsically bad. But acts which are bad ir. so.
but not secundum au. such as polygamy and homicide, God may
command when they are justified by a redeeming end. When so
commanded, such acts can no longer bo described accurately as
theft, homicide and so on. According to thea© theories, therefore,
fornication is absolutely foroidder, but homicide, as when God
commanded Abnham to sacrifice Isaac, can be good.
(r)
To this ihilipp© the Chancellor objected that the killing
of the innocent is always intrinsically bad and, therefore, on
the same level as fornication. Consequen tly, he argued, it
(1) d.1236
should be classified an evil secundum ae« On the other hand,
God is surely abo.e all laws of nature and can command ever:
such acts, bad both ig, je and securtdun ge, as Hia command to
Abraham seems to prove*
Philippe also extended the technical *jargon' of the study
of natural law. He suggested that natural law could be
considered from both the point of view of its naturalness -
natura ut r.atura • and froa that of its rationality - natura ut ratio
or ratio ut ratio, God forbids fori ieation because, just as
God cannot oppose idaaelf, God's true morality cannot oppose the
natural morality - natura ut natura - of marriage, But God can
command acts contrary'' to natura ut ratio or ratio ut ratio, because
it see -.3, reason is concern d not so much with the end as with
the means of an act, Abraham, tneref re, could be oosma .ded to
kill his innoce t son and to have relations with a woman who was
not his wife, since in each case the er.d was unadulterated. The
Command, according to Philippe, touched only the outward form or
material of the act - dianoaiUw-es roapactu materiae - and not its
end ~ disL.03itior.e3 respectu finis. - There are important
d
implications in such an ar.lysis. God seen3 to belong to the wurid
of 'nature' rather than to the world of reason. This would sees to
leave little room for the exercise of human reason, so that it
must become difficult for human beings to act rationally in bar.aory
with nature, natural ends or the will of God#
William of MeHton^ sought, to deal with the difficulty
by suggesting that. God car dispense with those precepts of
natural law which are concerned with ttie relations between
sen but not with those between God and man#
one of the many Aristotelians of the time, Bonahd of
(2)
Cremona, ' held that natural law is the fundamental inclination
of ©very thing to achieve its own fulfilment# In vegetables,
animals aid man the natural law is unique in that it is shaping
each thing towards a particular goal# In man this principle rises
into consciousness in the aynderesia, which organises and
controls all his tendencies towards t is good end. The latter
is not invariable for all men, however, for though monogamy is
the ideal of the majority, a special purpose inspired the
patriarchs to oo polygamous# The fluidity of such a conception
is, of course, useful#
Aquinas1s teacher Albert the Great was much concernod
with the part played by reason. He held that it is obviously
i
more natural for man to be ratioral than to be irrational. For
him,the essence of natural law lay in the principlesi iua natural.®
■at eat ipsa
(j\ Lottin: he Droit natural chea .it Thomas d'Aquin et ees pred^eesseurs.
(2) 1229 - 30. pp.49 . 50.
(La Gucma inedite de bono 'que Mgr Grabmann a prouve etre la
troiai&zne partie de la Suiaaa de creaturis.' (hottin,pp#41-2.)
urlncloia# These fundamental principles arc apprehended
intuitively like the first axioms of the speculative reason#
Froia the©, by process of reasoning, arise the first deductions,
such as tiie necessity for political authority arid private
property, arid from these car, be made further deductions which
finally lead to moral rules# The sore universal such rules are,
the nearer they approach to the natural 3mw itself, which exists
in us as a habltu..; closely attached to the svr.deresls. Albert
agreed with Isidore and Gr&tian that luu •aturale commit est
awim M&asm*. ssM Mam todfcteg&a agjacaa* sm &Uam
constitutione habitus, w. ioh would seaa to place the fundamental
or contra! instinctu natura of man in his moral sense rather than
in Ms animal tendencies# Albert, on the whole, ma rather
hesitant about the relationship of natural law to divine law#
im thought that natural reason in ma*. is sensitive to the
circumstances and the times in which it operates, and he agreed,
therefore, that although common ownership would oo appropriate to
a state of innoce.cc, natural reason allows that private property
is appropriate to corrupt society#
(1)
tootiier analysis, made by John of la Hocnelle, ' separated
natural law from revelation# John divided natural law Into
precepts given by God for the preservation of the individual, and
precepts written in the heart of man which teach iiira to love
God and to do unto his neighbour as he would be done unto#
(1) Stroma de nreceptla# '" ''
They are thus essentially directed toward the social aid
political harmony of mankind rather than towards man's
religious sarictification« Only the revealed laws help hi®
to realise this. In revelation John found confirmation of
natural law.
(l)
A zsorc radical thinker was St B®riaveiit«r«. • Of the
definitions of natural law as qu„d in Jagg ©t Ma&gjUS. qontlngt^r,
amd jmi ssmem awtem. aa$Asam» aa w&ma aatti
ar i italla, he chose the last as the most precis© and found the
first least accurate. In his elaboration of the theory of the
moral 3et.se, conscience cornea to the fore as a habitus closely
attached to the practical treason. For Bonaventure conscience
not only judges particular cases but grasps moral principles,
hvan in this latter activity, however, it is not wholly innate,
for it has to make use of terms derived from sensation, memory
and experience. There is only one exception to this rule; the
concept tat God should be loved is so much at one with the vary
light of intelligence itself that it is defined even in its
apprehension. It is, therefor®, utterly innate, aiamllciter intuitus.
The avnderesis. having been replaced by the habitus attached to
the practical reason, is not rejucted, but is understood by
Bonaventure as another habitus. It is attached to the will and
urges the will towards good* It is thus differentiated from the
(X)Jn IV. sent. D.33. Art I.Q.I, in 3. onaventurae Upera omnia
referred to by Dom Lottin, p.50.
IjyaagjB .irhitriu.' s. which is morally indifferent*
To Baaaventure, natural law in its strictest sense meant
that body of moral precepts which are th© objects of both
conscience and good will* He divided it into throe parts.
Firstly, there are some things, such as Its own first principles,
which are part of the natural law oaser tiallter* Secondly,
there are things, such as natural institutions, which arise as
conclusions from first principles, and these are part of natural
law aunpositi ■r«» And thirdly, there are all kind?of other things,
such as positive law, which are particular ard perhaps temporary.
These arc part of natural law participative. Lateral law, thai
is in evidence in a purer form when expressed in univeraals,
but it is still jjresar t eves when translated into positive laws
asid human institutions* It had become a ppl^it of justice
governing many sitmtions and conditions of life rather than a
fixed set of rulos, and this led to a significant tendency to
identify natural law more closely with reason itself and to
recognise, even if rather unconsciously, its creative power es
well as its mere usefulness in tabulating eternal principles*
This mderstanding of natural law as a quality rather than
as a rule or formal law also appears In the thought of Albert
the Great* Human beings have to be prepared to believe that
sometimes wtiat appears to be a wicked deed say be inspired by
a right and {.goodly spirit, & d as God desires a right spirit
above all things, we have to accept that Wn&t say look like
theft or homicide may be commanded by God for a good purpose#
So, for Albert, Abraham's act of sacrifice was inspired solely
by obedience to God, arid God's command giver, solely for the
purpose of shewing the world a auprea© example of auch
devotion# Albert, therefore, adopted . hilippe the Chancellor's
distinction between UlstoalUo res, esta materia© and clisoooitio
rospoctu finia, which meant that he had to adopt the principle
teat the end ©an justify the means# Bis interpretation of the
Abraham ai d Isaac story consequently shows no trace of the
concept explored by many recent commentators who, believing that
a good dead must bo good in both mmna arid ends, consider that
one of the sain points of the story is that it shews firstly
that obedience is the limit of the sacrifice required by God,
and, secondly, that if man is willing to obey, God never demands
anything intrinsically unnatural or bad as a means to even the
highest ends#
It fall to the lot of Alexanier of Hale* to sift and
set down in his Gummae ThealOfdae all the ramification of
twelfth and thirteenth century thought on natural law# One
(l) Summa Theologiae. Para. 111.
of Ms main conclusions was that natural law, although it is
made up jf the first principles of th© practical reason, is a
created thing, and therefor® cannot, be the Mam thing as divine
law, wMch is innate. Divine law is th© seal, natural law
merely the imprint.
Natural law Alexander saw as an image of th© Trinity* the
faculty is th® image of the power of the Dither, reason the
image of the wisdom of the Son, and will the image of the love
of the Holy Spirit. It is fundamentally a ha ...it as rooted not
merely in the reason or will but in the faculty itself. The
law shapes or informs th® faculty, reason enlightens th®
conscience, and the avrderesis stimulates the will. It is
indelible though overshadowed by sin. It can be eiatxjrated, as
it is adapted to particular circumstances, and its deaor.str-ilOi.es
can be dispensed with. Aloxa; er also accepted analysis of
natural law according to its field of reference. It Is natural©
who it governs actions common to men and animals, ha-nanum when it
applies to particularly human affairs, and divlnum when th© latter
are directly related to God. But although tho first memalr g can
apply tw ©the** creatures than man in th© sense that each has a
law uniting its nature and destiny, natural law SLoolailter et
proorie ia a miaan conception realised in human nature, arid
is most explicit in the pronouncement3 of human reason.
In the debate about the Decalogue, Alexander held that
God can dispense with the laws of the second table but not
with those of the first. The laws which bind God and man
he thought unalterable, but those which concern huma ^oh&viour
in the whole creation he thought God might alter £t will because
He had made the whole creation and had the right to do as He
would with it.
The thought of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries thus
became riddled with a superfluity of technical jargon* There
was an almost destructive passion for analysis ever; of the
most elusive experiences of mental and spiritual life, and it
produced a convolvulus tangle of definitions* This was partly
the result of a genuine search for the roots of truth, which
were nevertheless sometiaos rather prematurely discovered or
indented, arid partly an attempt to satisfy the human mind's
uneasiness in the face of mystery and ignorance* Unhappily,
some of the deepest mysteries which grace human existence,
particularly those at the very centre of it such as God's
purposes and the nature of the human mind, were sometimes
superficially covered by a confusion of words or swraarily
shuffled into place by the sewing omniscience of man*
The thinkers of this time, of corn-so, had to work without,
the knowledge of the depths and uncertainties revealed by
modern psychology, and they were comparatively unaware of the
complexity of the energies and the Incalculable repercussions
at w>rk in human life* Anthropology had not axhused the basic
skeleton of man's animal ancestry nor shed light on the fantastic
superstitions and the pathetic darkness and stupidity of his
savage state, and so cast doubt on the distinctive holiness of
his origins, i'odern criticism h d neither disillusioned those
MB nor Invited them to discover what might turn out to be
the deei.-est significances of the Scriptures. A static formalism,
therefore, seemed wholly credible. In Such circumstances
ignorance in some direct ons may account for certainty in others.
There were times when ar occasional confession of Ignorance or
uncertainty, or the leaving of a problem open to further
investigation or to more urgent prayer might have been more seemly,
humble at d wise.
The understanding of the psychological roots aid the
philosophic content of the doctrine of natural law is certainly
of great importance in the history of western olviliaction, and
the thinkers of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were the
pioneers, only by examining its foundations can one assess whether
they are sound enough to bear the strain of the eminei c© claimed
for it ard to justify the part it was made to play in politics.
The importance of this role has been strongly stated by Troeltach*
"... the fiction of a Christian natural law,
Which makes it possible to regard the State
aid Society as though both were ordered by
one Christian haw, will be the moans through
which it will become possible to speak of a
Christian unity of civilisation at all, and
it is this alone w ich makes men able to believe
in such a possibility. This Christian Law of
Latur© will also likewise provide the daughter
churches of Western Catholicism, Lutheran!**
and Calvinism, with the means of regarding and
shaping themselves as a Christian unity of
civilisation. The Christian theory of natural
law, ir which the pure natural law of the
primitive state, the entirely opposite relative
natural law of the fallen state, the
positive law, which often included the
greatest abominations, and that true
goodness wnich in spite of all these ideas
of natural law, is the only source of the
supreme power of the theocracy, were in
continual conflict... as a scientific theory
it is wretchedly confused, but as a practical
doctrine it is of the highest importance for
the history of civilisation and of social
evolution... it is the real ecclesiastical
doctrine of civilisation, and as such it is
at least as important as the doctrine of the
Trinity, or other fundamental doctrines..."(l)
It is difficult to see how such a wretchedly confused
scientific theory or fiction could be transfigured into such
a powerful practical doctrined. By what might alchemy? Were
its wretchedness, confusion and unreality outgrown, or were
they actually enlarged and complicated by growth? Or, by
being translated into practice, did it receive and accomplish
a new fulness of life no theory can ever have, so that its new
dimensions allowed for a harmony and realised a truth and
completeness which could never be contained within the cramping
limitations of an abstraction? The phrase a 'practical doctrine',
although its meaning is more or le3S clear, goes some way towards
allowing that "whatever is is right", and this position, with
it3 trace of existentialism, seems to have been put forward as
a ground for further rationalisation. It is important, therefore,
(1) The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches. Vo.l. p.160
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to find out to what extor t it could and did link God and
man, Church and state ar.d heaven and earth, arid to what extent
it was just a useful fiction giving the imprimatur of its
empty authority to this or that institution, pope, emperor,
law, reason at d to nature itself. It is likewise important to
find out to© extent to which its widening eompr©!ensivonsso was
related to its closer identification with the law of reason as
understood by man, for this identification ight well shew up
as much of conceit aa of genius.
At best, the theory of natural law acted as a compromise,
and like .most compromises it was morally ambiguous, involving a
confusion of good and evil in which righteousness and sin sat
uncomfortably or happily side by side, but neverthleas threatening
each other. The worst effect of such a confusion was hypocrisy^
but the confusion may also result from an honest reaiiam wnich
refused to trim the facts to make them fit into the limitations
of human theorising, and such an attitude might lead to the
possibility of understanding, reconciliation, even san&lfication.
Of the Influence of the theory in the history of civilisation
and social evolution there can be no doubt, as Troeltach says,
but it does not follow that the influence has always been the
best possible one. And if the nature of that influence itself is
questiona&Le, it is only natural to ask how far this may be
related to degrees of truth a< d corruption in both theory and
practice. There is a respectable solidity in the undoubted
incident that actually occurred, tor its energy in having com®
about at all argues its effectiveness and its sere existence
give it an air of inevitability. The tender ey has beat: for
historians to remake the prist in such a way as to shew that the
race has been moving forward, everyone, of course, has benefited
from the accumulations of the past and everyone is somehow rooted
in it, shaped by it and to some extent made to see life in its
terms. It has become almost a habit of aird that all hope for
future progress should be grounded on the demonstrated progress of
the past. But for obvious reasons this plotting of a progress is
a very selective operation. Only those movements, organisations,
schools of thought ar.d individuals which have achieved powerful
domination can qualify for places in the line of direct succession,
a d in order to keep this line more or less straight it has been
necessary to simplify ar.d tabulate the diffuse and ©cce: trie.
The evolutionary patter* of history, therefore, car. be very
inaccurate where spiritual, intellectual and imaginative things
are concerned, for these are often most powerful when most
invisible to plotters of progress# The latter, in their devotion
to the bact, can come close to a form of ancestor worship which
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may blind the® to those p«vi«apg better things wnicfa have
failed to fall into line, and which they can dismiss as mere!
Utopian, and so they do not weigh the fact that occurred against
trie possibilities oper. at the time. Hut once the strait-jacket
of evolutionary progress, with its conceit of inevitability, ia
cast aside, it does not seem impossible that, if past events had
fallen out otherwise thai, they did, the whole of what is now
called HJa© legacy of the past'1 could have been richer. It would
seem hard, for example, to rule out the possibility of a more
evolutionary evolution and a mor© progressive progress. Despite
all the weight that has bees: given to it, tnerefore, it is not
beyond quest!j« that natural lawwas the only influence which could
have reconciled the Ghurch and this world, and that it alone could
have created the civilisation we know, and which we perhaps overrate.
It is even possible that its binding spell got in the way of
something better, and robbed the world of a mora civilized
civilisation.
Although it is in a way incidental, the most important aspect
of the doctrine of natural law my well turn out to be that it
shews so much of the psychology of man, his dishonesty, his
incoherence, his power to sake unreality fruitful, his greatness,
Ms uniqueness, and Ma hopeless and astonishing ambiguity. As
the doctrine of natural law bus been expreseedthrougn ouch bewildering
qualities, a Christian evaluation of it can be reached only by
looking at it in the light of a Christian understanding of hianan
nature.
CHAPTER SIX
THE NATURAL LAW MORALITY OP' AQUINAS
Aquinas developed the psychology of morality as far as
was possible in his time. In his attitude to the fall he looked
upon original sin 'as a loss of privilege, not as a radical
(1)
corruption of nature.'It was a defect of nature which all
men share but for which they are not individually responsible.
For Aquinas, the essence of human nature, for redeemed ai d
unredeemed alike, and that which distinguished it aoove all from
other things, was its rationality, and this, he believed, was
the seat of morality. His understanding of the workings of
morality owed much to the subdividing of reason which had been
(l) T. Gilbys Between Community and Society, p.14,0.
practised by his predecessors in medieval psychology and in
fact he himself contributed nothing original# Mqr. de Solages,
it iaay be recalled,^ went so far as to complain that Aquinas
looked upon war as an individual matter rather than one of
politics and natural law. For Aquinas, however, natural law
was the bridge between individual and social ethics and he
naturally looked upon it from both points of view, and indeed,
grounded his natural law teaching on the psychology of the
individual human being. To understand how far Aquinas'3 teaching
holds good for Ms relation of it to individual and political
aspects of warfare and how far it can be harmonised with
Christianity calls for careful consideration of it as a whole.
Aquinas accepted the growing tradition of connecting natural
(2)
law with the svnderesis. lor him both are wholly the creation
of God arid therefore perfect and unalterable. The natural law
is made up of all the first and universal principles of moral action,
whereas the svnderesis is that 'part* of the mind particularly
responsible for and adapted to their recognition. In his earlier
works it is not clear whether Aquinas regarded the svnderesis as
a simple habitus, or disposition, as innate as anythi, g dependent
for its full expression and realisation on the medium of
UT dee above, 50—51.
(2)Cmn8S2i,Urv QXi diflnttaaces of eter Lombard. Il.Dist.24#Q.2.
See also^Dom Odon Lottin* i-sychologie et Morale et
Hie Siecles. Tome 11.pp.222-224.
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accumulated experience and memory can be; or whether he
understood this habitus as so necessarily accompanied by as to
be identifiable with a power or faculty# The opinion of Bom
(l) (2)
Gdon Lottinv is that in his earlier works, and largely out
of respect for his predecessors, Aquinas accepted the latter
interpretation, but that he later decided that it was a habitus
(3)
only. The problem is discussed further in Be Yeritate. and
although there the fifteen replies to objections affirming that
the svnderesis is not a faculty might appear to guarantee ills
disagreement, five further contrary objections were left
unanswered. Bom Lottin concludes that although Aquinas frequently
referred to the svnderesis as a potartia cum habitu. he showed a
greater preference for its simpler designation as a habitus only,
and in the Suama Theologica freed himself from tradition as a whole,
and followed the lead of Pierre de Tarantaise.^
Reason, then, is a single faculty, yet in its activity, it
can be divided, or considered diversely, according to the nature
of its object. When it is contemplating or discovering intellectual
truth, it can be called speculative reason; when it is considering
the moral qualities of human actions, its name is the practice!
{5)
reason. Ther*. are thus twro dominant" dispositions in the human '
(1)Odon Lottin: Le Droit Naturel Ghez St Thomas B'Aquin et Ses
(2)11 Sent. D.24 'j.11. Art.4. Pred^cesseurs.pu.68-72
(3)Q»l6. Art.l.




Hiind, the intellectus* habitus of the first principles of the
speculative reason, and the aynderesis. habitus of the first
principles of the practical reason. In this Aquinas was guided
by the Aristotelianism of his teacher Albert the Great.
Both the first principles of the speculative order and
those of the moral order are concerned not with the recognition
of immutable things, which is the work of yet another reason,
the 'superior* reason, but with that of the iimautable aspects
of variable things, Wuich are, in fact, the necessary relation¬
ships which connect their essences. Since both are so concerned
it is surprising that Aquinas did not here discuss their own
mutual relationship. This distinction between the speculative
reason and the practical reason indeed seems significant.
Unless both can function simultaneously, and can thereby be
proved inseparable in function, it suggests that during his
intellectual exercises and researches man's moral awareness is
temporarily in abeyance; it might even be claimed that todfy
this has been proved, for man's intellectual power often appears
to have outwitted his ability to control it morally. In any
debate as to whether the speculative reason or the practical
reason should, at any moment, be employed, some higher part of
the reason must presumably decide, otherwise man's intellectual
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life would be granted precedence over his moral life, or vica
versa. And, indeed, if some higher part is employed, it would
likewise suggest that morality is not the supreme human
consideration•
In any case, it is assumed that moral considerations, or
moral consciousness, need only be spasmodic, and that intellectual
activity does not need to be morally conscious in itself. Since
reason is characteristic of man, intellectual activity must be the
goal for which he was created, however, if a more complete practical
activity of 'doing good' in the widest sense is the real end of man,
towards which reason only helps, reason cannot be so valuable as
the 'spirit' or 'impulse' to do good. The identity in fact of the
speculative reason and the practical reason suggests that the
practical reason must work according to the same logical or
scientific rules as does the speculative reason.^
(1) Thi3 raises the question of the morality of faith and the
immorality of lack or imperfection of faith. Faith is regarded as
a gift from God, yet, apparently paradoxically, absence of faith is
a sin. Although truths of faith are beyond reason, the speculative
reason must have to assent to them insofar as it guarantees that they
do not contradict itself, and there 3urely must be some similarity
between this honesty of mind and honesty in moral matters. Yet
conscience presumably lias nothing to do with the intellectual side of
religion. For the iioman Church, however, morals are based on and
firmly linked to dogma, a d one would dxpoct tho Churoh to tako the
same attitude towards both. Yet by laying down dogmas, firmly and
infallibly for all with such absolute authority and assurance the
ioman Church leaves the individual no room for the exercise of his
conscience about such questions, since any Catholic who 'has the faith'
is not in a position to doubt. At the same time the Church holds
that moral matters are in the last resort left to the individual
conscience.
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The svnderesis, although by tradition logically separable
from the practical reason, so informs its first principles that
it can be considered as residing in them, and being as much
united with them as is an outline with the thing it defines.
The first principles of the natural law are given by God in the
firm shape of commands or prohibitions, human language and thought
expression presumably helping, rather than hindering, their
transmission. 'Grammatical syntax and the power and explcitness
of words are not regarded as in any way hindering the fullness of
their truth.
Although the basis of the practical reason, first principles
are not rational conclusions but are self-evident and intuitively
apprehended; reason, contemplating them and comparing them with
itself, is satisfied as to their perfect truth.^
The svnderesis is not identical with conscience, for the
latter is responsible for the particular judgements of the
practical reason, which are arrived at by deduction from the
universal principles established by the svnderesis. The process
of deduction is syllogistic, the first principles standing as the
majors of a 'practical syllogism', and the superior or inferior
(2)
reason as the minors, the conclusion being the work of conscience.
/ \ -j~T + oi o / 4*1^. Art. 2,»
(2) Morale All
o j aS: t/
The svnderesis cannot sin because it Is that part of the
mind in direct contact with angelic natures, and it is subject
to no corrupting influences because it is also, as it were,
/
I,
protected by the closed circle of its self-sufficiency. Nothing
can contradict the palpable honesty of self-evident truths.
Yet in spite of the fact that it is excluded from the possibility
of sin, being as innocent and inevitable a part of human nature
as a heart-beat, the efficacy of its judgements can be affected
and even hindered. It is possible, although the svnderesis is
not an act, to distinguish between it in itself and in its
exercise. In itself it can never be extinguished, for it has
the nature and form of the soul itself, but in its exercise it
can be subject to frustration.^
This conveniently, though somewhat dubiously, allows for
the possibility in 3ome men of ignorance of even the first
principles of natural law, as well as for varying and sometimes
contradictory basic moral perceptions. At the same time, however,
it maintains the absolute universa lity of natural law, in so far
as everyone has the possibility of knowing absolutely what is
right, and how he should act, even if he is not strong enough to
obey such knowledge.
Conaoiomfce itself can make mistakes and form wrong conclusions,
or a false minor supplied to a syllogism by the superior or
(1)
inferior reason can lead it astray. The will, helped or
hindered by emotion, decides whether to be directed by th#
judgement of the conscience as it establishes a unique or
particular or conver: tional form of conduct. Conscience is an
act of reason, unlike the simderesis. which is a habitus, though
conscience too is a purely rational judgement dependent only
on knowledge, whereas the decision of the will is tempted or
strengthened by passion or feeling. It is presumably the will
also which allows for the frustration of the s'/nderesis. This
particular relationship between the will and synderesis is found
also in the thinking of St Bonaventure.
Conscience allows of distinction between the 'psychological
conscience', which witnesses to the simple existence of a fact,
past or present, and the 'moral conscience' which considers or
judges the morality of an act whether it has already taken lace
or whether it is anticipated. This correspondes to the via inveniendi
of the speculative sciences, whereby on the one hand we deduce
conclusions from firm principles, and on the other, by means of
t.VmVia uidicandi we start from the conclusions and rediscover
(2)
principles.
Apparently conscience car, have no .jurisdiction over natural
(1)lie^er7'1.17. Art. 2> S.T.1.Q.79. Art. 12 - 13.
S^T.l. 11. Q.94. Art. 1. in corpj ad 2; SiT. 1.11. Q.47. Art.6.ad.l. ad.3«
rsychologie et iiorale Aux file et Xllle Si^claa.T.me 11. pp. 232-3.
De Ver. Q.17. At.+ i
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law itself, even tirough, because of the frustration of the
synderesis. a man nay not apprehend the true principles of
natural law. It is, in fact, wholly dependent on it for its
judgements, but in judging acts it is judging the worif of the
prudential reason,another 'department1 of reason which busies
itself with discovering the correct means for the achievement of
the ends supplied by natural law. These means might be 3uch
things as the unique acts of an individual, or political
judgements or laws.
The two main dictates of the natural law are known intuitively.
These are that one must seek and perform the good and avoid evil,
and that one must act in accordance with reason. The guide and
the goal of moral action is reason, and this is identifiable as
(2)the height of huraar, goodness. But the term good must be qualified.
Subjective definitions of what is good are not reliable or adequate.
Only that which is objectively good, that i3, purely arid perfectly
rational, is a justifiable end. And to act in accordance with
prudential reason alone is not sufficient either. Father
Copleston makes a distinction, which is not in Aquinas but which
must be in accordance with Ms meaning, between reason and 'right
reason'. He points out that both a burglar and a seducer could
claim to be acting rationally in that they take appropriate means
(1) ;>Svndere3is mouet prudentiam". (S.T.11.11.Q.47. Art 6.)
(2) S.T.I.11.Q.94. Art.2. "... ad legem naturae pertinent ea ad
quae homo laturaliter inclinatur; inter quae homini prourium
est ut inclinetur ad agendum secundum rationem." 3.T. 1.11.Q.94.
Art. 4*)
to achieve their enda, and he implies an interesting id ear ti fication
of the practical reason and the prudential reason when he suggests
that the reason which does not accurately apprehend the true
objective good for man cannot be properly fulfilling its function
of dictating the means necessary to its achievement, or, in other
words, that the prudential reason is morally ineffective or
unjustifiable if the practical reason and the speculative reason
(1)
which here must have to supply in-formation to it, err. ' He
does not however seem aware of the consequences of his implication, for
since there is this distinction between reason and right reason,
and since it is admitted that •false' or wrong reason can
perfectly organise and achieve the means necessary for the
fulfilment of its goal, and that it fails only in misunderstanding
(2)
the true nature of this goal, 'it would seem that the understanding
of good is to some extent outside reason itself, and quite apart
from mere rationality. In the phrase'rig-ht reason', reason must
be understood as a means to a good which is to some extent outside
itself. Otherwise reason would surely always be its own sufficient
end. The good, therefore, can not be identified with rationality,
which needs to recognise and understand the good before it can
become the means of ministering to it. It would seem then that as
(1) Aauinas. pp.204-5.
(2) There seems to be 3ama analogy with the proofs of God's existence.
If the proofs are to have any value God must mean something; if the
natural law has any value, good must mean something, and ought to be
intuitively understood since it is part of the first precept.
the first principles are intuitively understood, and as reason
by itself cannot know the final end of man, reason is almost
wholly concerned with means. Nevertheless, it is a sin for
man to act against his conscience, however misguided or wrong
its judgement,(1) ad this supremacy of conscience has always
(2)
been upheld by Roman Catholicism.
(3)
In a chapter on the supremacy of conscience ' Father
Lorson draws attention to what he calls the common Protestant
misunderstanding that the Roman Church holds its own authority
above that of conscience. Hie notions that the Roman Church
overlays conscience with prescriptions and traditions, and
values blind obedience more than free choice he seeks to disprove
from Romans XIV.23,^ hcclesiasticus XXXII.22^ and from the
writings of eminent Gatholic theologians who place conscience
above law, theology, priests and popes. Joan of Arc, for o|aple,
(1) "livery conscience, whether it is right or wrong, whether it concerns
things evil in themselves or things morally indifferent, obliges us
to act in such a way that he who acts against his conscience sins."
(QuodIIbetua 3.27)
(2) Henry Davisj S.J. Moral ar.d Pastoral Theology, p.7.
Rt Rev. Dr J.G.Vancej Freewill in C.T.3. Pamphlet July> 1939.
Pope Pius XII: Encyclical: Sunai Pontificatus. 1939.
Cardinal Gibbons: A Retrospect of 50 Years.
"Whatever is done contrary to conscience leads to hell." (Innocent III:
Decrets Lib.II. cap.III.)
(3) Lorson: Ur^tetier, ieyfrjU Objectguy d? Qoflpplencp,pp.93-lQ9
(4) "Happy is he that condenineth not himself in that thing wliich he
alioweth."
(5) uccleslaaticus. XXXII. 23. In every good work trust thy own soul;
for this is the keeping of the commandma.ts.
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was canonized for following her conscience against judges,
theologians and priests.^ The scholastics, indeed, taught that
Catholics should suffer excommunication and death rather than
(2)
thwart conscience. And Father Larson recalls the words of
Newman:
"If I had, which assuredly would hardly happen,
to propose a toast at a banquet to the honour
of religion, I should certainly drink: to the
health of the Pope, but don't misunderstand me,
first to the health of the conscience, and then
to tat of the Pope."
Two judgements, therefore, car be passed on any act with
regard to its morality. It is right and good insofar as it is
in obedience to a man's own conscience, though it may be wrong
or evil if measured by objective standards. Ana it is quite clear
that the first judgement is infinitely more important than the
second. For Roman Catholics today, as for Aquinas, conscience
is the supreme and final moral criterion. All other considerations,
sucn a3 the opinions and judgements of others, even those of the
Church aid of Jesus, have to be taken into account and allowed
full weight, and another moral judgement may be made later on a
aan's decision and action, but the supremacy of conscience proves
before everything that to Catholics the source of all true,
genuine morality is in the individual.
(1) Otto Karrort Dip Freiheit des Ohriatanmerschen. Benaiger, p.76.
quoted by Lorson, p.95.
(2) Dr Johannes Hesser<: Luther in Oekumeriischer dicht. p.65; quoted
by Lorson, p.99.
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Before considering the content of this natural rational
law it is important to mention the remaining psychological
forces, tendencies and inclinations which help to create the
true nature of moral action. The will is vitally important.
It is defined by Aquinas as an intellectual or rational appetite
by which man desires, quite naturally and inevitably, that which
(1)
the reason holds before it as good. ' The will is partly, but
not wholly, free, for it is already, by its very nature, inciin ed
and determined towards 'the good1, or rather, towards what reason
acknowledges as the good. There is a greater attraction, then,
between the will and what reason determines as good, than betwee',
the will and wiiat really is good. And yet if the really good were
the really rational, the will, in being inclined towards the
really rational, would be inclined towards the really good. There
is no suggestion that the will, in its inclination towards the
good, ever quarrels with an erring reason.
Man's understanding of 'the good' varies, and 30 the will
a paretly, swerves between lesser and greater goods. The natural
law itself, wnich decrees so absolutely that 'good' should be done,
has, when unenlightened by revelation, no knowledge of what is
(2)
the supreme good for man, ' that is, the possession of God.
(1) S.T. 1.Q.80. Art.2j 1.11. Q.l. Art.7j 1.Q.2G, Art.l.
(2) It is true that religious inclination is included in the basic ten¬
dencies of natural law, but even 30 the knowledge of God which it gives
is negligible'.'Inasmuch as all seek the good in ti e possession of which
happiness lies, all can be said, in an interpretative sense, to seek God.
But this does not mean that every human being consciously 3eeks God, which
would be patently untrue. If God as He is in Himself were revealed to us,
it would be impossible for the will not to go out towards Him. But God
The supreme good for the natural law is reason ar d rational
behaviour, or the rational orga isation of the development of
Biases potentialities* Aquinas, in suggesting that the inclination
of the will is always towards 'the good*, m d in acknowledging
that man, in hie ignorance and his sin, calls many things, 3cao
of which aroin fact, evil, "good1, because they are at least thought
of as 'meeting or fulfilling some rood of hiasan nature or as
actuaiising and perfecting some potentiality of nvmm nature',^
implied that the will is unintelligent, morally blind and
indiscriminate, aid perhaps a slave to its own gullible passion
or impulse towards a false good* For whatever reason holds before
it as 'good' draws it like a bait or magnet* The will is essentially
weakj it lias a weakness for 'the good'* At best it is a morally
neutral power and inevitably backs up the judgement of a wron reason
as strongly as tint of a 'right' reason. This is confirmed by the
fact that ova when the will is attracted by two ;ood$ a greater
(2)
and a lesser, it doss not necessarily choose the former* A am
oft® choosos quite deliberately what he admits as an apparent and
lessor good, w: ich may be a real evil, in opposition to what ho knows
to bo the real supreme good,
is not so revealed to U3..*» Me do not possess that vision of God
which alone would exorcise an inevitable attraction on the will#'
(F.G.Gople-ston: Aquinas, pp, 181-2)
(1) F*C«Goplestoni %uinaa, p,i8o.
(2) 3*T*1* Q*19* Art. 9* Also see F.G.Coplestons Aquinas, pp.183-6
The fact that the will must always be able to apprehend
the object of its desire and action as 'good' was not to Aquinas
a sign of the essential hypocrisy or even hedonism and self-
deception of man, but of the fundamental drive beliind all
conscious act3 of will, the drive towards self-fulfilment, self-
development ard perfection, and happiness. This impulse, however,
does not involve or contain any explicit conception of man's
objective and real good; for as has been seen, the will is not
driven by an impulse which is set towards the greatest or greater
good rather than the lesser, arid there is no proportionate
relationship between the degree of goodness in an object and
the strength of the impulse driving the will towards it. This
in itself would seem to suggest that this fundamental impulse
is morally useless; the will also is neutral and reason without
power. The law of nature, even when apprehended in its purity
and perfection, has no power to compel obedience, and reason
appears to be often employed in persuading man that his actual
drive towards inferior things, or even bad or destructive things,
is in fact a striving for perfection. Human language is so
relative that an inferior good may easily be identifiable with
an evil. The will is not necessarily attracted by the good at
all.
I evertheless Aquinas elsewhere insisted said Father
Copleston that the will is
"... necessarily set towards the final
or ultimate good as such and that it
is under the impulse of this dynamic
and innate orientation of the will that
we make our particular choices." (1)
Aquinas was able to say tiis presunably oecause of his conviction
that God is so much the ultimate goal of things that all things,
after however many deviations, will finally rest in iiim. But
it leads to a very differert idea of the will from that which he
gives in other parts of his works, in which the will is 3hewn to
be utterly dependent on reason for guidance, and even so is just
as likely to cnoose evil as good. Here the suggestion is that
of its own accord the will vrorks towards what is good, and is
therefore more adequate than reason which does not know the good
in its fullness. It has no icnowledge of God, who is man's true
aid final end, even though it might point towards God as such an
end. For even the metaphysical knowledge of God which in itself
is not immediately available to every man, teaches rather what
God is not than what he is. The ultimate knowledge of man's end
is given only in revelation or in the mystical vision of God
after death, and reason is certainly unable to shew us tliis good
in such a way that the will is compelled to follow and accept it.
(1) F.C.Gopleston: Aquinas, pp.195-6. Nevertheless the 'ultimate good'
is capable of varying interpretations: "But since there is neither
an innate idea nor an intuition of the supreme good in the concrete,
people's ideas of what constitutes the supreme good or final end can
be, and indeed are, different... To find the ultimate good or final
end of man we have to turn to the supernatural vision of God, which
is attainable only in the next life." (F.G.Gople£ton: Aquinas.pp.196-7.)
The supernatural good, which is also the real good, is
certainly inaccessible to reason, but even the natural good, that
is that man should perfect iiimself and fulfil all his potentialities,
(1)
can still not be translated into anything fully explicit. We
may have some reasonably clear idea of certain worthwhile tendencies
in human nature, but even so our understanding of them i3 very
imperfect, and the task of syntnesising them without a guiding and
integrating end is something about wrdch it would seam impOB si le
(2)
to dogmatise.
(1) "... the good is indeed undiscoverable if by good is meant the
good of the hedonist. But the same cannot be said of the eudemonist.
We have at least a hazy notion of what human nature is (using the
word nature in its metaphysical sense? the common specific possession
of all men); we have in consequence some idea of that towards
which it naturally tends; we cannot doubt that health, wisdom,
virtue, are the proper objects of activity, the proper term of
growth." (Gerald Vann: Morals and Man, p.77-8)
"It is less difficult to say what the creation of the perfected
personality is not, in any given individual, than to say exactly
what it is - It is not, first of all, the perfecting of any one
element to the exclusion of all others... it is not the perfecting
of all potentialities without regard to the well-being of the whole.
It is not a question of mere 'self-expression'." (Ibid., p.93)
(2) "We have reached a scheme of things in which every side is
viewed. But would it work in practice? The knowledge of God
possible to reason alone is so meagre that, since love dependson
knowledge, the God-motive would in practice, in the majority of
cases, be either non-existent or at least very weak. Almost
certainly the synthesis would split up. In St. Thomas's completed
scheme, when he speaks as a theologian, this danger is absent...
revelation opens to us the mind of God..." (Ibid., p.101.)
"If morals are divorced from dogma... the christian life ceases
to be a life, a growth, a process, and becomes instead are
conformity to a code.". (Ibid.. 67.)
It is clear, then, how essential for Aquinas1 a doctrine
of natural law is the anility of reason to prebend man's
goal. The difference between 'right* and 'wrong* reason is
that the former does so, whereas the latter mistakes for it
lesser goods. But this appreiiension of the true end of moral
action is something which reason can never except by accide; t,
achieve by itself. Han than never has a 'right* reason. It
appears to be generally admitted that only in so far as the
law of nature is integrated with revelation does it have any
specific moral value. In itself it is little more than descriptive
of the status quo, and as a directive has little more value than
the advice that one should keep on breathing in order to say alive.
Aquinas made a distinction between on the one hand, actus
humani, those acts which are the deliberate work of reason and
will and which involve the conscious determination of the will
towards an end approved by the reag>n as goodand on the other
(1)
involtfft&ary or unthinking acts. ' Only the former, whether interior
or exterior, can be truly moral.
Xet Aquinas recognised that man can arrive at a correct
conviction that an act is good or bad without necessarily going
through the process of logically assessing its compatibility with
reason, and that on occasion man car understand immediately
(1) S.T. 1.11.Q .iArt.l
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or feel rightly, that an act is good or bad, and that this
half-instinctive or intuitive reaction of men towards the moral
quality of certain actions is indeed indicative of a natural arid
innate understanding of moral truth. But he would maintain that
we should distinguish between t e way in which a person comes to
believe or recognise that an act is wrong and the objective
reason why it is so. Objectively any oad act must be analysable
as not in conformity with reason. Aquinas, then, did not mean
by a 'thinking' or'deliberate' act, one which is the outcome of a
clear and consecutive logical process, nevertheless, an element
of mental recognition or consciousness of the act as good or bad
must be present. Father Gopleston argues that although some such
acts might be described as being 'felt' rather than thought to be
good, Aquinas would have insisted that mental activity is involved.
He also maintains that Aquinas understood, that not only profound
thought and reflection but also other psychological factors must
help mas in determirdng all the secondary rules of natural law,
ard in applying such to individual cases? any genuine moral
decision must be made by the individual himself, and he may 'see it
or 'feel it' as objectively good apart from any process of logical
calculation. Wor would he be helped necessarily by the brilliant
reasoning power of an outsider, ever were the outsider a moral
philosopher. But Father Copleston emphasises that even if the man
(1) Aquinas, pp.224-5.
were unable to give reasons for his decision which would
satisfy a philosopher, his prudential reason would, in fact,
have enabled him to reach it. And if it were a good decision
A)
it would stand the test of rationality.According to Father
Gopleston's interpretation of Aquinas, not only is a man"3
understanding of what is •good1 dependent on his natural
inclination to pursue whatever is satisfying to his own being, but
it must also be the result of experience, even though he may
never consciously or explicitly formulate to himself the law that
good is to be pursued arid evil avoided. In defending this
interpretation against the objection that it is lowering man's
moral behaviour from the rational to the instinctual and emotional
realm, he claims that the general principle can be presupposed
or induced from the fact that man, in particular instances, is
conscious that he avoids what he thinks of as evil and pursues what
he thinks of as good. But'it is admitted that the law of nature in
general may remain unconscious.
The difficulty with this admission is that something other
than reason is brought into the picture, and made central. Such
mental processes as intuition, feeling, and unconscious understanding
of what is right are hardly compatible with the strictly syllogistic
looic outlined by Aquinas, and 'intuition', although it has often
(l| Ibid., pp.225-6t
been described as reason working at lightening speed, has in
fact never been fully araLysed. It must be connected with that
extra-sensory perception which is today the object of continuing
research, which cannot yet be fully explained in rational terms
and which cannot, therefore, always be .roved compatible with
reason. Hunches often defy logic and even common sense, and
yet prove themselves right. If rationality is stretched to
mean a mental registration of complex psychological factors and
processes, it ceases to have much to do with logic as such. Such
moral judgements as Father Copleston tries to defend against the
charge of 'emotionalism' or 'instinctualism' on the grounds that
they can always be proved compatible with the strict logic of
reason, are not always susceptible to such examination.
Reason is not always able to analyse such hunches or to
guarantee their validity. In making an appointment, an interviewer
may have an intuition that the less rather than the more qualified
person should be chosen, but reason can never know whether' the
intuition ua3 right or wrong. According to revelation natural
inclinations are likely to be very doubtful criteria, and the
specific experience needed to make reliable moral decisions is
always likely to be lacking. Certain^/Aquinas did not allow other
factors such as imagination, subconscious forees and drives,
intuition and feeling, authority comparable to that of reason;
he did not allow than to decide for themselves, and in their
own ways, the moral worth of their own activities. They cannot,
therefore, by themselves, achieve goodness. The 'god' of man's
mind is that integrating power of concentration which organises
all faculties to its own supreme and according to its own dictates,
and w; ich operates, although unconsciously, as the 'practical
reason *.
Father Copleston's explanation of how Aquinas understood the
derivation of the secondary from the primary principles of natural
law also undermines its strict logicality. The principle that good
must be done does not contain logically witnin itself the command
that adultery, for example, is wrong. It is rather the rational
reflection upon our experience of human life that leads the mind
to define the second principle as in conformity with the first.
And the more particular the precept, or the judgement of natural
law, the easier it is for ignorance, misunderstanding and rror to
creep in.
Sums get harder as tney get more complicated, and it would seem
true also that human experience introduces into moral problems,
elements widch make the latter less easily answered by rationalism
alone. There seems no absolute reason why, in those societies
where women outnumber men by thousands, reason,reflecting on
the situation, should not decide that polygamy is desirable.
In a situation where a husband is being tormented by a neurotic
wife, reason might well decide that divorce is the best solution.
Reason reflecting on experience is likely to result in widely
varying, and sometimes contradictory, secondary precepts.
This power of non-rational apprehension of something as in
accordance with reason is, presumably, explicable in terms of
Aquinas's theory of habits. He found inchoate habits in the
cognitive powers, and the understanding of the first principles
he called a natural habit.^
In opposition to innate bodily predispositions, the acquired
habits in the intellectual or sensitive parts of man are built up
by use and practice. The repetition of similar acts or thoughts,
makes it easier to think and act quickly and perfectly in certair:
ways and in certain circumstances, and the physical dispositions
also help or hinder the ease with which men can be virtuous in
(2)
various ways. A practised and accurate practical reason would
be able thus to make moral judgements with speed and wisdom.
Other good habits, the virtues, help man to act easily and




In spite of the fact that speculative reason and practical
reason are in fact one and only called differently in so far as
their objects differ, Intellectual virtues are, in one important
sense, unrelated to moral virtues* An expert mathematician, for
instance, may be proud and over-indulgent.^ It would seem,
therefore, that although intellectual virtue or eminence must
involve prudence arid reason there is no necessarily proportionate
relationship between the latter and moral virtue. The proper
maturity and development of the habits is what enable U3 to act
in a somewhat spontaneous manner, arid it is these habits which
prove that to act in accordance with reason does not necessarily
involve being painstaking and deliberate.
Amotions are just as much part of a moral act as reason, will
and the virtues. To Aquinas, emotions and passions were, in
themselves, morally neutral, their goodness or badness depending
on the degree to which they strengthened or undermined reason and
will. Emotions obviously seek some satisfaction or other; only
the successful repression, organisation and encouragement which
reason and will inspire can bring these emotions into conformity
with the objective good for man, and the perfection of an act is
possible only when this control is complete and when the emotions
strongly support the reason. Although there is virtue in an act
nrF.C.Copleion: Acuinas pp.207-8. He points out, however, the
importance of prudence for the moral virtues.
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which is performed in a state of emotional frustration or conflict ,
an act becomes morally superior when a man's whole being wholly
(1)
and happily wills and desires it. There is, indeed, a sense
in which the desire which moves the will is identifiable with
(2)
the ©iootion of love.
Aquinas distinguished between interior and exterior acts.
hVery human act involves the judgement of reason and the determination
of the will, but not every interior act leads to an exterior act.
When Aquinas considered the morality of a human act however he
thought primarily, though not entirely, of interior acts. The basic
intention and purpose of an act in the conscience of the man
performing it is of first importance in assessing its morality.
And every concrete human act is, according to Aquinas, either
oad or good, though it is not possible to make an abstract judgement
of every isolated act as such* To be of moral value an act must be
(3)
intentional, deliberate, and informed by a purpose, which suggests
that a situation from which these factors have been eliminated is
no object for a moral judgement.
A bad intention, or even absence of a good intention, corrupts
the whole act even though externally, or objectively, it is blameless.
(1) "It pertains to the perfection of moral goodness that a mar; should
be moved towards the good not only by his will but also by his
sensitive appetite." (S.T.1.11.Q.2A. Art.3.)




The intention belongs to the interior act which, by the analogy
Aquinas made with the hylomorphic theory, is the 'form' of the
whole act. The exterior act is the 'matter#. If a materially
good act is done with a bad intention, the whole act, in
(l)
both aspects, is morally bad. ' The action of giving to the poor
may be materially good, but a bad intention gives a 'form* to the
(2)
individual act wnich makes it morally bad. Intention, apparently,
is identifiable with the will in its relation to a rationally
justified end. Nevertheless, goodness of intention does not in
(3)
itself make an act good.v ' A good act needs to conform to right
reason in order to be objectively good, but a right intention is
not identifiable with right reason. This would appear to be
important in considering the relationship between means and ends.
It is not justifiable to defraud one person because we have the
/ Y?
intention of thereby benefitting someone else.
Here the word 'intention1 might be better translated as
'purpose' ir 'motive' for in such a situation there would be as
definite an intention to steal as to give. The means, then, must
be rationally and morally compatible with the end. In one sense the
(1)Father Gilby states that Aquinas "would have agreed that the
chief problem about atomic energy is not the physical destruction
it may cause, but the human wills ready to let it loose."(Between
Community and Society, p.205.)
(2) "For instance we say that to give alms for the sake of vain
glory is bad." (S.T.1.11.Q.20. Art.l.)
(3) "Goodness of the will, proceeding from intention directed to
an end, is not sufficient to make an exterior act good."(S.T.l.ll.Q.2Q.
Art.2.)
means must be considered as an act in itself, which must be
intrinsically good, whereas in another it must also be acknowledged
as being so united with the end, and so creatively connected with
it that it can either corrupt or be corrupted by it. As in the
teleological ethics of Aristotle, morally obligatory acts are
not means to an end which is simply external to these acts, since
they are already a partial fulfilment of it, nor is the end
something external to the agent.
In di3CUssii g the importance of the external-objective and
the internal-subjective factors, Father /ann exalts the value of
the latter. To be perfect an act must be inspired by a right
intention and conform to what is objectively good. But an action
which fulfils the law but which is contrary to conscience is bad,
whereas one which is in keeping with conscience but which is contrary
to law is good. Law only becomes moral when it is subjectivised
by a right spirit and intention. Emphasising the mere external
aspects of a law or aorta of conduct only results in unchristian
(l)
behaviour
"There is, in the thomist view, no such
thing as morality in the ordinary legalist
sense." (2)
As natural law consists of the judgements of practical reason
mode in accordance with rational principles, to act according to
(1) liorals and Han. p.100. p.70
(2) Ibid., p.73.
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the law of nature is to act in accordance with reason, which is
the unique and distinguis,ing feature which God has created in
man to help him to achieve the right organisation and development
of all his potentialities in short, his fulfilment. It is,
therefore, utterly natural, as well as right, that man should be
guided in all things by reason.
Fluckiger considers that this teleological element in
Aquinas's conception of the natural law prevents the formation
of an inflexible set of rules*^ Christian tradition, indeed,
enforced certain rules upon him but his hierarchy of them was made
up of only the really unalterable ones. The dependent and derived
rules are made conditional so that they can be adapted in changing
circumstances. Aquinas's respect for the individual, too, must
have dissuaded him from laying down too many general laws.
The first fundamental of the law of nature, that good must be
done and evil avoided, is a formal rather than an efficient cause
of the first precepts of the natural law, wideh express it
completely, and wiiich are so comprehended by this generalisation
that they are unified in and by it. The natural law then is one,
(2)
whole,and so rationality and goodness are identified. ' Because
all moral activity i3 purposive and intentional, the first precepts
(1) Fluckiger. Gescliichte des haturrechtea. pp.453-4*
(2) SiT.l.ll.Q.94. Art.2. S.T.1.11.Q.91. Art.2.
of natural law are identical with its final ends. Accompanying
each final end of any precept of natural law are the conditions
that it must be in accordance with reason and that it must do
good and avoid evil. Fluckiger's criticism of this principle
as ostentatiously saying nothing of great importance is, in a
{»)
sense, justified, ' for its identification of reason and goodness
makes it somewhat tautologous. The question of what is morally
right and wrong, assumes that it is right to do right, ad
wrong to do wrong, so it is not much help to be told that this
(2)
is the answer. 7 The question having been asked by the reason, it
must assume the supremacy of reason, as much as the answer. The
interchangeability of rationality and goodness is so self-contained
as to be rather sterile, nevertheless Fluckiger Claims that the
victory of the principle of reason in Thomistic philosophy is the
beginning of a new epoch in the history of natural law thinking.
Natural law is bo longer, as with the Fathers, primarily that
which is enunciated in the law and the Gospel but stands as
something separate from though parallel to it.
It could be claimed that Aquinas*s understanding of good
gains meaning from its identification with that which rationally
develops and perfects man's human nature. Natural law certainly
accura ulated precepts arising from reason's consideration of the
(1) ;eschichte des haturrechtes. p.45-4*
(2) There is an areLogy her= between the discovery that God exists
before God means anything in Aquinas's naturalistic theology, and
this moral enlightenment that doing good is the foundation of
ethics before good has any real definition.
basic tendencies and feelings in man. It is concerned with
all possible virtues and acts of virtue. It wholly takes in
and controls the animal nature of man. Dom Lotting opinion-
is that Aquinas, following Ulpian, held the (more or less)
Roman conception that natural law takes in actions common to
(1)
men and animals. In fact, natural law, as reason, cannot be
indifferent to any part of man's life, social or private. It is
concerned not only with obligatory act3 but also with the
counsels of perfection. And it is aware, in its understanding
and judgements, of the three fundamental drives which dominate
human ±ife, but which it must finally control; the drives towards
self-preservation, towards procreation and parenthood, and towards
intellectual, cultural and religious truth, aid social and
(2)
political community. '
These drives were not apparently placed by Aquinas in any
hierarchical order. It is obvious that conflict between their
different demands could easily occur. For example, menand women
might seriously impair their own lives and careers in order to have
and maintain children; the devotion to a life of intellectual
research might necessitate the sacrifice of marriage and parenthood,
as might the religious life. Here again there are likely to be
(1) See n.331.
(2) S.T.1.11.Q.9A. Art.2.
conflicts between individual and social ends, but Aquinas
assumed t;0 naively that all these drives necessarily harmonise,
while in fact the most trying task of the moral life is their
integration.
An example of one of the first precepts of natural law, the
outcome of reason contemplating and controlling one of these
basic drives, is that which concerns marriage. Marriage is
prescribed because it alone ensures the final end of sexual union,
the procreation and education of children, and also the second,
subsidiary end, the mutual help of man and woman. This secondary
end or precept is derived from the first and so subordinated to
it that, if necessary, it may be sacrificed on its behalf. Polygamy
is not contradictory to the first precepts of marriage, since it
need in no way interfere with the procreation and education of
children. Pdyandry however, because it involves uncertainty of
parenthood, is utterly opposed to it. Both polygamy and polyandry,
by causing frietionand jealousy, and by making complete devotion of
man and wife to each other impossible, oppose the secondary precept
or end of marriage. These secondary precepts however are not
essential, or, at least, they often need the support of human or
divine law to give them full authority.
This seems a bad, though conventional, example of a natural
law precept. It is very difficult to understand how the secondary
precept is derived from the first simply by reason contemplating
experience, or how, being a conclusion of it, it can ever hinder it.
It would be quite possible to argue that in many circumstances it
would be better for children to be educated away from one or the
other or both parents. Carriage is certainly not essential for
the procreation of children, which is stated as one of its
foundations and ends, and it could be argued that the parents are
only likely to be ideal educators if their union is one of love and
mutual benefit and harmony, if, that is, the secondary precept be
fulfilled first. It would even be possible in many
circumstances to guarantee parentage in a polyandrous marriage,
although both polygamy and polyandry might be likely to hinder
education of children.
This particular example has been examined in some detail to
shew that natural law is not wholly rational. Here the leading
influence was not rationality but revelation and Christian
tradition. Indeed, Flilckiger quotes with approval the opinion of
Hans Welzei,^ who emphasises that Aquinas's criterion for
discrimination between*good' and 'bad' natural inclinations was,
in fact, not so much reason as prescribed Christian ethics, or at
(I) Hans Walzel.*( laturrecht und materiale Gerechti^keit. p.61.
quoted by Fluckiger, pp.456-6.
least a reason so influenced






It is interesting to note, therefore, that at the same time
Fluckiger is astonished at the strongly naturalistic basis of
Aqiinas's ethical system, and thinks that, with its rationalism,
(2)
it becomes a resurrection of pagan natural law. Whether in
Ms thinking on particular natural law precepts Aquinas was
more under the sway of naturalism, rationalism or Christianity
is of the greatest importance. His natural law teaching on
marriage seems to be almost wholly Christian. His natural law
teaching on self-defence, however, seems to rely more on naturalism.
T e most important of the fundamental drives for a study
concerning war is that toward3 self-preservation a$td, therefore,
self-defence. Aquinas's first precept of natural law arising
from this impulse justifies both self-preservation and self-
(3)
defence as both right and good. Nevertheless, Professor Ramsey
tMnks that, in spite of his own natural law theory, Aquinas was
almost as reluctant to think of direct killing, even of an enemy
or an unjust aggressor, as intrinsically right as was Augustine,
who thought killing in individual defence wrong.^
(1) ueschichte des 1 aturrechtes. p.456.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Paul Ramsey: War and the Christian Conscience, pp.34-5.
(4) De Libero Arbitrio. Bk i. eh.V. It is possible to question the
absoluteness of Augustine's refusal to admit individual killing - see
p. 5"/£T below. Aquinas himself managed to interpret Augustine in such a
way that he agrees with Mm. For he said, when Augustine wrote 'How
are they free from sin In sight of Divine providence, who are guilty
of taking a man's life for the sake of the contemptible things.J, he
pointedly said for the sake of. in order to shew that he was condemning




Aquinaa's ruling on self-defence 'is closely bound up with
the law of double effect. The intention and act of defending
oneself is not unlawful since it is natural for everything to
preserve its own life, but if the act becomes disproportionate
to the intention and end, if for example more violence in self-
defence is used than is necessary, the act does become unlawful.
Aquinas used a legal rule as Ms test) 'It is lawful to repel force
by force, provided one does not exceed the limits of a blameless
defence.' And so it is presumably only when killing is inevitable
(l) S.T.11«11.'4.6a art 7. & id Q.A3 art«3» B.T.l.ll.'.f.srt 3»ad.3«
"I answer that, Nothing hinders one act from
having two effects, only one of which is intended,
while the other i3 beside the intention. Now moral
acts take their species according to what is intended
and not according to what is beside the intention,
since this is accidental as explained above...Accordingly
the act of self-defence may have two effects, one is
the saving of one's life, the other is the slaying
of the aggressor. T erefore this act, since one's
intention is to save one's own life, is not unlawful,
seeing that it is natural to everything to keep itself
in being, as far as possible. And yet, though proceeding
from a good inte: tion, an act may be rendered unlawful,
if it be out of proportion to the end. Wherefore if a
man, in self-defence, uses more than necessary violence,
it will be unlawful; whereas if he repel force with
moderation his defence will be lawful, because according
to the jurists, it is lawful to repel force by force,
provided one does not exceed the limits of a blameless
defence. Nor is it necessary for salvation that a
man omit the act of self-defence in order to avoid
.tilling the other man, since one is bound to take moracqre.
of one's own life than of another's. But as it is
unlawful to take a man's life, except for the public
authority acting for the common good, as stated above,
it is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in
self-defence, except for such as have public authority,
who while intending to kill a man in self-defence refer
this to the public good, as in the case of a soldier
fighting against the foe, and in the minister or judge
struggling with robbers, although even these sin if
they be moved by private animosity."
■i"| r**: w
^ j
that it is permitted insofar as one need not refrain from
defending oneself even if this brings about the death of the
attacker. Such killing will not cost the defender his
salvation for 'one is bound to take more care of one's own
life than of another's'. But this action is still not lawful,
for although self-defence is lawful, it is not lawful for an
individual to take a man's life except on behalf of a public
authority acting for the common good. It is unlawful, therefore,
for an individual to intend to kill in self-defence, except
inasmuch as ne acts in a public capacity and for the public
v good, jhiveri then he must not be moved by personal feeling.
Aquinas was obviously reluctant to justify the right of an
individual to kill even in self-defence, partly no doubt because
there is obvious danger that such killing might, in the urges:;cy
of a situation, be too hastily done, and partly because he felt
that the act is wrong in itself.
It is equally obvious, however, that in some cases of self-
defence it is necessary to kill in order to save one's life, arid
such an act could be regarded as proportionate to the end. And
since it is right to value one's own life more than another's
and since one can commit such an act without danger of losing
one's salvation, one would have thought, therefore, that for
8
Aquinas such killing would be wholly lawful. The separate
moral aspects of it appear to be so. But there is something about
the nature of the act itself which prevents Aquinas from really
accepting it. And thus, if one is acting solely as an individual,
he says, it is not lawful to take life or to intend to kill.
According to the judgement that morality is concerned only
with intentions, therefore, the act of killing in individual self-
defence must be considered as \ho2Jy immoral or, inasmuch as it
is completely unintentional, wholly amoral.
In discussing the difference between individual and public
right, Professor Ramsey suggests that in the latter case perhaps
the intention to Jpill is still regarded as evil, but it is thought
that good may come out of it, or that, 'in this instance alone as
an exception, the means used - the direct killing of the unjust
aggressor - should be judged to be right in itself.'^
But neither of these solutions really explains the difference.
Professor Ramsey holds that the rule of double effect was
first clearly stated in this discussion about self-defence, and
was the result of an attempt to Christianise justice, and to put
(2)
into practice a Christian regard for the sinful man, in that it
checked disproportionate revenge, arid preserved the intention of
(1) P*41»
(2) tfar and the Christian Conscience, pp.42 - 44.
i e./
Christian love.^ He argues that the permitted unintended killing
is not willed for itself, nor as a means towards the unintended
(2)
end, but only as 'one of twin, unavoidably connected events.*
(3)
He refers to criticisms 'that it is not humanly possible to
•let go the bullet and withhold the intention*, or *to let go the
blow and withhold the animosity*, and that it is therefore
hypocritical casuistry to judge the same act as good or bad on
grounds of intention alone, Such criticisms lead to the conclusion
that it is therefore better wholeheartedly to admit killing in
self-defence. Such reasoning he thinks springs from unwillingness
to admit love's power to safeguard a good intention over and above
the demands of justice, which latter would allow the intention as
well as the act of killing in self-defence, and is made by the
natural man in us, the man insufficiently schooled by Chri3t.
This unwillingness to see that love can temper justice he
finds in the growth of that school of later moral theology, which
simply distinguishes according to natural law between intrinsically
right means which are always justifable and intrinsically bad
means which never are. Many moralists, would say, according to
(1) "Herein is prohibited at the least, what love prohibits, namely,
the direct killing of any man, as an end in itself, or as a means of
preserving the life that a Christian should love far less than he
love3 God and his neighbor in God who stands before him in the
guise of a robber or a murderer." (loid.. p.45»)
(2) Ibid., p.44.
(3) Such as made by Father John C. Ford in an article on "The Morality
of Obliteration Bombinsr" in Theological Studies. V.3- (Sept.1944)
Jar andthe Christian Conscience. p.A9. pp.261-309
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their own personal prejudices, that Aquinas did not understand
the principle of double effect as it is understood today, or
that he applied it inappropriately to the question of self-
defence, or even that it i3 not to be found in Aquinas. After
the early seventeenth century most moral theologians ceased to
apply the rule of double effect to the problem of self-defence,
because they regarded the killing of an unjust aggressor as
inherently justifiable, and because it is assumed impossible for
one man to be a target for an act but not for the intention
behind itj it was related rather to the problem of the killing
of the innocent, since in warfare the innocent may remain materially
outside the sphere of the intention. The indirect would be
materially separate from the direct effect.
In the nineteenth century the rule of double effect come to
be prominent in Roman Catholic theology and it was elaborated to
mean that indirect consequences are beyond the bounds of moral
responsibility as long as the directly intended action is good,
or at least morally indifferent, in its nature and object, and a
good effect only is intended. The evil consequences are not to be
willed as a means to the good effect, but both effects have to arise
simultaneously from the good ormorally indifferent action which
causedthem, and the goodness of the good effect has to be done
directly as well as directly willed, and the good effect has to
arise as immediately from the act as any secondary evil consequences
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for which the doer ia not to be heldresponsible.^
The killing of an unjust aggressor has thus come to be
recognised as a good and justifiable means rather than as an
indirect effect, no doubt because the involvement of the will
and the intention i3 so clear and because it is difficult in
the issue of self-defence to permit the act without permitting
the intention. It would be impossible to think of the death as
an effect that comes as immediately from the cause as the saving
of one's own life.
Nevertheless, Professor Ramsey finds in Aquinas's condition
that killing lias to be indirect arid not direct, an example not of
the natural law ruling that every life is immune from direct
attack unless the right has been sacrificed by injustice done, but
of how love surrounds the weak arid the helpless, the unjust and the
foe. It therefore recalls Christ's willingnessto die for the
(2)
ungodly. He refers to Souscaren's thesis that only an operation
which in fact and in intention unavoidably kills the foetus
indirectly should be allowed, by claiming that according to
Christian morality, any lawful killing, including the killing of
an unjust aggressor, must be indirect.
Professor Ramsey thinks that the question is very relevant to
the modern dilemma a-out the all out use of nuclear weapons, his
(1) War and the Christian Conscience, p.48.
(2) Ibid.. p.52. He quotes T. Lincoln Bouscaren's The bthica of ectopic.




implication being, apparently, that not only does the rule of
double effect safeguard the subjective intention, but demands
that objectively also the intrinsically evil effect of the
slaying of innocent people be not a means to whatsoever military
advantage. This would bring us close to the rejection of all
modem warfare.
He concludes that Aquinas's true meaning is not to be found
by seeking into the exact interpretation of intendere. non intendere,
ex intentione and praeter intertionem, or whether to intend an
action includes intention of inevitable means. It depends on
"... whether one stands with Aquinas close to
Augustine's rejection of privat self-defence
lest a man inordinately love his life and
property more than God and his neighbor in
God, or whether one stands close to the fully
developed modern theories of natural justice..."(1)
But if Aquinas stands close to Augustine, he stands equally
close to the "modem theories of natural justice." He may think
with Augustine, but is in danger of acting with those who
inordinately love life and property more than God and their
neighbours in God. Christ's willingness to die for the ungodly
is impressive because he did die for them.
The dictates of natural law are the basis of all Individual,
particular moral judgements, as well as of all just human legislation.
(1) War and the Christian Conscience, p.56.
The question arises whether aLl acts accepted as moral are
obligatory. It would seen as though, if the fulfilment of
all potentialities were the natural goal of man, it would
for example be obligatory for him to have as many children
as he could support and educate. Only on the basis of belief
inadifferent and spiritual goal which transcended, to the exte; t
of contradicting, that natural end could celibacy be called a
higher law. Yet if that goal were allowed it would become,
presumably, obligatory, involving a man in moral evil if he did
not obey it. To what extent, therefore, can reason without
revelation understand and formulate such a goal and adapt its
judgement to it? It is interesting that Aquinas included the
inclination to know God within the law of nature, so that it
would apparently be possible for a man to feel a calling to
devote himself to spiritual matters apart from any revealed law
or vision of God. Clearly some kind of hierarchy of the basic
drives would help to decide whether a particular act were
obligatory. And yet Aquinas made no such arrangement of them.
Aquinas also differentiated the ways in which it is possible
to look at virtuous acts. Mot all acts are dictated by the law
of nature, for prudential reason can make certain decisions and
authorise certain actions.^
(1) Hl'Sent. D«33. Q.2. Art.3, 4-. See also Le Droit Maturel Chez
->t Thomas dfAquin et Ses Predecesseurs. pp.77—8
Within the sphere of natural law itself, only those virtuous
acts which would involve a mar in moral evil if they were not
performed are held obligatory. Father Copleston points out
that man is sometimes presented with a choice of alternative goods
of equal moral value, and gives the example of a man who, although
morally obliged to support his family, is not bound to be a postman
rather than a porter.Here one would have thought that it would
be in the choice between two such apparently equally good
alternatives that the essential wisdom of the moral sense of
prudence could prove itself, for the man might be more happy and
fulfilled as a postman than as a porter. In some choices the
alternatives might be of equal moral value, but moral decisions
generally are between greater and less goodness, even though
reason may not be able always to understand this.
For Aquinas himself, obligation depended upon how necessary
it is for realising the end sought. If it is essential, obligation
is clear. He distinguished between laws of nature, which are
always obligatory, and counsels of perfection, which become
(2)
obligatory only in certain circumstances. This would suggest
that the counsels are in general less obligatory than the law of
nature because they are less essential to man's final end. Since
(1) Aquinas, p.201.
(2) IV. Sent. D.15. Q.3. Art.l. Sol.5 ad 2.
IV. Sent. D.19.Q.2. Art. 2. Sol.l. ad 3.
See also he Droit Laturel Ghea St Thomas d'Aquin et Ses
Fr&igcesseurs. pp.7A.-5
all have the natural inclination to know God, although not all
feel impelled to follow it to the same degree, it would appear
that individual, vocational differences alter the degree of
obligation which resides in even a law of nature.
It has been seen already that reason's Inability to know the
final end thoroughly undermines the whole natural law doctrine.
And yet where reason is helped towards fuller enlightenment by
revelation, as in the counsels of perfection, such help was binding
only for a few who, by reason of their way of life and calling,
were committed to the ideal of perfection. The ordinary person
was not 30 bound. Aquinas accepted this distinction, but it is
increasingly rejected by Catholic thinkers today, hot only is
there a tendency to soften the distinction between the secular
and the sacred, and to allow the laity a deeper responsibility
and higher role in the life of the Church, but the counsels of
perfection are regarded as binding all Christians.
"As sanctity differs in manner in different
historical conditions, so we may suppose that
the christian's awareness of his temporal function
to-day "calls for a new type of holiness, which
one might characterize primarily as a holiness and
a sanctification of the secular life" and that the
new type of Christendom to which the exigencies of
to-day would seem to point is a Christendom not
sacrale but profane, a civilization which is no
longer simply an instrument of the spiritual but
is an end in its own order (finis ultiaus secundum qui )
The old bad theory of the Two Ways - contemplation,
perfection, for the cloister, the bare minimum
observance of commandments for the world (the state
of the imperfect) - this invalid distinction, "so
2 8 G
widespread, it would seem, in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries",
must receive practical refutation:
"profane will no longer be opposed to
sacred as impure to pure"j for the Gospel
principle — the sar.ctification of the
profane, the penetration of grace into the
depths of the world of nature - will reach
a further setp in its gradual manifestation
and realisation." (l)
(2)
Father Gilby ' finds a similar feeling even in Aquinas;
in his statement that nothing peculiar* attaches to sanctifying
(3)
grace. Holiness, 'though it may be rare is no luxury, but the
culmination of charity, commanded, not counselled,' And he again
refers to Aquinas^ as emphasising, in his study of the life
of perfection, that the vows and practices of the religious life
are only a means to an end, charity, which is a command for all.^
The relation between natural law and divine law in Aquinas
is not simple. One purpose of divine law is to confirm, proclaim
and emphasise the law of nature so clearly that no-one could be
(6)
wholly ignorant of it. ' The Ten Commandments supply an example
of this reinforcement of the natural law. But revelation does more
than this. It points man to Ms supreme and supernatural end,
which reason by itself can neither understand nor attain.
(1) Vann; Morals and Man. pp.131-2 (paraphrasing Marltain; Humanisms
Integral. p.l34«
(2) Between Community and Society, p.197
(3) S.T.I.11. GXX. 1.
(4) SfiT. 11.11. CLXXXtl.
(5) p.232. It has never bean disputed that 'love your enemies' is a
command also. See p.iOt
(6) SjT.l.ll.Q.4. Art.6.
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The positive divine law shews man that thi3 supernatural
end is a life of union with God, and teaches the supernatural
means, such as the sacraments and the availability of divine
grace, which help him towards it. The fully developed natural
man, wno in obedience to the law of nature, lias developed and
perfected all his potentialities is still not the ideal man.
He needs, in addition to the natural virtues those supernatural
virtues of faith, hope and love which can be given only by
divine grace, and which transcend, extend or enlarge, and do not
contradict the natural virtues.^ There was no question for
Aquinas of the lesser end, the 'good* apprehen ded by reason,
opposing, limiting, masking or usurping the final and true end
of spiritual union with God. It is, indeed, part of that end,
since for him the development and perfecting of all things was,
however unconscious man may be of the fact, identifiable with
the glory of God. The fulfilment of man's natural end is only
part of and only on the way to the greater and more final
fulfilment, which is communion with the glory of God.
This assumption that man's natural end never opposes his
spiritual end was too much taken for granted by Aquinas. In many
ways they do coincide, but they must often oppose each other, or
be so out of harmony that the natural law must be overruled.
^ijo.T.l.11. >58. Art. 3
How is it possible to reconcile Christ's teaching that one
should take no thought for one's life, food and clothes, that
one should not defend oneself when attacked, that one should die
unto oneself, sacrifice one's life for one's friend, for Christ,
for God, and lose one's life in order to save one's soul, with
the impulse to self-preservation and the teaching that it is
permissible to value one's ftwn life above that of others? How
is it possible to reconcile the command to leave one's wife
and children for Christ's sake, with the absolute goodness of
marriage and the familyj the impulse to intellectual honesty,
adventure and freedom with the claims of some of the dogmas of
faithj the conflicts liable to occur between loyalties to God
and to Caesar? In the world as it i3, self-fuflfilment and
3elf-perfection are apt to occasion the frustration and sacrifice
of others even when they are interpreted in a Christian sense.
At the same time, Aquinas's interpretation of the divine law
shews it as not always directed towards the common good and he
made it give way to the natural law, as when he deemed warlike
resistance more beneficial than non-resistance.
The seco dary precepts of natural law are those w;ich arise
from its application to particular circumstances. They are not
merely occasioned by sin. The commandments of the Second Table
and the voles of the las gentium allbelong to the secondary
precepts.^ They are valid on the whole, but, in certain
circumstances, they can be altered as long as the alterations,
whether of addition or subtraction, are a rational adaptation
of human behaviour in conformity with the highest end of divine
law. The tendency of such alterations, therefore, allows for
the choice of a lesser evil to avoid a greater. It follows
that although definite commandments, such as those of the
Decalogue, bind individual relationships, in politics, a ruler
as representative of reason, has freedom to make such laws as
he will as long as these aim at the common good. Fluckiger
remarks that in practice these processes have usually been
(2)
conducted under the wing of the Church.
Dut not only the secondary precepts are mutable. For
although natural law expresses the divinely ordained and growing
tendencies of things, most of the canonists and theologians,
Aquinas among them, allowed exceptions to its immutability,
universality and indispensability as a whole. They held the
rationality of natural law immutable, but thoughtthat in practice
it had to be allowed tliat the full spirit of natural law cannot
be locked in a set table of unalterable rules. As for any distinction
(1) S.T.I.11, Q.1Q0. Art.3.
(2) Geschichte des Naturrecntea. p.458.
between immutability and universality, while it is true that
Aquinas considered them separately he held that both apply only
to the commands to act rationally and to do good and avoid evil,
so that they come to more or less the same thing. But even here
an understanding of •good' calls for insight into its practical
translation into secondary precepts, so that if the latter are
allowed to be of limited application it is hard to make out a
case for the unlimited validity of the first precepts. The more
particularised precepts, such as that one must pay one's debts,
or that monogamous marriage is ideal, admit of exceptions, even
though they are of constant authority in the majority of cases
and are therefore invaluable as general rules.It would be
more in accordance with reason not to restore Ms sword to a
madman; polygamy may be ever obligatory in some circumstances,
for the sake of the education of the children. Such exceptions
are natural as well as rational, for nature herself sometimes
(2)allows inexplicable deviations from general rules. Some of
its apparent exceptions or irregularities in fact, are expressions
thoroughly consistent with some even more fundamental rule. Don?
Lottin, for example, reckons polygamy a pious obligation laid on
(■>)the patriarchs for the increase of believers. '
(1) 111.Sent. D.37.
(2) IV* Sent. D.33.Q.I. Here Aquinas used Aristotle's reference in the
Hicomachean kthics. to the variability within law itself.
(3) he Droit I.aturel Chez St Thomas et Ses JPredlcesseurs. p.85.
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In the Summa Theologica Aquinas distinguished the
universal principles of natural law, which can be included
among the first precepts, from the more or less particular
conclusions which can be drawn from them. He allowed only such
conclusions as were barely removed from the first precepts, the
conoluaiones propinqoae, as truly part of natural law.This
appears to go against Father Gopleston, who says that
"The natural moral law in its totality
therefore consists of a multiplicity of
precepts of varying degrees of generality.
But at the same time all these precepts are
virtually containedin the fundamental precept
that good is to be pursued and evil avoided." (2)
It seems quite clear that the farther reason is removed
from first premises the more it is likely to make mistakes, and
Aquinas even allowed that conelusiones propinquae are often
misunderstood by reason. It would follow, therefore, that a
precept loses universality in roportion to its conditioning by
circumstances. And as particular circumstances call for
particular rules, there is a sense in which it would be true to
say that circumstances shape natural law.
Aquinas, however, said that such variations as happen in
natural law arise not from circumstances but from human imperfection#
On these grounds while allowing for accidental mutability, he held
{l) b7t.1.11.Q«9A« Art. A»o»
(2) Aquinas. p.2l8.
natural law essentially immutable. Variations in human nature
he set down as signs of imperfection, not of Individuality.^
In politics this raises the question of how far variability is
the outcome of circumstances or imperfection, while, in a wider
sense, it would seen that if deviations from natural law can be
set down, to imperfection, it becomes difficult to know where to
look for natural law itself.
Natural law can be expanded as well as varied. Such
expansion arises from circumstances and actions of which it was
previously unaware. Common ownership and equality were never in
any age or eiraumstances commanded by the law of nature, so it can
happily tol arate their opposite3, private ownership and slavery,
which are direct products of the natural reason, and positive
institutions of the ius gentium. And God can dispense with Hi»
own laws. Since the author of the law relating to marriage is God
Himself, only He can dispense with it. This He may do by means
of an interior voice persuading, or rather commanding, man to
disobey the accepted rule. So a direct revelation commanding poljgamy
was made to the patriarchs. Their conduct was to serve as an example
to future generations who found themselves in similar circumstances.
Occasionally, however, it appears that God Himself cannot dispense
with first precepts of the natural law, but only with the secondary
ones. Man himself can do this of course. When Aquinas faced the
(1) S.T.11.11.Q.57. Art.2.
difficulty of Hosea's being commanded by God to marry an
adulteress and to commit fornication, which was against the
first precepts, however, he modified this condition, and
explained that as God was the author of nature, He could dispense
with any of its rules. Just as miracles witness to this power or
possibility in the natural world, so, in the moral sphere, God
is able by miracle to dispense with the first precepts. Such
dispensations and consequent unique commandments symbolise the
n8w law.^
God is the final end of all actions, and although most actions
express themselves towards Him by meandering means, others are
directly related to Kim, and confront Kim immediately. Such acts
as hatred of God, blasphemy and unbelief, therefore, are absolutely
bad, but others, such as theft or homicide, which seem bad at
first sight, may be so conditioned by human circumstances as to
be good. hVen God, therefore, cannot dispense with the precepts of
the First Table of the Decalogue, which refer directly to Him, but
only with those of the Second, which are concerned with a man's
12}
relations to his fellows.
Aquinas also distinguished the material object of the law
(3)
from the intention of the lawgiver. The latter is the fundamental
(1) IV. Kent. h.33. MJ. Art, Sol.l; ad.S.
(2) cent. jj»4'7. Art»4«
(3) 1U. Sent. D.37. Art. 4.
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criterion of the particular applicability of the law itself.
Since, however, all the laws of the Decalogue express this
intention absolutely, no man can dispense with any of them.
Aquinas, therefore, had to forgo his earlier explanation. To
support a new analysis that is that the rules of the Decalogue
are in themselves too vague, and that they but badly Interpret
the true intention of God, he fell back upon exegesis. The
sixth commandment, for example, does not forbid killing in any
and every circumstance, but only when the victim does not deserve
death. As for the marriage of Hosea, since this could not be
excused along such lines, he had to return to the earlier explanation
that God could, if He so wished, directly dispense with the Second
Table of the Decalogue.^ This seems to shew up a kind of
(2)
uncertainty, when he returned to the subject, Aquinas stressed
again that only the means by which the two fold intention of
natural law is to be realised can be altered, not the twofold
intention itself.
As has been seers, it is because reason without the help of
revelation is unaware of the true end of the 'good1 that natural
law theory seems questionable. And yet, as Fluckiger points out,
in any teleological system of ethics only the final end and
general direction remain unalterable, and the end is higher than
(1) De Kalo. Q.3. Art. 1 ad 17.
(2) S.T.1.11.Q.1QQ. Art.3.
(1)
the organisation. 7 Lesser ends can always be sacrificed
in favour of the higher or highest. For Aquinas, there were
no inviolable human rights or lawsj the individual human and
social law of nature was only relative, and must always remain
subservient and adaptable to the highest end of all existence,
that is salvation and eternal communion with God. On such
grounds the Church long approved slaver;/. Aquinas held it to
be part of the natural law inasmuch as some people, such as
(2)
savages, are by nature fitted for it. 7 But as the Institution
was only part of the secondary precepts he thought slaves ought
to be handled humanely. As slavery hindered the growth of
individual potentialities and probably withheld men from salvation,
however, it cannot be said that it did much to realise the true
ends of natural law. Nevertheless, the papacy allowed fifteenth
century Spanish and Portugese settlers in the Americas to make
slaves of the aborigines, and when the latter died in large numbers
because they werenot used to the work they were put to, La Casas,
a Dominican, advised Charles V to ship negroes to replace them.
In 1888, however, Leo Xlll ruled that the institution impaired the
(3)
sanctity of the individual, even so, Manser held that although
circumstances had made slavery into a lesser evil, it was not in
itself against natural or divine law, and that it had so long been
(1) GesMchte des haturrechtes. p.4,70
(2) But see p*327 below
(3) Manseri Anggwandteg Naturrecht.1934.. p.66. quoted by Ffuckiger,
p.4.66.
part of the economy in so many states that its abolition
would bring greater evils than its continuation*
On the subject of usury, Aquinas was at one with the medieval
Church and held it to be against natural law. Aristotle had
thought of gold as a ra5.rii.um of exchange, and to put out money at
interest.^ therefore, impaired its natural function. Usury,
therefore, was condemned for this offer ce and not for the sins
it might have been thought to encourage. In the end the Church
not only sanctioned usury but benefited from it. This change of
attitude has also been explained by Manser, who 3ays that although
usury is against both natural and divine law, the Church, in the
light of worldly circumstances, is entitled to allow it. A
creditor might suffer from the temporary loss of his money and
so he has a right to compensation. If the compensation takes the
form of interest, it is against the natural arid divine laws, but
even so it is a lesser evil than the creditor's deprivation, and
so it has to be allowed.^
On the other hand, neither the medieval Church nor Aquinas
held the institution of private ownership as the outcome of a command
of the natural law. It was rather tire outcome of human reasoning,
which had found it to be the most reasonaole among available
alternatives. Private ownership, therefore, was a human addition
(1) Ibid., pp.103. 107. 109, quoted by Fluekiger, p.4.68.
to natural law. In the middle ages, of course, the Church had
large properties and played a leading part in the economic
life of the world, and so it could easily find itself in the
position of having to make such additions in order to hold the
power it had built up for itself. In such circumstances it
became clear that any exception or addition to natural law had
to be allowed if it could be held tiiat it led to the one true
end of that law.
Some of the weaknesses of Aquinas's ethical thinking are
now clear. Because it was grounded on the psychology of the
individual human being it shared the shortcomings of medieval
psychology. Aquinas cannot be blamed for not being a modern
psychologist, but like others of his time he asserted as truths
what can only be called hypotheses. The departmentalising of
reason, for example, is really a myth contrived to account for
certain facts which seemed clear to his Christian consciousness.
But such contrivances as the svnderesis do not become real merely
because they are asserted. The natural law on widch Aquinas
grounded morality is universal and absolute only as long as it
remains vague and general. Reason is infallible in informing us
that we ought to obey her, and it is only reasonable to agree
to follow reason. But reason is not remarkably efficient in
telling us what to do. Although, teleologically, the essence end
of practical reason should be activity in particular instances,
its inconsistency becomes more clear the more particularly its
help is sought. Practical reason, in practice, is not nearly
practical enough. In a teleological theory the inability of
reason to understand the final end and good towards which it
should be working makes nonsense of the whole theory, since
it is thus unable to assess the value, in relationship to this
unknown good, of any action it might recommend towards its
ashievement. Nor is reason able to act with a foresight which
amounts to accurate foreknowledge of even immediate circumstances.
There can, of course, be no quarrel with Aquinas's placing
the moral centre of the individual in the mind. But to say that
all people think that the first command of the moral sense is that
they should act rationally is very questionable. Many would agree
that to act with common sense is a valuable rule of life but this
often has no connection with morality at all. That one should act
with kindness arid forgiveness is certainly more widespread as an
ethical ideal than that one should act rationally. Nevertheless,
the affairs of the world shew that not only immoral behaviour but
ignorance and unintelligent action bring abouta great deal of
(1)
suffering and real ill, ' and Aquinas1s stress on the duty of
(l) The most tragic evidence of this today is the way improvements
of human life which have resulted from excellent motives, have
accelerated one of the maft ominous menaces to the future health and
security of mankind, a rapidly developing population which may eat
itself out of existence.
It is clearly good that the diseases which have taken toll of human
life for centuries should be overcome and that better feedin:;
acting in the full light of reason should not be too readily
discounted. But for Aquinas, the criterion of natural morality
was much wider than strict intelligence or rationality, for he
allowed the rational to be overwhelmed at times by instinct,
intuition or feeling. His natural law in fact is at times more
natural than rational.
His theory does at least take note of many aspects of
behaviour. But these other aspects, such as instinct, feeling
and even will, are amoral in themselves, and as they cannot always
be harmonised by reason there car. be little certainty of resulting
good. It is true that the telelogical nature of Aquinas's theory
allowed some flexibility, but at the 3ame time it led to all the
dangers of justifying means for the sake of the end and of
overlooking the truth that a means is, in a sense, its own moral
end. Similar dangers arise from allowing circumstances to condition
morality. This may lead not only to acceptance of lower moral
standards, but also to acceptance of circumstances which have
conditioned them. Just as it was possible to accept the economic
and political circumstances which lay behind slavery until they
could be used to justify it as a lesser evil so too may economic
and politcal circumstances be used to justify war as a lesser
evil even though the circumstances are in fact clearly not unalterable.
and living conditions snould lengthen human life. But some proportion
must be kept between population and the food and living accommodation
available for it. Promoting the former and neglecting the latter
has been a folly so tragic that some experts have been driven to
suggest that in some areas the diseases overcom- should temporarily
be allowed to resume their old counter balancing function.
iievertheless the possibility of flexible interplay between
firm rules and changing conditions does allow for the moral
freedom of the individual. And from Aquinas's natural law
doctrine, considered apart from revelation, it is clear that he
gave first thought to the Individuaiard rated motive and intention
and the internal-subjective aspects of an act above all others.
On this issue Vanderpol and Stratmann are much nearer a true
interpretation of Aquinas than Regout and Mgr de Solages.
But when Aquinas sought to harmonise natural law with Christian
revelation he seems to have allowed more weight to the Old Law
than to the New, for whereas he took great care to harmonise the
Decalogue with natural law he often left contradictions between
the lew Low and natural law unreconciled. Indeed he applied some
of the counsels of perfection to clerics only, so that he implied
that parts of the Hew Law are less universal than the Old Law,
which could be reconciled with natural law. That the counsels of
perfection, which Aquinas certainly believed give directly the
words of God in the words of Christ, and which contain the full
revelation of how man can achieve his true end and perfection,
should be set about with more qualifications than the ten commandments
seems an awkward conclusion for a Christian, and for a natural law
thinker.
(i) See above pp.172-186.
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Aquinas's general ethical teaching has been examined in
order to assess its relevance to his answer to the problems of
self-defence and individual participation in war. The value of
this answer is itself a test of the general theory itself. Aquinas
grounded natural law on the basic drives, and in this case those
towards self-preservation, and therefore self-defence are deemed
to be wholly right. Any difficulty which might occur through
rivalry between life and life in their struggle for self-preservation
had to be resolved, apparently, by the rule that one is bound to
take more care of one's own life than of another's. To this extent
Aquinas's theory is self-centred. Aquinas was more or less bound
to accept the right of power to assert itself and, therefore, the
naturalness ar.d Tightness of the 'survival of the fittest.' In
individual terms, such struggles often become deadly and Aquinas*s
only teaching here was that act and intention could be kept apart.
It was unlawful to kill but it could be done in self-defence as
long as the defender did not mean to kill.^
Some of the weaknesses of such a theory have already been
made plain. If further help be sought from the more general
principles of natural law, it can hardly be found. In the heat of
(2)
the moment, reason is likely to lose its head and go awry and even
(1) See abov&p. 276.
(2) R. Niebuhr and Bishop Dunn (Article in Christianity and Crisis. Vol.
X7.Uo.10. June 13. '55) denounce non-violence as inferior because it takes
its stand on obedience to God rather than on consequences, and they reckon
that calculation of consequences is part of a responsible moral decision.
The 'works' for which every man is 'responsible to God* include the
results as well as the motives of our deeds. If these consequences are
taken into account by pacifists, they are quite wrong about theta-misjudge
them. But they admit that consequences of modern warfare will probably
4 > f*» o
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in cold blood is likely to be inaccurate. Reason cannot easily
decide whether life or property has been attacked or the relative
value of the two lives; it cannot accurately forecast the result
of any defensive action, or ensure that it will be feithffproportionate
to the strength of the attack, or successful. Indeed a prizefighter
is likely to be a better defender of self than a philosopher. Not
to mean to kill an attacker might well hinder the defence, while
proportionality itself is a difficult criterion if the attackers
are more than one. In particular situations, of course, self-
defence seems to arise from spontaneous impulse rather thai, from
reason, whereas irdividual participation in war would seem to call
for more rational judgements. The forbidding of the intention to
kill was presumed by Professor Ramsey to be Christian rather than
natural or rational, for it goes against the natural impulse to
self-defence veiich may, quite naturally and rationally, become
self-conscious of meaning to kill if necessary. Thus, if the bax
is held Christian, it is against natural law, and if it is held
part of natural law, the latter commands irreconcilables, for it
is at the same time both cat arid mouse. This is the real difficulty
with his theory.
It will be recalled that it seemed from the war articles dealt
with in the Summa Theoldtgica that Aquinas handled his New Testament
include tremendous, incalculable destruction on both 3ide3. And later
it is admitted that id does not seem possible to draw a line in
advance, beyond which it would be better to yield than to resist and
that 'because the ultimate consequences of atomic warfare cannot be measured
only the most imperative demands of justice have a clear sanction'.
(see pp. 403-4-1C beloir)
texts in such a way as to make them fit in with a preconceived
opinion which was most likely the result of his own natural
ethical thinking and the leading ethical and political theories
of his time. The shortcomings of his exegesis were only too
clear in his interpretations of the words of Christ. The most
explicit teaching of Christ on retaliation, non-resistance and
the right attitude to the foe, which is found in the Sermon on
the Mount,^ was not dealt with in the war articles, but now that
the significance of his general natural law thinking for the
particular problem of self-defence lias been examined, it is fitting
to consider his treatment of tsse most important texts in order to
learn whether he gave more sway to revelation or to his theories
of natural law.
(2)
Aquinas's authorities in the Catena Aurea 'upheld the lex
talionis and the righteousness of those who follow it. Still
further from sin are those who seek no retribution at all and
justice is best served when no trace of revenge is present. Christ
undermined sin at its source by forbidding retaliation. Augustine
stressed that non-resistance as well as non-retaliation was
enjoined, and that Christians must be willing to suffer wrong and
to give to all who ask. Wickedness he thought a spiritual sickness,
(1) atthew. V.38 - 4.8
(2) pp.204-210.
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and it had to be endured for the sake of those who suffered
from it as Jesus shewed by giving up his life. But Augustine
also stressed that willingness to suffer wrong does not rule
out the possibility of mercy through correction, iiiijah visited
some sins with death because death was better for sinners and for
others than that the sins should flourish, for pain and fear may
bring people to God when love has failed. Christ, said Augustine,
forbade not this sort of correction when he rebuked the disciples,^
but only the hateful spirit in which it could be rendered, and
even after Christ had preached love of our neighbours and after
Pentecost, Ananias and his wife were punished by death, and Paul
handed some to Satar; for the destruction of the flesh. Keeping
deed and spirit apart also answered those who feared that the
command not to retaliate opened the way to the plunderer or foe.
Augustine thought it possible to fulfil the command in spirit and
yet to give mercifully short shrift to the attacker. To keep
the commonwealth Christian, indeed, its wars must be waged with
good character for the restoration of harmony with arid setting
up of godliness among the vanquished, who are, of course, our
neighbours. Anyone who needs our help is our neighbour, and to
help those neighbours vttio are our foes is a fulfilment of the law
of love.
(1) Presumably James and John when they wished to bring down fire
on the villages of Samaria.
Chrysostem set out Christ^s commands to shew that they
were made in ar. order of increasing difficulty. Firstly, we
must not do wro g. Secondly, retaliation must be wholly just.
Thirdly evil mustnot be returned. Fourthly, we must be willing
to endure even more evil than the attacker wishes to offer us.
And instead of hating the attacker, we must help, love and pray
for him.
Despite the strain of obeying such command the writer
of the Glossa Urdinaria said that the Church fulfils them, and that
the notion of hatred in the Old Law arose from the notion of a
Jahveh of battles. Jerome complained that many think of their
own weakness rather than of the power of the saints and so rest
content with the virtue of not hating. Cnrist, he said, expects
more than natural goodness of his followers, for whereas sinners
shew natural kindness to those who love them, Christians ought to
have even more love for those who do not. Christ commanded not
impossibilities but perfection.
Augustine mentioned passages which do not advocate loving
the enemy, and suggested that the •enemy' in such cases must mean
(1)
believers who sin. ' Some saints, he said, have gone so far as to
pray for the eternal damnation of some souls, but in so doing they
were hating sin and not the sinners for whom, indeed, it is seemly
(1) Thus Stephen prays for his murderers. But Paul did not pray for
Alexander, a Christian, since he had attacked the brotherhood
through jealousy.
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to pray* For sin is only overthrown by the correction of some
sinners and the eternal damnation of those who abide in it.
When St Paul said certain men are hateful to God, he meant,
that they are hateful for the evil that i3 in them, but we must
love them nonetheless for that which is good, that is, their
rational human nature.
Evan when we see justice done, said the writer of the Glossa
Urdinaria. our minds must be free of ill feelings. We do not
resist evil because we believe God punishes without the urging of
the saints. On the other hand, since no love is higher than love
of jut enemies, to love them is to love as perfectly as God
himself.
Although the Catena makes clear how hard it is not to resist
evil and to love the foe, it does not suggest that these commands
are laid on the few only as counsels of perfection but treats them
as binding all Christians. 'Love your enemy' has, in fact, never
been regarded as a counsel but always as a command. Since in
this passage it is so much part of the general argument against
resistance, it is impossible to consider the other injunctions as
less important or less binding. Rather is such teaching set forth
as a rule for all, and one which points directly to the true end
of human life.
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Here again Augustine sought to reconcile this teaching
with material resistance, whether by an individual or by a group
in war. Like Aquinas in his ruling on killing in self-defence,
Augustine sought to do this by keeping apart deed and intention.
Us reading of Christ is that sometimes we must resist by love only,
but at others by brute force in a spirit of love. Aven so, he
seems to have thought St iaul right not to pray for sinning
Christians. Augustine thought it more rational to pray for non-
Christians than for faltering ones.
In his commentary on the Sermon on the Mount,^ Aquinas
wrote of turning the other cheek and of non-resistance that it
leads to 'fulness of perfection' and is of the essence of the Mew
Law, which means in particular both enduring all things and doing
good. With reference to bodily attack this counsel means that no
revenge should be sought and that any amount of ill must be endured.
The Qld Law teaching forbidding revenge and that of the lex talionis
he sought to harmonise by separating into private and public rules.
(2)
Thus, 'an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth' ' was a social
law meant to hold bach ^ controlled personal revenge, whereas,"Thou
shalt not avenge nor bear any grudge against the children of thy
(3)
people"was meant no forbid personal revenge directly.




This assumes that personal revenge is likely to be more
savage than social, and that social morality is higher than
personal. However, Aquinas applied Christ's teaching only to
individuals. He thought of the evil of which Christ spoke as
separable into bodily evil, damage to property and enforced labour.
Against one's own sin, of course, one must fight tirelessly. And
all evil Aquinas found partly the penalty for one's own sin and
partly the result of the sin of mankind. Nevertheless, in spite
of this collective element in all evil, he still kept apart private
evil and public evil,^ and this allowed him to interpret the
unqualified command "Resist not evil" as forbidding non-resistance
to public evil for all persons. Whereas legally authorised defence
is a precept for subjects and princes alike, non-re3istance is
forbidden outright.
A private evil can be dealt with by discussion; or, when even
flight is impossible, by unarmed defence by clerics and laity; or,
what} the defence is blameless, by armed defence undertaken by the
laity;-
"... it is not lawful to clerics although to
the laity by chance it may be lawful at the
moment of offence, with a moderation of
blameless defence..."
Clerics are commanded not to use arms, but the laity only
counselM. 3oth, however, are commanded to keep revenge from their
(1) This in spite of the fact that in Jesus' command 'Love your enemies'
the Greek word is echthros. wliich unlike polemios and dusmenes. can
be applied both to a personal enemy, or toa political foe.
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lainds.
This exegesis is followed by a eulogy of non-resistance,
nothing how Christ told us not only not to resist but to endure
patiently that others might be converted by ova- example.
It hardly needs saying that here Aquinas overwhelmed Christ's
simple words with natural law. Indeed, although he allowed the
laity as individuals to follow the words of Christ, his wider
meaning seems to be that it is often more sensible to go against
them. Despite the fact that he thought this command wis of the
essence of the New Law, he allowed disobedience short of armed action,
even to clerics. And throughout he assumed the words were spoken to
individuals and not to societies.^
Such handlings or mishandlings of the text are ill-grounded, for
neither the Bible nor the theory of natural law differentiaties lay
and clerical morality. The idea that, on the basis of teleology,
a particular vocation calls for particular means towards its
fulfilment does not, as has been seen, mean very much when the
vocation in question is the general or comprehensive one of
(2)
Christianity, and when the issue in question is a moral one.
From the Christian side, therefore, it is hard to differentiate
morality on the basi3 of vocation, while from the natural law side
it is unreasonable to inhibit at a certain point such a radical
(1) Yet "The Gospel has not one law of charity for individuals and
another for States and nations - which are indeed but collections
of individuals." (Benedict XV. iacera Dei.Hun113. Slay 23rd, 1920)
(2) See above pp.152-157.
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principle as self-defence. This rent in the harmony, like those
between private and public morality and between intention and act,
seems to yield proof that Christian and natural morality were not
really reconciled, for Aquinas held on to the Christian teaching
only by setting it apart as a command for specialist individuals,
or as an intention which could be quite separate from the act.
Why Aquinas both forbade, in his commentaries, non-resistance
to individuals acting in a public capacity, and further allowed
them, in his natural law theories, to intend to kill, is not clear.^
He reconciled Old Testament texts on retaliation on the ground
that individual revenge is more savage than sober social justice,
and, therefore, must be forbidden. This means that resistance and
retaliation are not wrong in themselves, but only when they are
enacted by a wrong authority. Such a view underlies the commentary
(2)
on Romans XII. 19» in which Paul's teaching on non-resistance is
taker: to mean that God is a more perfect revenger, and that He
administers His revenge not through individual but only through
public authority and public justice. As public justice is allowed the
intention of killing, there can be nothing wrong with such an
intention in itself.
Professor Ramsey sees the gap between the two moralities as
even greater in the writings of Augustine, who he thinks allowed
(-3)
no individual self-defence at all• Pro feasor Ramsey argues that
(1) See aoove pp. 276.308.
\2) See above pp. 166-167.
(3) War and the Christian Conscience, pp.35-39
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Augustine had no grounds for justifying Christian participation
in war because of its justice, for had he allowed this he would
have been bound to allow it to individuals too# Although there
is some likeness between the positions taken by Augustine and
(1)
Luther, 'Professor Ramsey thinks that Augustine was not so much
anticipating Luther as simply upholding the representative nature
of the existing political authority and persuading Christians to
fall in with it out of 'earthly love' rather than out of justice
(2)
or Christian love. ' If this was Augustine's meaning, he was not
so much justifying war as making it out to be an activity in which
Christians could allow themselves to be guided by the majority
opinion.
The idea that a prince or public authority is likely to be
more just than individuals was shared by Augustine and later just
war theorists, arid Professor Ramsey thinks it lies behind their
allowing more power of retaliation to authority than to individuals.
It lies behind Aquinas's interpretation of the Old Testament view
of retaliation and of Romans XIII. It is this mistrust of the
individual as either just or inspired by God which colours Aquinas's
exegesis of the Sermon on the Mount.
(1) Professor Ramsey quotas Lutner's Secular Authority; To What ^jct'eat
it Should be Obeyed. t-fork3 111.242:
"In what concerns you and yours, you govern yourself by the Gospel
and suffer injustice for yourself as a true Christian; in what concerns
others, you govern yourself according to love and suffer no injustice
for your neighbour's sake. (Ramsey: iar and the Christian Conscience.p.38)
(2) pp.15 - 33 and pp.38-9. Ibid.
"... Augustine was more correct arid realistic in believing people to be
bound together more by agreement of will and purpose than by agreement
in their general conceptions of justice.* (Ibid., p.32.)
But Aquinas seems to have been unaware of the great difference
between a negative command meant to withhold individuals from any
retaliation beyond what is not in itself wrong simply because
they are untrustworthy individuals, and a positive command of
perfection, holding forth non-resistance as absolute and right in
itself, aligned with a positive and constructive attitude of love
and forgiveness arid generosity, and based on trust in the ability
of man to behave in this way. As Aiquinas certainly thought of
the teaching of Jesus on non-resistance thus, as of the essence of
Christianity, and a3 pointing clearly to the highest human end, and
as not limiting but helping humanity towards fulfilment in love,
he might have been expected to make it an ideal for individuals
and societies alike, especially as he presumably thought that
social morality was likely to be more perfect and more representative
of God than private.
On the other hand Aquinas also thought of the command not
to resist as not necessarily right in itself and as needing to be
conditioned. In this sense his forbidding the intention to kill
to individuals must be grounded on the need to limit individual
vengeance and not on essentially Christian love.
Aquinas*s natural law teaching, therefore, does little to
bring together natural morality and Christianity on this point.
In practice in fact it would be imprudent for an individual under
attack to wait for God*s justice to be expressed through society.
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Delay in the name of social justice may help the attacker
more than the defender. Indeed., if individual defence is allowed
at all, the defending individual does in fact take the law into
his own hands. Aquinas's attempts to combinei his natural and
Christian attitudes, then, resulted in confusion rather than in a
satisfactory compromise.
Mar is another matter. Nevertheless, it is hardly reasonable
to think of individual self-defence and public defence as so
unlike that the morals of conducting them contradict each other.
The decision whether or not to take part in such a war and in
what way is individual, even when it means no more than assenting
to submit to authority. Aquinas thought individual conscience the
supreme authority. Professor Niebuhr and Bishop Dunn, who complain
that pacifists apply an individual ethic to a social problem,
nevertheless agree that
'... in the final analysis the individual
conscfence is the aroiter of the concept
of a just war...' (l)
The individual Christian mind has to reckon with the
collective Christian view of a situation likely to start war,
and to take into account all objective and political factors in
making it3 decision, but nevertheless that decision is an
individual one.
(1) Articles in Christianity and Crisis. Vol.XV.Ko.10. Junel3,1955»
Aquinas*s separation of public and private evil is, indeed,
questionable. For the symmetry of theory the concept of public
evil is useful, but it has less reality for human beings than
the evil which, even in war, comes to its destructive rest in
individuals. It is easier to consider separately individual
evil than public evil, for the forraer is both more fundamental
and comprehensive and elements of it remain even in the latter.
The act of killing involves men in a strangely intimate Relationship.
War lays its hand on all aspects of individual life, for it
invades, disturbs and destroys the most sensitive and deepest
loyalties arid feelings. Nothing touches the individual so
closely and completely as death.
irivate evil, indeed, cannot be left out of the reckoning
in dealing with the collective problem of war. The answer to
the latter is likely to be influenced by the answer to the former.
It is logical to say that if individual killing in self-defence
is allowed so can collective defer!ce against collective attack be.
The wonder is that Aquinas should have been satis fied with
inconsistency•
Aquinas did not consider the possibility of a war being just
on both sides. From that point of view his answer was a collective
and not an individual one, and he overlooked the individual justice
which might rest on both sides. But his acceptance of the right
of self-defence could mean that once the just had started to
fight their unjust foes, then the latter could, as individuals
without intention to kill, or as public representatives with
intention to kill, justly defend themselves.^ If this is
true it means that the just war theory disintegrates at the
moment of attack, and war becomes a chaotic collection of human
individuals defending themselves with more or less organisation.
And this political organisation or sense of social cohesion is
as likely, in the heat and fire of the fighting, to be shot to
pieces and to disappear, as anything else.
This must be even more the logical conclusion of those who
although they 3till hold the doctrine of the just war yet see
more clearly the impossibility of one side having a monopoly of
justice. This Professor Ramsey thinks the view of Augustine,
whose insight into the doubtful and relative moral value of all
social arid political institutions and the earthliness of that
justice which must justify warfare means that he could never have
regarded only one side as fighting justly. Even so Professor
liaxasey thinks Augustine had
'... a confident enough judgement a3
to a Christian's responsibility in
justifiable(if not unambiguously just)
war' (2)
which illustrates the discriminative aoility Christian ethics give
men and leaders. They may not
(1) He nowhere considered whether individuals on the unjust side,
defending theaselvesin war are justified.
(2) War and the Christian Conscience, p.32.
•••"know enough to compare unerringly
the overall justice of regimes arid
nations"
but should have
"... a capacity to know more clearly and
certainly the moral limits pertaining to
the armed action a man or a nation is
about to engage in." ( l)
The justice of war is thus at its best rough and approximate!
one side may be approximately more just than the other, but the
advantage is weakened by increased sensitivity to the justice on
the other side and the more one thinks in terms of individual justice.
Professor Ramsey thinks that Augustine's attitude springs
from his thinking of political community in terms of agreement of
will arid purpose rather than agreement about justice, but that
by the time of Aquinas the natural law understanding of justice
was central in the 'analysis of the causethat justifies participation
in war', giving it its usually accepted meaning. Professor
Ramsey, however, thinks Augustine was nearer the truth.
A further development was concentration on rules for the
right conduct of war, and Professor Ramsey thinks that although
this has often been thought the weakest part of the traditional
theory, it is one far more within the scope and competence of
reason than analysis of just causes arid ultimate consequences.
Since any killing is wrong in itself, however, it can only
(!) It would be easier to have faith in such discrimination of
Christians on both sides correspondingly agreed.
be justified in terras of motive and end.
Certainly, the particular political and social elements
of war are important, and not least in the minds of those who
contemplate the problem, tfeny thinkers regard it as an
exclusively social problem. It is therefore necessary to study
the political aspects of Aquinas*s theory of natural law.
CHAPTER 38BW
AQUINAS*S THOUGHT ON POLITICS
AND JUSTICE IN RELATION Tu WAR
Since warfare has been gp nerally recognised as one of
the most significant manifestations of political life, the
question of its morality is lively to be related to that of
the relationship between politics and the natural law, between
the ius get tium and the jus naturale. and to the significance
of the latter itself.
Before Aquinas,war, together with slavery, was often
thought the main cause of government and political institutions,
(1) "slavery was an immemorial institution, the effect of sin in
general and of war in particular, for the ius gentium countenanced
keeping your enemies in captivity." (Thomas Gilby: Jetween
Community and Society, pp. 14.6-7.) J.30 see pp .204.-5 above.
whether these were thought sinful or perfect. The
identification of ius naturals and ius gentium made it
possible to think of slavery and private property as
rational and just consequencies of circumstances such a3
war.^ duch identification may imply the essential humanity,
and, therefore, the natural imperfection of both ius naturale
and ius gentium rather tIrian the essential divinity or
perfection of both. Wherever it occurs, then its actual
significance must be carefully looked into.
•One law for the ass arid the ox is oppression.'
The precise meaning given to natural law by those who
would separate it from the ius ge tium is important also.
Ulpian, who identified human natural law with animal tendencies,
might be thought of as regarding the ius gentium as a higher
because more distinctively human law than natural law.
Nevertheless, he accepted slavery as according to the ius
gentium, and the distinction may be one of degrees of universality
rather than of morality.
It will be remembered that Professor Garlyle suggests
(l) Gee pp. 201-2 above.
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that it was the problem of slavery, generally acknowledged
as arising from warfare, which first occasioned the
distinction between the ideal law and natural institutions,
and that Professor Garlyle, Professor Macllwain and Professor
D'Gntreves agree that this differentiation was one of the most
outstanding tendencies of the Corpus luris Givilis, and that it
was Ulpian's view that is that not only were the two distinct
but that the ius /rentium was of later historical ori in and
its content the result of strife and war, rather than that of
(1)
Gaius that later jurists followed.
It would appear to be generally agreed, therefore, that
warfare is a main expression of that sinfulness which caused
and occasioned government and political institutions. If so,
it is hardly adequately described as a 'circumstance' and would
seem to be more truly defined as a 'departure from innocence'.
If warfare and its consequent slavery are really prior to
government they to some extent stand outside it as ills which
it attempts to deal with. War and slavery are therefore more
sinful than government, so it is likely that all warfare, even
(1) See pp. 203-4.above: "so that the weight of Roman law was ultimately
added to the influence of the philosophic views of Semeca to combine
with Genesis in forming the theories generally accepted in the Garly
Middle Ages on the question of the origin end nature of social insti¬
tutions such as slavery and government, that is that they are due to
a departure from innocence."
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that waged by governments, should be similarly sinful.
On the other hand, if warfare, slavery and government
are equal expressions of sinfulness, the latter is not superior.
It is true that warfare is inevitahly associated with political
life, so that neither way can governments or warfare be con¬
sidered sinless.
This understanding of warfare as the sinful cause and
occasion of the institutions and rules of the ius gentium
and as an intrinsic weapon and manifestation of such institutions
at least fits in admirably with the definition of the Fathers
that the latter are the result of and the cure for sin.
(1)
But this definition is itself questionable. It is
(2)
important here to distinguish between to cause and to occasion.
(1) See pp.207-8 above.
(2) Much of Jesus' teaching is occasioned by sin in the sense that it
presupposes most realistically the sinfulness of mankind. The
higher and more refined the ethical law or action the more this
is true. 'Love your enemies* is no command for a perfect society,
neither is the demand that we should forgive seventy times seven.
Most of Jesus' teaching takes into account such imperfection, the
many prohibitions only prove the presence of the erring heart and
mind, but these commands are never regarded as imperfect because
of this: no more should political rules or activity because they
too have to rule for an imperfect condition of men and society.
The contrast between Jesus' teaching and man's inability to obey
it emphasises that it i3 in itself something quite perfect. The
Crucifixion may be regarded as the supreme example of something
which is both caused by and a cure for sin, but here again, the
contract between the sin and Jesus' attitude to it, is complete.
But such a complete separation at such a moment of paradox i3
possible only for Jesus, or for someone as sinless.
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It is quite possible for something to be both occasioned
by and a remedy for sin and to remain itself quite sinless.
But if it is the result of sin in the sense of being caused
by it it must, on Aquinas*s own analogy of cause and effect,
itself share the corruption. And tlie suggestion that such
institutions are a cure for sin also provokes suspicion. It
is unlikely that the institution whose corruption is caused
by the sin whose chief expression is war should be able
satisfactorily to transcend it. Or if war is merely a general
expression of the general imperfection of man, it is unlikely
that politics, another expression, will be superior.
War in itself involves the conflict of two groups and,
therefore, a certain amoiait of organisation vhbh can be
regarded as embryo government. The suggestion that government
in general is the ideal cure for such warfare is dubious, in
that any government is limited and prejudiced and as likely
as not to extend the quarrel. War's responsibility for
political institutions has probably been overstressed. It
may have been accorded such importance because it is a dramatic
expression of the more general disorder of human life, a
disorder which is bound to overflow into efforts at social or
political organisation. The jus gentium should be an
organisation against chaos. It should not seek its ends
merely by organising the chaos of war more efficiently, for
its true business should be to organise it out of existence.
The theory that governments are both caused by and a
divine cure for sin reached an apotheosis in the doctrine of
the divine light of kings. The government which was
acknowledged as being caused by sin was by divine inspiration
held to cure or counteract it. This, in fact, introduces
a new type of law or institution which transcends the
normally accepted conceptions of both natural law and the ius
ge tium. It does at least make the point that religion is
as much concerned with social and political activity as with
individual and subjective aspects, and that it comprehends
natural law and the ius gentium and has final authority.
How the divinely Inspired ruling on warfare differs from natural
political ruling is of great importance.
In following Augustine's war theory, Aquinas followed one
who both held a comparatively low opinion of politics and yet
Has the chief reconciler of war, a powerful instrument of
politics, with Christianity. As he ranked politics far
higher than Augustine did, Aquinas probably had little
difficulty in thus accepting the former*s attitude to war.
Father Gilby suggests that Aquinas did not hold warfare as
so sinful as did the Augustinians because he accepted the
earthly nature of polities as essentially healthy:
In discussing the warfare inherent to
individuals and groups, St. Thomas cannot,
so easily as the Augustiniaas did, ascribe
it to sin. In his view, original sin is
seen as a loss of privilege, not as a radical
corruption of nature. He sees no offence
in the impolite origins of political institutions
for civilisation itself is warmed fey the
closeness of bodies. No doubt a sort of blight
does lie over animal nature, but all life-
forces in themselves are essentially healthy, (l)
Here Father Gilby seems to accept warfare as one of
the healthy natural origins of political life, and at the same
time to suggest that to Aquinas it wa3 not blameless, later he
(2)
describes it as a particular sin. Indeed, he points out
that in spite of the fact that Aquinas accepted the natural
(1) pp.139-14.0. To what extent civilisation is truly warmed
by that closeness of bodies which is warfare might be
questioned. It is rather like being grateful for the
welcome warmth of incendiary bombs.
(2) "Slavery was an immemorial institution, the effect of
sin in general and of war in particular..." (p.14.6)
world more contentedly,^ he 'shared St. Augustine's sense
of men's first birth from, and into, a universe of corruption
(2)
swayed by lust'.
It seems quite evident, therefore, that, for Aquinas,
however much heaven itself might benefit from political
organisation, the actual roots and conditions of government,
as of any human activity here on earth, were tainted by sin.
Aquinas could not have looked upon the expression of war after
the fall as sinless even if he countenanced the possibility
of war as a heavenly measure.
irofessor d'iwrtreves also thinks that Aquinas did not
•in all respects directly and categorically contradict the
older explanation of those institutions as the result of and
(1) "Evil 3eems to loon larger before St. Augustine than before St.
Thomas. Original sin, identified with what we suffer and do in
concupiscence, is less neatly distinguished from actual sin,
and the blame i3 more personally applied... He manifests no
cheerful belief in a sunny paganism, but his outlook, to judge
more from his dialectic of ideas than his sparing rhetoric of
terms, is more optimistic." (p.136.)
(2) "Political as well as theological science is all the better for
appreciating, pitifully and perhaps angrily, how base is our
natural lot, and how, by our first birth, we spring from a vast
descent-group, moved and perpetuated by lust, a reproductive
Instinct which runs through our animal nature like a common will,
at once self-seeking arid co-operative. I:either St. Augustine's
identification of concupiscence with original sin nor his sardonic
tolerance of the earthly city was copied by St. Thomas, to whom
the physical world was less disturbing and who was, perhaps, also
more disposed to welcome what cannot be escaped from. Both were
misogynists, St. Thomas in a more offhand manner, but neither
shrank from the world like a prudej both possessed a strong and
almost troducian imagination of all men merging from the race,
dripping with its ooze sharing in a common lapse, hoping ina
common promise." (pp.129-130).
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the divine remedy for sin', but he stresses that for Aquinas
sin had only weakened human strength to obey natural law.
Knowledge of the latter was still within reach of the human
mind in the fallen world, and the bidness of government was
to see that politics work out in the light of such knowledge.^1'
Aquinas believed that the virtue of politcs was that it was
natural to human beings. Like Aristotle, he thought that
the ideal political unit was a city or province, and that man
is by nature a social and, therefore, a political being, for
as people are unequal by nature society needs the organisation
of government. This social instinct is one of the fundamental
(2)
impulses of the law of nature, and since men are unequal by
nature it i3 for the good of all that the best, most intelligent
and most capable should serve the community by ruling it for
the good of all. Aquinas thought that complementary compulsion
(3)
and obedience would be needed even in a state of perfection.
There is hierarchy among the angels. It was on such inequalities,
which many Christians have thought belittling to personal freedom
and dignity, that Aquinas grounded his understanding of ius gentium.
(1) C'cntr^nress Aquinas, Selected Political vJritings, p.xiv.
(2) See above, p. 272.
(3) S «T » 1. Q.9&. Art.
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That the ius gentium was universally regarded as both
caused by and as tolerating slavery, the result of war, and
the fact that Aquinas tended to think both the ius gentium and
human inequality natural and good suggests that he might have
accepted slavery as naturally good also. In fact his
attitude appears contradictory. As Father Gilby says, he
is not at all squeamish about adopting
Aristotle's argument that some men are bound
to be slaves'
and yet he
'... thoroughly disapproved of one man
owning and treating another as a utility.'(l)
(2)
In general he opposed slavery as a sin, and he should,
therefore, have thought that war, the cause of such slavery,
was a sin too, and that the justification of it under the
ius ge. tium was likewise sinful.
But political subjection Aquinas considered as of a
different quality, and quite fitted to a state of innocence,
(1) p.14.7. He quotes. SsT.1. XLVI.3J XCVI,4; 1.11.XCIV.5. ad 3j
11. 11. X.10; CIV.5.
(2) "There are two forms of subjection. The first is servile in
which case the master makes useof his servant for his own
convenience, and such subjection began as a consequence of sin."
(S.T.l.Q.92. Art, 1. ad 2.)
"The first sort of dominion which is servitude did not exist
between man and man, in the state of innocence." (S.T.1.Q.96. Art.4»)
*> «> <I
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for even before the fall, he held, there would have been
some who ruled for the good of the ruled who nevertheless
remained free. Aquinas's distinction between a slave and
a free man is Aristotle's. A free man is 'one who is a
master of Ms own actions',^ while a slave is completely
under the control of another. And when he states that a
personrules another as a slave if the latter is ordered about
solely for the benefit of the ruler, he admits that elements
of slavery can exist in politics, or in any relationsMp
where one loses freedom, and is exploited for the selfish
satisfaction of someone else. Aquinas^he Augustinians,
therefore, would agree that politics and war after the fall
are evil, but. they would differ about their fitness for the
world before the fall.
Political organisations and activities, including war,
then can be sinless only inasmuch as every man remains free
to accept or reject such organisation. For if a man is
controlled against Ms will, even for Ms own good, he can
hardly be described as remaining free. At the same time
politics can only be justified if men are orgaMsed for their
own good.
'(l) be iteaimine rrincjpum. lib.l. cap.l.
This union of freedom and control, and the coincidence
of self-will and co-operation, are one aspect of the
identification of natural law and the ius gentium. However
desirable this identification may be as an ideal, Aquinas
was unrealistic if he believed that it could ever be perfectly
achieved on earth.^ Such credulity would seem to be parallel
to that of those who believe that what is caused by sin can
cure it.
Comparison betweenthe natural law and the ius gentium
in Aquinas is needed because in spite of the fact that men
are unequal by nature, natural law itself teaches the moral
equality and freedom of all and the adequacy and supremacy of
individual knowledge and the individual conscience, whereas
the ius gentium inv Ives in practice, compulsion, lack of
freedom, and is based, to a large extent, on unequal responsibility
for moral judgement.
(26)
bom uottin stresses that although in medieval times
ius and lex were used interchangeably, nevertheless ius meant
(l) Aquinas does admit that 'the particular interest and the common
good are not identical,' but he seems rather too optimistic
about the ability of politics to harmonise them.(he Regimine
Principum. lib.l.)
(2; Le Droit Patural Chez St Thomas d'Aquin et Ses Prececesseurs.p.97 ff.
far more a principle of order than of moral obligation. He
says that Aquinas departed from Albert the Great who rejected
the Roman definition of natural law as common to man and
animals, and followed Bonaventure who accepted iti^ Here,
Dom Lottin is presumably concerned with Ulpian*3 definition;
ius naturale est quod natura omnia anirnalia docuit. Aquinas
also accepted the Roman conception of ius gentium as the
specifically human natural law. This would make the ius
gentium more rational, essentially human and, therefore, superior
to the natural law.
Grati^n, says Dom Lottin, wrongly confused natural with
divine law, by deriving natural law from the well known double
precept and by adding; 'which is contained in the law and the
gospel'. The decretists were unable to contradict this
identification, although later ones put it in the background.
Albert the Great saw in it a general sense of natural law.
Bdnaventure considered it as the least precise of the definitions.
Aquinas mentioned it in the Commentary on the Sentences but
preferred the definitions of Cicero and the Roman jurists which
express the intrinsic naturalness of natural law. Like Albert
the Great, he grounded natural law in human nature, and, again
(l) For his exposition of the following argument see Le Droit Natural
Chez Saint Thomas d'Aouin et Res ; redecesseurs. pp.61-67
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like Alb art, held that reason is ideally mistress of all human
tendencies. Dom Lottin reckons that on the whole Aquinas
preferred Ulpian's definition, although this meant accepting
as natural certain human characteristics which, being common to
man and animals, are not rational.^
Aristotle divided all laws into iustua legale and iustua
naturale. Aquinas included the ius gentium within the ius
naturale of Aristotle, which comprehends the tendencies man
shares with animals, such as procreation and parenthood, and
Lottin feels that this closer identification of natural law
and ius gentium is faithful to the spirit of the institutes.
As pointed out before he differs from others on this point.
However, when he discussed Isidore,s definitions Aquinas
charged his gound. In one definition Isidore divided all laws
into human and divine, natural law being part of the divine,
elsewhere he divided laws into ius naturale. ius civile and ius
gentium.
'vddla. d'apres Isidore interprets oar
saint Thomas, le ius gentium voisin du
ius civile et nettement 3erare du ius naturale.' (2.)
He thus had to reconcile these two positions, the one which
-67
separates the ius gentium fsfcora the iua naturale. and the
other which identifies them. He did so by explaining how
human law could derive from natural law. Firstly he said,
it could be deduced immediately from first principles. The
human law 'Thou shalt not kill', for example, is an immediate
deduction from the first principle 'Thou shalt not do evil'.
Such laws belong to the ius gentium. .secondly, it could
arise as an answer to a particular situation. Thus, the law
which assigns a particular punishment to a particular crime
springs from the general law that all crimes are punishable.
Such applications make up the ius civile. He thus stressed
that the ius gentium derives from natural law as a conclusion.
Man, he seems to say, is naturally rational, and 30 naturally
makes deductions; the deductions which form the ius gentium
have been acknowledged among all peoples because they are so
close to first principles; in this way ius gentium participates
in natural law; ius gentium, therefore, is natural law for
human beings.
iua gentium est aliaue mode naturale homini
secundum quod est ra.tior.ali s.
Nevertheless, he held on to the Isidorean distinction
between natural law and ius gentium because natural law, unlike
the ius gentium, is concerned with affinities between man and
animals, even though he elsewhere was able to identify natural
law and divine law. To uphold Isidore's position, therefore,
Aquinas had to uphold Ulpian's distinction between ius naturale
(1)
and ius gentium. Dora Lottin sees this as another token of
Aquinas's leaning towards the thinking of the Roman school.
Aquinas seems to have found the question troublesome. In De
(2)
lure he tried to reconcile the differentiation of natural law
and ius gentium with the implication of Ulpian*s teaching, that
is, that iiis gentium is so widely acknowledgedamong different
peoples that its naturalness argues its oneness with natural law.
There are two kinds of relationship, he said. Of these, the
first arises naturally from the things related. Thus, the sexes
(1) Note how different is Grotius's position. He refused to agree
that the affinities between man and animals could be related
to ius. (See p. 202 above..)
(2) S.T.II.II. Q.47. Art.3. dig. 1 and 3.
are naturally fitted for procreation, and parents for bringing
up their children. Sexual union and education, therefore, he
called natural institutions. Qther institutions, however,
embody a second kind of relationship. Thus, the institution
of private property is natural not because, for instance, it is
natural for a particular field to have a particular owner, but
because it is the reasonable way of bringing about the true end
of a field, that is, its cultivation. The first kind of
relationship arises from irrational instincts shared by all
animals. The second kind, however, arises from a rational
understanding of means and ends, and it is this second kind of
relationship which betokens the nature of the natural law with
which the institutions of the ius gentium can be said to be one.
It was on such grounds that Gaius held ius gentium to be the
specifically human law.
This is an odd analysis, hlsewhere, Aquinas held that only
marriage, and not mere sexual union, is according to the natural
law,^ and that marriage is a conclusion of reason contemplating
experience. Such an understanding of marriage arises from the
(1) See above p. 273
first principle of natural law, that is, that all deeds must
be reasonable. But when he set apart iua gentium on the ground
that it is less irrational than natural law, Aquinas not only
went against the whole drift of his thinking, but more or
less implied that ius gentium must be a higher and more moral
law than natural law, and, therefore, the nearer of the two to
divine law. He also implied that politics, and therefore,
political morality, is somehow set above individual morality.
Such conclusions weaken faith in his consistency.
Part of Aquinas's difficulty may have been that having
committed himself to an Isidorean position he was bound to
conclude the humanity of ius gentium. which is apart from
natural law. Where he did not feel bound to defend Isidore
Aquinas, although he took Isidore as his starting point, allowed
his thought to grow more freely towards a bringing together of
natural law and ius gentium in the general notion that for
human beings the ius gentium is the natural law.
Apart from all such distinctions, however, the middle ages
took it for granted that politics should be inspired by moral
standards. Professor d'Entreves says that the great difference
between modern and medieval political thinkers is that the
former give too much thought to particulars, whereas the latter
worked from the underlying principles:
'They started from the beginning, not, as we
do, from the end. And 'in the beginning was
the Word': the supreme values, the standard
of good and evil. Politics were to St. Thomas
a branch of Ethics.* (l)
Whereas Augustine thought that politics was grounded in
sin, Aquinas strongly believed that, in spite of the fact that
since the fall politics was tainted, its roots run down deeper
and arise from primal nature. On the one hand, the common good
which it seeks is a higher one than that of the individual or
family, and this gave it a high moral standing. On the other,
Aquinas*s belief in the higher end for human being3 revealed
by Christ withhelt him from an Aristotelian glorification of
the state as the highest reach of human life, and preserved the
dignity and freedom of the individual. As so often Aquinas
was perhaps too ready to take for granted the harmony of
individual natural law, political natural law, and divine law.
(1) p.viii.
Professor d'bntroves emphasises that because Aquinas believed
that grace perfects rather than abolishes nature, human values
and truths in the world of ethics and piitics are not
necessarily obliterated by the revelation of higher ones, but
should be considered 'as possible tools for the great task of
building up a Christian civilisation.'^ These human values
are those of the law of nature, and can be identified with
justice. Human justice is 'not vitiated by sin nor absorbed
(2)
in the glare of absolute and divine justice.' ' But although
the notion of natural law as justice is the core of Aquinas's
political theory, Professor d'Ehtrbves stresses that 3uch
natural law is grounded on natural cosmology and not on natural
individual rights:
'... froathe notion of a world well ordered
and graded of which law is the highest
expression, natural law i3 like a bridge,
thrown as it were across the gulf which
divides man from Ms divine Creator.' (3)
Through natural law'3 participation in the eternal law, natural
law is the pattern of all positive legislation, but it stresses
the essential duties of government and political alie giance rattier
t'nan the rights of the individual.
(1) p.xiii.
(2) p.xiii.
(3) pp. xiii - xiv.
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With all respect to Professor d'l&treves this seems a
confused statement. However much natural law may participate
in the eternal law it was, for Aquinas, firmly grounded in
the individual svnderesis. and sets out individual duties by
which individual rights are correspondingly established.
Besides, whatever may be meant by a plan of creation, the
universe yields no ready-made pattern for political behaviour.
A political society has to be made by individuals through laws
and these lay down social rights and responsibilities. Moreover,
a political society is only part of society in it3 full meaning,
which orders its relations by divine law as by natural law.^
Professor d'Entreves considers that Aquinas reconciled
Aristotelian ethics and politics with Christianity by
distinguishing carefully between the spheres of knowledge and
action, the spheres of the speculative and the practical sciences.
It was only in the latter sphere, he says, that Aquinas upheld
the Aristotelian notion of the overwhelming importance of
politics, whereas in the former, he implies, Aquinas gave first
place to religion. However, this division is too sharp, for
religion as Professor d'Entreves shews when he writes 'In the
beginning was the Word', is concerned with the source of earthly
(1) Indeed Professor d'Entr<Wes suggests that the Eternal Law transcends
natural law when he says that the ^natural order which comprises and
sufficiently justifies pollteal experience, is for 3t. Thomas only
a condition and a means for the recognition of a higher order, as
natural law is but a part of the eternal law of God.* (p. XV.)
life and is not limited to the speculative world. Still, it
seems to be on the strength of such a division that Aquinas
allowed only hermits and saints, whom he presumably regarded
as living a contemplative life, to remain more or less
(1)
oblivious to the demands of political obligation. ' Indeed
he took their oblivion as a sign of perfection rather than of
negligence. So although politics was usually seen as part of
a wider scheme, Aquinas allowed the perfect man, whom he
identified with the self-sufficient man, an utter indifference
to political matters. This suggests that divine law is all-
sufficient and that there is no need for the political natural
law for Christians.
Political natural law, however, does in fact preserve
certain natural and Christian rights, or as Professor d'BntrWes
puts it:
"Though the emphasis is never on 'natural
rights' in the modern sense, the action
of the State is delimited by objective
rules of justice which ensure the respect
of the fundamental demands of the Christian
conception of human personality." (2)
Yet these very laws which 'protect' the Christian conception
(1) Coma, on the iSLitics, lib. 1. lect. 1.
(2) Aquinas . Selected Political Writings. p.XIX.
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of human personality' are not in themselves enough to achieve
its fulfilment. The state car ac.iovo humr: perfection
neither for the individual nor for the coOTUnity. Indeed,
Aquinas thought of such perfection Wholly in a personal way,
and so he could hardly have expected revelation to light the
way to highest political good* Tho wight he allowed to
conscience means that individuals are still individuals
within the state and lose none of their individual standing
fay facing part of it# There can be no question, therefore, of
aquinaa putting individual .good below political good on grounds
of individualism, for he allowed individual religious perfection
to rise above political. Indeed he made it the end towards
which the state should move, bven within the state individualism
has the furtner institutional safeguard of the church. Church
aid state he saw as complementary kingly powers by which
human perfection could be achieved. He was careful, of course,
to put the eertiily power oelow the heavenly, and tho idiom of
the kingdom is not easy to handle when the metaphor has to be
t@aa®3 out rationally. But for Aquinas the two kingdoms were
one in Christ.
Professor d'ion.troves points out the unheeding religious
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nature of the state:
"... But when we come to examine the actual
working of this indirect power, we do not
only find that, as could later be 3aid of
the Jesuits, what is granted with one hand
is immediately withdrawn with the other#
We also find that the matters which the
State is supposed to leave to the Church
are precisely those which the modern man
has struggled for centuries to secure against
the interference of Church and of State alike.
Medieval intolerance had at least one
great advantage over modern totalitarianism.
It subtracted entirely the definition of
orthodoxy from the hands of the politician.
It put a bar on hrastianism. It would never
be allowed that 'the General Will is always
right'. It was an intolerance of a different
arid more noble brand. But it was intolerance
all right, and a thorough, totalitarian
Intolerance.11 (l)
Aquinas neither saw reasonfor ending powers of
excomnunication nor allowed himself soft-hearted feelings
(2)
for those handed over to the secular ana for punishment.
This, as Professor d'dntreves says, 'casts a sinister light
on St. Thomas's teaching', and it yields something of a
parallel to Aquinas*s ruling on the part played by clerics in
war. For Aquinas, church and state were a unity of diversity
of such a kind that the authority of an infidel government
(1) pp. xxi - xxii.
(2) p.xxiii.
only loses its authority over the faithful if the church
declares that the state threatens religion. An excommunicated
ruler, for example, has no right to the obedience of his
subjects.
It should be kept in mind that the notion of a universal
empire of Christendom as a political possibility had already
faded into the past in Aquinas's time, but its place had still
not been taken by the modem notion of the national state.
The widely understood political unit was the city state which
was held to be an ideal community fitted and having authority
to make its oan laws. Universalism in Aquinas's writing is
found only in his natural law teaching and in the widely held
belief in an ultimate union in the mystical body of the church.
But such a union was outside practical politics, and Professor
d'EntrWes maxes the point that although Aquinas grounded
political authority in the consent of the people, and even urged
participation in politics upon them as a duty for the common
good, he did not allow them any natural rights because he held
that even if there is a human source of authority, the authority
itself is God's. The former is causa material!3. the latter causa
formal!3.
For iTofessor d'Entreves, then,
'... Natural law is the insurmountable
barrier against which the will of the state
is powerless. We are led back once again to
the defence of certain supreme ethical
values which is the gist of St. Thomas's
theory of politics... Politics are subordinate
to Ethics. Natural law is the guarantee of
that subordination...' (l)
But for Father Gilby, who, among later commentators at
least has shewn the most lively imagination in seeking both
to understand the thinking in itself and to throw light on its
backward and forward looking significance, Aquinas was right
in keeping politics to a great extent apart from ethics and
for not treating the former as an extension of the latter:
Ito decisions are not wholly reducible
to the rules of morality, nor, for that
matter, to any rules at all...*(2)
Civil law is similarly independent of ethics and even of
(3)
religion. Indeed, Father Gilby rates common sense above
moral idealism in politics.'^' and gives the impression that
Aquinas would have agreed with him. Father Gilby does allow
that in the Gumma Theolofcica politics was treated explicitly
(1) pp. xxx - xxxl. .
(2) p.13. He quotesra.ll. XGV.2.
(3) "Civil law is an art with its own proper character, not
deriving from ethics: political authority and the Prince
have a majesty not shed on them by religion." (p.67)
{4.) "It is arguaole that the Church has been better served by
good bad Popes than by bad good Popes; it is certain that
Edward 1 was a better king than the Confessor." (p.82)
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as a branch of ethics but he seems to think that when
Aquinas's teaching is seen in a wider historical setting
it can best be understood in a somewhat different light.
But although history might well impress the amorality of
politics on the mind of Father Gilby, the only references
from Aquinas with which he supports this point of view are
that 'right does not explain happiness but happiness explains
right', and that although happiness i3 not explicable in
terms of reason it 'flows over into joys the ordinary man
(1)
can well appreciate.' Such an understanding of politics
would have been wholly acceptable to the utilitarian school
of Bentham and Mil. Nevertheless, he finds in Aquinas*s
thinking little trace of politics in terms of progress or
moral improvement, and suggests that, liice Aristotle, Aquinas
thought of politics rather as the art of making social peace
on grounds of mutual self-interest within the bounds of the
humanly possible. The sacred and profane, the animal and
rational are harmonised in ordinary life, and so he thinks
Aquinas was not uneasy about the inroads of such things as
'passion and predatory power' simply because they could be
assimilated with no more irksomarxess than accompanies any
obedience to law.
SJI
(1) p.84. He refers to^l.ll.xviii,i,4.5»11.8. and to Disputations 11,
de ,alo. t 4.5. Father Gilby's general thesis nevertheless is that
the political community connects the natural with the divine
society.
Father Gilby adds that this presence of both rational and
non-rational elements as are found in •custom, tradition, habit,
myth and sympathy' and in •innovation, debate, exposition,
criticism, judgment' within a political system is analogous
to the balance of emotional and mental elements within the
individual, and he thinks it wuld be dangerous to build a
(1)
state on purely rational principles. The analogy is not
quite apt, however, for Aquinas allowed no authority whatever
to personal emotions and insisted that they should always be
(2)
under the rule of reason. Nevertheless Father Gilby notes
with approval Aristotle's belief that 'natural friendship holds
states together and that a wise lawgiver will put unanimity
before justice', which would seem to leave morality at the mercy
of political prudence. To defend such a position Father Gilby
contrasts the Anglo-Saxon habit of regarding morality as an
absolute in itself with the utilitarian ethics of Thomism. For
the latter, the right is only a means to the good, duty to
happiness, ar.d the moral virtues are means
•to the higher ends of loving wisdom, a
possession beyond the calculation of
way3 and means, and therefore beyond
morality.•
(1) p.221.
12).. Gee p.240 also."For one reason, nature as manifestedin
custom is freer, more flexible and adaptive to circumstances
than are such rigid artifices as laws... Hence the importance
of tradition even in advanced societies... The prevalence of
popular habit as against governmental edict is a social trait
in a free country."
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Although he does not hold the Augustinian idea of the state
as 'a pragmatic accommodation to a world out of gear* and
ever, sees in it *an order of true justice expecting the higher
order of friendship1, he thinks the Thomist rather than the
Anglo-Saxon attitude to ethics can be reasonably applied to
the state insofar as it is not an end in itself. It should
confine its attention to outward relationships and act as a
general overseer of temporal justice rather than as an advocate
of good causes.'The ruler*s business is to organise what
is politically practicable, not to advocate theoretically
high-minded principles:
"It is by no means impossible that the
day will come again when, given the men
for the occasion, Gurope is rescued from
barbarism not by preachers of the Gospel,
but by religious administrators unafraid
of being defiled by touching pitch." (2)
There seem to be enough ambiguities in Aquinas's expositions
of the relationship betweenthe natural law, ius gentium and the
divine law, and also in his understanding of the natural law
itself — at one moment it is regarded as eminently rational, at
(3)
another as particularly irrational — partly to account for
such Thomistic contradictions. But that 3uch eminent scholars
(1) pp .234- / *
(2) p. <83
(3) See pp.251,334 above.
a3 Professor d'AntrWea and Father Gilby reach such diverse
opinions weakens still further faith in the widely held belief
in Aquinas's consistency. Father Gilby stresses the non-
rational and amoral sides of politics so much that his
understanding of them is generally pagan and only incidentally
Christian. If this were a right understanding of Aquinas's
naturalism, it would mean that as Aquinas thought revelation
less than enough to deal with politics he fell back upon
Aristotelianism, which could be all the more easily harmonised
with Christianity because the latter has so little to say
specifically about politics. Aquinas certainly gives the
impression at times that politics is outside the sphere of natural
and divine law. And from such a position Father Gilby can
reasonably say that politics stands self-contained and apart
from ordinary morality. A conclusion from this is that warfare,
being a social and community matter is also beyond the ruling
of individual natural or divine law, and that though it may by
no means be wholly good in itself it may be a not unacceptable
course ever! for both sides in a conflict. For as he thinks
(i) "There is a three fold order to be found in man. The first
is that which derives from the rule of reason? in so far as
all our actions and experiences should be commensurate with the
guidance of reason. The second arises from comparison with the
rule of divine law, which should be our guide in all things. And
if man were actually a solitary animal, this double order would
sufficej but because man i3 naturally a social and political animal...
it is necessary that there should be a third order, regulating the
conduct of man to Ms fellows with whom he has to live."(3.T.1.11.Q.72.
Art. 4»)
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Aquinas was not likely to flinch from the expression of wild
passions, he must have allowed that even the worst warfare
had the virtue of being at least natural. Aggression is as
natural as self-defence.
On the whole, frofessor d'hntreves's interpretation of
Aquinas*s political thought, that is that the state and
political activities be restricted by natural law as well as
by religion, seems to be the more correct one, arid it is
certainly the interpretation which appears most obvious from
a reading of Aquinas's explicit statements on the question.
Professor d'i&iti'feves mentions war as givin ; an interesting
illustration of the function of the state. War he thinks an
evil from the point of view of Christianity, but its evil has
to be limited by justice. War is part and proof of the very
existence as well as the authority of a state, while at the
same time the rules of justice which should restrict it properly
limit the state's power.^ Here at least Professor d'hntreves
and Father Gilby share common ground, for the latter also believes
that war should be limited by 'formal constitutional controls'
which, no doubt, are an expression of that temporal justice
(2)
which he thinks is the proper concern of governments.
(1) p.xxix.
(2) p.222.
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The significance of such agreement, however, depends
upon what each means by justice. The consideration that
Father Gilby tends towards an appreciation of the pragmatic,
and Professor d'hntrWes towards the supremacy of religious
values in politics at once emphasises that the concept
•justice* is of somewhat uncertain meaning. What Aquinas
really meant by it, and whether it was for him a possible if
not, indeed, the chief political virtue as well as the virtue
most manifest in warfare, can perhaps be discovered from his
discussions of it.
Aquinas thought that as relations between people always
depend on external factors, justice, which is exclusively
concerned with the latter, is the only virtue which has as its
sole and the good of others rather than of the self.^ This
71) S.T.ll.ll.q.57. Art.l. and Q.58. Art.8.
definition would seen to identify justice with self-
sacrificial love, and as politics is not an expression of
the latter but the art of mutual self-interest, justice,
therefore, would seem something more than the virtue fitted only
to politics. Nevertheless, Aquinas emphasised again and again
that justice is concerned with external actions, ar.d went on
to say, that it has nothing to do with the way in which an
action is carried out.^'' He also insisted on the division
between man's internal passions and moral virtues on the one
hand, and his external actions and justice on the other, and
stressed that the passions are inward and subjective whereas
justice is concerned only with external actions, whether or
not they are stimulated by the passions. The latter are not
directed towards another person, though their effects, as
(2)
external acts, may be. Aquinas did not as this point take
into account the fact that such vices as hatred, selfishness,
negligence or meanness may have external effects without
causing external acts, although he did so later. The purely
internal vices he acknowledged as having external effects even
though they may not lead to any outward acts. 3ut it would
seem difficult to judge the truly internal vices as long as
(3)
they remain unbetrayed by action. Aquinas did not think of
(1) 3.T.11.11. Q.57. Art. 1.
(2) 3.T.11.11. Q.58. Art.9.
(3)j•T.11.11.Q.60. Art.3•
' > 5 1
passions and feelings as just or unjust, for he held that
justice lies solely in their regulation by will in accordance
(l)
with reason, and although passions are the source of
external acts, he did not allow that certain passions lead
to good and just acts without the intervention of justice
itself. An example of the rigid distinction Aquinas made is
his statement that a man may take another's property not
through desire to have the latter, but through the will to
(2)
hurt the man. But he forgot that behind such an act, there
is likely to be a desire to hurt.
Often, therefore, Aquinas defined justice as concerned
W: .oily with outward appearances of morality, and took little
account of motives. Justice appears to be that part of the
prudential reason and will which is efficient in organising
external actions in accordance with a formal state of external
equilibrium. Other virtues are responsible for seeing that
(3)
the actions are carried out from the right motives, ' though
metaphorical justice, too, has 3ome part in this task. Justice
he regarded as more directly rooted in the intellect, w ich
(1) S.T.11.11. Q.58. Art.9.
(2) Ibid., ad. 2,
(3} "And so a thing is said to be just, as having the rectitude
of justice, when it is the term of an act of justice, without
taking into account the way in which it is done by the agentt
whereas in the other virtues, nothing is declared to be right
taiisss it is done in a certain way by the agent." (S.T.ll.ll.Q.57.Art.l)
alone has the universale good as its object, than the other
virtues. It is essentially the work of the will acting in
accordance with reason, and not of the passions.^ It would
seem, therefore, that justice is a right yardstick for
politics. As its standards are based in reason they should
be understandable and acceptable to all men, and shoiHd provide
grounds for common judgement. Moreover, its concern with only
external actions makes it easier for the comparatively
impersonal art of politics to apply.
But Aquinas's conception of justice is not really quite
as ratioral, objective, external and universal as this, for
elsewhere he modified these expositions of it .
By grounding it in the will, for example, he made it seem
(2)
more fitted to individuals than societies. When Aquinas
agreed with Augustine that justice is 'the love of God and
our neighbour' which pervades the other virtues, indeed 'the
'(3)
common principle of the entire order between one man and another,
he made of it a virtue which cannot, be confined to politics, and
which therefore can hardly be realised by it. It is found also
in individuals, among whom, as metaphorical justice,^ it is
t,l) Because justice expresses itself in actions its source is most
essentially in the will, which orders, dictates and achieves such
actions. The will is nevertheless 'in' the reason. We are just
through doing something just.(3.T.11.11.GU58. Art. 4«)
(2) ^T.ll.ll.Q.58.Art.4..
(3) 3.T.11.11.Q.58. Art.8. ad.2.
(4) 3.T.11.11.Q.58. Art.2.
concerned with the harmonisation and regulation under reason
of internal individual elements, and, as particular justice,
in relationships between individuals. ' There is an element
of justice in all virtues inasmuch as such virtues have
(2)
beneficial effects upon others. ' In this sense justice is
definable as a general virtue. It is indeed this 'legal
general justice' which is respons ble for the efficient
altruism of the other virtues. The name 'legal justice' is
given to general justice on the grounds that thereby man is in
harmony with the law which directs the acts of all the virtues
to seek general good. Legal must here refer to the divine as
(3)
well as to natural lav. ' If, indeed, justice is identified
with rationality, it does become general insofar as it becomes
identifiable^ with natural law, and, therefore, with all
morality.
The restriction of justice to external matters is connected
(1) S.T.11.11.Q.58. Art. 7.
(2) "Speaking in this way, legal justice is essentially the samo
as all virtue, but differs therefrom logically: and it is in
this sense that the Fhilosopher speaks". (S.T.11.11.Q.58. Art.6.
(3) 3.T.11.II.Q.58. Art. 5.
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with its relation to the other virtues, and this is also
questionable. Justice was regarded by Aquinas as superior
to liberality on the grounds that the just man considers
the coHmon good, while the liberal man is guided wholly by
(1)
self-regarding motives. According to his understanding
it would be only possible to differentiate justice and
liberality on grounds of intentionsince their external acts
are the same. Indeed the act of liberality is justice,
elsewhere he insisted that the motive or intention of an act
is irrelevant to its justice, but here it is on the basis of
intention that he puts justice above liberality. In the
abstract, indeed, justice and liberality are equally universal,
and in practice equally limited. The fact that virtue itself
is defined as a faculty of doing good to others would seem to
accentuate the inaccuracy even of a logical distinction between
justice and the other virtues.
Similarly in his discussion on injustice, Aquinas
recognised that all vices tiiich detract from the common good
have so far the character of general injustice, and insofar as
they harm one individual they have the character of particular
(1) S.T.11.11.Q.58. Art.12. ad.l.
injustice. He allowed that justice does not have sole
responsibility for, or authority over, even external acts,
since the other moral virtues have some share in the©. It
is thus not easy to separate justice and injustice
from the other virtues and vices. Moreover, Divine justice
comprehends all virtues, and any sin whatever can be termed
injustice before God, as the word 'iniquity1 so aptly signifies.^
But once religion is allowed into the consideration, justice
becomes incalculable. Justice lias to remain a human and
limited value if it is to have any definable meaning, for we
can never be just with God. And if how we stand with God is
allowed to affect our relationship to others, human reason is
at once shewn to be inadequate. Divine justice may even have its
(2)
ground in the will of God rather than in reason.
Aquinas hinted at the complexity of establishing justice
in even purely human relationships. Although he did not deal
with them fully, he saw that justice cannot always be maintained
in a straightforward way since it is complicated by personal
inequalities such as those between father and son and between
(3)
slave and master. Personal and subjective conditions, therefore,
must be the concern of justice. In face of such differences
(1) S.T.ll.11. Q.59. Art. 1. ad 1 and 2.
(2) S.T.ll. Q.57. Art 2. ad 3i Q.58. Art.A
(3) S.T.ll.11. Q.57 Art.A* ad 2
> > i.j f)
justice requires that, whatever his station or need, each
person shall receive his right or due. Here, then, natural
law is concerned with rights after all, although Aquinas was
careful to include justice within the larger love for God
which, insofar as it i3 justice, cannot ever bp fully achieved,
because one can never render His due to God.^ Religious
faith, however, is regarded as a help towards the achievement
(2)
of metaphorical justice. ' Charity alone among the virtues
he allowed to transcend justice. The former lias as its object
both Divine and human good, whereas the latter seeks only human
(3)
good. Justice is otherwise the cardinal virtue, to which
and in relation to which other virtues, such as mercy and
liberality, are but secondary.
Since Aquinas recognised formal (subjective) as well as
material (objective) justice, he should not have restricted the
significance of justice to external actions. And it is clear
that he thought the former more important. Any action which is
(1) "The Divine law is not properly called ius but fas, because, to
wit, God is satisfied if we accomplish what we can"(3.T.ll.ll.Q.57.Art.l
ad. 3)
(2) S.T.11.11.Q.58. Art.2. ad 1.
(3) S.T.11.11.Q.58. Art.6.
<■) (-»)
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unintentionally unjust through ignorance, other than ignorance
of the law or other outward or inward circumstances, is only
(2)
indirectly unjust and is not in itself an injustice.' Aquinas
even conceded that "it may happen... that a man who does an
(2)
unjust thing is not unjust".x ' The action is here materially
and indirectly unjust but not essentially so. The other virtues
do not admit of distinction between the intentional and the
unintentional.
He further referred to the distinction between intentional
and unintentional ill when he ruled that when a wrong action is
intentional the injury i3 aggravated, and is considered a greater
thing, requiring a greater punishment, by reason of a difference
not on our part but on the part of the thing. Here the intention
is regarded as qualifying the justice or injustice of the act,
although it appears to be implied that even an unintentional
(3)
injury deserves some punishment. But elsewhere the quality of
the internal intention was acknowledged as of great importance
in determining the degree of punishment, and involuntary
injustice is, in fact, said to deserve forgiveness. Thus when
a judge becomes aware tlxat a wrong has been committed in ignorance
(1) S.T.11.11.Q.59. Art 2
(2) 3.T.11.11. Q.59. Art.2.
{3} o.T.11.11. '.6l. Art.<4* ad 3»
or with a good intention he should not impose the punishment
of retaliation.^'
Intention is thus not only vitally important to but
actually determines the nature and name of the justice or
injustice of an act. This see®3 to rule out the possibility
of coincidence between objective justice and subjective injustice
and the reverse, although it would certainly see® that a
subjectively unjust act may appear just. Aquinas also allowed
that the terms 'just' and 'justice' are often used to cover
real injustice.^
Certainly, even if it is mainly concerned with external
(3)
events, justice in itself is an inward spirit ' and in order to
express itself it has to take account of inward aspects too.
Aquinas said that externally justice is a negative virtue in
that rendering to each his due merely restores a balance and
levels an unevenness, rather than contributes anything positive.
ut a just man benefits himself, so that the more positive value
of justice appears to consist in its spirit, its inward,
unreasoning motive, and in the effect it has on its possessor.^
(1) S.T.11.11. Q..68.Art.A. ad.l.
(2) S.T.11.11.3.57. Art.l. ad.l.
(3) The virtue of justice, considered purely in itself, is described
as an inward disposition which moves one to act in accordance with
the decisions of the svnderesis.(S.T.11.11.Q.60.Art.l ad.l.)
(4-) S.T. 11.11» ;»5» Art.3* ad.l.
Free forgiveness of wrongs would aeaa to nullify the
inequality and injustice suffered, for if a man forfeits Ms right
of revenge of Ms own free will there is no disproportion*
Aquinas distinguished between that which is done externally
considered in itself (the concern of objective justice) and
the formal or essential element (subjective justice) as it
exists in both agent and patient. The material (objective)
justice is ther fore as much affected or altered by the attitude
of the sufferer as by the intention of the actor.^ TMs,
of course, adds yet another dimension to the context in which
Aquinas dealt with this question.
It is clear, therefore, that justice is a general virtue
which to some extent permeates all relationships, and that it
is not separable from the other virtues and is not the exclusive
concern of politics.
Aquinas did, however, make a distinction between particular
justice, wMch regulates relationsMps between individuals, and
legal justice, which regulates those between individuals and the
(2)
community. He stressed that the particular good of an
individual differs essentially from the common good of the realm,
(1) 3.T.11.11.Q.59. Art.3.
(2) 3.T.11.11.Q.58. Art.7. ad.2 and 3.
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and natural right or justice, he held, differs from the
right or justice of nations. The former he described as
common to all animals whereas the latter is appropriate only
to mankind.^ This, in fact, is the same distinction as
(2)
between natural law and ius gentium. and shews that he
clearly identified natural law and justice. International
justice he thought so essentially the work of reason that no
(3)
institutions were necessary to establish it.
The common good is the end of each individual member of
a community, and since legal justice seeks to achieve the
common good, it is more concerned with ordering the internal
passions of the individual, particularly in relation to their
external operations, than is particular justice, which is
directed to the good of another individual.^
In contrasting legal justice with the other virtues
Aquinas approved it not only because it benefits others, but
because of its wider range. hVen particular justice, however,
surpasses the other virtues because it benefits more than the self.
(1) S.T.ll.ll.Q.57.Art.3.
(2) dee above pp.
(3) S.T.11.11>Q.57. Art.3. ad.3
Urs.T.ll.ll.Q.58. Art.9.ad.3.
Previously, however, Aquinas noted that justice is a negative
virtue since it benefits only the self positively.
As all types of justice are more directly rooted in the
reason than the other virtues they share its eminence. Another
reason why justice appears a collective virtue is that judgement
is preliminary to any act of justice and although judgement
is the work of prudence and justice, the working relationship
between them remains vague. Aquinas defined prudence as a
virtue and justice as a disposition? prudence is a different
thing from wisdom, and spiritual justice and judgement
apparently differ from human.^ They are not in themselves,
however, regarded a3 authoritative enough, for since their
object concerns other people, another person's judgement must
be called in. Where the other virtues are concerned 'there is
(2)
no need for judgement other than that of a virtuous man'.
This presumably means that where one's action affects another
person or persons a collective judgement is essential, and
individual judgement is unreliable. This tells very heavily
against the usefulness of natural law as moral guidance,
especially as the fulness of judgement is not permitted or
possible for al-1 men. Only the sovereign has the power and
U) 3.T.11.11.Q.60 Art.l. ad.2.
(2) Ibid., ad.3.
right to decide, presumably in all S; hares, what is just.
Subjects have at most the responsibility of administering a
justice which they are incompetent to calculate, and which
they may not understand.^
The three conditions which determine the justice of
any judgement are parallel to those which regulate the
conditions of a just war. The judgement, to be lawful, must
"proceed from the inclination of justice" and from the proper
authority and be in accordance with reason. Here again the
internal spirit of justice seems to be as important as the
justice of the external act, however objectively just. Absence
of inward inclination to justice renders an otherwise just act
or judgement unjust, and when a just spirit acts in ignorance
any consequent act of injustice is deemed not really unjust.
For a judgement to be just, reason must have certainty, arid when
a judgement is formed on insufficient grounds it is called
(2)
judgement by suspicion or rash judgement.
Christ's words 'Judge not that ye be not judged' Aquinas
interpreted as applying to 'inward intention or other uncertain
things'. This would seem to make it impossible to assess
(1) S.T.11.H.Q.60. Art.l ad.4
(2) 3.T.11.11.Q.6U. Art.2.
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with certainty whether or not it is possible to fulfil the
first condition of ajust judgement.^ Since those guilty
of grievous sins should not judge 'those who are guilty of the
same or lesser sins,' any human judgement would appear to be
impossible*
Aquinas acknowledged that judgement of things is less
important than judgement of peoplej such judgements differ in
quality, for the former involves no moral values apart from
those in the judging person. The extent to which an external
act considered in itself is a thing is undefined, but
it certainly cannot be called a person. In judging things a
false judgement seems to be always an evil, but in judging
people Aquinas recommended that the most favourable construction
(2)
should be put upon the facts.
lie made another distinction between commutative justice,
which governs dealings between two individuals, and distributive
justice, which governs dealings between 'the whole* - presumably
any limited community as well as mankind - and the individual.
Legal justice governs the actions of individuals in relation to
the common good, and particular justice is defined thi3 time as
(1) S.T.11.11.Q.60. Art.2. ad.l
(2) S.T.11.11.Q.60. Art.4-.
being concerned with the distribution of the common good
among particular individuals.^ In this sense justice
takes into consideration existing differences among men,
the distribution being apportioned presumably according
to desert3 rather than to need. Hence it aeema that once
more an external action cannot be separated from the persons
(2)
it touches. Distributive and commutative justice differ
according to the nature of the relationship to which they
apply as well as to the actual numbers of people involved.
Thus, the kind of right an individual has in common property
(3)
is unlike the right he has in private property. Both
distributative and commutative justice aim at equality, but
the former follows geometrical proportion, the latter arithmetical.
In actions and passions a person's station affects the quantity of
a wrong, for it is a greater injury to strike a prince than a
private person. Hence, in distributive justice a person's station
is considered in 30 far as it causes a diversity of things.^ In
(1) Father Gilby remarks that what ve now call social justice is
nowhere specially treated by Aquinas, but is 'fitted in somewhat
uneasily, with the service the individual owes his group, arid the
fair treatment he should receive from its rulers' (Between Community
and Society, p.8.)
(2) 3.T.11.11. Q.61 Art.l. ad.5j Art.2. ad.l and 2. Father Gilby thinks
it significant that they are treated as persons, each with his
expectations and rights, and not as a mass.(Between Community and
Society, p.210.)
(3) o.T.11.11. .6l. Art.l. ad.5*
(4.) S/T.11.11.Q.61. Art.2. ad.l, 2 and 3.
distributive justice the emphasis is on persons, and personal
differences are taken into account. In commutative justice
the emphasis is on things. A distinction was made between a
'rational' and a 'real' mean. The other moral virtues follow
the rational mean whereas justice, depending on the diversity
of things, follows the real mean.
Aquinas at one point recognised that individual good and
the good of the community do not always coincide,^ and his
rulings on the state's right to take life prove how impossible
it is to be certain at what point the one ought to be sacrificed
for the other.
The deed of killing he considered fully, and decided that it
is praiseworthy and advantageous to the commonwealth to kill
anyone dangerous and infectious to the coramunity because of some
, , .(2)
sin on the ground that "a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump.'
He did not, however, consider the implications of applying such a
principle wholehearted!^ nor did he define the sins antlthe degrees
of wickedness which merit such correction. Likewise he ignored
the possibility that the sinner might be a potential saint who
at some later time might benefit mankind.
(1) Seep. 329.
(2) S.T.U.11.Q.64-. Art.2. He quoted 1 Corinthians. V.6.
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Aquinas's interpretation of the parable of the wheat
and the tares^ was that the wicked should oe preserved only
for the sake of the good. If their destruction could be
achieved without danger to the good, it would be desirable.
He mentioned no possibility of finding in one person the
wickedness arid goodness referred to. Nor did it occur to him
here that the wicked might be preserved for their own sake in
hope of their eventual conversion and redemption. He thought
that God sometimes slays ainners in order to protect the good,
but that sometimes, with Divine discrimination, He allows them
time to repent, even at the apparent risk of harm to the good.
Human justice, by killing off the really dangerous, and
allowing only the less dangerous to have time for repentance
he considered as imitating God, but a3 God, with Divine
discrimination, may allow time for repentance even to the really
dangerous, this cannot be wholly true. It is in itself 'an evil
(2)
to kill a man*, said Aquinas, 'so long as he preserve his
dignity', but since 'a bad man is worse and more harmful than a
(3)
beast*, it may be a duty or even a virtue to kill him. Once
again he did not define the degree or kind of sin which deserves
(1) S.T.11.11.Q.6A. Art.2 ad.1.Matthew kill. 24 - 30.
(2) "If we consider a man in himself, it is unlawful to Will any
man, since in every man though he be sinful, we ought to love
the nature which God has made, and which is destroyed by
slaying him."(S.T.11.11.Q.64. Art.6.)
(3) StT.ll.il.Q.64. Art.2. ad.3.
such punishment, but he did say that it is the privilege of
the ruling authority of a community to administer it, because
the common good is the responsibility only of persons of rank
having public authority. When clerics accept secular office,
however, they acquire only power to authorise, but not power
to inflict, capital punishment themselves, because they are
•entrusted with the ministry of the hew Law, wherein no
punishment of death or of bodily maiming is appointed.•^ The
priests and Levites of the Old Testament, being ministers of
the old law, which enjoined the punishment of death, might
appropriately slay with their own hands, and in so doing they
were imitating God, who, as His discretion, can Himself slay
evil-doers. Aquinas did not remark here on the dissimilarity
on this point between the New Law and the Old, between the
ministers of the hew Testament and the ministers of the Old,
between the Christ who would never retaliate and the God who
could annihilate, nor did he comment on the fact that ministers
of the New Law can authorise members of the laity to perform
deeds which would be sinful if performed by the ministers
themselves.^ The good of the community which justifies,
inasmuch as it is the result of, such killing, seems, therefore,
(1) S.T.ll.ll.Q.64. Art.4.
(2) He did 30 elsewhere of course. See pp. 157-9 above.
to be a merely material good, since it is unfavourably
compared with that apparently separate and higher spiritual
welfare to which clerics are so peculiarly devoted, and which
precludes preoccupation with material concerns.
Following Aristotle, Aquinas thought that suicide is
i
always wrong on the grounds that the death of a may always
injures rather than benefits the community of which he is a
part, which i3 a point he did not consider explicitly when
discussing whether a bad man should be kilted, Suicide is
more intrinsically and unconditionally wrong than the killing
of another man, which, as has been shewn, may be justified in
certain conditions, because it i3 contrary to the natural
inclination of everything to remain in being, and also to
charity, whereby every man should love himself. He did not
reckon with the possibility that the suicide of a bad man, such
as a tyrant, might benefit a community. Here the natural
inclination to love oneself and to stay alive is presucaaoly
deemed to override the law that the good of the whole comes
before the good of an individual, which law alone justifies
the killing of a bad man. Since Aquinas stipulated that it
belongs to God alone to pronounce sentence of life or death,
he presumably implied in all his arguments for the rightful
destruction of the wicked that the persons who authorize and
carry out such destruction are acting as agents of God
Himself. Death he regarded as the ultimate and most fearful
evil in this life, and suicide as particularly evil because
it allows no time for repentance and is not sanctioned by
(l)
public authority. '
The killing of the innocent is at the heart of any
weighing of the ethics of war. Aquinas said that the killing
of a person can be considered in two ways. Firstly from the
point of view of the person concerned, and secondly from the
point of view of the person's relation to the community. The killing
of even a sinner is not justified from the first point of view.
Only if death would benefit the community is killing justified.
That means in fact that any killing, in war or otherwise, is only
half just, though Aquinas prefers to use the term 'irregular1 to
describe it. Both a judge who rightly condemns a raan to death
and a cleric who unintentionally kills a man in self-defence are,
(2)
however 'sinless', irregular. ' The killing of the innocent is
(3)
in no way lawful.
The harmony between individual good and the good of society
is thus by no means satisfactory or inevitable, but is often
unlikely or impossible. In his reasoning on justice Aquinas seemed




rather too easily to take it -for granted that the individual
should be sacrificed for the whole. In spite of nis nominal
differentiations between legal, particular, commutative and
distributative justice, infact, the relationships between the
individual and the group or groups of which he is part, are
by no means easily amenable to exact justice.
Indeed, when Aquinas discussed equity^ he shewed that
although 'merely just' justice is often adequate in practical
concerns, it is less than the fulness of justicej human justice
must be seen as relative to the absolutejustice of God, and
equity is the intenseht expression of man's closest approximation
to such justice.
"equity... included the virtue of the free
and fair man described by Aristotle, but
went beyond the legal recompense of narrow,
keen and little minds, the quid pro quo of
particular justice, beyond the political
virtue, of the mthics and Politics, beyond
friendliness, beyond the 'justice' of Plato,
even beyond the righteousness of the Old
Testament, to a generosity and friendship
surpassing civic reasonableness. It marked
the place wnere political life soars into the
full life of friendship. For justice in order
to be just must become lissom so that it may
seek nothing less than the ultimate justice of
god, only to find that it has found mercy." (2)
Aquinas's inheritance from the past is clear. In Plato
(1) S.T.ll.ll.Q.CXX.
(2) ..set-ween Gonmunitv and Ooeietv. p.3o2.
and Aristotle is found the conception of justice as a general,
universal virtue,^ the art of bringing proportion and iiarmony
to the individual and to all life, which the Fathers made one with
the love of God and man. In Aristotle there is too an understanding
of justice as a morelimited, particularly social virtue, working
(2)
in relationships between persons. It is to Aristotle that
Aquinas is indebted for the idea that whether particular or
general, justice is altruistic ,and for the distinction which
may exist between apparent, or legal, and real justice and injustice.
It has been pointed out with some truth that Aristotle's
various divisions of justice are indistinct, and not entirely
integrated,^ but he certainly applied justice particularly to
relations between persons, and made the distinction between
proportional or distributive justice which is relative to the
inequalities existing among persons, and commutativejustice,
either correcti e or judicial, which balances the inequalities
of things and acts when persons can be regarded as equal.
Aristotle has been criticised for considering penal justice
(6)
as private rather than public, and thus limiting penal injustice
(1) Aristotle: The hichomachean ,',thles. Book V.I.1129b.
(2) Ibid.,Book V.I. & II. 1130a.
(3) Ibid.,Book I.1130a.
(4) Ibid.,Book V.IX.1136b.
(5) Giorgio del Veechio. Justice, pp. 53-4.
(6) Ibid., p.52.
to the violations of individuals rather than of the state
and its legal system. He has also been criticised for not
sufficiently distinguishing between reparation and punishment,
and for thus considering penal justice as an aspect of commutative
or synallagmatic rather than distributive justice.^ Another
criticism is that for him the justice which works in
contractual relations has an objective rather than a subjective
basis, whereas in contracts subjective personal aspects should
be pre-eminent.^
These criticisms would imply that Aristotle too often
thought of justice in individual but yet impersonal terms.
In Aquinas also is this confusion between the general and
the particular, the subjective and the objective aspects of
justice, a confusion worse confounded by the introduction of
religious considerations.
For although Aquinas gave.justice separate consideration,
his analysis of it turns it into a somewhat formless quality
which is inseparably part of all the individual and social
virtues which can be directed towards others. It is identifiable
(1) Giorgio del lecchio. Justice. o.52.
(2) Ibid., p.53.
with reason, and thus with natural law and with all human
moral goodness. His definition of it as concerned only
with external actions is eontradieted by his conception of
metaphorical justice which is purely internal and responsible
for motives, and by the fact that sill justice has to take
subjective and personal considerations into account and
allow thera to affect its judgement, hven the attitude of the
person who is affected by an action is allowed to determine
its degree of goodness or badness. Justice is itself an
inward spirit and the inward intention of justice or injustice
actually determines the justice or injustice of an act. Indeed,
it is the only virtue which is so determined by its motive, as
the other virtues cannot be distinguished as intentional or
unintentional. And so it is only this importance of inward
intention which enables justice to be distinguished as a
separate virtue since the act of doing good to others is part
of the other virtues. Justice alone is motivated by concern for
others, while other virtues are motivated by concern for the
self. ^-"k3 external concerns justice is merely a negative
virtue, for only the inward spirit of justice benefits its
possessor. Thus, that which distinguishes it from the other
virtues identifies it with them, since these other virtues are
regarded as benefitting only the self.
Aquinas agreed that a just intention is not easy to
ascertain. He regarded it as an 'uncertain thing'. Yet for
a judgement to be just reason he said, must have certainty.
Since it has to include both right intention and rationality,
justice is a very difficult virtue to attain. Justice is
indeed distinguished from the other virtues as following the
real rather than the rational mean} yet justice is rationality.
Hot all of Aquinas*s reasoning about justice is strictly
fair and rational. He does not consider the possibility of
permitting a suicide which would benefit the community, but
regards it as always wrong in that it allows no time for repentance
and is not sanctioned fay public authority. Killing a bad man
is permitted if it benefits the community, as is killing in
self-defence, even though this too might allow no time for
repentance, need not be sanctioned by public authority, and
might benefit only one other individual.
Nummary of Aquinas's Teaching on Justice.
Justice is by no means a virtue peculiar to politics. It
is rooted in the individual svnderesis and will. Metaphorical
justice is wholly individual and internal, particular justice
operates between individuals only, or at least has individuals
as its object. Legal justice starts from individuals. The
scope of justice is not necessarily wider than that of other
virtues for they all have an element of altruistic justice in
them. And charity transcends justice and so is likely to have
an equal or greater effect on others. Indeed, it is only if
altruism be •extracted1 from the other virtues and called
justice that it is possible to exalt justice on the basis of
it3 extra community-value. Hie identification of legal and
general justice is misleading if it suggests that political
justice is comprehensive. Political measures do indeed have a
wide reference, but quite outside the field of politics one man
may have a vastly beneficial or devastating effect upon others.
General justice is certainly too inclusive a virtue to be
realised by political action. And if it is so exclusively
altruistic, as Aquinas suggests, it is also too high an aim.
Charity, Aquinas held, transcends but includes justice,
justice being concerned with human good, charity with divine.
Divine justice, however, by no means always harmonises with human.
It is allowed to transcend human reason, to reveal the radical
injustice and relativity of all human justice, and to introduce
another dimension and other values. Avery sin can be accounted,
an injustice before God, and since no man can be so just, and
those guilty of grievous sins should not judge thoseguilty of





Aquinas gave no clear indication of where the dividing
line between public and private judgement should be. Many
private decisions can affect more than one individual without
apparently requiring the judgement of others.
It is plain from his doctrine of the just war that
Aquinas thought that justice rather than love is the virtue
which warfare can achieve. Political measures can indeed
achieve a measure of justice but at best such justice is likely
to be partial, imperfect, approximate, and limited to material
concerns. The dilemma of justice is centred at the meeting point
between individual and community or communities. In war these
relationships are most primitive and chaotic.
The superiority of public over individual administration of
justice, Aquinas thought lay not only in its wider reference, but
in that it is more dispassionate, calm, rational, deliberate
and more discriminate. But in warfare it is precisely these
elements which are missing. The judgement and the authority of
the monarch often mean little more than the sanctioning of
individual responsibility for the actual practical carrying out
of the fighting. War is largely indiscriminate and irrational,
a collective activity blind to the individual and based on the
primitive conceptions of corporate personality and. blood feud.
It is an activity where there is every incentive to tempt the
expression of savage passions, where physical force is allowed
to be the ultimate power and victor, where the refinements
demanded by justice are impossible, and where justice miscarries
so much that the death of the innocent has to be accepted as an
incidental effect. The brutality inevitable in warfare makes it
at best a clumsy instrument of justice. Even if he had realised
how difficult it is to face war or a situation likely to lead to
war with justice, Aquinas seemed to consider that charity has
no further help to offer to a political solution, even though
he accepted its transcendence over justice and eventhough far
more than material issues are involved in any war. Charity was
not, however, a virtue to be applied by politics.
X X X X X
Modem thoughton justice and it3 relationship to law and
Christianity shews more awareness of the elusive nature of the
question, but no greater clarity in dealing with it. The
great difficulty of defining justice in practical terms stands
out even when it is regarded as an absolute value, for it is
held to result in conditional rather than apodeietic laws. For
example, it cannot fix a penalty for shopliftings it can only
rule that this should be less than the penalty for housebreaking.
And it cannot say whether theft or bodily injury is the greater
(1)
crime, but only that they should be punished differently.
It is indeed hard to respect the absoluteness of law and at
the same time to be sensitive to particular circumstances and
persons. Nevertheless, justice is ultimately a relationship
between persons, though often expressed indirectly, however,
through things, institutions and other persons, and it must reckon,
therefore, with all the personal and other factors involved in
any situation, and so become wholly conditional. Theft through
housebreaking may be thought of as two crimes, and in this sense
needs two punishments, but any particular act of housebreaking
may call for lighter punishment than any particular act of
shoplifting. That housebreaking should be considered always
more serious than other thefts, while bodily injury is not
(1) H.H.Walz, in The biblical Doctrine of Justice and Law, pp.15.17.
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necessarily so, suggests that property weighs more heavily
in the scales of legal justice than human beings, and that
justice which so pronounces it has gone only half way to being
conditional.
Scepticism about the practical possibilities of justice
is implied in the rejection of such generalities as 'honeste
vivere. neminem laedere, suum cuique tribuere1 as naive and
useless in deciding in fact what justice is, and in the
assertion that the most explicit requirement of justice is that
all people who are under a legal system must be treated both
equally and individually, andmust know what the law is and have
faith in its power to enforce its prescribed penalties.^
Since there has been no great improvement on Aristotle's
(2)
distinction between arithmetical and proportional justice,
and no reconciliation of them, and since they are so apt to
contradict each other, such generalities are of little practical
help. The difficulty of treating everyone both individually
(3)
and equally is plain, 'and knowledge of the law is no guarantee
of justice unless one is allowed to at least criticise it, even
if not to share in its creation. And if one knows that the law
(1) The Jiblical Doctrine of Justice and Law, p.16.
2) .mii ijrunner: Justice and the Social Urder, p.31.
3) One cannot really escape the dilemma by postulating that equals
be treated equally and unequals unequally, for there is in every
individual that which is 'equal' and that which is 'unequal'.
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is unjust there is little security in the knowledge, or in
finding out that it can be powerfully enforced. Moreover,
justice and law often go ill together, not only because it is
so difficult to know and administer justice, but also because
justice is not a full basis for law. Political and social
feeling, custom and general morality and the interest of
governing groups, according to most thinkers, have to be taken
into the reckoning. Justice itself, however, either can or
cannot have something to say about such things. If it cannot,
the relationship between it and them is likely to be inharmonious;
if it can, it car; call them just or unjust and 30, in a sense,
transcend them.
mven legal security is only indirectly connected with justice,
for it must be grounded on political power. And that power which
supports the authority of law can conflict with the justice which
recommends different treatment for different cases, and since part
of legal security is the assurance that law will be enforced, it
is hard to bring law and justice together. In the modern world
the problem has grown harder because there are no generally accepted
bounds to the reach of law. This has arisen from man's bewilderment
about himself, and his uncertainty a.out the goal of life. But
although this confusion may sometimes be held to harm justice more
than legal expediency, self-questioning is at least a first
step towards self-understanding. Nevertheless, such
bewilderment lies behind the modern disbelief in eternity
in which Professor Quick discovers 'the real cause of a
new, radical totalitarianism.'^ It is difficult, he thinks,
to appreciate man fully as an individual who is an end in
himself unless he is seen as directly related to the eternal.
In the light of such possibilities, it is clear that justice
and law fall within the fields of theology and metaphysics.
On the face of things the development towards democracy
should have increased rather than decreased justice insofar as
subjects became lawmakers, and this seems to have happened at
the beginning of the development of modern states. But it means
that law3 are now made by a majority, rather than that they
express the will of the community. hven in the middle ages
thi3 common will was hardly the genuine will of the community,
but rather the inevitable acceptance by the unthinking masses of
an order willed by a few. Modern decentralisation and party
politics have also disturbed the security of law and it can now
be changed too easily or used as a party weapon. Such flexibility,
however, may help the cause of justice.
(1) 0.0.Quick: Ohristianity ard Justice, p.7.
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The relative values of expediency and justice have
, been rated diversely, iixpedlency is sometimes extolled as the
handmaid of justice,^ but at others law is allowed to plead
necessity or expediency rather than justice or moral principle
(2)
in its decrees, since expediency rather than justice determines
the relative evaluations of things, and the penalities to be
imposed. If justice is the conditional art or virtue it is
often thought to be, this should be its particular task. Pure
justice is now reckoned no more than a rallying cry for enthusiasts
and romantics, including Christians, who may use it to manipulate
(3)
law for their own selfish ends. ho-one can discover it. The
equality demanded by liberalism is likewise unrealistic, since
men are basically unequal.
The same modern bewilderment confuses the understanding of
the relatiWisMp between expediency and justice. Doctor Walz
defines expediency as that which refers to the highest good
0* cultural of people who agree to live a
lif§t He then condemns it because each of these goods,
taken by itself, is inadequate, whereas justice consists of a




mixture of the three elements. He seem3 here to confuse
expediency with the 'wrong type of highest good*. By saying
that 'expediency by itself as the sole factor in matters of
law tends to be self-stultifying' he also assumes that
expediency can be an end in itself. The real question here
is clearly about which of his alternative goods man ought to
follow, not about whether man ought to follow,/
expediency as one of the goods. The
assumption is parallel to that ofassuming that reason can be an
end in itself.
The distinction between the three different ways of looking
at law, as finding the basi3 of law in its origin, in its goal,
or in its achievement, is also parallel to the consideration of
justice as an ideal which law strives to fulfil, as existing in
law, or as the result of law. Natural law, which in Catholic
legal theory is Thomist law, is an example of the first aspect.
hisewhere, natural law is so interpreted that its origin is
found not in Cod, nature or reason, but in things as vague as
institutions or 'norms for behaviour which may be derived from
(2)
what is given in experience'. ' It is reckoned that any
institution has rules which spring from and are consistent with
(1) The Biblical Doctrine of Justice and haw. pp.2/+-5
(2) Ibid., p.30
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the idea of the institution. State law, for example, is an
expression of the institution of the state. Sociology would
define justice as the 'maximum satisfaction of human wants and
expectations' and anthropology might suggest that a law of
culture i3 more appropriate to man than a law of nature. This
again raises questions as to whether man is fundamentally law-
abiding or freely creative.
Professor drunner stresses the importance of clarifying
the diverse interpretations of natural law,^ but he thinks
that the objective collective law of nature of the pre-Christian
world based on the conception of the logos which pervades the
cosmos, the subjective individual and rational law of nature
of modern times and the Christian natural law, all arise from a
transcendent but real principle of justice, even though they,
unlike it, lay down firm and explicit rules and rights. And
he thinks that the auum cuique is justice and the natural law.
But there is a further modern variant of natural law, which
*... claim3 Grotius as it3 father and
was developed on the one hand by the
more or les3 rationalistic school of
Pufendorf, Thomasiu3, etc., and on
the other by the English and French
philosophers of the Age of Reason.' (2)
1/ Jretiqe and tftq social order, p.80.
2) Ibid., p.81. Though he explains how the Sciptural conception of
the orders of creation came close enough to what the Romaa jurists
and Greek philosophers meant by the law of nature to make the
latter - no doubt becauseof it3 rationality -acceptable.
This, however, he also classes with the others as anti-
naturalistic and moral,^ and distinct from what is generally
meant by the natural law today, that is, an irrational and
naturalistic impulse which takes the laws of nature as
starting point and guiding principle.
Professor Brunner does not, apparently, consider that a
synthesis between this and other interpretations ought to be
possible in that these natural laws are, after all, part of
(1) This is largely supported by Garl (Seeker in The heavenly City
of the Gi?rhteenth-Century Philosophers. His thesis is that
although the philosophers cast away Christian revelation
they kept Christian philosophy, their new revelation being
the laws of God written in the great book of nature, '•••
having denatured God, they deified nature.' With an
ominous and increasing awareness of evil in nature and of
reason's inability to find God or morality, however, came
a compensating concentration on humanity and virtue, and a
need to make religion, morality and politics fit the nature
of man. The search for 'constant and universal principles
of human nature* was conducted by experience rather than by
abstract reason, such research proving that these principles
are, after all, relative, but that experience can separate
those customs which are suited from those which are unsuited
to human nature. Christianity, Becker thinks, with its
Garden of iiden in the past, its realism about man's present
situation arid suffering, and its hope of his eventual
salvation and security, perfectly reflects the experience
and hopes of average men. But it was given up, and
replaced by the religion of humanity, which substituted
love of humanity for that of God, man's own perfectibility
for divine salvation, and continuance of life ir» posterity
for immortality in heaven. Posterity was personified^
almost deified, and liberty and equality became sacred
principles.
the divine creative ordinance of God.^ He thinks that this
modem perversion of natural law into something basically
instinctual is so pervasive that it lias virtually devalued
the real meaning of the term. He would, therefore, put it out
of service. Christian justice Professor Brunner would ground
on the Christian understanding of the orders of creation.
Human rights are given by God at birth.
The Reformers, although they allowed for the effects of
sin more than did the Catholics, did not believe sin had
destroyed these orders of creation, and they too accepted the
Aristotelian teaching on the state just as easily as the
rationalist understanding of science and physics. On the other
hand, they emphasised the corruption by sin of natural knowledge
more than Catholics, and based their understanding of justice
more on revelation. Professor Jrunner thinks that jurists have
rejected the natural law because of its individualism, and
because any such transcendent standard is likely to menace the
positivist law over which it stands. This was particularly so
where the natural law developed into a complete system of law,
and has become increasingly common since the time of Grotius.
Here the Reformers diverged most clearly from Catholics,
supporting positivist law, and allowing natural law as a
criterion only. The right to resist tyranny, a right based
on natural law, was, however, firmly supported by the Reformers.
But this right became obsolete when the modern constitutional
state protected its citizens against the need for such
resistance. This grounding of a natural law principle in
positive lawKas indeed the germ of the moderr constitutional
state, out the rise of totalitarian states has necessitated the
revival of the natural law principle of resistance:
••Hence wherever peoples are suffering
under the rigours of dictatorship, it
is on the law of nature, and the idea
of the rights of man that they have set
their hopes. The law of nature, the
eternal unwritten laws of the Creator,
are nerving their will and convincing
them of the divine righteousness of
their resistance against a tyranny which
is devoid of any foundation in law, and
can in no way claim the obedience due to
the •powers' jecausa those powers do not
show what is, in the words of the Apo3t|e ,
the raison d'etre of all powers - they do
not attend upon lawful order as, after all,
the Roman State did. On the contrary, by
their lawlessness they destroy all law, and
by their very existence outrange all sense
of law. Hence the totalitarian State, which
arose on the ruins of the law of nature,
has been the means of bringing it to life
again.'1 (1)
Another type of legal theory holds that law should provide
for each individual all the freedom needed for free moral growth,
(l) Justice ai d the Social Order, pp.88-9
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because it is reckoned that the moral law is individual and
not social, not prescribing morality. Yet another founds
law in the will, though this could be a natural law theory in
that it is natural for the strong to impose their will on the
weak.
Recent Christian thinking ^ only proves that the right
relations.dp between Christianity and human justice is in many
ways vague, and that it complicates rather than clarifies that
between justice and law. The difficulty of reconciling hu an
justice and Christianity is the difficulty of reconciling the
God of Creation and the Old Testament with Christ the Redeemer.
Although it is now acknowledged that the basis of human justice
must be the triune God, and although the solution of the problem
in terms of natural law arid the orders of creation is increasingly
recognised as inadequate and partial, the contradiction between
these and Christ is one tdiich the most subtle and extravagant
theories cannot really eradicate.
Redemption is allowed to have both reasserted God's absolute
claim upon man and yet, at the same time, to have shewn that
(1) A reasoned, survey of Christian discussions on the matter i3
given in \ Biblical Doctrine of Justice and lav;, by Heinz-
Horst Schrey, Hans Hermann Walz and W.A.Whitehouse.
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man*3 rights are not destroyed by sin but reinforced by Christ.
The justification which is prepared for man by God's
righteousness is acknowledged as both basic for any understanding
of human law and justice,and yet separate from it. Old Testament
law on the whole is rejected as too closed in its ancient context
to be of any practical help, and the main guidance found in the
old and new testaments is thtir oneness of spirit and the
people's experience of the union of the sacred and the secular.
The only safe criterion is the living Christ w1k> can speak with
a fresh message to every generation.
God's righteousness is alternatively associated with law
and separated from His loving kindess and mercy, or identified
with the latter. The saving righteousness of God is held to
include a judgement or condemnation of man's unrighteousness in
terms of laws, statutes and commandments.^ Justice should be
done by means of restitution, and altliough retaliation is to be
allowed, it must be limited. The impersonal character of such
legal retaliation is acicnowledged, and it is believed that it
makes a positive contribution to the health of the community and
that making vengeance legal and religious underlines it as the
prerogative of God. At the same time it is held that Jesus
(1) Ibid., p.57.
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reveals that the righteousness given by God is not proportionate
to man's obedience to the law, but comes by an act of sacrifice
(l)
wholly different from that of Jewish legalism.
The attempt to reconcile such an. act with human justice
leads to some doubtful reasoning. Jesus is held to have to
utterly identified himself with the people and their sin that He
willingly submitted to a death by means of human justice. God
had appointed such a death, and Jesus thus represents the
righteousness of the community, gathers up the gross self-
assertion of those who had condemned him and, by submitting to
it3 judgement, makes it acceptable before God. In this way man's
self-assertion was taken into the service of God's righteousness,
and thereafter man could live before God with a righteousness
which is the expression of love for God and for his fellow-man.
Yet this righteousness is not achieved by obedience to law, and
even less by obedience to a bad law or a tyrant, but by
participation in Christ by the Holy Spirit, and by taking the
sins of others upon oneself and returning good for evil. And
(2)
such imitation of Christ should underlie human law and justice.
By remaining a Jew, even at the price of death, Jesus is
reckoned to have upheld the society of God's people at the expense
(1) Ibid., p.93
(2) Ibid., pp.94-lC2. .Professor Schrey seems to lean heavily on the
Treysa Report in this section.
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of the nation, and thereto to have shewn that God repudiated
any particular national or cultural setting for the life of
His people.^ Since the apartness of this new community is
marked by what it suffered at the hands of the Gentiles, however,
it is surprising that the new righteousness includes a respect
for these as ministers of God.
Professor Barth believes that in Christ the angelic powers
were called to order, and that the role played by Pilate shewed
that, even when misused, the statesman's power i3 brought into
the service of God. Thus, when Pilate in the garb of justice and
the exercise of his God-given power, allowed injustice to occur,
«
he was
'the human instrument of that justification
of sinful man, which was completed once
for all time through that very crucifixion.' (2)
For the church Jesus is man as God intended him to be, and law-
abidingness plays an important part in the achievement of that
manhood. He was born at Bethlehem because an imperial edict
required his parents to be there, He died the victim of a
legal murder. However, it is only possible to say this because
He did not transgress the law of the land. The attitude was
(1) Ibid., pp.lG3-4«
(2) Karl Barth: Church and Btate. p.16 quoted by Professor Schrey.pp.106-7.
finally expressed in Christ's acquiescence in Pilate's unjust
sentence, from which Professor Schrey draws the lesson that
'The self-expression of faith within
this world will therefore include a
practical respect for the law, carried
to the point of accepting the common
version of just dealing, and enduring its
perversions where they occur.' (l)
Thinkers of Professor Barth's school believe that the trial
of Jesus shews up more clearly than any other incident the
difficulty of linking power with law. Christians, they say,
accept law becausein the crucial encounter between Jesus and
the law, the last word was with God:
•Law... has been brought to the point of
participating in the crucial encounter
of God with His creation, and in that
encounter the ends for which it strives
have been secured. Henceforth, Christians
know that the law, wherever and however it
bears on human life, does so in subordination
to the authority of Jesus Christ, at once
expressed and concealed in his submission
to that unjust verdict after a life of legal
rectitude.' (2)
"He it is who has borne the sins of the people
and thus satisfied the demands of justice
while at the same time manifesting the grace
of God. He it is who uncovered the radical
injustice of human justice— notably in the trial
before Pilate— but at the same time he
authenticated that justice by submitting to
it." (3)
(1) The biblical Doctrine of Justice and Law, pp.122-3
(2) Ibid., pp.123-4.
(3) -PLlul: be Fondeaent theoloftique du Droit, p.29 quoted by
Professor Schrey, p.174*
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Rather inconsistently, however, Professor Schrey does not hold
up Jesus' uncritical acceptance of Pilate's unjust verdict for
imitation. Instead Christians are urged to press for
alteration of the law, even though Jesus Himself did no such
thing. This is called an 'outworking, through the Holy
Spirit, of the crisis where Jesus Christ subjected Himself to
the law, but it hardly agrees with the recommendation that
Christians should follow Jesus' example of acquiescence in
Pilate's unjust sentence* It is also stressed that imitation
of Christ, including His humility, gentleness, His rejection of
power and violence, and particularly His giving up the Old
Testament right of retaliation should permeate the secular
(2)
world., while at the same time they believe that the Gamon on
(3)
the Mount contains hyperbolic metaphor. Christians should
oppose injustice because not to do so would leave the field to
evil and chaos,^ and must respect the civil authorities since
it is only under their protection that the community'can pursue
a tranquil and quiet life in all godliness and gravity' and yet
they are to form a society without the common political features
of hierarchy, opportunism, and personal security, and have to be
willing to sacrifice rights and suffer unjustly to the point of
kl) 'He will follow Jesus in His denunciation of mistaken notions






martyrdom.^ Because God forgave, Christian society must
(2)
forgive, but the impenitent are to be excommunicated.
The Church, indeed, must use worldly laws to win safety for
its own peaceful existence.
Other aspects of Jesus' life and teaching which are allowed
to affect human justice include the image of a judge applied to
both God and Christ, which they see as proof that the early
church realised the importance of judgement and law. But they
would apply the words 'Judge not, that ye be not judged' to
individual relationships only, although they would allow that
it should influence Christian attitudes to public judgement.
Such a text is really a warning of human moral imperfection, and
should lead judges to think of themselves as one with the
accused, both in his sin and in God's forgiveness of that sin.
Law itself should shew the fruits of such consideration, but
how remains vague. Human justice, they say, is at best an
interim measure, for the times before His second coming as Judge.
The contradictions of these positions are so flagrant that
it might be shewn, by following similar lines of thought, that
the incarnation itself degrades God rather than elevates man.
(1) Ibid., p.110
(2) Ibid., p.112
Christians are to imitate Christ in silently submitting to
unjust law, and in denouncing and altering it. To believe
that Jesus' non-resistance made the crime of crucifixion
acceptable to God, and that Jesus authenticated unjust justice
by submitting to it, means that the soldiers who nailed Him to
the cross were as virtuous as Christ in their obedience to law
and that they were unwittingly imitating Him. The assertion
that all human law, no matter how unjust, is always subordinate
to Jesus because he submitted to it confuses relative roles and
responsibilities and good and evil.
To make the mark of belonging to the new society the
giving up of the lex talionis in favour of the Sermon on the
Mount, and then to call the latter hyperbolicj to hold that
Christians must resist agression if it is unjust while they
must not seek normal security but rather suffer injustice and
martyrdom; to say that they must forgive and excommunicate,
and that the judge must identify himself with the criminal
but not, presumably, s:are his punishment, are paradoxes which
must bewilder all normal processes of thought. They shew that
the attempt to reconcile the God of justice and creation with
the Redeemer God of Mercy and Love has failed, despite many
cle-ver and dogmatic assertions. It is indeed admitted that
that the theological question with which it is important to
wrestle is thrown into the form of asking what is the relationship
between the belief about creation and the belief about
redemption.
In the abstract Christians can relate justice to love by-
regarding the former as an essential preliminary to or part of
the latter. Both respect man as a person who is an end in
himself, and love can be regarded as both the ground and goal
of justice. Professor Quick maintains that justice mu3t refer
to an end outside itself:
"All rights and claims are rights and claims
to something, and clearly that something
cannot be bare justice itself - otherwise
justice would, as it were, operate in vacuo
and have no material to work on. — Clearly,
to affirm rights and claims of this kind is to
affirm something concerning the fundamental
order of the universe." (l)
He would say that man's rights are based on the love of
God, so that justice must presuppose love. Consequently human
justice must be relative and, therefore, tainted with sin. He
thinks that creativity belongs to God's love and not to His
(l) Christianity and Justice.pp.53-A. This i3 another affirmation
of the truth that reason must have a goal and purpose outside
itself. See pp.252-3 above.
justice, which therefore has no authority over His love. A
Christian forgives his fellow-man because he himself is
forgiven by God, so that
'... the definition of rights and duties
appears to be of no final importance. All
men are equal, no longer as subjects of
rights and objects of duties, but rather as
subjects of sin and objects of grace...
Henceforth the Christian owes nothing to
any man 3ave love; and love is the one
tiling that cannot be rendered as a duty;
for if I am conscious that I ought to love
my neighbour, I thereby acknowledge that I
do not. And as for my rights, how can any
follower of Jesus concern himself with them?
To be saved is to allow love to consign them
to oblivion.* (l)
The implications of such an understanding of the relation
between justice and love remain very vague, and Professor Quick
admits that this 'evangelical* understanding of justice is hard,
if not impossible, to reconcile with other understandings of
(2)
justice. Professor Brunner acknowledges the same distinction
between iuatitia civilia and iustitia evangelica, which latter
he calls the antithesis of worldly justice. And he goes on to
say that their respective spheres are as separate as heaven from
hell. 'Love gives the same to all - itself. But justice renders
(3)to all their due.' Nevertheless he seems to think that
(1) Ibid., p.57.
(2) "In what we have caller the evangelical point of view, God has,
as it were, allowed Christians by faith to take a glimpse from a
position in which they will only be able to stand firmly when they
are finally risen with Christ and have passed beyond this world
altogether... And to look at it from above is certainly not to be
content to leave it as it is. The love which enables men to reach
that point of view is the only really creative and revolutionary
power in the world." (ibid., p.60.)
(3) Justice and the Social order, p.105*
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traffic rims smoothly between this, heaven and hell, for the
same God rules both, the same God both commands citizens to
obey the state and also to return good for evil. And he is
distressed by no necessary conflict between justice and love
for he allows love to reign only in personal relationships
assigning justice to their impersonal aspects and to dealings
between groups and societies. He agrees with Professor Barth
that 'the State, the most impersonal because the most comprehensive
(1)
of institutions, knows nothing of love,' and thinks that it
nevertheless commands the allegiance of the Christian on grounds
of its justice.
Such a tidy differentiation between the spheres of justice
and love is questionable, as is the hope that justice always
precedes love and will never come into conflict with it.
A similar vagueness characterises the relationship between
(2">
love, justice and power in Professor Tillich's lectures, * in
spite of their tone of certainty and depth. He is confident that
only the ontological nature of these realities is the ground of
their ultimate unity. Without justice indeed no ontology is
(3)
possible, it is a metaphysical and general virtue, the old
(1) Ibid., p.117.
(2) Paul Tillich: hove. Power and Justice.
(3) Ibid., p.50.
natural law of cosmos and city, and the fight for the rights
of man against cynicism and dictatorship can be won only by 'a
new foundation of natrural law and justice.'^ All morals and
ethics imply or assert the nature of man and being, and should
(2)
be related to them.x '
Professor Tillieh's chief theme is that on the basis of
ontology love is the principle of justice, for in God, who is
{3)
Being, love, power and justice are one.They remain, neverthe¬
less, human concepts, and although they must also become one in
human experience they merely describe metaphorically, as symbols,
wr.at is in God. On the human level there are confusions and
ambiguities in each separate concept and in their relationships,
but spiritual love, power and justice can overcome these
difficulties. Justice must be dynamic and creative, breaking
old forms to adjust to new situations,^ it must be entirely
personal, for justice is always violated if men are treated as
(5)
things. Personality must become a principle of justice*, and
this may mean giving up proportional for creative justice such
as is found in the reconciling forgiveness of Divine love.







it destroys rather than fulfils its object, ' and throughout
he insists that punishment may be the work of justice. Even
human justice does not contradict but completes love. Indeed
to neglect or waive justice may reduce love to mere emotion
or sentimentality, for justice is the form in and through which
love performs its work. "If love does not include justice it
is chaotic self-surrender", and to be unjust towards oneself is
to be unjust towards the other. Hegel he thinks was right when
(2)
he said that the criminal has a right to punishment.
He thinks that love does not contradict but transcends
justice, as revelation does reason.
Nevertheless, in spite of 3uch faith in their ultimate
and theoretical harmony Professor Tillich does not sufficiently
face or reconcile their practical position. He does not really
explain away the apparent contradiction between love and justice
in God's forgiving and justifying grace, when he admits that
'nothing seems to contradict more the idea
of justice than this doctrine... it seems
to be utterly unjust to declare him who
is unjust, just.'





declared and made just by reunion.1 ' The same dilemma is
present in the conflict between love and power in God. Thi3
tension he thinks refers basically to creation, and his
acceptance of the physical and moral evil in the world
because it occasions the opportunity for man's independence
from and a resulting reunion with God, is a little complacent.
Ke says that God's power is not that He prevents but that He
overcomes such estrangement, but he does not sufficiently
consider the responsibility for the creation of evil. He
believes God's sharing the suffering of His creatures shows a
(2)
unity of love and power in the depth of reality itself. The
tension between love and justice are related, where they are
revealed as one.
Professor Tillich asserts that love has to destroy what
is against love, and yet to save the sinner through forgiveness,
but he gives no clue as to how this can be done. Indeed he gives
the impression that he could accept the bodily destruction of a
murderer as an affirmation of love, if accompanied by prayers
(3)
for his soul, ' and that he agrees with Luther's opinion that
'Sweetness, self-surrender and mercy are...
the proper work of love, bitterness,killing,
and condemnation are its strange work, but
both are works of love.' (4.)
The main complaint he makes against Luther is that he did not
(1) Ibid., p.86.
(2) Ibid., p.113*
(3) "It made the reunion of the radically separated soul of the criminal
with himself and with the souls of his natural enemies possible.'
U) Ibid., p.49. (Ibid., p.50.)
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recognise the tragedy as well as the strangeness of such love.
Again he gives no practical answer to the problem of
power relations between social groups, but asserts that no
answer could be given on the level of practical political
organisations. He asks whether there is an answer out of the
relation to the ultimate, that is, an ontological answer, but
his own reply is vague. It is to praise pacifism, in spite of
its theological weaxnesses, for having kept this question alive,
but at the same time be blames it for having focussed on the
problem of war rather than on a wider area of predicaments of
power.^ He gives no final answer, except a rejection of perfect
adjustment as meaning a rejection of creativity, and ends on the
doubtful note that
'... a world without the dynamics of
power and the tragedy of life and
history is not the Kingdom of God,
is not the fulfilment of man and his
world." (2)
Justice indeed is no easy virtue to define or to attain, for
ib has to be too precise to be human. One might say that nowadays
it is something of a lost cause. In relation to the secular world
it appears too idealistic, abstract and conditional to be
practicable. In relation to religion it is variously defined
as inferior to and dependent on Christian love, a stepping-stone
(1) Ibid.,pp.122-3
(2) Ibid.,p.124..
to it, or a substitute which is more practicable, particularly
in political relationships.
X X X X X
It is perhaps surprising, therefore, to find justice still
being championed so resolutely today. In a statement^ made by
Bishop Dun and Professor Mebuhr for example, the inherent
difficulties in realising it and the confusion between justice
and love, particularly in relation to war are only too evident.
They rebuke Christians who would express Christian self-sacrificial
love in a collective situation such as war, where justice should
be the instrument of love. They also, without giving evidence,
rebuke them for not applying their understanding of love to all
areas of life, and for not regarding 'the love - command... as an
overarching principle which confronts the Christian in all his
(1) Angus Dun and Reinhold hiebuhr: God i'/ills Both Justice and Peace,
originally printed in Christianity and. Crisis. Vol.XV.Iio.10 June
13th, 1955. and in The dtudent Jorld. ho.2. 1956, pp.134-142.
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relations' but 'as a neat formula to use in situations of
violence'.^ They think it right to suffer rather than to
inflict suffering in a personal relationship, but that to
accept suffering individually in a social situation is to
inflict it on others. If this were so, however, it would
not prove that resistance inflicts less suffering.
Again, presumably because their idea of justice, as in
Aquinas, i3 predominantly rational and based on calculation
of consequences, they seek to refute those who would substitute
love for resistance as a deed of sheer obedience to God. Yet
they admit that some refuse to participate in warfare on the
basis of calculation of consequences. There are, therefore, two
opposing opinions about what course of action justice decrees,
and one of them would seem to lead to a course of action
identical with one grounded on loving obedience to God. They
go on to allow that it is no longer possible to calculate
consequences. Moderr, weapons have created a new dimension of
catastrophe, so that when we make our moral calculation of
consequences of a just war we must remember that they will
probably include tremendous incalculable destruction on both
sides, so that it is not possible to decide in advance at what
point it would be better to take the position of non-resistance
than to resist. They should reasonably conclude, therefore, that
(1) Ibid., p.135.
justice is of no further use as a yardstick in judging matters
of warfare. However, their conclusion is that since the
ultimate consequences of warfare cannot now be measured, only
the most imperative demands of justice have a clear sanction.
This amounts to standing by the abstract principle of justice,
even though actual justice cannot be known or attained without
surely calculated results. Criticism of those who do not
take calculation of consequences into account and of those
who stand by the principle of obedience to God is, therefore,
itself unjust.
After upholding the claims of justice to rule questions of
war because it can be applied to collective situations, irofessor
Kiebuhr and Bishop Dun suggest that the moral question of war must
be thought of in terms of individuals. They state that when war
was recently condemned as 'contrary to the will of God1^ it
was condemned as a social evil but that this does not mean that
victim and aggressor are equally condemned,for if war is thought
of as an individual because a social evil, justice disappears.
It is difficult to see how one can condemn war without
including aggressor and victim, for without either there could be
no war. If judgement is to be done to and for individuals, then
war is primarily no longer a collective situation, and the
(1) The Amsterdam Report.
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Christian who takes an individual stand and expresses an ethie
directed towards individuals should not be blamed.
Professor Niebuhr and Bishop Dun agree that most Christians
rigiitly acknowledge the 'delegated, relative and provisional
nature of the state aiitbprity!, and that it applies to unredeemed
society. Yet they blame Christians who refuse to participate in
war both for having alimited idea of Christian citizenship and
for taking it seriously. Such Christians they say at best allow
responsibility towards the state's justice only up to the point
where the coercion and violence commanded would violate their
consciences, but in this they are wrong because
'••. the demands of the Gospel challenge
him at every point, and not merely
when the state resorts to force.' (1)
Thi3 suggests that Professor Kiebuhr and Bishop Dun agree
that the use of violence and force in war is unchristian, and
that in such circumstances the Gospel should challenge the state.
Their indictment of pacifists for not holding to such a critical
stand more rigorously arid widely is hardly a condemnation of
the attitude itself. For one thing it is strikingly untrue that
all pacifists are uncritical of the state in other directions.
Nevertheless, they are further condemned for doing too wholeheartedly
(1) Ibid., p.37.
in one direction what they have just been recommended to do in
all. For they urge the church to renounce war and to preach
non-resistance to the enemy.
Professor Mebuhr and Bishop Dun go further and seek to
reprove all who do not think of the problem of war in political
terras, and yet they accuse advocates of unilateral disarmament
and national non-resistance of trying to impose a policy - in
this case a pacifist one - upon the state. How they contrive to
make advocacy of a hopeless cause the same thing as the imposition
of a policy must remain one of the unsolved mysteries of higher
thinking. Pacifism may be misguided and wrongheaded but this
last indictment contradicts the previous criticism that pacifists
are not socially conscious. It also contains an implicit admission
that not only can no 'individual* ethic be enforced., but that it
ought not to be advocated anyway. All evangelism would appear
to be done avray with.
Professor Niebuhr and Bishop Dun conclude that after all,
and although other elements have to be taken into consideration,
the question of war must be answered in terms of individual justice
and individual conscience. Bven these are insecure, they think,
because the human mind can easily make wrong conclusions from the
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words of the Gospels or from moral principles.
The Bishop and the Professor then review all the
•collective' answers to the question of war from the point
of view of their ability to help individual decision. The
Catholic just war tradition is rejected as a rigid and
artificial structure, likely to confuse rather than to
enlighten.^ One of its conditions is that more good than
evil should be done if a war is to be justified, and Professor
Diebuhr and Bishop Dun think that the conclusion from this
that no war can now be just, implies that the moral problem
of war is being ignored. But such a Catholic condition is an
application of the rule that consequences should be calculated,
a rule strongly championed by Professor hiebuhr and Bishop Dun,
who are therefore unfair when they say that 'Here the effort to
preserve an elaborate formula has gotten in the way of clear
thinking.•^
They regard international law and institutions, as providing
the most objective collective judgement available, but think that
even this is neither infallible nor impartial, and undue reliance
should not be placed on it. They acknowledge the position which
is held by some Christians, that in the absence of supranational
(1) It is interesting to note, therefore, that Professor Ramsey
assesses the position of Professor Mebuhr and Bishop Dun as
•in general that of the just-war theory.1 (p.88.)
(2) p.L40.
institutions military action is the ultimate source of law,
and citizens must be encouraged to defend law.
What is significant is that all these theories are valued
as guides to the individual conscience. Another criterion is
that Christians should take part in a war waged to vindicate
•essential Christian principles', to defend wanton aggression
and to secure freedom for the oppressed. Professor Niebuhr and
Bishop Dun reckon that because such a criterion stresses
conscience and avoids elaborate formulas it comes closer to the
idea of a just war; on the other hand they think it gives little
direct guidance to eonscience and is 'rather crusading'. It is
this Christian sense of duty which they look upon as the reincarnation
of the idea of the just war, which was as a theory so recently
rejected. When they say that modern weapons make the aggressor
more sinful than ever they admit that the different nature of
modern war does affect its sinfulness. They conclude, however,
that the defender is proportionately more virtuous for putting
down such criminals, even though he uses the same weapons.
Professor Mabuhr and Bishop Dun conclude that only a war
to defend the victims of wanton aggression can be justified, but
thi3 is qualified with the insistence that the demands of justice
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must join the demands of order, that justice must not disturb
peace. Therefore, a war to secure freedom for the oppressed
cannot be justified, as the claims of peace and order are
reckoned much greater than those of justice. Qfhristians who
refuse to participate in warfare were previously blamed on the
ground that there can be no true peace without justice for
choosing peace rather than justice.
But in spite of the fact that the type of injustice which is
oppression is acknowledged as never more abhorrent to the Christian
conscience, and never more dangerous to true peace, they do not
regard that ending it is justifiable. And yet they finally reaffirm
that no lasting peace is possible except on foundations of justice.
V X X X X
The above arguments prove that individual and political
(l) Professor Ramsey criticises Professor Niebuhr and Bishop Dun and
points out that it is not easy to separate aggression from defence
in the modern situation, and that it is rather illogical, therefore,
to agree to disturb peace and order in order to defend victims of
•aggression' but not to defend victims of oppression. He thinks
that the Hungarian revolution ha3 proved this.(p.89.)
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responsibility, like individual and common good, are not easily
harmonised, and that there is likely to be difference between
individual and political justice as well as between justice and
love. Modern thinkers, as well as Aquinas, are too inclined to
regard the state as having a strictly definable and separate
authoritative function in matters where there is considerable
scope and need for individual initiative and interplay.
It is misleading to assume that the state, a limited community
in any case, rules justly for and covers adequately all man's
social relationships and duties. Aquinas stressed that man is
a social and politcal being, but the two are not always synonomous,
and may conflict. Man's extra-political relationships are equally
important if not more 30 than his political needs and duties, and
they may modify the aptness, righteousness and authoritative
claims of the latter. The assumption that only the monarch or
persons of rank having public authority can rule for the common
good 3hews a narrow notion of the latter. It cannot mean the good
of mankind, for 3uch is beyond the goal of a particular state, nor
can it mean the common good, in its widest sense, of only one state,
for although such common good is something towards which political
aid legal activities can contribute, it is not their exclusive concern.
The state is more likely to hinder than help its achievement if it
claims anything like absolute authority for its own limited ends.
In a telling manner, Father Gilby takes up the traditional
distinction between community and society, and paints it afresh,
in such a way as to suggest that although each is separately
definable in the Abstract, in reality they are interdependent.
The community group he thinks forms a mass composed of parts
which by themselves are fragments, whereas each member of the
society is complete in himself. The society indeed produces no
collectivity or group, display no hierarchical system and imposes
no positive laws,^ for while the good of the community should be
ordered by legal justice, interplay in the higher society of
individuals is spiritual. The law of the lex talionis is at work
in any community but friendship and forgiveness should rule in
society; while the community is a city of force, the pure society
is a city of freedom.
The Universal Good aimed at by a society of persons is unlike
(2)
the collective good which is the aim of a community. Such
collective good amounts to a sum total of parts, and must sometimes
interfere with the particular good of the parts, which are
subservient to it, for it is a 'heap value', the benefit of a
majority according to individualistic utilitarianism. The common
good of a society is distributive in that all, whether singly or
(fl) Between Community and Society. p.l94-«
(2) Ibid., p.195. p.211.
together, share in it,^ and in this common good and personal
good are not at opposite poles as they tend to be in a community.
Corresponding to his distinctions between community and
society, Father Gilby makes a contrast between an individual
considered as a member of a community and a person, considered
as a member of a society,^ An individual is amore or less
repeatable unit, separable only from others of the same kind,
•to be manipulated in the common multitude', but a person is a
centre of responsibility, a world in himself. Individuals are
means to an end, even if the beneficial end of the common good,
but persons are ends in themselves.
Political organisations Father Gilby thinks, should swing
between community and society, for these are not mutually
(3)
exclusive and their boundaries are flexible. Indeed his opinion
is that Aquinas condemned by implication the strict separation of
the sacred and profane communities.^ The human community
ascends to the conditions of the human society through political
institutions, and the life of this spiritual society flows back
into the depths of the material community, and so he is content
that the Grusades provided outlets for the land-hunger of the






*... physical huddle, the political
group, and the heavenly society...
are different aspects merging into
one another within one single ascending
social progress,1 (l)
and he thinks that, historically, a community belongs to
(2)
different categories according to who is considering it.
Just as the political community moves between pure community
and pure society, so the citizen is part individual, part
(3)
person. ' The typical politcal organisation is :
"... a communication of rational
animals undertaken for mutual
benefit... yet responsive to un¬
premeditated self-interest. The
parties help with one another's
burdens, but do not displease
themselves —— The association is
all the stronger when everybody
gets something out of it." (4) 1
The political community is, he holds, an accidental whole,
although in harmony with natural law.
"The 3taie shifts between man arid
society, the citizen faces both
ways submerged, carried, protesting."
Thus Father Gilby sees the problem at issue as that of
social responsibilites and relationships which cannot be
compressed into politbs rather than that of the division between
m Ibid., p.88
(2) "Historically a community can occupy several departments at once.
For one the state may be a collective whole(propoganda) For the
Chief of Bomber Command the second (integral whole) and for the
legists charged with announcing the Peace Treaty the third
(artificial whole.) (ibid., p.111.)
(3) Ibid., p.201.
(4)Ibid., p.170
the regulations of the secular state and the 'conscience of
personal religion.' The individual should be entirely
subordinate to the good purposes of the whole, but politics
cannot comprehend this whole.^ And he thinks that Aquinas's
true thought is to be found by not only relating particular
justice to legal general justice, but also by relating the
common good of the community to the more universal and personal
good rising up behind the universe.
That religion or religious loyalty is not a purely personal
affair but one which has social significance he thinks proved
(2)
by the life of Gandhi. And he thinks that the attraction for
the conditions of pure society is not after all remote from
politics and that
1... the common good should not be
restricted to juridical patterns, or
what nowadays would be called political
values for it includes all social
qualities, some of them not at all official,
such as the humour, doggedness and patience
of the people. And beyond this country,
another opens out, the universal and surpassing
good of the heavenly city, in which each and
all are achieved.' (3)
uvery man exists at once in and above nature, and has to





an end and being acted on as a means. Like Professor d'Entreves,
Father Gilby recognises that for Aquinas no organisation should
cramp the individual.
"The ultimate substance is the person,
ho higher containing compound exists,
nor anything like an Oversoul." (l)
Father Gilby 's ideal, which he believes wa3 that of Aquinas
also, that political life should swing between community and
society, depends for its practicability on the particular form
a government takes. The individual, according to Father Gilby,
remains supreme in Aquinas*s political and social organisation.
Whether and how this can be so cannot be seen without discovering
what Aquinas thought was the best form of government.
xxx*
(i) "With one voice he echoes the Augustinian teaching that the
human person is made to the image of God — With another
voice he echoes the Aristoteiean teaching that virtue is
essentially social, that every act is a political act
It is as though he were attempting to combine Aristotle's
teaching that the good life is impossible outside the State
with the Stoic teaching that man has aboriginal rights
independent of the State.' (Ibid., p.2G3).
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AQUIKAS'S IDhAh FQItM OF GQVi^lfeKT.
Aquinas considered the main traditional theories of the
forms of government, monarchy, oligarchy, and dsmocracy, and
their corresponding perversions. His argument for monarchy
was that since the peaceful unity of society is the aim of
government, this is best achieved by a government composed of
unity itself, that is one man. This attitude was based on his
metaphysics and theology, in that the more perfectly the form
exists in the cause, the more perfectly it will be achieved in
the and. It has analogies also with God's rule over creation,
and with the government of such communities as bees.^ There
seems to be confusion here between singleness and unity. For
the unity government hopes to achieve is a harmony of separate
things and more likely to be achieved, on Aquinas's argument
from analogy, by a governing body of separate persons. A
harmonious and united family is more likely if both father and
mother co-operate to guide and organise it. The unity of a
city or a province cannot be identified with the individual
(l) Be Kegimine iTincipuin. lib. 1. cap.11.
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loneliness of a single person. In any case the former is
an artificial, limited and at best imperfect unity, shutting
out, as it must, the rest of mankind. Agreement between
different persons, particularly if they are representative
of the people, is a more genuine unity than the unanimity of
one man. Moreover, it is quite possible for an individual to
be divided within himself, to be uncertain, weak, capricious,
or more frustrated and liarried by influential advisers than
if they were openly sharing his power. A chorus expresses the
notion of unity more clearly than a solo , which expresses
rather the notion of singleness. Unity is a much richer thing
than mere singlaress, and the more valuable the more comprehensive
and integrating it is. The 'king' of the bees is an egg-laying
prisoner of the community rather than an autocratic sovereign.
Aquinas also want astray when he said that
"... cities or provinces which are
not ruled by one person are torn
by dissentions." (l)
However, even if it were true that in ideal conditions
monarchy were the best form of government, the fact that Aquinas
believed that tyranny, the perversion of monarchy, is the worst
(l) Ibid., cap.11
form of government seems to prove that in his opinion the
goodness or badness of a government depends more directly
upon the moral character of whoever rules than on the actual
form of the government.
Aquinas allowed that the very virtues of monarchy
present opportunities for perversion and misuse. Thus one
could argue that the characteristics of all the types of
government considered by Aquinas are so equally balanced
between advantages and disadvantages that they promise even
chances of success, nevertheless Aquinas maintained his
preference for monarchy. There are passages which suggest
that Aquinas favoured what we should call constitutional monarchy;
Father Goplestone is of the opinion that this is his final choice,
though it is doubtful whether he would in any sense openly
(2)
acknowledge the sovereignty of the people. At times the
superiority of the sovereign over all law was stressed, but
at others the sovereign was held to be bound by the law of nature.
It is Sir Srne3t Barker's opinion that 'it is in the writings of
St. Thomas Aquinas that the theory of Contract is finally hatched'
and he attributes such political liberation to the coming together
of three main influences, Biblical teacning, Roman law and
(1) S.T.I.11.Q.105. Art.l
(2) Aquinas, pp. 232-3.
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Aristotle's political ideals, wrdch are evident in Aquinas's
contention that although God ordains the sovereign authority,
its constitutional form and exercise are governed by the
i (1)people.
Fluckiger thinks, however, that although Aquinas modified
his conception of monarchy, and in a few places appeared to
support a slightly more democratic form of government, the
emphasis was most strongly on the comprehensive superiority of
the monarch.^
Self-regard appears to be the corrupting element in the
rulers. Aquinas at one point seemed to suggest that it is much
better if the self-interest of as many people as possible holds
sway and is satisfied, than if only a few indulge in it at the
(3)
expense of others. Self-interest, then, is not wrong in
itself, but should be limited and restrained by the self-interest
of others. This underlines Aquinas's premiss that mutual self-
interest is one of the fundamental raisons d'etre of the
political community.
Yet Aquinas argued that monarchy is the best defence against
tyranny, and that even the latter is better than the corruption of
(1) Social Contract. Intro, by Sir £h*nest Barker, p.¥11.
(2) ueschichte des i.aturrechtes. p .463-4
(3) Pe ftegimine Principum, lib.l. cap.111.
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democracy, since the dissensions which commonly follow
government by many are destructive of peace, the most important
good for any community.^ I3ut this good, Aquinas reckoned, is
not destroyed by tyranny unless the latter is so unbounded as
to enslave the entire community. Aquinas did not seem to
consider that the exploitation and deprivation of the community
by the tyrant are likely to endanger peace as well as prosperity.
Certainly this attitude contradicts the earlier assessment
of tyranny as the worst form of government.
Kevertheless, he continued to argue that there is less
likelihood of corruption establishing itself in a monarchical
form of government, and of the monarch becoming a tyrant, than
there is of an oligarchy or democracy becoming easily upset,
perverted and degererate. He reckoned, surely without any
foundation, that a man may more often be deflected from the
common interest if he be 'one of many' than if he be alone in
government, 3ince disagreement among rulers splits unanimity
(2)
and is likely to end in strife. ' It is true that Aquinas's
understanding of democracy was that of Plato and Aristotle, and
not that of the modem western world. But is is equally true
that the monarch or dictator may, in the absence of opposition,
(1) Ibid., cap./.
(2) De Hegimine Principum. lib.l. cap.'/.
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preserve an unjust form of 'peace'. There is no guarantee
that a monarch will be naturally inclined to act in the common
interest, nor, as Aquinas seemed to think, that his tyrannies,
if they do exist, will be trivial. Further, in pointing out
the disadvantages of a pluralistic form of government, Aquinas
warned that its corruption is likely to arise through its
degeneration into the rule of one man.^ If tyranny, or
corruption of any government does arise, it is not essential
to sacrifice by killing one, or a few individuals, even for
the common good. There are two reasons why this is so, the
first being that it may involve the risk of greater evils, the
second that such an act would be qjposed not to the common good,
but to divine teaching. So that a direct conflict between the
(2)
common good and divine teaching,xor between the material good
and the spiritual good of the community is here thrown into
(3)
relief. And the divine teaching is preferred.w/
Sometimes, however ,the tyrant although he cannot be killed ? /
/
by 'the more powerful 'citizens' can be deposed or restrained by
'public authority', Aquinas appeared at times to favour a
(5)
constitutional harmony of democracy, oligarchy and monarchy ,




(4.) Do Regiaine Prineipum. life.l. cap.VI.
(5).'There is in addition another form of mixed government, constituted
from all the elements just mentioned, and thi3 is the best form of
government. In this, law is enacted according to the definition of
l3idore(Stym.V.10.)'by the common sanction of noble3 and people'.
(S.T.1.U.Q.95. Art.l.)
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certain powers of restraint. The rule of the people, which
he elsewhere designated as the breeding ground of tyranny has
to be recognised here as making a contribution towards the
safeguarding of justice. As a last resort, Aquinas said, the
help of God may be invoked against a tyrant.^
The relationship between the king and the church was not
for Aquinas entirely clear, and this blurred boundary between
the realms of king and pope was present also in the relationship
between natural and revealed law, and between natural law .and
eternal law. It would appear that no office could be
higher than a king's, for he is in his sphere analogically
likened to God in His. He is to his kingdom what the soul is
to the body, and what God i3 to the universe, its ultimate
controller arid guide, its source of power and authority.
However, not even a perfect king is capable of fully guiding
his kingdom towards its time supernatural or spiritual goal. He
has some responsioility for its moral goodness, but is more
essentially concerned with its material welfare. The goal of
the king, therefore, is limited and partial, and so is his
responsibility, though in securing the material well-being of
(1) Ibid., cap.VI
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his people he is helping their progress towards their supernatural
end. Aquinas thought the first requisite of well-being was
virtuous action, but the secondary requisite, which is
apparently a means to the first, is a sufficiency of material
goods, a d harmony and peace within the community, so that it may
employ itself in doing good.
The supernatural goal is revealed by the church, and the
Pope is responsible for legislating and helping men to attain it.
Christ is the divine ruler in the absolute sense and under Christ
kings must be subject to the priests. The prim® example, of this,
was the gradual subordination of the rulers of Rome to the pontiffs.^
The king and the state, therefore, were separate from the
church but ultimately subordinate to it. Father Goplestone thinks
that it was not easy for Aquinas to define the relationship
between the two precisely. If he had lived during the time of
the strong monarchies of Europe no doubt he would have found it
useful to make a more discriminating and dogmatic analysis of
their separate functions. Father Coplestone claims that for
Aquinas the end of the State, as much as that of the Church, was
the supernatural end of communion with God, since man has in
(2)
fact only one final end. This raises a problem involved in
(1) De -iegimine Principura. iib.l. cap. XIV.
(2) Aquinas, pp.233-4,.
the whole doctrine of natural law. If the latter is unable
to envisage the final end, how can a limited one be allowed
in the face of teleological necessity.
At the least there should be co-operation and mutual
respect between Church and state, and the latter is so
endowed with Divine power and sanction that even a usurper
or a most imperfect being who creates disturbance or disorder
does so with the permission and overruling power of God.
Human laws are binding insofar as they are just, which
means, above all, that they must be in accordance with natural
law. Inasmuch as they contravene the latter they are unjust.^
Both first and secondary conclusions from the first principles
of the law of nature are included in human law in that it aims
at the good of the city or larger unit for which the administrator
promulgating the law is responsible. This is in full accord with
the recommendation of natural law that good should be done, and
might be inferred from the natural law itself. To be valid, the
(2)law must be promulgated by the ruling power.
This close connection of the justice of a law with the
authority and eminence of its author is strikingly evident in
(1) S.T.i.ll.qu.95. Art.2
(2) Ibid., Art.#.
Aquinas's argument that even an unjust law retains, by-
virtue of such a connection arid its semblance of justice, an
element of power and authority. Here there seems a danger
of acknowledging even the devil at least for his power, or
giving credit to the wolf for hi3 sheep's clothing. The
greatest hypocrisy, ever blasphemy, is to use the name or the
appearance or the power of divinity to conceal and achieve an
unjust purpose.
The supreme governing power may not only apply but also
make the laws. Nevertheless, only those laws which are just
are binding on the conscience, except apparently, when observance
of them would prevent a worse evil than disobedience. If the
legislator acts for his own ambition or self-interest against
the common good, or if he violates thetrust placed in M.9, or
exerts more power than he should, his enactments have no binding
force. And any law which contradicts divine law is unjust.
Fluckiger points out that because the divine law and order was
not understood in the middle ages in an eschatological sense
but in an institutional one, it was thought to be contained and
completed satisfactorily by the church law, but this wa3,
nevertheless, not the legislation of the papal court, but a more
indirect spiritual power.
(l) rlucki;;er. pp.4-59-4^0.
Aquinas's arguments for the supremacy of monarchy are
rather artificial. Unity is not individuality. The relative
dangers of perversion of the various forms of government he
considered prove that the characters of the ruling person or
persons are more important than the form of the government.
All types of government considered by Aquinas are so equally
balanced between advantages and disadvantages that they are more
or 1633 equal in value. Aquinas thought that the best form of
government allowed for the self interest of as many as possible
to be taken into account, and this is surely to be achieved by
something resembling western democracy; but Aquinas condemned
democracy as the worst form of government because he thought
is likely to degenerate into the bad rule of one man. This he
thought would arise when a monarch becomes a tyrant.
ijven the perfect king is not responsible for more than
material good. Yet the common good is to be overruled by divine
teaching only in relation to certain types of rebellion against
a tyrant. Here i3 an opinion analogous to that of Professor
Kiebuhr and Bishop Dun, who hesitate to encourage resistance to
an oppressor.
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Most thinkers regard warfare as the main expression of
the sinfulness which, according to most theologians before
Aquinas and most Protestants 3irce, necessitated political
institutions. Aquinas neither emphasised nor discounted its
sinfulness, either as a natural expression of primitive instincts
or as a more sophisticated instrument of governments, since he
accepted the natural roots of political life as healthy. On
the other hand he thought slavery, which was at least a result
if not part of war, sinful, and deemed that war, like any other
expression of politics, was only justified inasmuch as every man
remains free to accept or reject such organisation, and inasmuch
as such organisation is for his own good. Self-defence is one of
the natural instincts behind warfare, and Aquinas certainly
recognised this as justifiable. On grounds of naturalness, he
could also have accepted the social manifestations of aggression,
acquisitiveness and the de3ire for supremacy, especially when
connected with a desire to survive.
lie allowed the state to enforce actions which if carried out
by individuals only woulA be merely permitted as inferior alternatives
to non-resista ce. He also allowed individuals acting as
representatives of..the state an intention to kill denied to
individuals acting in a private capacity. At times he seems
to have regarded the revealed command of non-resistance to
individuals as a command of perfection beyond the responsibility
of governments either to recommend or to command. On these
grounds he should not have allowed governments to command the
opposite as compulsory. Public evil may be different from
individual evil, but at least it includes the latter and, therefore
should not have a completely different ruling. And if Aquinas
was anticipating Luther's distinction between the love which
bids us suffer injustice rather than defend our own li-vas, and
the love which bids us fight in deferce of others, it would have
meant that he was accepting self-sacrificial love as a standard
for political action. Such love cannot however really be
commanded. The defence of the defenceless in the face of public
evil is also largely balanced by incidental killing of the innocent
If individual non-resistance is upheld as excellent there seems no
reason why governments should not at least recommend it even if it
has to be seen practically as a counsel of perfection.
There is evidence, however, of confusion in Aquinas's mind
about the real nature of the Biblical command of non-resistance.
Partly he seemed to regard it as a negative command to restrict
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savage anarchic revenge until such time as public justice
could be done. This public justice he identified with Divine
justice, thus reconciling the human and Divine commands. On
the oasis of such an interpretation he can consistently allow
the 3tate a superior judgement and authority. It is, however,
impossible to interpret the command merely in this way. It is
in any case doubtful whether in such a mass activity as warfare
the state can do justice more efficiently than individuals. The
state authority does little more than give approval to the
practical administration of •justice1 by individuals. The latter
thus bear the practical responsibility, while escaping all moral
and spiritual responsibility which, Aquinas thought;was that of
(l)
the sovereign. Indeed as regards self-defence individuals are
in a better position to carry it out more effectively and at a more
fitting time than governments.
In any other dispute between states, as in a quarrel between
two persons where the lives of many are involved, and where, the
matter not being so urgent as self-defence, there is time for
(i) "The person by whose authority a thing is done really does the
thing, as Dionysius declares.(Coel.Hier.llll. Hence according
to Augustine (Be Civ.Dei.1.21), He slays not who owes his
service to one who commands him, even as a sword is merely the
instrument to him that wields it... just as a soldier slays the foe
by the authority of his sovereign... '(S.T.ll.ll.Q.64.Art.3»ad.l.)
-I ;< i
arbitration, it would seem that neither of the individual
states involved is any more capable of mailing a just decision
than is a prejudiced individual. The monarch, or public
judgement, as arbitrator in a contest between individuals,
might be more just because more aloof and dispassionate, but in
a contest between states each state is as likely to be motivated
by revenge as any individual. Thus any likelihood of a really
just judgement would necessitate the arbitration of at least
another state. Warfare, indeed, is the one situation in which
the monarch or governing authority is least likely to be just and
rational.
p<aV>V|C
The intention to kill in self-defence, however, was allowedA '
presumably because it is reckoned that public judgement is more
rational and deliberate. This fits Aqui: as's understanding of
the ius :-:er;tiu7i as a higher becausemore specifically rational
human law than individual natural law. Certainly warfare without
the intention to kill is an unthinkable contradiction. It is
possible, however, remembering Father Gilby's understanding of
politics as having strongly naturalistic roots and as lying
outside the realm of ethics, to tuink of the compulsion and the
intention to kill as revealing not greater rationality and
morality but gre?3ter naturalism. Aquinas's teaching on individual
self-defence was mainly naturalistic ^ with some rather
ineffective 'Christian' inhibitions. It would not be
surprising therefore if his political teaching were even more
naturalistic, since it had to cover non-Christians as well
as Christians, and since he was ruling for wars of aggression
as well as for wars of defence.
Indeed, where the war is not one of self-defence or defence
of a community in general, it would be difficult to find any
cause to justify taking life. Any sin, objective or subjective,
which damaged anything less than life would seem not great enough
to justify war, especially as private property is not according to
natural law originally but only according to natural law by
addition. Since an individual cannot even intend to kill when
his own life is threatened, it would appear quite unjust for a
public body to intend to kill for any lesser reason. Aquinas's
distinction between private and public evil is in his commentary
on non-resistance, and he appears in fact to be thinking mainly
(2)
of defending life, not of resisting other evil.
In hi3 war articles he justified the individual's waiving
(1) See aoove p. 309-
(2) See p. 307-8 above.The just war theory, it was pointed out, operates
only up to the first moment of attack. Unce the unjust side are in
the position of defending themselves even they too are equally
justified on grounds of the right of individual self-defence.
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the command not to resist if it is for the common good.^
This suggests that he did not really consider non-resistance,
even in individual relationships, as an absolute command of
perfection, since it cannot guarantee the achievement of the
greater good for all.
This raises another question, which is not necessarily
connected with the difference between individual and political
responsibility, that of the common good. Aquinas rated legal
higher than particular justice because it aims at a wider good.
This is another reason why he sets 'political natural law' higher
than purely individual natural law. Such a comparison is
strengthened by those of his interpreters who suggest that the
individual has no rights in relation to the community and that
individual law is restricted to inward spiritual and contemplative
matters, whereas active and practical matters should be ruled
{2}for by politics. These interpretations are inaccurate, however.
And Aquinas himself had to contradict the leading principle of
his natural law teaching, that is, that the law of nature is
reason itself, in his attempt to prove that the ius gentium is,
because more rational, different from natural law. And this
difference implies superiority, since it is by virtue of
his reason that man is superior to the animals.
(1) Annas and Caiaphas argued that Jesus should be sacrificed for the
good of the nation, but for this they 3tand condemned, because
they put apparent social and political equilibrium before true justice.
(2) See above pp. 337-8
In fact the relationship between individual natural law
and the political and social natural law is not clear-cut,
neither is that between individual good and common good. Legal
justice which seeks common good stems from the individual aid
is not confined to political activities. Altogether apart
from politics an individual cars affect a large number of people,
including future generations. Aquinas at one point said that a
public judgement was essential for any matter affecting many
people, but he did not shew at what point such collective
judgement is needed for any individual or collective action which
affects the good of the community. Such judgement is, of course,
already included in any collective action. At what point it
becomes essential in any individual decision wiiich affects the
community is not clear. In any case, a common judgement is
not necessarily less biased than an individual one.
In warfare, then, the individual's reaction affects the
community for good or ill. Individual participation in war can
be looked at from two points of view. It may be seen as a
participation in which the individual is central, in which he
employs his own conscience will and knowledge, and in which he
is tied by no irrational prejudices to any particular group. He
can then decide, (after taking into the account that he may be
himself more materially dependent upon on© side) that to align
himself with on© rather than the other side will help towards
greater justice for all. He may, by virtue of his belonging to
one community, be forced by it to fight on its behalf. If such
action is against his own conscience and decision he would be
acting, as Father Gilby would say, as an 'individual', a
mathematical unit, not as a person. And hia 'personal* element
would have to express itself as best it could in other ways.
From the point of view of the justice which issued from the
state towards the individual, warfare is never justified, for
Aquinas thought that the killing of any mar: is always unjust in
itself. Its incidental effect of benefitting the community he
thought just, though even this justice is difficult to guarantee.
That the state orders its individuals to defend themselves,
taeir source of existence or the defenceless in their midst,
appears more or less as just as individual self-defence, but it
should be surely permitted rather than compelled on the political
level, especially if the good of more than one nation be sought.
When two states are locked in conflict the common good for
which each strives is in conflict too. The common good of any
limited community is itself likely to be limited and may even
prejudice the common good of mankind.
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Commutative justice would seem less accurate than
distributive justice, and in warfare thi3 latter can certainly
not be done. Indeed the only justice possible in war is that
which is worse than commutative, for it i3 unequal without
good reason, arbitrary, clumsy, chance justice as far as
individuals or groups are concerned. Even on a purely material
level, therefore, the common good which is the only justifiable
aim for warfare is araoiguous and limited. Further, such
common good is transcended by what Father Gilby calls the
'Universal (k>od,' that is, the good of society. War is much
more than a material concern, It is certainly a political matter
but only partially so and it is a different problem for each
group, oach individual is related to his group and bound by it
to some extent, but he is related to its members not only through
politics and law but also through other relationships involving
friendship and religion. At the same time he has a relation not
only to his own state group but also to other people in other
nations, including his political enemy. From a Christian point
of view certainly, arid even from a rational point of view, material
and spiritual responsibility towards mankind must in any conflict
override narrower political responsibility. It is conceivable
and rational, therefore, that a Christian, believing that his
contribution to the good of mankind is to obey Christ,
should, in the absence of the possibility of calculating
consequences, and the impossibility of achieving justice, decide
to follow the teaching of non-resistance and to love the enemy.
He has every right to decide that he ought not to kill in
defence of his own life or that of others, but that he ought
to protect his friends as far as he can without harming or
killing in the belief that, in the long run at least, it will be
more beneficial spiritually and materially to friend and foe
alike than armed resistance. Aquinas at times seemed to agree
(1)
that such non-resistance is the essence of Christianity, and
although he may have rated 'political' natural law higher than
individual natural law, he could not rate it higher than divine
law, individual or social. The spiritual good of the community is
higher than the material good, as it is the goal towards which the
state points. Aquinas allowed the individual relationship between
the self and God to transcend and even to do away with political
responsibilities, and Father Gilby is more insightful than
Professor D'Fntreves in his realisation that such a relationship
has social effects. Just as there is often disharmony between
individual and social good, there i3 likely to be disharmony between-
national ar;d world good, and between material and spiritual good.
(l) See above p. 307
It is important, therefore, to consider whether Aquinas
harmonised individual with social Divine law on the matter of wax ^
He never conceived of Ms •perfectionist* interpretation of non-
resistar ce on a political level. But on the interpretation of
non-resistance as an interim and restrictive command which was
merely to inhibit anarchic revenge, he legitimised state revenge
and identified it with the wrath of God. Everything hangs, then, on
how Jesus1 teacMng about non-resistance and love for the enemy
ought to be interpreted.
In fact, therefore, although there is a difference b&ween
Ms individual natural and divine ruling on defence, there is
no difference between political natural and divine ruling. Since
there is negligible teacMng on war in the Hew Testament this
suggests that the former is being used for the latter. The former
is not even satisfactory and certainly not perfectj to bring in the
doctrine of the divine authority of the king merely to back up and
compensate for the inconsistencies of a political natural law ruling,
wMch from some angles falls below individual natural and revealed
teacMng, is not convincing. Warfare as organised mass self-
defence is imperfect but it has its own kind of inaccurate and
naturalistic pagan justice. Still, it is quite secular and has
notMng at all Christian about it. m . . „ ,.To bring in God's blessing to
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make up for such imperfections, and to suggest that His will is
deliberately done through them, invokes suspicion.
If God's will is really to be done, and if God really does
intervene to the extent of inspiring and overruling leaders, there
is no reason why He should not inspire the wicked aggressor or
sinner to cease from his evil. Since the divinely inspired king
or government is given special power, presumably, to impose
God's absolute divine law upon individuals, it is hard to understand
why such compulsion should be limited to external matters, or why
it should be delayed until vengeance needs to be done. Prevention
would seam more righteous than curej compulsory conversion more
healthy than compulsory punisunent.
Aquinas's political ruling on war is if anything, then, more
naturalistic than his ruling on individual self-defence. It is
indeed not much more than the latter applied to a collective
situation, with the Christian restrictions left out. Since he
was considering wars of aggression, such justification is even more
difficult to reconcile with Christianity. Hven though a war of
defence may be allowed the virtue of defending the defenceless,
this is spoilt by the incidental killing of the innocent. Ho war
can be more than partly just, since the killing of any individual
is unjust in itself. 4ven the justice which might be done in such
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a i<ar is unpredictable and partial. There is nothing
distintively political or Christian about his teaching. The
coincidence between human and divine law is no guarantee
that there is real harmony between them,^ it i3 no
evidence of a real incarnation.
Justice is a metaphysical as well as a religious and
practical problem. And although its connection with the orders
of creation has often been left imharmonised with its relation
to Christ, there is so little revealed teaching on the particular
topic of war that is is important to consider how this might
fit into any c?asmological pattern. Professor cL'hntreves, indeed,
thinks that i3 is through its participation in the eternal law
that natural law becomes the pattern of all positive legislation.
The extent to which Aquinas*s understanding of the eternal law
can give any guidance on the matter is therefore important.
(l) Indeed it will be remembered - see p.330 above - that Aquinas
was not enthusiastic about Gration's identification of natural
and divine law.
CHAPTER BIGHT
TUB GROUNDING OF AQUINAS'S
NATURAL LAW TEACHING IN HIS
NATURAL THEOLOGY.
Since the Eternal Law is God,^and since morality consists
in a rational participation in this law, it is important to try
to decide the extent of man's ability to know the Eternal Law
through reason. Unless he understands the Eternal Law, he
cannot rationally participate in it. and has no proof that his
(1) "The nternal Law is the system of divine government «— thus
then all that is in the things created by God is subject to
the Eternal Law: but what belongs to the Divine Nature or
essence is not subject to the Eternal Law, but is really the
Eternal Law itself." (S.T.1.U.Q.93. Art.4.*)
moral certainties given him by the natural law of Ms reason
are from God.
Aquinas considered both how far man can know by his
reason that God is, and also what God is. For moral guidance
the knowledge of what God is appears to be more important than
certainty about Ms existence, though the two are confused
and interdependent. Proof that God exists has no value unless
'God* means something. Aquinas indeed professed to maintain
a strict distinction between what God is (quid est) and that God
is (quia est), but whether he really did so, and whether it is
really possible to prove the existence of something about which
nothing at all is known is questionable.
Aquinas set down five proofs of the existence of God.^
All of them take as their starting point, and rest upon, observed
(1) a) the proof from movement, i.e. the ultimate dependence of all
moving entities upon a primary unmoved Mover.(Con.Gen, lib.I.
cap.13J 3.T.l.Q.2.Art.3)
b) the proof from efficient cause, i.e. the ultimate dependence
of the series of efficient causes upon a primal efficient
Uncaused Cause. (Gon. Gen. lio.I. cap.l3> S.T.I. Q.2.Art.3.)
c) the proof from the contingency of all created things, i.e.
the ultimate dependence of all contingent things upon an
aosolutely Necessary Being. (3.7.1. Q.2. Art.3.)
d) the proof from observed degrees of truth and being, i.e. that
such degrees imply and necessitate the existence of,Absolute
Truth and Being. (Gon.Gen. Iib.l.cap.l3j 3.T.I.Q.2. Art.3«)
e) the proof from design.(Gon.Gen. Iib.l.eap.l3j 3.T.I.Q.2.Art.3.)
fact. Only the last of them involves any element of induction
and therefore of mere probability. The first four are grounded
on causality and the principle of sufficient reason, and are
held to establish not mere probability but certainty.
There appears, however, to be some similarity between
inductive logic based on experience, but not yielding certainty,
and the logical implication, again based on experience and on
the principle of sufficient reason, which is supposed to lead
(1)to proof. Countless times tilings appear to be contingent, or
at least give no evidence of their self-sufficiency, but it is
presumptuous to assert that this is an absolute or necessary
contingency, even though to the limited human mind absolute
contingency may appear to exist in those cases it is fitted to
observe.
Aquinas said that as the existence of an effect is enough
to prove the existence of its cause, the 'effects' of God can
prove His existence eventhough, because they are finite and He
is infinite, they do not enlighten us as to His essence. The
nature of an effect is here rather unreasonably assumed. Once
anything i3 called an effect, its cause is implied. But it is not
clear that tilings are effects and therefore have causes in any
other sense thar. in that of the temporal series.
(1) The principle of sufficient reason holds that everything has a
sufficient reason for its existence; if this reason is in
itself it is a necessary being, if in something else it is a
contingent being.
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In the first proof, that from movement, Aquinas meant by
movement not only local and physical change, but also qualitative
alteration and intellectual activity inasmuch as the latter is
based on the concepts of potentiality and motion.^ H© noted
that Plato and Aristotle differ in their understanding of the
(2)
concept of motion, for whereas to Plato it meant 'any operation' ,
so that he could refer to God as self-moved, to Aristotle its
meaning was limited to the act of something corporeal and
(3)
divisible. ' All motion, that is the passage of things from
potentiality to actuality, must, directly or indirectly, by a
series of causes and effects, depend upon a first cause of motion
which is uncaused and changeless. For Aquinas, God was this
first cause. He would not allow the alternative of following a
causal chain back to infinity, for he held that although a
temporal series of an infinite number of secondary causes is
philosopiiicaliy possible, an ontological series is not.^
"Hence it is beyond question that he
held it to be entirely illegitimate
to argue to the existence of God
from the supposed necessity of a prius
to the temporal series. On the contrary,
his contention was that any arid every
causal 3erias, whether temporally finite
or infinite, is inherently contradictory
Tl) Phvs. lib.V.cap.11. lect.A; S.T.l.Q.2. Art.3. ad 2; S.T.I. 0.2.
A3rfc»3# ad. 2; S«T»X»Q»79» S♦T^a^~XX*Q.*9• Art«4*
(2) GOn.Geri. lib.I.cap.23,
(3) f'h;vs. lib.Vl. cap.lv.
(4.) Commentary on Peter Lombards leniences. 2.DlSt.l.Q.l.Art.5j
SjjT.1.Q.46. Art.2 ad 7j Son. Gen, libll.cap.38.
■i: Si: e)
unless regarded as depending upon an
ultimate cause which is not in time at all•* * *
The dependent implies the independent, the
relative implies the absolute^(l)
The illogicality of an infinite series of ontological
causes seems no greater than that of an Uncaused Cause, or
Infinite First Cause. For both these concepts contradict
Aquinas's belief that everything must have a cause. Indeed It
appears that all perceptions from the human perspective, merge
into a single vanishing point.
Aquinas argued that an infinite series of causes is
illogical because it eliminates a first causes
"...And so it must be said universally of
any infinite, whether in the order of causes
or the order of magnitudes, that all its
parts are intermediate; for if there were
some part that ftas not intermediate, it must
be either the first or the last, and each is
incompatible with the concept of the infinite
which excludes every term and beginning and
end... And so, if moving causes proceed to
infinity, there will be no first cause, but
the first cause is the cause of all the others;
hence it will follow that all causes will be
wholly removed; for if the cause be removed,
all those things are also removed of which it
is the cause." (2)
But the Infinite excludes definition. Infinity has no
beginning and no end,therefore the series of <causes he refuses
to accept are not intermediate, but just causes.
(1) The Conception of God in the Philosophy of Aquinas. pp.6l-3»
(2) a.T.l.Q.2. Art. 3*
If God i.3 Infinite, He can only be Infinite Cause and not
First Cause. In a series of infinite causes, the first cause
will not be the cause of all the others, the series will be}
therefore the removal of the first will not mean the removal
of all other causes.
If it were unreasonable to work back to a first cause of
a temporal sequence, but reasonable to work back to a first
cause of an ontological one, it would become more difficult to
distinguish between this first cause God and its effects,
creation. It would raise also the question of how far it is
legitimate to use arguments or principles of reasoning which
make essential use of time, for any conception of causality or
change would seem impossible if the time factor were wholly
left out. This emphasises one of the differences between
causality and creation. Likewise, if a temporal infinity is
metaphysically possible, it is hardly possible to prove logically
beyond doubt that God created time with creation. If a temporal
series to infinity is possible the relationship between finite
and infinite thus becomes one which does not necessitate a jorius.
Time and infinity thus become so simultaneous and interdependent
as to come near to pantheism and this must at least qualify all
other relationships between the finite and the infinite.
Movement is inconceivable to the human mind if unrelated to
time. It needs the accompaniment of time. The proof from
movement, therefore, can hardly be valid if temporal
dependence is ignored.
At times Aquinas limited motion to the activity of that
which is imperfect or only in potentiality, and called the
other kind of motion, that vnich is the act of that which has
(1)
already received its actuality, operation. ' The latter he
confined to non-physical motion such as sensation, knowledge
and volitio • Aquinas admitted that mind has potentiality, but
he distinguished its potentiality from that belonging to matter.
The starting point of this first proof is the movement, intellectual
and physical, of that which is potential, and not, presumably,
operation. Professor Patterson regards this as evidence of the
identity of the first and third proofs. The third proof '
•reasons from contingency in general to
a necessary being which is its cause, the
first argument reasons from a particular
form or aspect of contingency to the same
necessary being,' (2)
The trnderlying principle of both proofs is that of sufficient reason.
The second of Aquinas's proofs is the one from efficient
cause, arid Professor Patterson argues that it too is identical
(1) De Anima. lib.lll. lect. 12.
(2) The Conception of God in the Philosophy of Aauinas. p.70.
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with the first. This identity he grounds on the identity of
motion and chan;e, and the identity of a causal chain of change
or movement with that of cause and effect, hvesn if we restrict
motion to the quantitative and qualitative changes of physical
beings the causal chain of change in physical things is the
starting point for both proofs. Professor Gilson allows the
similarity of the first two proofs but denies their identity, since,
the first proof shows us God as the
cause of cosmic movement and
of ail movements dependent on it, the
second presents him as the cause of the
very existence of things. Me have found
that God is a moving Cause, now we know
that he is the efficient Cause." (l)
He assumes that each proof starts from a different order of effects,
but Professor Patterson argues that the series of movers and things
moved and the chain of cause and effect are one and the same, and
that there is no difference between these and the realm of
(2)
contingency underlying the third proof.
Those who stress that the second proof is concerned with being,
rather than with becoming, point out that Aquinas himself dis¬
tinguished between causation secundum fieri and causation secundum
(3)
esse. Others, such as Joyce, are not satisfied that causes in
fieri and causes in esse can always be distinguished in nature,
(4)and find examples of causes of becoming-and-b&ing together.
(3) S.T.I.Q.10A. Art.l.
(A) G.H.Joyce. S.J: Principles of Natural Theology, p.59
(quoted by Professor Patterson, p.76.)
Aquinas himself appears in some places to have denied the
impartation of being from one finite thing to another.
"...this is the difference between a divine
agent and a natural agent, that the natural
agent is the cause only of motion, while the
divine agent is the cause of being." (1)
Nevertheless, he acknowledged that certain secondary causes
of being do exist in nature. Professor Patterson points out,
however, that impartation of being is never witnessed since
such causation is only secondary. The starting-point of any
chain of causes secundum esse, therefore, must be the same as
that of any chain of causes secundum fieri. Nor can the validity
of the chain secundum fieri be denied on the ground that it
involves an infinite temporal regress, unless the argument from
motion is held invalid too. Indeed, any proof based on causes
secundum fieri can only be valid if it Is identifiable with the first
proof.
Professor Patterson considers the possibility of distinguishing
the first proof from the second on the ground that the first could
refer to accidental change, and the latter to change of substances.
But he points out that Garrigou-Lagrange and Joyce both understand
that in the proof from motion, motion involves, or means, all kinds
(1) Commentary on the Sentences of PeterLombard. l.Dist.37,Q.l.Art,l.sol
Con.Gen, lib.111.cap.65j he Potentia. Q.5. Art.l.
of change, accidental, spiritual, sensible, local, and
qualitative. Joyce defines it as
"•*. the energetic and therefore
incomplete actualisation of a
potency belonging to some form of
being. The end towards which the
process tends may be a new quality?
or an increased quantity: or again
a specific nature as is the casein
the development of a seed or an embryo."(1)
This controversy involves the questions of the nature of being,
and of the relationships between being and becoming, and between
God and creation. If the processes of being and becoming really
coincide, it would seem more difficult to separate God from
creation. If created things do not impart being to each other,
all things are equal in their degree of dependence on God and
therefore any doctrine of degrees of being among created things
which is based upon different degrees of dependence, becomes
impossible. It would seem that there.could only be two degrees
of being, - Being, Uncreated, Actual, Simple, Independent, Infinite,
and being created, potential, complex, dependent, finite. The
qualities of such degrees of being would appear to be too equivocal
(2)
to allow any analogy between them. If created things do impart
being to each other in any ultimate sense and if God is the sole
source of being, God must be in created things, in a pantheistic sense.
(1) G.2. Joyce: Principles of natural Theology, p.36.(quoted by
Professor Patterson, p.79)
(2) See below pp. 464.-5.
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If the 'being' which created things impart to each other
is nothing mors ultimate than a manifestation of change, there
can be no evidence of cause and effect in relationship to
created being. If there is no chain of being in creation,
there is no change of being.
Analogy is grounded on the principle of cause and effect
and on the degrees of being; it wuuld seem that this cause
and effect should nold between the degrees of being.
Creation seems as different from cause as is an uncaused
cause from a caused cause, and utter independence from utter
dependence. An effect may be similar to cause in the series
cause-and-effect, since both need a cause, and since every
effect ar.d every cause is the middle and connecting term between
two connected terms. But the offoot of croation is not necessarily
similar in any way to Creator. Only two terras are involved, the
creator and the created, and these in themselves appear to be
essentially different. There need be no analogy between a series
of causes and effects, and between creation and its effect. This
utter difference must permeate the Being of God and that of created
things. It is difficult to see, therefore, how there can be
analogy where there is utter diversity.
Aquinas's third proof, the one from contingency, was based on
the facts of generation and corruption. The objection to the
identity of the starting points of the first three proofs on
the ground that the basis of the third is narrower than those of
the others since it cannot include accidental change (generation
and corruption being concepts which apply only to substances ^
is answered by the fact that accidents are at least as contingent,
(2)if not, acre so, than substances. The stress on the generation
and corruption of substances implies a ground beyond nature.
Aquinas, however, did not directly describe this necessary being
as super atural or immaterial.
If the second proof is separated from the first, because it
refers to God as the cause of being rather than of movement, the
second proof becomes identical withthe third, which demands an
absolutely necessary being as foundation for all contingent
existence. Professor Patterson sees no reason for distinguishing
the first and third proofs, since altiiough they use different examples
such as change, generation and corruption, of the one principle
that the ontological priority of an actual necessary being is
implied by these manifestations, there can be no metaphysical
difference between contingent change and contingent generation and
(1) ihvs. lib.V. cap.l. lect.2.6.7.
(2) De '/er. Q.21. Art.5. SUT.l.ll.Q.llO. Art.2. ad.3
contingent corruption. Any differences can at most be literal.
The third proof, then, really comprehends the others.^
The fourth proof, the one from the observed degrees of
truth and being, like the others, depends upon the principle
of causality. Although some have argued otherwise, there
appear to be causal links between the different degrees of being,
for Aquinas grounded this proof on a statement in Aristotle's
Metaphysics, that
All derivative truths depend upon the
eternal principles of being and Truth as
their causes. (2)
In his commentary on this passage Aquinas agreed with Aristotle.
He illustrated his theory of how various levels of being share,
through participation, in Being by describing how fire, the
(3)
ultimate heat, is the cause of heat in all hot things. In
The Commentary on Peter Lombards Sentences,^ Being was even more
directly affirmed as the cause of the being in things. Opponents
of the causal interpretations of the fourth proof argue that this
illustration is merely figurative. Professor Patterson thinks it
odd that Aquinas should have been so inaccurate as to illustrate
a non-causal argument with an argument drawn from cause. The
(1) The Conception of God in the Philosophy of Aquinas. p.73*
(2) The Conception of God in the Philosophy of Aquinas, p.83.
professor Patterson refers to the second book of the Metaphysics
chapter. 1.
(3) ne rotentia. Q.3. Art.5.
(4) 2 Piat. l.Q.l. Art.l.
argument from fire was based on the general principle that
"... what is the maximum in any genus is the cause of all
other members of that genus". The varying degrees of heat which
approach ever nearer to the intensity of fire are evidently
introduced to illustrate how the varying degrees of being,
unity, truth and goodness depend upon and are caused by the
Absolute Being widch is at once Absolute Unity, Tauth and Goodness.
For Aquinas, Being, like the transcendentals truth, unity and
goodness, was an analogical and not a univocal concept. Truth
was, indeed, identical with being. Because it is based upon
characteristics which are anlogically and not univocally predicated
of all existences, the fourth proof does differ from the other,
but it nevertheless implies the same causal principle. Certainly,
if the distinguishing factor between Being and being, and the
determining factor of- any levels between them, is the utter
independence of the former and the utter dependence of the latter,
and if there are thus degrees of dependence or contingency it
would appear that the tnird and fourth proofs are identical also.
The opportunity this argument might seem to jr esent for
arguing towards an absolu ely evil being was no problem for
Aquinas because to him evil was wholly negative. Being was a good,
and so an evil being was for him a contradiction in terms. "The
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(l)
causal series leads us only upwards."
iixperienced degrees of reality may lead us to conceive
of Absolute Reality, but the flaw of the ontological argument
would seem to be present if we should posit this Absolute
Reality as a fact.
The fifth proof, the one grounded on evidence of design
in the universe, from which it is held that there must be a
designer, could also lead from instances of apparently wick d
design to a wicked designer. Purposiveness and order by
themselves do not guarantee goodness either in themselves or
their designer. Aquinas, however, thought otherwise, for to
him order was the token of goodness, bven so, he allowed that
only in a majority of cases can the mind find order in the
universe. This majority he held sufficient for his proof.
This proof is open to the usual objection that induction
guarantees no more than probability. M. uarrigou-Lagrange,
however, argues that the observations of chance instances derive
from, imply and illustrate a fundamental principle. As this is
not self-evident, it calls for a cause which must be, on the
(2)
principle of sufficient reason, "intelligent mind". Moreover,
(1) The Conception of lod in the Philosophy of Aquinas, p.90.
(2) bieu. son existence et- sa nature, pp.321, 190: (quoted by
Professor Patterson in The Conception of Jod in th.., Philosophy
of Aquinas, pp.91-2.
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he urges, the purposiveness of events in nature presupposes
a guiding intelligence. Nevertheless, even if order were
proved to prevail, the connection between a system of self-
contained order in the observable universe and a governing
mind behind it does not necessarily follow logically, and the
connection has often been denied.
It is difficult to understand what criterion Aquinas used
in deciding which aspects of creation aireanalogously similar
to the Creator. Fluckiger maintains that he had to resort to
revelation to distinguish those natural tendencies which are
bad from those which are good.^
Aquinas agreed that no logical process can ever make up
to us for the lacx of an immediateand intuitive vision of God.
let he discounted the metaphysical importance of mysticism and
(1) "Faktisch war fur ihn die naturalis inclinatio nur so wait
richtunggebend fflr das Vernunftgemasse, als nicht ein
direkter Widerspruch zur christlich^n Sittenlahre darau3
erfolgte. Sobald aber diej enigen "natOrlichen lieigungen"
zur Rede standen, die ffir das christliche hmpfinden als
"stbidhaft gelten, richtet er sich nach der Christ lichen
Wertskala, und die "naturlichen Neigungan" gelten dann als
sinnlich und vernunftwidrig."
(leschichte des Naturrechtes. p.456.)
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in this is unlike most scholastics'.^ There is not doubt,
however, that even though h© may not have relied upon
mysticism, his conception of God is not an achievement of
his logical processes alone, but is largely the fruit of the
preconceived and established Christian doctrine of God which
Vie inherited.
Nevertheless, in advancing his arguments Aquinas sought
to move only on the grounds of most precise and detailed logic.
(1) "But behind thinkers of the thirteenth century there lay
welinigh a thousand years during which Christian monotheism
had been cast in the mould of a i eoplatonic philosophy.
The dominant influence of St. Augustine lay like a shadow
over medieval Christendom, fheologians no longer seriously
disputed as to Whether the Deity had a body, or was in
space. The word God had been given that stereotyped and
conventional significance which it was to retain for five
hundred years, down to and through the period of the
Jeistic controversy and practically until the beginning
of the nineteenth century. Incorpereality, aseity,
omniscience, imautaoility, eternity, were attributes included
as a matter of course in the conception of divinity." (The
Conception of God in the Philosophy of Aquinas, p.27.)
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By starting from a conception of an Unmoved Mover and
Uncaused Cause, Aquinas, using the negative method, condluded that
God is without change, potentiality, composition, materiality,
substance, accident, genus, species and so on. Thus, even if such
predication is equivocal and analogical, as far as God is defined
in negative terras alone He must be univocal with these negative
qualities in created things, since the negative can never be
transcendent or thought of in terms of different levels of being.
Although he did not acknowledge it in his argument as to
what God is not, but claimed that the propositions to which his
negative method led must be understood in a negative sense, and
although he insisted that the divine essence is beyond human
comprehension Aquinas admitted in liis refutation of Maimonides that
"... the conception of negation is always founded
upon soma affirmation? as is evident from the
fact that every negation is proved by an affirmation?
whence it follows that unless the human intellect
knew something affirjnatively concerning God it could
deny nothing of @od. For it could know nothing if
nothing which it said of Him could be verified
affirmatively." (1)
And it is by means of his doctrine of analogy that Aquinas reaches
(2)
such positive knowledge of God.
(1) De Pot. Q.7. Art.5.
(2) G.B. rhelan. "... witnout an understanding of the doctrine of analogy
it is impossible to acquireaknowlwdge of metaphysics. Tho importance of
analogy in the philosophy of St Thomas literally cannot be over-estimated.
There is not a problem either in the order of being^or in the order of
knowing, or in the order of predicating, which does not depend for its
ultimate solution on the principle of analogy. Hot a question can be
asked either in speculative or practical philosophy which doe3 not
require for its final answer an understanding of analogy."(G.S.Phelan:
St Thomas and Analogy, p.l.)
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He distinguished two modes of analagous prediction.
According to the first, two things are analagous only because
of their similar relation to third thing, as when being
is predicated of substance and quantity. But as there is
nothing prior for God to be compared to, this mode cannot be
applied where He is part of the analogy. According to the
second mode, two things are directly related because they share
some common quality. Aquinas used this second mode, the "analo^ia
quae est unius ad alterum,11 for linking God and creation. ^
The finite and the infinite seem too far away from each
other to allow any kind of resemblance. Aquinas, however,
distinguished between two modes of resemblance. The one is that
of proportion or proportionality, "according to which one thing
stands in the same relation to a second tiling as a third does to
a fourth," the other the likeness which "holds between members
(2)of the same genus which partiexpiate in a common quality.:i
Only the first of these applies to relations between God and
creation.
iJLsewbere the words proportion and proportionally are
not usee synonymously, but are carefully distinguished in such
a way as to make it even more clear that no direct comparison
(1) Ue Pot. Q.7. Art.7j Con.Gen, lib.l.cap.34..
(2) Pe Ver. Q.2. Ar, 3; Q.23, Art.7; Q.2. Art.11.
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can be made between God and man. The only comparison possible
is that between certain proportions which they share proportionally.
The similari ty remains constant in any comparison between the
finite and the infinite.^ Thus, we can never compare the
goodness of roan, for exmaple, with the goodness of God, since one
is finite and the other infinite. But we can say that as the
goodness of man is to man, so the goodness of God is to God.
This is all that the analogy of proportionality amounts to.
Since God is indivisible, however, it is inappropriate to
compare one aspect of Him with another, except in so far as such
division into aspects is recognised as a logical and not a real
division. Consequently, the analogy of proportionality is not
really applicable where God is concerned, and it is therefore hard
to see how it i3 at all pee sible to discover any analogy between
God and man.
Aquinas was clearly aware of this difficulty, and on the
whole he stood for a direct relation between two things and not
for theanalogy of proportionality. One of his definitions of
proportion is equivalent to allowing any relation of one thing
to another as an analogy in the sense that
fll De Ver. Q.2. Art.H.
"... there can be a proportion of the
creat lire to God, inasmuch as it related
to him as effect to cause, and as
potentiality to actuality." (1)
Yet, on the other hand, he retained at the same time both this
position and the analogy of proportionality, apparently
regarding thera as two equivalent statements of a single
position. ^
He allowed that in order that a thing should be wholly
known it is necessary that there should be a proportion between
the knower and the thing known. In the analogy of being, this
would mean that there should be a proportion bet.ween God and
man, and therefore it would seem that any analogy of proportionality
which is not grounded on some direct relation between God and man
must be useless. He almo allowed that God is beyond man's power
of knowing. It would seem, therefore, that where a proportion
between the Knower and the known is impossible, one has to be
content with a relation of proportionality in which the Knower
stands to tnat which is to be known as the knowable stands to
that voich is known. Proportion, therefore, seems to be no more
than "any relation between God and man," no matter how vague or
tenuous it might be. As Professor Patterson says, therefore,
(1) S.T. 1.Q.12. Art, 1.
(2) Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. A. bist. Q.2. Art,l.
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"Undoubtedly he was anxious to make it clear
tnat the infinite can in no sense be measured
by the finite, and yet in the same breath to
insist that genuine inference from the finite
to the infinite is possible, and that real,
though fragmentary and imperfect, knowledge
of the latter is attainable." (1)
This raises the question of how valuable, as distinct
from true, analogical knowledge is, and whether this is not a
more important question than its truth. One half of a cockroach
may be to a cockroach what one half of man is to a man, but
this is neither enlightening nor interesting. And if analogy
only teaches that God is so infinitely different from us that
the similarity between llim and us, although real, is
infinitesimal, and, for all practical purposes, unintelligble,
it is hardly useful.^
There is much uncertainty as to whether Aquinas finally
preferred the doctrine of proportion(in the sense of direct
relation) or that of proportionality. Garrigon-Lagrange,^
Balthazar, Sertillanges^and Valensin favour the latter and
claim that it does provide real knowledge of God. Descoos,
however, holds that proportionality is without metaphysical
interest because it presupposes and depends on the analogy of
(1) The Conception of God in the Philosophy of Aquinas, p.24.7.
(2) Anderson indeed concludes that Aquinas's use of mathematical
analogy, wich in fact is univocity in the form of an analogy,
serves to indicate a general property of proportionality "...
namely its complete indifference to the natures of the terms
related and indeed to the character of the relations themselves."
James F. Anderson: The Bond of 3ein;t. p.294»
(3) Garrigou Lagrange: Lieu and son existence et sv< nature.dp.527-54,5.
1 nncrfl<t! S. Thnnwe H'Amiin. 1 .nn.l ft '3—1QO
proportion.^ For as God is not divisible into subject and
attribute, it is impossible to formulate the proportions between
which the relation of proportionality is said to hold. Moreover,
we cannot say that Divine Knowledge is to Deity as human
knowledge is to man without first knowing what Divine Knowledge
and God are.
The ground of this analogical relationship is the theory
of degrees of being and the nature of certain analogous terms
such as goodness and truth, which are taken to be "transcendentals"
These "transcendentals" can be applied in different modes to
different genera and different levels of reality, such as God
aid man. The transcendental quality is the element of similarity
and the level at which it operates is the element of difference.
Incidentally, the difference is not one of grades of intensity,
for if it were the transcendental quality would still be univocai.
The difference is between different levels of reality, as, for
example, between colour, which is an accident inher-ing in
something other tlian itself, arid God, in whom essence and
Existence coincide. Being belongs to all of these, though not in
the same way. A name which is applied to both God and man is
altered in significance by the degrees of reality to which it
(1) Descoqs: Instituiones netanhvsicae Ger eralis. p.272.
(2) ens, res, unum. verum, oonum.
refers when it is applied to God on the one hand and man on the
other. And some names are more appropriately applied to God
than others. Thus, names such a3 "goodness" and "infinity"
are said to describe Him literally,whereas others, 3uch
as "fortress", w. ich may be used to emphasize His strength,
(2)
are simply metaphorical.
Aquinas also distinguishes difference from diversity,
Things wholly dissimilar are for him diverse, but there is
some similarity in things which are only different. The
goodness of God differs from the goodness of man only in the
mode of its existence, and this is determined by degree of being.
iAran the names of transcendental qualities literally ascribed to
God may be ascribed to Him only in so far as their signification
i3 concerned. In so far as their mode of signification is
concerned they may be denied of Him, for whereas in God these
transcendental qualities exist in a more eminent mode, they are
known to the human mind only from their appearance at the level
of being of croatures. It would seem to follow, therefore, that
the goodness of God considered as a whole differs from the goodness
of man, whereas the modes of signification of the respective
goodnesses are diverse. But as essence, existence, mode and
quality are inseparable in God, there seems to be no way of
(1) Gomraentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. l.Dist. 22. Q.l. Art.
(2) 3.T. 1. Q.13. Art. 3J Con.Gen, lib.l.cap.30
separating what is diverse from what is different.
Aquinas, then really fails to explain whatever was his
notion of "difference in similarity". Moreover his under¬
standing of different levels of being, which is the very core
of his conception of analogy, is both vague and confused.
Professor Pattersonthinks that if we had the ability and
precision of language, it would be possible to dissect our /
analagous terms
"... into a number of distinct and simple
qualities, some similar, some dissimilar,
but all strictly univocal. It is indeed
difficult to see how a simple quality could
manifest itself at more than one level of
reality." (l)
The identity of Divine essence and Divine Existence only
complicates the confusion, since God's simplicity suggests
that in Him all the transcendentals are synonymous or identical.
This difficulty, as Aquinas says, arises from the fact that God
(2)
is beyond the grasp of human understanding.
Aquinas dogmatically and consistently assorted that no
knowledge of the essence of God is possible. The way of analogy,
he held, sought to prove triat human beings may know that God is
(quia est), not what lie is (quid est). Yet hi3 doctrine of
analogy does profess to give some such positive knowledge. This
(1) The Conception of God in the Philosophy of Aquinas, p.252.
(2) De Pot. Q.7. Art.6.
contradiction can only bo explained on the rather unlikely
and evasive thesis that Aquinas, or the schoolmen, meant
knowledge quid est only, complete perfect knowledge of God's
essence, while by knowledge quia est he meant much more than is
(l)
usually comprehended in the term. By this thesis, indeed,
knowledge of God quia est must be given a meaning wide enough
to take in knowledge of God's wisdom, intelligence,creativity,
(2)
immutadlity, infinity and the rest of the transcendentals. '
The doctrine of degrees of being on which the doctrine of
analogy rests would seem, therefore, to depend upon some kind
of knowledge of the degree of being of God's essence. And this,
Aquinas asserted, is denied the human mind.
Another way of looking at Aquinas's doctrine of Analogy
of Being is to be found by comparing it with the two types of
f3)
imperfect analogy, described in the Commentary on the Sentences,
and classified by Cajetan as the analogy of inequality and the
analogy of attribution.
(1) G.ii.Joyce: Principles of imtural Theology, pp.256-7. (quoted
by Professor Patterson, p.255*)
(2) Bee Anderson: The Borid of Being, p.266: "... St. Thomas clearly
distinguishes between knowing a thing quidditatively, that is,
knowing its definitive essence (knowledge quid eat) and having
quidditative knowledge of it. Any knowledge that we have of a
thing is quidditative knowledge; it is, so far, knowledge of
what that thing is. Thus everything short of knowledge of a
thing's definitive essence fails within knowledge quia est -
knowledge of the thing's existence nd everything else that
can be known about it, short of knowing its essence as it is in
Itself".
(3) 1. Dist. XIX. Q.5. Art, 2.
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In the analogy of inequality, the concept of the analogated
perfection is univocal, even though its analogical applications
at different levels of being results in metaphysical equlvocity.
This is also definable as an analogy of generic predication where
the genus is logically but not physically or absolu oly one, as for
example where body, a logically mivoc-1 concept, is applied at
various levels of reality, to a physical thing and to an
immaterial fore, with resulting equlvocity. The only analogy
present tiiore is in the mode of realisation of the common univocal
generic character.
The second type of analogy, analogy of attribution, is by
itself inadequate, but when it
"is mingl d with an analogy of proper
proportiQuality.»• it appeare to give a
firm foundation for metaphysical
demonstration".
An analogy of attribution holds when a quality or character
existing in only one thing is referred or attributed by the mind
to others because of some causal relationship between them.
The five proofs which are meant to demonstrate the existur.e
of God are meaningful only because they predicate qualities of
God*s es3ei.ee. It is in his doctrine of analogy that Aquinas
(1) .-ilouo. idcy.: .qalogj-a ;'e
(Id. .1 Zanmit) referred to by PhelanJ ->t. . nomas and ..;r.alogytP»3o»
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comes closest to admitting the possibility of this positive
but limited knowledge of God, which is in fact the basis of the
knowledge of God's existence and essence. The five proofs and
the doctrine of analogy are based, indeed, on the belief that
(1)
it is permissible to argue from creation to the Creator. '
The doctrine of analogy assumes that the five proofs are
sufficient proof of God's existence. However, the five proofs
themselves assume the sufficiency of the principle of analogy,
which is involved in Aquinas's whole concept of cause and effect,
because for him the principle of causality means that God is the
sufficient reason for the existence of the world, and the
possibility of arguing from creation to Creator is based on the
analogy between cause and effect in nature and the Cause and
(2)
effect which are Creator and creation.* ' There is, however,
considerable controversy among prominent scholars on the issue
of the relationship between the five proofs and analogy.
Phelan states that it is by means of the analogy of proper
proportionality that one can demonstrate the existence of God.
He also considers it legitimate to think of God, indeed thereby
to prove God, as the prime analogue in analogy of attribution.
(1) All objections to the idea that words used of God and man are
equivocal are answered by the statement that it is possible to
argue from creation to Creator. See Con. Gen, ch.33.
(2) See Garrigou Lagrange: God; His .Jcistence and Hi3 Mature, vol.1,
pp.224.-7, and Dorothy bmmet; Mature of Metaphysical Thinking.
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This is questionable, since in the proofs of God's existence,
we argue from existing things back to God, and do not start
from the prime analogue, whereas in the analogy of attribution
we start from that which has real being and apply it to other
things.
He states that by reason of the analogy of being in
be - ina it is possible to demonstrate the existence of God,
not, indeed merely as the prime analogue in analogy of
attribution, but as the Cause (analogically understood according
to analogy of proper proportionality) of the being of all that
exists. For the very notion of cause is itself an analogical
notion and any demonstration of the existence of the Cause
of being, although it may virtually contain an analogy of
attribution, dedves its probative force from the likeness of
proportions which must exist between things which are only by
(1)
participation and Being which is in its own right.'
i'lascall admits that the doctrine of analogy does not merely
give us further proof about God once His existence has been proved,
but explains how it is that any discussion about God has been possible
(2)
at all. ' And yet he maintains that the question of analogy does not
occur at all in the mere proof of God's existence, and that only
after we have, presumably by the principle of sufficient reason,
proved the necessity of a self-existent Being do we understand that no
predicate can be attributed to finite and self-existent being univocally.
He thinks that the God whose existence is proved would have no
recognisable meaning for human
Thomas ^ Analogy. p.Al.
4 7 0
beings unless already understood analogically.
liascall gives the positions of Penido, Gilson and Maritain.
Penido suggests that analogy relates to essence rather than to
existence and claims that it is possible to arrive at the proof
of God's existence without explicit recourse to analogy, and yet
that fcueh knowledge is analogical. The proofs of God are
•analogical realities', otherwise they would prove nothing. But
they do not fall under the jurisdiction of the method of analogy,
as theology employs it.^ He thinks it is important to
distinguish without separating or opposing, the probbm of
analogical knowledge and the metaphysical problem of analogy.
This is presumably a logical distinction. The former is legitimately
employed in proving God's existence but only after we have
established the proof car we "approach the latter in its fulness".
Analogy depends on the five proofs. 'Analogy begins at the precise
point where the rational demonstration ends.'
ilascall understand Penido's distinction to mean that while
the act of God's existence can be affirmed without any use of
analogy, His essence, His mode of existing, can only be affirmed
with the use of analogy.
Penido repeats the assertion that no use of analogy is
(l) -tolc de 1'Analog!e.(quoted by Mascail, pp.95-6.)
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necessary in the mere demonstration of the existence of God,
which has been proved, before the use of analogy, to be a self-
subsfetent existence.^ But elsewhere in dealing with Bescoq's
argument that the analogy of proportionality is not the basic
(2)
analogy since a relation of proportion must be established first,
he concedes that proportional analogy is not primary, since the
analogy of attribution has first to establish the existence of
God. He appears to make this identical with causality, or at least
he acknowledges that the causality used in the proofs is analogical.
Gilson's position is different# He thinks that true
analogy is needed to allow us to affirm the Divine existence,
to define Being in the very act of proving it. As Mascall adds,
•The gruat problem for a radically transcendent theism is how to
keep God, as it were, from slipping out of our grasp at the moment
In which we affirm His existence. 1 Gilson thinks that affirmation
of the existence of God must include 3ome meaning of the word
(3)
God, which can only be supplied by analogy.
Maritain is quoted by Mascall as holding the same position,
and in this following John of St Thomas. He claims that when we
argue from created beings to the existence of an Uncreated Cause
we are using analogy of strict proportionality, cvon if unoonoiously.
(1)iide d'Analoaie. p.136 ff. (quoted by Mascall, p.41.)
(2) Role d'Analogie, p.l46ff. (quoted by Mascall, p.115.)
(3) Mascall, pp.116-7.(he Thornqsroe Part 1. ch.V. sec.11.Sec.M.)
For the reasoning we use implies that the notion of cause is
analogical. Also by naming the First Cause Being, we are
implying its analogy with the being which is the starting
point of our demonstration. This causality may result in an
analogy of attribution but the latter is not used to establish
the existence of God.
Anderson discusses the relationship of the principle of
analogy to the five proofs which are, he reckons, thoroughly
analogical in character, as any proof of God's existence must be.^
That is why a logical attack on the proofs is false, because the
demonstration of God's existence is metaphysical and not logical.
Logically the proofs do not demonstrate God's or any other
existence, in metaphysics the existence of something is however
inferred from the existence of something else and all metaphysical
terms are logical and transcendental.
He particularly investigates the role of analogy of attribution
in the demonstration of God's existence, and states that His
existence must be demonstrated before His nature can be explored.
He further states, quoting Penido, that it is possible to arrive
(2)
at God'3 existence without having recourse to analogy explicitly.N
ll) ?he~~3ond of Bain;?, pp.156-63.
(2) "It is analogy of proper proportionality which alone makes possible
any human conceptual knowledge of Godj although it is possible to know
many things about God without explicit recourse to the principle, or
even without being aware of its existence. But nothing can be known of
God - nothing can be attributed to Him truly - except through proportion¬
ality." ( The Bond of Being, p.253.)
and himself claims that arJ.ogy of attribution can only be used
when the prime analogate, in this case God, has been proved to
exist. He would therefore app ear to disagree with Penido who
regards analogy of attribution as being used in the proofs. Also
Penido has labelled the proofs as National* which suggest perhaps
that they are logical rather than metaphysical.
Anderson repeats that it is possible to have a 'certain
and sound1 knowledge of the existence of God without referring at
all to the principle of analogy,' without any explicit use of this
(1)
principle or even any explicit knowledge of it'. But he
obviously adknowledges that analogy is used impBcitly. For he
states that the very reasoning used in inferring the existence of
God from created things involves true analogical notion of cause,
and that this is analogical according to analogy of proper
(2)
proportionality, and not according to analogy of attribution.
But in answering the objection that we cannot discover an
unicnown attribute of God by relating it to God's existence
since this too is equally unknown, created being being so
unknowably different from Uncreated Being, he answers that the
latter is not unknown 3ince analogy is already explicitly present
(3)
in thg,dj&lustration of God's existence. This would mean that
BS|? • ; " . ' j (' ;V 1 '• ■
(1) Ibid.. p.lbE
(2) Ibid., pp.161-2.
(3) "Of course, the fourth term of our proportion is already analogical;
analogy is already explicitly present in the demonstration of
God's existence." (The Bond of Being, p.289)
the attribute is also not unknown. And it would suggest
that for Anderson analogy of attribution is sufficient to
demonstrate God's nature, and analogy of proper proportionality
to prove his existence. He therefore seems quite opposed to
Penido, who regards the analogy of attribution as involved in
the demonstration of God's existence and the analogy of
proportionality as used for discovering God's nature.
In answering the further objection that this would be
basing analogy on analogy and arguing in a vircle, he argues
that the existence of God is based on the simple initial
affirmation that the existence of any limited being points
to the existence of some single, unlimited Being, into which
analogy 'does not enter -t all, at least not explicitly.' ^
And since all the derivative analogates rest on this affirmation,
there is no question of circular reasoning.
Yet in the next sentence he suggests that all metaphysical
thinking i3 analogical through and through:
"Of course it does not follow that theological
argument moves in a vicious circle because ta©
fourth term of our model proportion is already
analogical. All metaphysical thought is analogical
from the out setj so this alleged difficulty is
not peculiar to theology. Metaphysical arguments
are in fact all based on analogy, on the analogy of
being. Ho other basis is possible} for being is
analogical in itself." (2)
(1) The Bond of Being, p.290. Such a statement appears precarious.
Analogy needs to be explicit if it is to establish proof.
(2) The Bond of Seinr?. p.290.
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He deals twice with the objection that analogy of
proportionality is useless because God'3 existence and essence
are one, and therefore there can be no proportion in Him with
which to compare the proportion in man. His answer is that the
distinction between God and His attribute though not existing
in God is a logical and therefore a real one. However, in view
of his previous distinction between the logical and the metaphysical,
he cannot claim that the distinction is analogical or metaphysical
and therefore a "basis for analogical reasoning. For all analogical
reasoning, therefore, there is no distinction between the essence
and existence of God, 30 that His existence must be qualified by
His nature at the same time as His nature by His existence.
Therefore if the existence of God is known analogically, His nature
must be so known also. So there is no 'x' which is unknown. Yet
Anderson states 'What 'x' is is of course unknown.' ^ If 'x* is
unknown so is the existence of God with which it is analogically
and metaphysically one.
It would seem, therefore, that one of the weaknesses of
identifying the essence and existence of God must be that at the
moment of affirming His existence, whatever method of reasoning is
used, His nature is also inevitably, if unconsciously, affirmed.
It is therefore illogical to prove analogy after God's existence
(1) Ibid, p.286
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has been found, for analogy has been assumed all the time,
In the affirmation ,God exists', God must be allowed more than
mere anonymity. It is not possible to affirm the existence of
something by a principle of logic and then to identify it by a
principle of analogy. Analogy is therefore, assumed in the
proof of God *s existence.
If the existence of God must be established before the
doctrine of degrees of being, the doctrine of analogy, and the
analogical method can be established as legitimate it would seem
unjustifiable to prove the legitimacy of analogy on the basis of
God's existence. Therefore the proofs of God's essence and
existence are unsound.
The relationship between analogy and the principle of
sufficient reason is important. The rule that because everything
within our experience must have a cause therefore something
unknown must not have a cause does certainly not seem logical.
Also, since in relation to God both cause and effect in nature
become effect, it would appear that the 'analogy' between cause
in creation and cause in God might equally be termed equivocity.
In relation to God, in their identical ontologieal dependence,
created 'cause' and 'effect' are simultaneous, ambiguous, and
synonoraous.
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The difference which Anderson draws between logical and
metaphysical proof is at least doubtful. Metaphysical inference
may lead to the truth that it is Impossible to deny God's
existence, but not even logic, let alone metaphysics, could
deduce that this proves His existence absolutely.
Aquinas assumes that the causal link between Creator and
creation implies similarity. This can be but a 'one-way' similarity,
however, for although the creation can be said to be similar to the
Creator, it is improper to 3ay that the Creator is similar to any
of His creatures. This is because God the Creator, being perfect,
self-sefficient and wholly independent, has only a logical
relation^ to the creation. A real relation would involve
dependence. It would seem, therefore, that whereas causal relations
in nature are reciprocal in similarity, causal relations between
God and the creation are not.
Since analogy exists in a relationship between God and mar;,
and since there is no real relationship in the sens© of metaphysical
and analogical, but only a logical one, from God to man, it is
difficult to see how there can be any analogy, hven if the
proportion of God's nature to His existence be 'related' to man,
this also must either be part of God, essential to His essence,
and therefore unrelatable to man, or else it must remain simply a
(1) S.T.I. Q.13. Art. 7.
logical proportion having no analogical value. It is difficult
to see how as&ogy can be possible either way. There seems to be
a special difficulty in the fact that the relation of identity
between God's essence and His existence is often considered as
the very metaphysical centre of God's Being. Yet if it be, as
Anderson thinks, only a logical relation it can have no such value.
Anderson only allows analogy of attribution in actually
comparing God's nature with that of creatures, and yet he holds
that the analogy of proper proportionality is the only true analogy.
But if thi3 relation of identity is metaphysically the essential
nature of God then it is God, and He is being directly compared
with man in the analogy of proper proportionality.
The analogy of proper proportionality is seen by Phelan, who
follows Gajetan, to e/ist between beings or tilings rather than
between levels of being as such. The occasion of analogy is thus
the individuality and diversity of things. This diversity is a
result of the differences of proportion between existence and
essence and between potentiality and actuality, in them.
"Diversity results from the manifold
limitations of act by potency" (l)
(l) 3t Thomas and Analogy, p.40 *
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Unity exists in that all things exist, but some things are
said to exist more than others, in the sense that some have a
greater degree of independence and of being than others. This
depends on the proportion of potentiality to actuality in each
thing, so that the unity of *beings in being' is understood as
analogical and not univocal.^
Analogy between things would seem to be more difficult to
grasp than analogy between different levels of being, if the
latter themselves can be accepted. Things include many levels
of being, and there it is difficult to see how a transcendental
can be applied tc a thing without the analogy losing something
of the diversity of mode which makes it analogy. This
distinction raises the question of whether degree of beingness
or quiddity is the more ontologically ultimate, and what is
the relation between them. Res is itself a transcendental.
(l) "In analogicals it is not diverse realities which fall
under consideration but diverse modes of existence of
the self-same reality." (St. Thomas and Analogy, p.41.)
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Not only the relation between God and the world, but their
separation and the avoidance of pantheism, are dependent w on
the doctrine of analogy in relation to the teaching on Act and
Potentiality.^ Being is to be grasped under these two aspects.
Aquinas saw in the created world a reflection of the
division between God, Who is Pure Act, and creation, which i3 a
mixture of being and becoming, of act and potentiality. Inasmuch
as a created thing realises its potentiality it reaches its
fulness of being and •participates' in Being, it becomes analogous
to Being which is God, Unity and Goodness. Allthings have a share
in the Being of God in proportion to the extent to which they are
themselves actual beings. When a thing reaches its actuality,
when it participates in the divine reality it can communicate arid
give itself, it reaches its full goodness.
God gives to everything its form arid potentiality. The
form of a thing brings it to its fullest realisation of being, but
to fulfil its individuality everytidng has to fit into the law of
unity of the whole, which Aquinas believed to be achieved by the
(l) Analogic und Akt-Potenzlehre bestimmen das Verh'dltnis von Gott
und Welt."Das Axiom der Analogia entis, in dew wir die Grundlage
der thomistischen Philosophie erblicken, ermoglicht nun, die
Ilauptsatze der aristotelischen Metaphysik zu Ubernehraen, ohne
doch (wenigstens schelnbar) die Unterscheidung von SoKopfsr und
Gescifdpf preisgeben zu muasen. Unter diesen Kauptsatzen 1st an
erster Stelle die Lehre von Akt und Potenz, die "Hauptregel"
der aristotelischen Metaphysik, zu nennen. (Ibid., p.4.39)
4 81
natural hierarchical ordering of everything. Every thing has
a natural tendency towards its own fulfilment of being, and
this is its law of naturej in man the natural law is the
natural inclination towards rationality, which is identical
with the form of his being. The perfect idea of everything
is in God, and ifi is towards the fulfilment of this that each
thing strives.
Aquinas*s conception of matter and form on which his teaching
on act and potentiality largely hangs is by no means free from
difficulties.
Aquinas conceived of matter as pure potentiality,^ even
though as such it cannot have being. God has to will it, and
everything God wills has to imitate in some way the divine essence,
who is pure Being. There is here an absolute contradiction. A
complete gulf is fixed between God and matter which allows no
analogical bridge. If God is the cause of the universe He must
be the cause of all matter in it. And since there was always for
Aquinas some likeness between cause and effect, there must be
some likeness between God and matter. It is impossible to conceive
of God as the cause of matter and yet wholly diverse from it
(l) Con. Gen, lib.l. cap.17
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without giving up the theory that there must be similarity
between cause and effect, which theory i3 central to Aquinas'a
doctrine of analogy.
Aristotle regarded primary matter not as an existing
element in concrete things but as an abstractioni Professor
Patterson emphasises that this was not so, however, for Aquinas.
And he concludes that if matter could be regarded as -
"... a mere abstraction, a 'logical construct',
a theoretical terminus assigned by the
intellect to the descending series of degrees
of being, the contradiction which faces us
would perchance disappear. Tempting,... it
can be accomplished only by flying in the
face of Aquinas's own utterances on the subject.
'In all corruption, when the actual has been
removed the potential remainsJ for a thing is
not corrupted into complete non-being just as
a thing is not generated out of complete non-being'."(1)
Not only matter has potentiality, however. Aquinas
regarded an angel as an entirely immaterial, spiritual being.(2)
3ut he regarded it as having potentiality! therefore if matter
is pure potentiality it obviously needs some characteristic which
will distinguish it from potentiality in general. Yet no such
characteristic was givers it by Aquinas, and indeed if such does
exist, matter can hardly be described as pure potentiality. It
(1) The Conception of God in the Philosophy of Aquinas, p.128.
Professor Patterson refers to Gon. Gen, lib.11.cap.55 and i-hys.
lib.l. cap.IX. lect. 15.
(2) De hnte et essentia, cap. IVj S.T. I.Q.3. Art.3.
seems that here Aquinas's distinction between form and matter
as having any metaphysical reality, breaks down.
It is also difficult to maintain that God is Pure Act.
Aquinas could not admit that God had of necessity to will the
universe for this would result in pantheism. But it is difficult
to see how he avoids at least the implication that the world does
do something for God or help to fulfil some purpose in Him, which
would involve His potentiality. Professor Patterson regards
Aquinas's admission that 'God's love of His own perfection leads
him to will that it be imitated by the creatures in a plurality of
modes"*''1''' as Implying a further admission that the universe does
contibute something to the divine perfection.
"Whatever motive be attributed to the
Diety,... the universe must serve some
purpose, it must fill some need in the
divine nature. It cannot be said that
Aquinas has discovered any way of
avoiding this unpalatable but unescapable
conclusion." (2)
Also, since created tilings were not created eternally, it
might be said that before the creation of the world this act was
only a potentiality in God even though the creative idea was
eternally present with Him. It is indeed difficult to understand
(1) Comp. Theol. 1, cap. 95*
(2) The Conception of God in the i-hilosophy of Aquinas. p.344«
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why potentiality in some of its aspects should be regarded
as an imperfection. Infinity itself is from a human point of
view an unfinished concept of an unfinished eternity, and
although this may be so because the idea leaves the mind
beliind, this may also explain any apparent contradiction between
the ideas of perfection and potentiality in God.
It is only because of the identification for Aquinas of
ontological reality with moral goodness, that a lack of quantitative
fulfilment is a lack of perfection} such identities seem most
questionable.
Everything attains its perfection through its form, and the
form of a thing gives it its identity, and brings it to its
fulness of actuality. Form also is potential in relation to
its existence throu h participation in which it becomes through
its union with materia signata a concrete object in the world
of nature.^ Thus it is that it would be possible to retain the
immateriality of angels only at the price of admitting that there
is a distinction between potentiality and matter.
(1)"... form does not in itself possess being, but... through it 3oae
composite substance exists, and... accordingly it is not made at
all - in the proper sense of the word - but... it begins to be
by reason of the passage of tho composite substance from potentiality
to actuality." (Gon. Gen, lib.111. cap.69.)
There is a further problem that needs clarifying.
Aquin s attacked the conception of a plurality of substantial
forms and declared that any concrete individual is constituted
by the union of matter with one, and only one, form.^ But
this does not explain how one thing changes into another, or
how the form of the acorn changes into the form of the oaK-tree.
If matter is an abstraction there is nothing that can receive
the determination of the first formj if matter is a form,
(2)
this does not help the problem. As Mgr. Knox points out, even
with our advanced physical knowledge we still have no further
knowledge of the reality of form and matter. And our
sophisticated scientists report that
• "... a kind of anarchy seems to reign
in the very heart of naturej the law
of averages comes in, no doubt, to
redress the balance} but to assert
that there are any other laws in nature
is to go beyond our present evidence.
It looks very much as if indeterminacy
were a fact." (3)
It is more realistic, therefore to think of every simple
substance as having a simple potentiality, the potentiality
of essence in relation to being. The distinction between form
(1) Philip Wicksteedj Dante ad Aquinas, pp.61-2.
(2) Ronald Knox. God and the Atom, pp.35-6•
(3) Ibid., pp.47-8.
4 8 6
and matter therefore ceases to be a satisfactory basis for
the division between act and potentiality, and it is therefore
the same tiling, the whole thing which is both potential and
actual. The actuality of a thing is apparently its fulness
of individuality, of tilinghood, but this also has difficulties.
If the distinction between matter and form be left out,
there is no metaphysical difference with reference to its
individuality between a thing which is achieving and a thing
which has achieved its individual distinctness} for each stage
of development is equally essential to the identity of the thing.
The being of any one thing, according to Aquinas is achieved
when that thing reaches its climax Bather than when it has
developed and exhausted all its potentialities} this means that
actuality can coincide with potentiality.
It is difficult to know at what moment one can place the
fullness of being of a plant, for example. Certain parts function
at different times, yet each part is equally essential. A plant
is realising itself at various stages of its history; the stem
is achieving its end while it is growing and bearing the bud
upwards just as much as when it is supporting the full flower
or fruit. The bed of petals protects the seeds when it is
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tightly furled as well as attracting poller; isera when wide
open; is potentiatlity fully actual!3ed when the petals are
widest or when the fruit is heavy and ripe or when the wind
lifts away the seeds to independence and separates the plant's
achievment from itself? An animal might be thought of as
realising its purpose when reproducing itself, or when it has
achieved the education of its young; or only when it has
fulfilled and lived its whole life might it be said to have
realised all its potentialities, so that its completeness if not
its zenith is at the moment before death. If recognisable fulness
of individuality be the criterion of actuality, however, this
may have continued throughout all the phases, and is equally
vital at each one of them.
Decay, degeneration and death can beset a thing while it is
still recognisable and in a sense bring new fulfilment. As it
changes into humu3 the plant only realises further potentialities
even though *it' ceases to be a plant and continues to exist
under another name. I latter thus becomes eternal, form temporary#
Certainly, even if physical development or reproduction be
the zenith of perfection for plants and animals it is not so for man
who can be spiritually creative at any age, and who can accumulate
wisdom with his years.
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It is the vocation of soma things essentially to become,
to be mobile, to express themselvesin activity or to be
available as potentialities for others. In any case the real
moment of fulfilment of anytliing is when it is contributing
most appropriately to the good of the whole. It is the work of
the wind to travel rather than to arrive, but in an extremity
of windiness it might destroy more than it creates. It is the
essence of living things to grow, develop and change.
If fulness of individuality and identity is actuality and
fulness of being for Aquinas — and this would seem to follow from
the conclusion that potentiality and actuality can not be
referred to matter and form, but to the relation of essence to
existence, it is difficult to see how the actual has more being
than the potential, for the essence of a thing is its individuality
and identity. A thing is essentially itself at all stages and
each stage is as essential to the thing as any other.
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It is doubtful, therefore, whether human reason can reach
sure knowledge of God's existence and essence. And if it cannot,
it is difficult to think conscious human participation in that
Eternal Law which is God possible. Yet even if Aquinas's account
of human understanding of God as a wholly rational process were
accepted, his identification of God with the Eternal Law and his
assumption that the latter is wholly effective in moral guidance
lead to further difficulties.
Eternal Law, he said, is the system of divine government
and is itself God. This particular aspect of God, was, according
to Aquinas*s thinking, only logical and not real, for in reality
(1)God the Creator and God the Uonserver are inseparable. Lever-
theless, he thought it logically justifiable to separate the
Eternal Law as that fulfilling the particular function of
controlling all the activities within any creature. The organisation
of these activities he thoughtobeys a law, whereas the divine plan
(2)
of creation ha3 the nature of a pattern or idea. The Eternal
Law is the work of divine reason, but as God is without ratiocinative
(3)
powers, which involve the knowing of one thing through another,
(1) "Not only the beginning of the world, but also the entire sequence
of events which fills the time series, is willed by the same single
and supra-temporal act. Creation is thus separable from <» nservation
only in thoughtj actually the two are identical. The relation of
the world to God is one of dependence. When we refer to the beginning
of that dependence we speak of creationj when we have in ?nind its
continuance we use the term conservation I' (The Conception of God in
the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p.460. Professor Patterson
refers to Les grands theses de la philosothie thomiste.pp.89-90
E.Thomas d'Aquin. tome l.pp.296ff.)
(2) E.T.I.11.Q.93.Art.lr 3.
(3) Con.Gen.lib 1. cap.57
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the Eternal Law, like God, works through intuition. Aquinas
did not her© relate logically the plan of divine government to
the plan of creation or to any laws which might be said to
fulfil such a plan. This plan, being eternal, must have been
in the mind of God from eternity, and it must, therefore, have
accompanied creation without achieving it.
It is indeed difficult even logically to separate such
government from the creation of individual things, though it
might be so separated from the creation of some undifferentiated
stuff, since time was created with creation, and things evolve
in time, and the creation of things or beings is evolutionary.
The divine government of things aims at their full perfection of
being. Such fulfilment, however, is only the completion of their
creation if creation has any further meaning than that first and
eternal intuition of God which comprehends and controls the whole
future of the whole universe. It is only in the latter sense
that creation can be regarded as foreordained and finished from
all eternity. Hut if it is understood to include the bringing
into being of identifiable tilings or creatures it cannot halt
midway or erven at the gerra of the embryos of things, however much
these might contain the concentrated and energetic plan of their
own fulfilment. It must in one sense continue, by means of
-u>
change and disintegration, to the end of all existence. It
is hardly possible to separate the law of creation which
begins things from a law of development which completes them.
The reality of many things, indeed, lies in activity, and that
of others lies in their contribution to the whole.
The eternal Law, therefore, must be full of the spirit
and originality of creation. Not only was it with God from
eternity and identifiable with His naturej it is endowed with
the spirit of creation and found within the necessities of every
created thing. It is difficult to see then how the Eternal Law
can be rational. For the essential miracle of creation is that
it creates the universe out of nothing. And in opposition to
this man's reasoning takes a firm stand on the impregnable
principle that a thing cannot both be and not be. Yet for all
human reasoning, even that of the intellectus, it would appear that
inasmuch as by a thing is meant that which has identifiability,
there must have beer, at the beginning of creation an infinitesimal
fraction of a second, too quick for the slow sensitivity of
human perception cognition or imagination to grasp let alone to
separate, when Being and non-being were so much one that within
the possibilities of human understanding they were simultaneous.
If creation was created with time it must have been created in time
And the notion of being as created out of non-being is
ever, more perplexting to human reason than the conception of
their simultaneity. If it be allowed that everytning has some
kind of reality in the mind of God even before it be created,
t is raises difficulties in relation to the divine nature. If
the world was tue result of the divine intellect God, presumably,
was aware of its varying degrees of being before He created it;
but uefore creation there was nothing that God could know but
His own essence, wiiich could not share the plurality of created
things, nor did this exist outside him.^ Similarly, there is
an absolute contradiction in the idea that what is future doe3
not exist but since God conceives it it must exist. Professor
Patterson suggests that a possible solution might be to regard time
(2)
as at least parti-ally unreal and the future as real.
T
This, however, would make the participation of the natural
law in the eternal law difficult. In practical affairs it is not
reasonable to take such a relative view of time seriously. Aquinas
himself does not do so. Nor is it any easier to reconcile the
metaphysical understanding of God with laws of human thought. As
Professor Patterson writes, the idea that
"... qualities which at a lower level of
being are distinct and separate, should
fuse at a higher level into an absolute
(1) The Conception of God in the Philosopny of .it, Thomas Aquinas.
pp.298 - 300; Con Gen. lib,l. cap.50
(2) p.443»
identify- seems to involve a direct
denial of the validity of the laws
of thought..." (l)
The explanation that such a situation has to be grasped
(2)
intuitively rules out the use of reason and Professor
Patterson concludes that the only way in which it can be
understood must be in the light of the scriptural injunction -
•He that i3 able to receive it, let him receive it.1
The hternal Law is not, moreover, successful in achieving
( 3)
universal order. For although God, through secondary causes
rules every detail of the universe and would, therefore, seem
to be responsible for any deviation from the norm, Aquinas used
such deflections only as a proof of the contrasting perfection
of God's perfect order.^ He nonetheless seemed to allow
that God's rule is not always perfect when he says that divine
(5)
intelligence usually moves physical bodies for the best. God is
active everywhere and in all things. It would 3eem, therefore, that
His business shoiti be to c >rrect rather than to maintain
irregularities. He is allowed to produce particular effects
directly without the intervention of secondary causes, although
Aquinas, apparently, would make secondary causes and not God
(6)
responsible for anything evil. '
(1) The Conception of God in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, p.
(2) As a contemporary Keoscholastic writer puts it "seized by an
experience or intellectual intuition.
(3) Con.Gen. lib.3. cap.77
(4.) Con Gen, lib.3* cap.64.; lib.4,. cap. 71
(5) Con uen. lib.3. cap.64. L>e Verlt. q.5s a. 2.c.
(6) Con Gen, lib.4.* cap.71.
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Evil was purely negative to Aquinas, and identical with
lack of being. Although a defect in a secondary cause is not
the same thing as individuality, Aquinas did seek to justify evil
on the ground that varying degrees of goodness — lack of goodness
amounting to lack of oeing —help to produce the multiplicity and
individuality of things and help some things to come nearer to
God than others. In this he seemed to identify ontological with
moral good and evil and at the same time to identify ontological
evil, which is the lack of perfect goodness or being, with moral
goodness, since it is morally good for each thing to fulfil its
individuality and this individuality i3 partly dependent on lack
of being, which is evil. It appears that Aquina3 ought either
to give up his identification of being and goodness, or make a
distinction between ontological and moral goodness, or his
justification of evil on this ground.
As the beauty of the universe is made up of multiplicity
and individuality, it is not easy to believe that they can be
anything but good, since the good of each particular contributes
to the good of the whole. Created things imitate divine goodness
inasmuch as they themselves are good. The greatest good among
created things is the good order of the universe, which is
especially willed and intended by God.^ The goodness of the whole
(l) Con. Gen, lib. 3. cap.6A.
is ultimately the good of God in whom Beauty and Goodness are
synonymous. In the universe, however, order consists of the
right management of particulars, so that for Aquinas the beauty
of the universe would seem to consist of the orderly arrangement
of good and evil.
Certainly for Aquinas justice requires that creatures should
act according to their natures and the fulfilment of such natures
is wholly good. But although God implants a good intention towards
such fulfilment in all things the conflicts to which this may lead
are evil. This evil he justified as calling for-th patience and
vindictive justice.Fulfilment of the nature of a thing,
therefore, is not in itself necessarily good, since it may have to
be sacrificed for the sake of the whole. Yet its frustration mu3t
in fact detract from the good of the whole in one sense, according
to the identification of good and being. Nor does the fact that
good may come from evil mean that it always does• Altogether AJuinas
seems to come near to making good and evil exchangeable terms, for
he held that where good and evil are set side by side the good is
better known and more desired, and that evil is a proof of lod's
existence. BVil can hardly be negative if it has such a positive
effect, arid if ontological evil be allowed to produce spiritual
(1) Con Gen, lib.4. cap.71.
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good, the latter is hardly identifiable with ontological good.
This evil which fits so neatly into the scheme of things ia
after all a deflection and reflects the failure of an effect
to imitate its cause.
All such confusions as these about moral evil, defects in
secondary causes and lack of perfect being takeplace in the
universe regarded as wholly under the providence of the Eternal
Law, and not merely on the human plane, where part of the
responsibility for confusion must lie with the fact that free¬
will is at play. Aquinas was not of course dismayed by thfe
sacrifice of individual good to the good of the whole. He seems
to have been unaware that when parts of a vhole are imperfect,
the whole to which they belong must be likewise less than
perfect and therefore less than 'whole.' Aquinas, however,
believed that God could have made a better universe if He had
wished.
"The willingness of St Thomas to acquiesce in
the sacrifice of individual good to the good
of trie whole is indeed striking. But what is the
good of the whole, and for whom is it good? God
undoubtedly is the being for whom the universe
is good, and its goodness seera3 to be of an aesthetic
character. The notion that evil is a necessary
elementin the harmony and beauty of the universe
is a familiar one both in religion and philosophy,
repugnant as it is sure to seem to the minds of
many. Yet a God who could forgo creating a better
universe to create a worse one - and, as we have
seen, this is what Aquinas believed
to have actually occurred — would
doubtless be capable of finding pleasure
in the contemplation of evil as well as
of good." (l)
Providence, which orders things with respect to their ends, is
even more closely identified with that Eternal Law which is the
shadow of natural law, for it is connected with the practical
cognition of God and would be imperfect if it did not extend to
(2)
particulars. But the particular virtues of active human life,
which are related to material goods and their possession and to
(3)
politics, cannot be predicated of God. As Aquinas, however,
held that the order of the universe must be caused by one and not
a plurality of agents, it would appear that God must possess the
virtue needed to guide such human affairs.
Considering the wealth of confusion, therefore, the Eternal
Latf which is God must seem beyond the reach of human reason.
Father Coplestone notes that Aquinas believed that God, as a
perfectly self-luminous and pe rsonal being, must have used His
intelligence in deciding to create the particular finite beings
rather than any of the other possibilities open to Him. On the
other hand, Aquinas also believed that the creative act, as it
exists in God, is identical with the divine nature itself, which is
(1) The Conception o God in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas,p.4.70
(2) Con. Gen, lib.3. cap.75.
(3) Con. Gen, lib. 1. cap.93. S.T.I.1.Q.XX1.
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essentially immutable. Similarly, he wag convinced both that
the creative act as it is in God i3 necessarily eternal and
that the external effect of this act is not eternal. Aquinas
allowed that this past point had not been proved by philosophers
but he held that they had not proved the contrary and that theology
had proved its truth no matter wnat philosophers might make of it.
He held, therefore, that all these propositions could be asserted
without contradiction.
Father Coplestone concludes therefore, that there is a point
in the analysis of creative activity beyond which human reason cannot
gog and adds that the business of Christian thinkers is not to
(X)
eliminate all mystery but to shew clearly where the mjistery lies.
It is clear enough that the mystery lies at the heart of the
divine creative reason itself, for creation is an inexplicable
miracle, and reason, by straining to comprehend it, finds itself
thrust back, frustrated and contradicted by its own limitations.
And since the Eternal Law is part of the divine creativity it too
must be largely incomprehensible to man both in itself and in its
human relevance. There is not a perfect understanding between
divine and human reason.
(1) Aquinas, pp.139-140
When the nature of the Eternal Law is sought in not merely
logical terms but in the world of pirticular things, the human
mind must be 3till more baffled#
It is hard to believe that the world understood from a
human perspective shews everywhere and always an all-embracing
and detailed perfection of all things co-operating in one harmony
in which there is no room for omission, mistake or evil. To
•consider the heavens* is to know that our perspective is limited
indeed. If one tries to conceive of the deep power wnich holds
within its buoyant strength billions of whirling suns the apparent mistake
of a snooting star might seem like a little extra brilliance, the
pretty excrescence of an unwanted world breaking into more brilliant
light. There is a generosity that adds up to waste, that seems like
Omnipotence at play. Creation is abundant beyond the limits set by
any purpose or need until it i3 but a waste of beauty disintegrating
into greater light with an enthusiasm only for origino\ity. If one
compares this overwhelming wonder with the things that woiTy our
sense of perfection in nearer nature, these latter may seem dwarfed
into irrelevance, trivial errors magnified into evil only by our
microscopic vision. It should perhaps be enough for us that God
manages the stars. Yet we are so zealous for His perfection or for
our own idea of it, that it is easy to be sceptical as we probe
deeper into the detail of our inch of the universe. It is amongst
living things that difficulties and disharmonies are most easily
discovered, yet it is living things that most visibly express the
teleological forms and. the Eternal Law as understood by Aquinas.
The inanimate world might appear to have reached the highest
development of its potentialities and its fulness of being. Any
irregularities in it might appear as physical rather than moral
problems. But among things in full vitality there is often disorder
and distress, and in spheres beyond our control suffering and
cruelty which, if we had responsibility for them we should call
immoral, evil or disharmonious. An earthquake which disturbs or
scars a landscape can be regarded as a natural adjustment of
impersonal forces, but when it unconsciously kills or injures it
appears that the laws of relationship between living and non-living
things have not yet achieved infallible perfection. Indeed when
the two meet there is danger for the living, with whom the burden
of adaptability remains.
There is also so much stress and conflict among living things,
that it is difficult to believe that outside man the world is
organised by utterly perfect laws, whatever such might be. For
according to this conception, there could be no possibility of
freaks, not one leaf should be out of place, no flaw could be allowed
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to crack the perfection of the whole creation, except for the
amoral incompleteness of immaturity and growth. For the whole
art of the Eternal Law must be to bring with extraordinary care,
every individual thing to the climax of its perfection in such
a way that this perfection is fitted to and contributes to the
wealth and harmony of all things.
In fact life murders itself. Living things continually
kill each other, and trough this may not be immoral from some
deep religious viewpoint one could only adapt this to Aquinas1s
theories by suggesting that some weak plants were never intended
to grow into healthy ones but were a destined sacrifice to the
stronger; that some buds werenot meant to flower but at an
appropriate moment to wither and decay into humu3 for the richer
brilliance of others; that a certain lamb was never meant to
become a sheep but was created as meat for wolves; that some stones
should relinquish their identity by disintegrating into nut-ritous
dust. The very zest of creation, the frantic energy of the eternal
law itself, cause suffering and death.^
(l) W. Macneile Dixon: The Human Situation, p.101. "It is the fecundity
of nature against wiiich our moralists should direct their indig¬
nation. Nature is the enemy. I have read that the bodies of over
30,000 infants are picked up every year in the streets of Shanghai.
Until the reformers have found some means of restraining that
facundity, of reducing Nature's vast population, these living
creatures can hardly be expected to lay aside their weapons,
whatever they are."
In man the problem is complicated by the partial
separation within him of the power and form of the law which
no longer, as in outer creation, inform each other. To some
extent he is overwhelmed and shaped by the powers working
unconsciously taLthin and without him until he stands on a
threshold where he belongs to both worlds, the world of
inevitable nature and that of his own choice and mailing. To
some extent he is conscious of an eternal law working within
him and possessing hiin with its dynamic purpose. He is a blind
and helpless victim and beneficiary of these forces and he has
to acknowledge even his free will as an extension of something
other than himself. He is continually carried along by life,
he essentially is part of its mystery.
But at several points he is aware that the internal Law is
not the great creative hand of life upon him. He realises that
he is not thoroughly possessed by it and not secure within it3
confident dictatorship, but is, in a sense, decentralized.
He is abandoned to the responsibility of self-direction. Whereas
in the rest of creation the laws or forms of things are one with
their own creative energy at some points in man they separate.
He may have to search for a law to guide him or it may overshadow
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him but as a powerless ideal. His feet are fastened to the
earth, but such mental and spiritual freedom as is given him
is as void of directions as is the sky.
The purpose which in the rest of the universe is charged
with power, although it remains with him, does so as a powerless
unfinished design wiiich he can perhaps hardly trace in parts,
but which he must realise, and colour and fill with detail, for
many of the odds and ends of it are only suggestive incentives
to his creativity.
lie may be encouraged by such as hold Aquinas*s position to
think that he has been invited to co-operate with God, but he
may also feel more like a child suddenly set at the wheel of a
car amid dangerous traffic, knowing only that he must drive without
disaster and that he lacks the knowled e and experience to do so.
Though this situation might obviously hinder harmony and
bring about mistakes axid misery, these are no more than what the
internal Law had in store for man. Yet this is the opportunity for
man's perfection and, according to Aquinas, natural law is man's
guide. Hatural law is that part of the Sternal Law which is
capable of being understood and realised by him in his life.
Indeed, Aquinas's doctrine of natural law has its dignity and
authority because he placed it within the oontext of Sternal Law,
which meant for him, God.
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Professor 3ath condemns the rational proofs of God as
exhibiting 'humour and fragility',^ and as worthy of serious
consideration only as possible proofs of idols. To Professor
Garth the proof of God as Creator has become visible in Christ
(2)
alone. Such an altitude provokes a defence of Aquinas. The
dedicated desire to discover and define God with all the powers
of the mind, should not be treated with condescension. Aquinas
is in touch with the agelong tradition of the relation of the
human mind with the Unseen, and his faith in the affinity between
the human mind and the Divine mind is, indeed, one aspect of
Professor Garth's faith that the ultimate harmony between man
and God is revealed in Christ. Ultimately, neither standpoint is
rational.
Aquinas already 'knew' God, from tradition and revelation,
before he began to prove Him. If he realised this he probably
accepted that he was prejudiced only towards the truth. It was,
however, this passionate conviction of God and of His Nature,
which controlled his selection of certain facts and arguments, and
helped him to assert conceptions such as the 'Simplicity of God'
which are foreshortened to raeaninglessness by the human mind, as
dogmas rather than likelihoods. The principle o£ sufficient
(1) Dogmatic in Grundriss. pp. 37 S
(2) Ibid., p.52.
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reason is, like inductive reasoning, based on limited human
experience, and leads to the idea of the likelihood of the
absolute priority of God, rather thai to utter certainty aoout
Him.^ Aquinas,s proof is based on a circular argument. This
is most clearly manifest in his use of theanalogia entis to
prove God, when such proof is needed to prove the legitimacy
of the analogical method. This is a self-contained circle of
hypotheses, which proves nothing more than the logical necessity
of such interdependence. It does not prove God. The same
criticism applies to the interdepenence between the positive
and negative aspects of God, and between His Essence and His
Existence, Quid i^3t and Quia ast. The explanation in terms of
knowing a thing quidditatively and quidditative knowledge of it
is as unsatisfactory as the difference between analogical
knowledge and knowledge of analogy. Aquinas asserted that all
knowledge, perfect or imperfect, of the Essence of God is
(2)
absolutely impossible to man,v but imperfect knowledge of His
existence, which includes knowledge of Ms goodness, justice,
wisdom and infinity, is possible. God either is or is not, and
(1) As Gzekiel in a more direct and personal meeting with God, would
only describe the appearance of the likeness of the glory of the
Lord. (Ezekiel 1.28.)
(2) We have no guarantee that God as He is in Himself is not wholly
other than how we Imagine him to be, on the grounds of our
imperfect knowledge. It is only such a humanly conceived being
that we can hope to prove exists.
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imperfect knowledge of His Existence should be described as
probability rather than proof. It is only by admitting this
•quidditative' knowledge into the Quia hst, and that the Quid n3t
can remain unknowable; but this is unfortunate, since the
essence and insistence are identical, and this unknowability
must qualify the existence also* As far as the Essence is
concerned, unknownoility is the only characteristic the human
mind knows of it.
When Professor Anderson agrees that logically the proofs
are useless he means that the principle of sufficient reason is
not a logical but a metaphysical principle. This is questionable.
The assumption that metaphysics can contradict logic is untenable,
yet such an assumption is implied in the distinction between
logical proof and metaphysical proof. An enormous amount of
Aquinas's arguments are purely logical, and if logic is inadequate,
or if there is such disharmony between the logical and the
metaphysical, this undermines their value.
Aquinas's thinking on the relation between God and creation
is not flawless, in spite of its intense detail. He falls to
prove absolutely that the universe does not add anything to God's
perfection, and that there is, therefore, no potentiality in God.
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At the same time in defining matter as pure potentiatlity
he asserts a mystery. Such a definition does away with the
possibility of any analogical relationship between God and
matter. The ultimate relation between matter and form i3
equally mysterious, as form in itself has not being and has
to be educed from that which has no actuality - and therefore
no being. The distinction between act and potentiality is
not parallel to tiut between form and matter, but to that
between existence arid essence, but essence is the actuality
of form and matter. There appears to be a coincidence too
between fulness of being or existence and fulness of
individuality or essence. His dogmas about the Utter Simplicity
of God make it difficult for pod to have any significant
connection with the creation.
Generally Aquinas's reasoning about God is so abstract that
it is not difficult for it to remain aloof from the hard facts of
human experience. His explanation of evil in predominantly
ontological and negative terms is too easy. His relegation of the
cause of evil to secondary causes while accepting the overruling
responsibility of God is aabiguous. His identification of moral
with ontological goodness or evil, and his justification of the
latter on the ground that it makes for the individuality of things
and accentuates the good, is doubtful.
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It is only on the basis of analogy that the natural law
can be thought of as participating in the eternal law. The
doctrine of analogy is, however, very doubtful on certain points,
as is the understandsbilit y of the perfection of the Eternal
La«f. It is by no means clear to the human mind that there is
perfect rationality or harmony in the creation outside it. And
yet it is in the ordering of creation that Aquinas finds the
greatest good of created things. It is the only guide and plan
for human beings, yet Aquinas explicitly stated in spite of the
fact that it is a law of government itself, that there is no
pattern in the eternal Law for human society and government*
Mutual destruction, killing, self-defence, the survival of the
fittest seem rife amongst living tilings outside mar:. He might
therefore quite reasonably understand this as a justification for
(2)
similar behaviour on his own level; He might, on the other hand,
(1) 3.T.1.11.Q.X01. Art.2. Also see F.FIuckiger; Geschichte ries
liaturreohtea. Vol.1.p.45 • Ohno dio Analogia proportional!tatis
wird man diese Fra,:e nicht klaren, noch die beruhmte impressio
divina im latureesetzeif Quoted from .iari3er, Das i aturrecht in
thomistischer Beleuchtun.r. 1944, S.77f.
(2) Victor White stresses that '... nature lives on death, on violence
and destruction.If we repudiate that, we repudiate nature; and in
repudiating nature, we repudiate God, the God of nature. We are also
repudiating the God of the Scriptures who found the world he had made
very good, if w© say that we find a world existing on destruction very
bad.• Therefore he reasons that we must not disapprove of 'Nature
red in tooth and claw' for that might mean there is something wrong
with our idea of God, and we must accept ourselves a.3 carnivorous
animals who may only be able to survive at times by killing others.'
And he quotas T.S.Eliot: , . . .Hen. polish your teeth on rising and retiring;
Women! f%llsh your fingernails;
You polish the tooth of the dog and the talon of the cat.'
(The Morality of War, p.4*)
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understand himself as a being gifted with the responsibility and
purpose of employing his reason to introduce another type of
conflict, one against destruction itself. He would have to some
extent to stand outside the natural scheme of things, to change
(1)
redeem and improve it. ' This, however, implies that man's morality




Pale beech and pine so blue,
Set in one clay,
Bough to bough cannot you
Live out your day?
When the rains skim and skip,





Unto this wood I came
As to a nest;
Dreaming that sylvan peace
Offered the harrowed ease -
Nature a soft release
From men's unrest.
But, having entered in,
Great growths and small
Show them to men akin -
Combatants allI
Sycamore shoulders oak,
Bines the slip sapling yoke,
Ivy-spun halters choke
jilras stout and tall.
Touches from ash, 0 wych,
Sting you like scornJ
You too, brave hollies, twitch
Sidelong from thorn.
Lven the rank poplars bear
iothly a rival's air,
Cankering a black despair
If overborne.
Since, then, no grace I find
Taught me of trees,
Turn I back to my kind,
and good sense transcend that of the Eternal Law, rather than
Worthy as these.
There at least smiles abound,
There discourse trills around,
There, now and then, are found
Life-loyalties•
T.Hardy.
"Thought must strive to bring to expression the nature of the
ethical in itself. To effect this it arrives at defining ethics
as devotion to life inspired by reverence for life... Sympathy,
and love, and every kind of valuable enthusiasm are given within
it... Arising, as it does, from an inner compulsion, the ethic of
reverence for life is not dependent on the extent to which it can
be thought out to a satisfying conception of life. It need give
no answer to the question of what significance the etidcai man's
work for the maintenance, promotion, and enhancement of life can
be in the total happenings of the course of nature. It does not
let itself be misled by the calculation that the maintaining and
completing of life which it practises is hardly worth consideration
beside the tremendous, unceasing destruction of life which goes on
every moment through natural forces. Having the will to action,
it can leave on one side all problems regarding the sucee3s of its
work. The fact in itself that in the ethically developed man there
has made its appearance in the world a will-to-live wtdch is filled
with reverence for life and devotion to life is full of importance
for the world.
In ray will-to-live the universal will-to-live experiences itself
otherwise than in its o her manifestations. In them it 3hows itseif
in a process of individualizing which, so far as I can see from the
outside, is bent merely on living itself out to the full, arid in no way
on union with any other will-to-live. The world is a ghastly drama
of will-to-live divided against itself. One existence make3 its way
at the cost of another? one destroys the other. One will-to-live
merely exerts its will against the other, and has no knowledge of it.
But in me the will-to-live has come to know about other wills-to-live.
There is in it a yearning to arrive at unity with itself, to become
universal.
Why does the will-to-live experience itself in this way in me alone?
Is it because I have acquired the capacity of reflecting on the totality
of Being? What is the goal of this evolution widch has begun in me?
To these questions there is no answer. It remains a painful enigma
for me that I must live with reverence for life in a world which is
dominated by creative will which is also destructive will, and
destructive will which is also creative.
The surisisings and the longings of all doep religiousness are contained
in the ethics of reverence for life. This religiousness, however,
humbly and imperfectly participating in its perfection, so that
the Eternal Law i3 called upon to participate in the human law.^
Some Christian thinkers, however, are able to see, in the
light of the suffering and redeeming love of Christ, that the
conflict and suffering and ruthless ness of created things
witness to the fact that redemption, sacrifice and staff©ring
(2)
love are at the heart of creation. '
does not build up for itself a complete philosophy, but resigns itself
to the necessity of leaving its cathedral unfinished. It finishes the
chancel only, but in this chancel piety celebrates a living and
neverceasing divine service. (Albert Schweitzer: Civilization and
Ethics, pp.244-24.6.)
(l) See God's education by Thomas Hardyj
God's Education
I saw him steal the light away
That haunted in her eye:
It went so gently none could say
More than that it was there one day
And missing by and by.
I watched her longer, and he stole
Her lily tincts and. rosej
Ail her young sprightliness of soul,
Next fell beneath Ms cold control,
And disappeared like those.
I asked: "Why do you serve her so?
Do you, for some glad day,
Hoard these her sweets —He said, "0, no,
They charm not me} I bid Time throw
Them carelessly away."
Said I:"We call that cruelty—
We, your poor mortal kind."
He mused. "The thought is new to me,
forsooth, though I men's master be,
Theirs is the teaching mindl ". T.Hardy.
(2j C.E.Raven} The Theological Basis of Christian 1acifism.op.A2-A. Is
Victor White's suggestion in The Morality of War. p.5» that 'Perhaps it
was cynicism, but perhaps there was more wisdom than was recognised,
when the explosion of the first atom-bomb in tho desert of New Mexico
was given the code name of 'Operation Trinity,' at all analogous with
this point of view?
Such an insight starts from Christ and must be the work
of faith, for irutMeasiness and suffering love are hard to
reconcile. Reason would separate them.
The examination of the ontological basis of Aquinas's
teaching on natural law does not prove without doubt that it has
firm theological foundations. Reason alone cannot reach
satisfactory certainty about Cod and his Nature, and even if
it has an inkling and a dim and insecure knowledge of some
Infinite Power behind all things, this is not enough to identify
such a power with Jesus; and even if reason has a sense of
kinsnip with tids pov&v it is not enough to guarantee that its
own way of life and its own small authority are divine.
CHAPTER NINE
SUMMARY OF AQUINAS«S ATTITUDE
towards war
Aquinas's direct teaching on war then is slight,
unoriginal, derived more or less wholesale from Augustine
and Gratian, abstract and theoretical, dry, dogmatic and
inspired by no personal emotion or thought. It is related
neither to contemporary political and ecclesiastical conditions
or events, nor to the rest of his thought. It crops up in
a treatise on charity, but is considered as a problem of
justice. Nevertheless it is considered there, in both
individual and social aspects, as a specifically religious
problem, and Aquinas professed to give a clearcut Christian
ruling.
Neither his natural reasoning, his consideration of the
etiiieal and political issues involved, nor his reconciliation
of just warfare with Christianity was, in the war articles,
at all complete or adequate, although he seemed entirely
satisfied with his conclusions. His treatment was even a
little vague; he did not discriminate between offensive and
defensive war, he allowed authority to declare war to 'any
public person' at a time when superior imperial and papal
power existed, and he regarded the limited 'common good' of a
province or nation as sufficient justification. He omitted
to state that war could only be just if it were a last resort,
and that arbitration should be sought at all costs. His
moral justification of deceit is doubtful.
In the war articles Aquinas by no means dealt exhaustively
with the Biblical material which is relevant to the question of
war. He did not note that there is no specific teaching of
Jesus on the topic, nor did he include the few texts where war
is mentioned and the most obviously relevant Sermon on the Mount.
He also failed to consider how Jesus' life, hi3 attitude and
behaviour, particularly in relation to the political background
against which he lived, might give guidance on the issue.
In his selection and application of specific texts he
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followed Augustine. It is very clear from the Catena Aurea
that Augustine wa3 the chief, if not the only commentator who
went out of his way to reconcile warfare and punishment and
judgement with Jesus' most pacific teaching. And it is
notable that in the war articles Aquinas used such interpretations,^
(1) Luke 3. Only Augustine mentions that this implies a sanction
or warfare.
ilatthew. X.34. Augustine alone manages to suggest that the sword
of which Jesus wa3 speaking may be a literal sword, when he says
that the most perfect peace is achieved when that which is diseased
and causes strife, is cut away*
Luke. XXII. 35. Augustine and 3ede in particular feel that circumstances
can alter commandments, and they think the disciples wer_ really
commanded to carry arms.
Ilatthew. XXVI. 52. It is only Augustine who, by distingui3hing
between to take the sword and to use it unlawfully, made it
possible for this event and saying to be used in the service of war.
: atthew. V. 38-4.8. Augustine alone emphasised that although non-
resistance as well a3 non-retaliation is enjoined, and Christians
must be willing to suffer wrong, this is not incompatible with
merciful correction, and that(by keeping spirit and deed separate)
it is possible to fill the command in spirit while at the same
time giving mercifully short shrift to the attacker. And
in the commentary on Jesus' teaching on non-resi3tance, he
states tlxat to keep the commonwealth Christian its wars must
be waged with good character for the restoration of harmony
with all the setting up of godliness among the vanquished who
are, of course, our neighbours.
Augustine said that as Jesus when struck did not turn the
other cheek, the command should be followed in spirit but
not necessarily literally.
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probably because he was there rather uncritically copying
Augustine, whereas in his own commentaries he was more free
of such influence and intention*
He was guilty at times of oversubtle if not dishonest
reasoning in giving to some words of Jesus, meanings which are
inconsistent with the main stream of tradition expressed in
earlier and later commentaries, including his own. His
likening of giving that which is holy to dogs to letting the enamy
know about plans for attack is opportune, arbitrary, is indeed a
perversion of the text. Hi3 implication that just warfare is
identifiable with the spiritual warfare Jesus arouses, or that
the material peace Jesus come to disturb is not the material
peace at which war aims, is unacceptable on the grounds of his
own and almost all other interpretations.
His inconsistency and the dangers of oversubtle exegesis
are most evident in his dealing with Jesus' command to ieter to
put up the sword, and His warning that 'all they that take the
sword shall perish with the sword'. In spite of the elaborate
exegesis and his application c£ some of it in the war articles,
Aquinas did not make its significance quite clear. In the war
articles he accepted Augustine'3 explanation that Jesus was
r" s p*
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condemning those who take the sword inasmuch as to 'take'
means to use unlawfully, even though in the uatena Aurea.
Augustine allowed that Jesus commanded the disciples to take
the sword. And in the war articles Aquinas allowed this
saying as justification of the sword of righteous warfare,
the sword which causes to perish those who take it unlawfully.
At the same time he considered that both the command and
the warning were addressed to Peter, who had been authorised
to take it by Jesus, and was in the act of using it in apparently
the most justifiable sense, to defend the sinless, and concluded
that even just warfare is entirely forbidden to clerice on
penalty of perishing by the sword.
In his commentary, indeed, there is no attempt to make
this text justify warfare, although there is an implication that
the sword divinae sententiae can be expressed militarily. At
the same time Aquinas stated that those who take the material
sword will perish by their own sword, and Jesus' refusal of
defence is acknowledged as an example which ordinary men can
emulate. This is stressed by the fact that Jesus, by refusing
also supernatural help, remained fully human throughout. Perhaps
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the most interesting thing to note is that Aquinas did not
think this incident of relevance only to relationships between
individuals, since he applied it to the participation of
clerics in warfare.
There is inconsistency also in his accepting St. Paul's
ban on material and military weapons as involving that
spiritual weapons are acceptable even though, or even because,
they are likely to be even more materially destructive. There
is uncertainty about his claim that Paul was speaking for
clerics only and not for all Christians. Certainly modem
Catholicism suggests that Paul was speaking for all followers
of Christ, and on Aquinas's interpretation this would mean that
warfare is forbidden for all Christians. There is no proof that
the soldiers of Christ referred to in the hpistle to Timothy
were thought by Aquinas to be clerics only, although they were
there forbidden to take part in war. There is contradictory
thinking in Aquinas's idea that clerics should abandon physical
warfare, since their aim is to defeat God's enemies, when
physical warfare is justified on the ground that this i3 its
aim too. It Is only on grounds of his vocation that a cleric
is allowed to be entangled in secular affairs, by why this
should not include physical warfare is not clear. Since
a cleric's vocation is Christianity and since the 'entanglement'
he is allowed is limited to spiritual duties, this means Ms
vocation is itself an entanglement. Otherwise he would not
be allowed to be entangled at all, so that the admonition to
the soldiers of Christ would not be addressed to clerics.
Since a cleric's vocation is Christianity itself, he can indeed
hardly be distinguished on such grounds from other soldiers of
Christ. Aquinas saw no incongruity in centering his objection
to the particip&tion of clerics in warfare in the fact that they
administer the central sacrament of the Church, the Eucharist,
while holding no similar objection to those who partaice of the
sacrament. At the same time he admitted a oneness between
cleric and layman in that those who advise or fail to advise
share responsibility for the fruits of their counselling or
negligence. And there is some dishonesty in allowing clerics
to encourage participation in warfare while disallowing them to
authorise it.
There is evasion of the real issueswhen, for example, in
discussing whether war is compatible with love of one's neighbour
Aquinas dealt only with one aspect of unlovingncs3, namely deceit
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This he justified to Ms own conscience while ignoring the
severer aspects of war such as the killing and wounding.
Aquinas chosethe literalist rather than the allegorical
interpretation of Old Testament warfare without discussion,
and there is no doubt that the Old Testament pidure of Yahweh
as a God of Battles must have influenced Ms acceptance of
Christian warfare. He also confused the Old Testament
proMbition of individual revenge, which he may have rightly
interpreted as a restraining of savage anarcMc vengeance until
such time as this can be expressed through a public body, with
the New Testament absolute proMbition of revenge and resistance
which he Mmself lauds as the height and the essence of
Christian teacMng. But the confusion resulted in Ms
conditioning to the extent of contradicting Jesus' words in the
Sermon on the Mount and allowed Mm to state that God, in
forbidding the individual to resist, is merely asking Mm to
wait for that public vengeance wMch is identifiable with His
own vengeance. The same conditioning is allowed to weaken
Jesus' command to love the enemy.
H* *> i
O iL 1
It is partly the Old Testament idea that religion is
primarily based on a relationship between the community and
God which made it easy for him to think of political authority
and activity as superior to individual, and to accept Paul's
belief in the divinity of the ruler and his right to wage
warfare.
It is fair, therefore, to criticise Aquinas for a very
unsatisfactory, indeed contradictory, treatment of the
relevance of revelation to the question of war. In fact he
came extraordinarily near to completely forbidding Christian
participation in warfare when he forbade it outright to clerics,
for his limitation of the prohibition to the latter rather than
to all Christians is based on shaky if not faulty exegesis, as
well as on the now outworn distinction between the 'Two Ways'.
It might be said that the whole issue rests on the exegesis of
such small words as we, take, love, and the phrase resist not
evil. As it was, Aquinas was able to keep clerics apart, and
to conclude that Christian revelation has nothing striking, or
specific to pronounce on the question of war. War is such a grave
moral and social problem that such a silence might understandably
seem to argue the ineffectiveness of Christianity and to call its
value in question. For Aquinas Christian revelation elevated
just warfare to a divine activity, and affected the spirit
of love, justice and punishment in which it ought to be
fought. It had, however, no power to change outward
action. This seems, indeed, like cutting Ghristianity in
half. Thus Christian revelation was allowed to confirm the
natural law position. It would seem likely that modem
Catholic opinion would hesitate to support Aquinas's exegesis,^
and might agree that both Augustine and Aquinas had on this
issue rather fitted their Christianity into their natural
ethical thinking in such a way that nature was allowed to perfect
grace, rather than grace perfect nature.
Tradition has equal weight with Biblical revelation for
Catholics and the just war doctrine is the strongest though not
the only tradition for them on this question. To depart from
it would apparently therefore be extremely difficult even if
an exhaustive exegesis of relevant Scriptural material yielded
a different conclusion. It might be that such exegesis, although
(2)
not confirming Christian warfare would neither forbid it. If
this were so it might be possible to retain the just war tradition
on the ground that although it is admittedly natural law thinking,
such thinking is as Christian as revelation, and certainly to be
relied upon when revelation has nothing to say. Though if Christ
(1) Only the Old Testament teaching on warfare might seam to modern
Catholics to give a Scriptural basis for war, and here they would
presumably agree with Aquinas and disagree with most Protestants.
(2) TheChureh does after all admit that it is doubtful whether there is a
Biblical basis for all Church doctrines although it also claims that the
Church teaches truths of faith(and surely also of morals?) inaccessible
to reason. In what category does war fall? as answered by reason and
tradition, or by revelation.
or Christianity has nothing to say on the problem of war then
we are of all men most miserable.
The 'Christianity' of natural law as it is understood
by Aquinas, is, however, questionable. The law of nature does,
of course, profess to be a God-given law, and Aquinas's elaborate
and rather dogmatic, if inaccurate, psychology does its best to
guarantee the sinlessness of that part of the mind, the svnderesis,
most directly in contact with God in receiving this law. It does
thus root moral responsibility in the individual conscience and
mind, as does Christianity, and it is a very human law \nKich can
be said to be fully expressive of, understanding of and adapted
to human nature, ana encouraging its perfection and fulfilment.
Inasmuch as the human is sacred, this must be a religious task.
Although Aquinas was not entirely happy about the identification
of natural law ami divine law in theory, natural law might seem
perfectly reconcilable with divine law in that its guidance comes
directly from God and is given to Christians and pagans alike.
It might therefore, seem to provide an excellent meeting ground
for them. In fact, however, it is by itself disappointingly
emtpy and impotent, for the only absolute moral certainties it
gives, namely that man must 'do good' and 'be rational', need
considerable exegesis and application if they are to guide
him through life's complexities. 'Good' is an ambiguous word
which reason does not properly understand, and rationality,
the most absolute demand of natural law, is as likely to lead
to controversial as to unanimous opinions on moral issuesJ it
is inadequate as a moral criterion and incapable of accurate
prediction of consequences. It is obviously valuable as an
ingredient in moral decisions, and if Aquinas had simply
recognised the partial and perhaps vague scope of reason instead
of exalting it to supremacy and universality, his position might
have been more acceptable.
For rationality by itself is insufficient andaaoral.
Intellectual research work in a vacuum might seem to be the
fulfilment of natural law in that man is thus fulfilling the
distinctive characteristic of his humanity, but to bo truly
moral it needs to be geared to some ultimate meaning or purpose
beyond reason, and fitted into the whole context of life.
Reason needs directives outside itself if it is to fulfil
itself, and these are most apparently found in terms of his
origins or his goal. Aquinas did precisely this. He included
both origins arid goal within natural law and saw reason as
the harmonising principle which should theologically organise
all man's naturalinstincts and impulses towards their utmost
fulfilment and use in the service of God's purpose and rule
for man given in revelation.
This sounds satisfactory and even ideal, but it is
extremely difficult, and Aquinas found it often impossible to
retain both nature and grace without ignoring or outlawing one
or the other. It means that natural law may become more
natural than rational, for irrational impulses, such as
intuitions, are allowed to overrule reason and are likely to
leave man at the mercy of his instincts, passions and ignorance.
Harmony between nature and revelation is impossible for the pagan
who has no revealed knowledge of a final end which alone can
properly direct and organise his impulses and reason. If it
has no final goal, it will turn back and explain itself in terms
of its lower elements. That reason itself is not unanimous in
its understanding of these naturalimpulses and their relative
powei* and importance is proved by the number of pagan 'naturalistic'
theories or philosophies which are common today, and which find
the baoio and motivo of human lifo in oox, economics, power or
race. It is difficult for natural law to be a harmonising principle
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when there are so many different understandings of it.
But ever in Aquinas's system of natural law, which can
have meaning because it can include the final end given in
revelation, the incompatibility of the marriage between
nature and grace is obvious. If it be accepted that Christ
lived the life of man as it ought to be lived, the fully human
because the fully divine life, that in giving out He lived out
all His human faculties fully, then His life must be the finest
enlightenment that natural law could have. In fact, however,
Aquinas was content to harmonise the law of nature with Old
Testament morality, and he seemed unaware of how incompatible
it was with Christ. The law of nature is self-centred, but
the impulses to self-preservation ar.d self-fulfilment are denied
by Christ, who taught that property, money, life should be
sacrificed for others, and that even nearest relations, husband,
wife and child should have no special preference but may even be
neglected for his sake. At least spiritual fulfilment will result,
but this should not be sought of itself. Although there was
nothing in his law of nature to warrant this Aquinas accepted
such Christianity for clerics but not for all Christians, and he
saw no contradiction between it and Ms natural law theories.
Contradiction there is, however, and it is most marked in
his teaching on defence.
Self-defence is undoubtedly natural. The impulse is so
deeply planted as to appear instinctual, and it may be even
just and rational. The desire to extend or improve one's
own life even at the expense of others when unavoidable is so
natural as to be universal. If God has given this impulse, if
it is part of the order of creation, rational or otherwise, the
problem is to reconcile it with Christ. The Old Testament God
of battles may be identifiable with the Creator who gave this
impulse. But Jesus refused even spiritual help in His own
defence. He died for his enemies and forgave the most evil
murderers. He behaved in a way that is 'unnatural' or 'supernatural'
He thus challenges natural man, and the burden of reconciling
Him with the Creator remains.
There may be a Christian uneasiness in Aquinas's natural
law ruling in that he denied individuals the intention to kill
and recognised that even public killing of a sinful man is unjust
in itself. He tried, like Augustine, to retain an element of
Christianity by keeping the act and spirit apart and recommending
that one should kill lovingly. But that war can be turned into
peace by the spirit in which it is fought is rather too blindly
and blithely optimistic. This is not real reconciliation
but a bad compromise which emasculates both Christianity and
natural law, and so divorces the spirit from the body as to
maim both. Here is no incarnation.
In any case, Aquinas allowed the intention to kill to
public persons and this suggests that his denying it to
individuals was not, as Professor Ramsey thinks, evidence of
the taming influence of Christianity, but proof that it was
merely a restriction of individual rights and authority.
That he allowed unarmed defence even to clerics confirms that
he must have thought of it as a thoroughly wholesome impulse.^
This is not perhaps surprising if it be remembered that at times
Aquinas seemed to favour the understanding of natural law of
the Roman jurists, which emphasised its essential naturalness,
and the affinity it had with animal instincts, rather than its
divinity. In order to maintain the distinction between the law
of nature and the ius gentium he stressed the less rationalistic
(2)
and more naturalistic nature of the former. ' At times he
identified the law of nature with the divine law in theory but
was less happy with this identification, and he really brought
the ius gentium nearer to the natural law than to divine law.
(1) The modem Catholic acceptance of killing as a means which is
good in itself rather than an tnintended incidental effect is
presumably grounded on natural law rather than on revelation.
(2) See pp. 333-9 above.
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Professor d'Entreves suggested that Aquinas reconciled
Aristotelian ethics and politics with Christianity by
distinguishing between their spheres of action and knowledge,
but it is quite impossible to relegate divine law to the
impractical, and natural law to the purely practical. And
indeed Aquinas spoke at times as if politics was the science
which was separate from both natural law and divine law.
Such variety in Aquinas's discussions on the topic has
led to confusion as to whether Aquinas subordinated politics
to morality, or whether he considered it as a science in its
own right, and it is probably due to the fact that he was being
comprehensive and aiming to weld, however loosely, everything
human into his systematising. The question of the relationship
between the ius Pentium and the law of nature is important for
an examination of the morality of war, war being a peculiarly
political question and the ethical nature of the ius gentium
being particularly relevant. Everything depends on the significance
of each term. There is little doubt that Aquinas thought of
political activity as a material or human expression of the
law of man's God-given nature, and that man was fitted for community
life and government. Just as he accepted at least a degree of
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selfishness and self-centredness as quite good and normal
according to natural law, so in politics he had no qualms about
the mixture of self-interest and co-operativeness, and the
dangers of inevitable unbalance between them which it involved.
He certainly understood community life as allowing every
individual his proper place, and what he considered his relevant
share of authority, and wanted the common good as far as possible
to fulfil the material good of the individual# In spite of the
opinion that he did not establish and was not concerned with
human rights, natural law, in so far as it defines duties and
responsibilities must certainly be held thus to outline
individual rights, the right to continue and preserve one's life,
and that of one's family, the right to co-operate in community,
the right to private property, and the right, above all, to
follow conscience. Just warfare could thus be understood as an
organised effort by a community group to safeguard or maintain
these rights for itself against their invasion or destruction by
others. As such war is wholesale self-defence.
Aquinas no doubt regarded such organised warfare as superior
to individual defence on the grounds that a community is a richer
and more important thing than an individual, public authority more
just than individual authority, the community 'higher' because
literally bigger. Fighting for the community can be both
self-centred and altruistic, so that warfare can seem a
larger and more noble activity than individual fighting. And
this no doubt partly accounts for Aquinas1 s allowing public
servants an intention to kill which is denied to individuals.
This acceptance of the intention is linked to the fact that
warfare is more calculated and. definitely involves the use
of intellectually devised weapons. It has precisely that
quality which Aquinas associated with the ius gentium when he
was comparing it withthe law of nature, for it is more
sophisticated and rational than self-defence, which is
impulsive or spontaneous. A struggle between individuals has
at least the rough justice or logic of a natural lust for
survival with no pretensions to mrality. But lany more doubtful
elements enter into warfare. It has no exact parallel in nature,
being distinctive of mankind, although there is no evidence that
man's instincts and drives make war inevitable for him. Although
there is killing of other species for food, intra-specific
fighting is rare in the animal world and found as a group
activity only among social insects, whose militarists are sterile
and expendable. It occurs between individuals mainly as a tool
of selection and is highly rit ali3ed, with surrender signals
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to prevent or minimise physical injury.^ Because war is
not a feature of animal biology and man is in any case not
wholly the prisoner of his own instinctual behaviour, the
acceptance of warfare would seem the choice of his peculiarly
human characteristics of reason and freedom.
As Professor Niebuhr emphasises, there is a sense in which
all man's characteristics, even his natural instincts, are
never purely animal, but have a depth and power which are a
potential danger or blessing because of his divinity. The social
and psychological causes of or aids to warfare are many and
obvious: the necessity to prove manhood, pride in the herd, the
family or nation; boredom, greed, the need for subsistence or
expansion of population, the isolation of national groups, the
projection of one's own evils on to others, and simplification and
abstraction in terms of good and bad nations and peoples.
Nevertheless, there is nothing inevitable or essentially reasonable
about warfare, though reason is often used in its service. The
weapons with which man's peculiar ingenuity has blessed him
are the fruits of his constructive and rational power. Organised
(l) Wolves engaged in mortal combat shew an advance beyond man
when the weaker bares the most vulnerable part of his neck to
the stronger, who then also becomes passive.
warfare, because of its rational element, may in fact,
therefore, be not only more deadly but less discriminate.
Acceptance of war as a legitimate measure leads to the creation
of a war machine or war system in which innocent and guilty
alike are caught up in an almost anarchic chaos, wherein life,
law and community are liable to be lost. The impulse of self-
defence in war can lead to disproportionate excess in that a
man's legitimate desire to save his life or tnat of his family
may lead him to annihilate other lives without discrimination.
Reason, which is indeed exquisitely clever, has produced weapons
so overwhelmingly savage and brutal in their effects as to be
insane, which can only prove how easily reason can be subservient
to impulse while pretending to be its own master. The claim that
warfare 'ju3t' or 'unjust' is, as a product of the ius gentium,
typically rational, human and expressive of this good desire to
live in community seems most unlikely. However excellent
politics or government may in itself or in some of its achievements
be, it must surely be true that acceptance of warfare even by
the 'just' means that community and reason, the characteristic
ingredients of the ius gentium, have been temporarily surrendered.
This is consistent with the fact that warfare was generally
regarded by political thinkers before Aquinas as the chief
expression of the sinfulness of man, and one which necessitated
political organisation. Because Aquinas saw warfare as a
result of human nature rather than of sin he was not so
worried by it, but this must mean that he here under-estimated
the sinfulness of human nature. He was more reluctant than
most thinkers to accept government as caused by as well as
cure for sin, and perhaps this was consistent though less
realistic, for a thing caused by sin cannot be a real cure for
it. oven just warfare adds nothing to the primitive situation
which confronts it. Living in community is as likely to create
problems and to irritate the selfish and savage elements in
man as to remedy them.
The fact that politics is caused by and a cure for sin
really implies that whether ideally or in practice it is never
wholly bad or good. It is a means towards an end and its
goodness or badness depends on the goodness of the accompanying
means and end. Government is in itself amoral, but capable of
yielding great good or great evil. Its complexity and higher
organisation can help it to be superior in its scope to either
individual good, or evil. bven if political activity is equal
with or even superior to the law of nature, the same difficulty
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nwallii as with the latter, that la its reconciliation with
Christianity. Christ said little or nothing about politics
beyond implying that it demands a limited, discriminating
allegiance, and he said nothing about way, out it has generally
been presumed, spoke only of individual attitude toward the
enemy. There is however no real reason why it should be so
presumed that Jesus was speaking to individuals and not to
groups. If the community or group car. itself be justified on
uhri&iar. grounds, it can surely be addressed in Christian terms.
And some schools of opinion regard the 3«naon on the .Mount as
•the transcending of the lex t lior-lj
hy a new dynamic of community'
and that
•to argue that privately the Christian
must love his enemy but in the group
oiturxtio: fi ;ht idra, is a denial of the
ontologies*! character of Christian
experience.* (1)
There is no doubt that in theory Aquinas allowed the
ultimate supremacy both of the individual and of Christianity.
Th# political natural law may transcend individual natural law,
but it cannot transcend divine law whether individual or communal.
(1) Vaul .-eacuoyr 9*9"
The individual must be allowed both to act towards the State
and to challenge it if necessary in the interests of a wider
and higher community. Aquinas was inconsistent in
forbidding in his gospel commentaries individual non-resistance
of a public evil, particularly as he recognised that all evil
is part punishment of one's own sin. Justice, so often
considered an essentially collective and political virtue,
was for Aquinas primarily and essentially subjective, springing
first from, and ultimately resting in, individuals. War seems
less likely to achieve justice than any other form of political
activity.
There is a sense in which Aquinas also gave supreme value
to the individual at the very moment of denying it. For he
centred moral responsibility in one man, the king. This is
really perverse in that it eclipses the individuality of other
members of the community.
In spite of this repeated and important respect for the
individual, Aquinas reconciled the political teaching on war
with religion on the basis of the divinity of the king as God's
minister. The divine right of the king was a doubtful doctrine
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the pretensions of which have been shown up in the course of
history. And the 'divinity* of the government may be created
as much to compensate for as to confirm fallible human judgement.
Aquinas's comparison of the various forms of government proves
again that the individuals who make up the governing body are
more important than any particular form.
There is no doubt that whether his answer is right or not
Aquinas did consider that the moral problem of war is at bottom
one which is to be answered in termsof subjective morality, and
religious morality. Vanderpol and Stratmann are right in thinking
that not only did he consider right intention and fault essential
in the just and unjust respectively, but a study of his under¬
standing of justice makes it clear that an objective injustice
would not have been a sufficient cause of war for him. On the
other hand his failure to consider the possibility of a war being
just on both sides, and that, in fact, in any war there must be on
each side a great mixture of subjective justice and injustice,
does make his ruling in itself collective and objective. He
applied a criterion applicable only to individuals to a group,
without apparently noting the difficulties involved. Thus, as
Stratmann says, his ruling does make war difficult if not
impossible to justify, though this may be because it is unrealistic.
And perhaps the most serious criticism of his doctrine is
that he was ruling mainly for aggressive warfare. Even on
natural law principles it is very questionable whether an
aggressive war in defence of anything less than life, such as
property^ or honour, could ever be justified, particularly
as Aquinas held private property less ideal than common
ownership. The admission that any killing of any man is in
itself unjust further undermines even his justification, let
alone the Christianity, of warfare and is opposed to modern
Catholic opinion which, having rejected the law of simultaneous
double effect as inapplicable because hypocritical in modern
warfare, and unwilling to allow a bad means towards a good end,
has to accept killing as a good means. The only justification
of killing for Aquinas is that it be for the good of the
community, but tills was a limited and material, albeit, no doubt,
a real good, which may itself conflict with the wider spiritual
and material good of all.
The difficulty of reconciling natural law with Christianity
might perhaps prejudice Christians against it. This may perhaps
be due to the limitations of revelation, and it might be
(1) There is a sense in which property is livelihood but the
desire to hang on to things partly acquired by the morally
doubtful instincts of acquisitiveness, aggressiveness and
lust for power, at the further price of death, is not
entirely justifiable.
possible to find, within a more universal and cosmological
setting, some other religious ground for reason, nature,
goodness. ^' Natural law in Aquinas's theory draws its
dignity and divinity from its participation in the Eternal Law
which is God. But reason cannot with certainty even find God.
It can guess at His great probability, but not prove Him
infallibly. The qualities of God which Aquinas claimed that
reason can reach, His Wisdom, Infinity, Immutability, Goodness,
Oneness, Intelligence, and Love are so abstract as to be of no
great help in moral guidance. It is only on the basis of
analogy that man can understand so much but the doctrine of
analogy is more than dubious and even if it were valied, the
knowledge it claims to yield of God's Nature is so slight and so
analogical as to be rather worthless.
Professor d'Entrkves claimed that natural law was above
all concerned not with individual rights but with practical
matters and politics. It outlined, he said the duties of
government and political allegiance, and it did this precisely
(1) Vidler and Whitehouse, p.38;
"
... It is also manifest that the formulation in their proper order
of the detailed rules of Natural Law is a matter which requires a
high degree of technical skill and a wide acquaintance ^.th the
principles not only of law but also of ethics and of psychology
(which is in some sense the ground of ethics) and of metaphysics,
of which the principles govern all being. La metaphvsique imbibe tout.
by virtue of its cosmological connection with the great governing
Eternal Law. In fact Aquinas stated that fete particular virtues
related to practical things arid politics are not found in God.
There can be no very relevant pattern for human government
therefore in the Eternal Law. And both in theory and in practice
the order which Aquinas thought the highest good of created things
does not seem perfect. Aquinas interpreted the imperfections in
Creation as due to created things themselves rather than to the
Eternal Law working through them, but he thus divorced moral and
ontological evil, since secondary causes have no moral responsibility.
He then justified the ontological evil on the around that it made for
the individuality of things and brought some nearer to God than
others. Thus he identified ontological evil with both ontological
and moral goodness. The ontological conception of goodness and
evil, which is the heart of Aquinas's thinking, is therefore very
difficult for reason to understand.
Outside man the preservation of the whole, good or not, has
to include the sacrifice and suffering of some individuals. There
is among living things only the law of struggle for survival and
the survival of the fittest, from which Aquinas's teleology is not
far removed. The law outside man does not seem morally much better
than that within him. Or is it indeed God? Do we find here, in the
'law of the jungle', the justification as well as the basis of
Aquinas's teaching on war?
The government of things, even of animals, is of course
different from the government of people, but about this the
universe is silent. Organisation in human affairs there must
obviously be, but it may be that man has to evolve one slowly
and painfully, rather than follow a ready-made pattern, through
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eras of trial, experiment and learning. He is thus called on not
so much to obey as to create and creation calls for imagination
and the devotion of the whole mind and being. Progress depends
on such wholehearted devotion. It would seem that men should
devote themselves to preventing and outlawing war rather than
justifying it by such unsatisfactory arguments. The 'justification'
may be looked on as a limitation, to some extent, and it is. But
it also accepts war, and that acceptance may breed an attitude of
mind which becomes complacent about war in general. To Aquinas
to kill in any way was in itself unjust. As war is notiling but
the killing of men, in itself, therefore, it must be held
unj ust.
CHAPTER TEN
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TEACHING
ON WAR BETWEEN AQUINAS AND GR0TIU3.
During the three centuries after Aquinas, the just cause of
war which he had defined in general terms as some injury which
deserves punishment^was more precisely elaborated.
Defence, which had been often ignored, and of which Aquinas
aaid nothing specific in his war articles because he took its
rightfulness for granted, came to be recognised as a specific cause.
(1) Q.X. in J03. See p. 43 above.
Recuperatio. the recovery of goods unjustly stolen and held,
or wrongly taken in some previous conflict, was also listed
as another main cause. A punishable injury was regarded
separately.
This list of three distinct causes, each accompanied by
its owr. rights arid conditions, first appeared in the Summa
Astesana (c.1330)^ and it was often repeated. It was generally
accepted that in defensive war there 3hould be no element of
punishment and that it was right to recover only flhat had been
wrongly taken. >eyond this there was to be no enslavement of
(2)
prisoners and no seizing of enemy possessions. It was also
generally recognised that defence derives its authority from its
own intrinsic justice, and does not necessarily need external or
superior authority. It may also reach out to allies, friends
and neighbours.
Recuperation was placed somewhere between defence and
aggression. Recovery in continent! which was a more or less
instantaneous upshot of an earlier conflict, and which can be
thought of therefore as an extension of defence, and as sharing
its conditions and rights, was distinguished from recovery after
(1) RegoutJ ha Doctrine de la Guerre Juste, pp.94.-8
(2) Gajetan, however, states that these conditions apply to a defensive
war carried out with only private authority, whereas in a proper
war, authorised by the prince, one can enjoy the full rights of
war,seizing the goods and persons of the enemy.
aii interval of time, which by different writers was called
either defence or aggression. Henri of Gorychum,(c.L43l) for
(1)
example, would call such recovery ar act of defence, whereas
it was more often widely 3een as a new act having something of
the nature of aggressive war and, therefore, requiring proper
authority. St Anthony of Florence (1389 - 14-59) and others held
both recovery in continenti and defence as legitimate without
superior authority, but thought that recovery after an interval
of time was wrong if embarked upon when a superior authority
could have been but was not appealed to. Otherwise, if there
were no superior authority to appeal to, this act of later recovery
could be carried out on the authority of the injured. Even so,
although the guilt of the enemy were proved, such a war included
(2)
no rights of punishment.
Regout, indeed, claims that all writers agree that although
punishment is an element in all other types of aggressive warfare,
a war of recovery after ar; interval of time is not in any sense
punitive. This, he thinks, is confirmed by the 30parato definitions
(3)
of a war of punishment and a war of recuperation.
Cardinal Cajetan (14-68 - 1534) also distinguished, albeit
incidentally, wars of recuperation from wars of defence or sanction,
(1) La Doctrine de la Guerre Juste, p.105.
(2)_IiaMJ», p.113, p. 120.
(3) Ibid., p.143.
but he did not say whether a war of recovery after a time should
be treated as defence or aggression.^ Gabriel Biel (c.1425 - 1495)
widened the meaning of recovery to cover more than the mere
regaining of objects stolen, and gave it the more general sense
(2)
of the repairing of material and moral wrong.
The third ease of war was an act of vindictive justice,
directed against the moral guilt of the enemy as punishment of
this guilt.
Regout remarks that this, which had beer, the most important
justification for war for Augustine, Aquinas and Alexander of
Hales, slipped into the background of the thought of this later
period except in the writings of such tneologians as Gajetan and
(3)
Sylvester.w/ Most thinkers limited the right to punish to just
war3 of aggression, for they held that this type of war alone
was regarded as a war with full rights. Punishment could include
the capture and enslavement of perspns and the confiscation of
goods and property, harly in the sixteenth centry Ca.jetan urged
that the sin or guilt of the enemy gave the ju3t side authority
coming from God through the specific power of the sovereign, to
punish people normally beyond its jurisdiction.^
Although pope and emperor were generally taken to be the
(1) Ibid., p.128.
(2) Ibid., p.119. p.143.
(3) Ibid., p.141.
(4) Ibid.. pp.124-6. p.145.
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highest of authorities, there was much discussion of the precise
nature of proper authority and controversy between the el mpion3
of temporal and spiritual power about which was superior -. In theory
such pofer had long been held to belong to pope and iinperor de .jure.
but in reality many independent kings, as those of France i&igland
and Spain, were recognised as having full authority to declare war.
Cajetan thought that an independent prince who had been attacked
held the right to wage a just war against, to legislate for and
to punish offending foreigners, from God and natural law rather
than from any superior temporal authority.^ As this comes near
to allowing the right to punish as part of defence, Regout argues
that because hajetan kept the notion of penal ties outside his
definition of a just defensive war he must have held that some of
the violence of the latter has other erds than punishment, and
(2)
therefore that violence unrelated to punishment is justifiable.
Regout concludes that punishment is not an integral part of a
just war or even of a just war which a prince engages in on his
own initiative. Although the medieval writers did not consider
the possibility of action which is only objectively unjust as a
legitimate cause of war, he thinks that for all of them even
including Aquinas and Gajetan, the true justification of any war,
defensive or aggressive, was the maintenance of justice and order
(1) Gabriel Mel claimed also that justice is its own authority, that
war car be made without formal authority, by virtue of divine
and human law. (ha Doctrine de la Guerre Juste, p.117, p.lA5«)
(2) Ibid., p.129.
arid the safeguarding of the good of the community. Any
violation, however subjectively just, of such a good, he says,
would have brought about an aggressive war, although such a war
would not have a penal character.
"The medieval doctrine of the right of
war has not, according to us, as centre
of gravity, the culpability of the injustice,
but the injustice widch is culpable." (l)
Most of the other developments of this time were less
important. The treatment, of right intention in embarking on a
just war, however, was significant. Purity of intention was still
held essential, but its absence said Gaoriel Biel, makes the war
guilty, not unjust. Eegout thinks that the word 'unjust' was
deliberately left out. Gajetan also held that right intention
is necessary for blameless ness, but that its absence does not
lessen one's right to what has been taken from one. One has a
right to one's own goods, and on this right depends the right^of
recovering them. And although a right intention is necessary to
avoid moral fault, its aosence does not make a war to regain one's
(3)
own goods, unjust. '
Amimg the things one has a right to protect, defend, avenge
or otherwise aid were friends and allies. Martin of Lodi said that
friends could help an attacked nation even if help were not asked forl^
(1) ha Doctrine de la Guerre Juste, p.14.6.
(2) Ibid., p.119.
(3)Ibid., p.129.
U) Ibid., p. 115.
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If, in a war justly undertaken, the wrongdoer offers satisfaction
before there have been any casualties said Cajetan, the war
should be ended as it can be right only when utterly necessary.^
More and more, indeed, thinkers of Ms time were coming to allow
war only as a last resort for maintaining or restoring justice
after all other means of settlement had been tried and had failed.
It the same time most of than did not think of the oppressive deeds
of an independent prince against Ms subordinates and subjects as
an aspect of war at all. And in the time of this comparative
simplification of theories of justification they began to turn
their minds to the study of the means of conducting war.
TMnkers of the earlier middle ages had found that although
they believed in the theoretical coincidence of justice and
victory, they had no grounds for guaranteeing victory beforehand
to an army wMch seemed to have justice on its side. Later thinker ,
therefore, held, simply that on the one hand the prince should
reckon the likelihood of victory before beginning a just war, and
on the other, that the prince who believed he had power to win a
war should only put his strength to the test if all the conditions
of the just war were fulfilled.^




to mio an Influential contribution to the doctrine of war. He
accented armed defence of property, life and honour as justifiable
without question,^ but held that offas give war must fulfil th®
(Z)
conditions of being declared by the right authority,N being
carried out in the right manner, and having a Just cause. The
occasion of such an offensive war - bollum offaaaivum - must be
an injustice suffered, injuria acc& ta. Such a war should be
(5)
the only and the ultimate means of repressing the injustice, '
ai d there should be & proportion between the evils let loose by
(6)
the war and the good one hopes to attain by it. In such a war
the enemy arc not justified in defending themselves inasmuch as
(7)
they fully recognise the justice of the aggressor. Vitoria was
original in stressing that this good should be the good of
Christendom and the whole world, not the limited good of a nation
, (8)
or people. '
The guilt of the enemy was not, however, essential for a war
(9)
to be just. A war to recover wrongly held goods or property say
be initiated against an innocent enemy acting in good faith, and
'4» **
it would involve no element of punishment. In Vitoria the recovery
of stolen property or lards was differentiated from pimishaent^1 '
The differences were defined within the context, of a war of
(lit
punishment, 'but Ragout claim;.- that this shows how Vitoria saw in
(1) 1 - 3. (2) 5 - 9. (3) iu - U. (45 13 - U. (5) 6o. (6) 37.
(7) 32, (8) 1.
(9) Vanderpol thinks that Vitoria did insist on guilt. But as evidence
says Ragout he quoted Vitoria's ruling for an offensive war, a war of
vindication.
(1) :i44,"-refatury to an answer bo it noted that as is shewn by what has
boon said a ove, war is waged? Firstly, in defence of ourselves aid what
belongs to us| second ly, to recover tilings taken from usj thirdly, to




•recovery* and •vindication' different elements. Such recovery
is accepted as a sole justificatory reason for war and as a form
of defence. Vitoria followed the medieval distinction between
defence in continent! and recovery of goods after an interval
of time. A private individual had the right to defend his person
and Ms property but he could neither administer justice nor
attempt to recover Ms goods after some time has, passed. Defence
(2)
in oontinenti, however. was permitted to Mm.
In Ms commentary on Aquinas Vitoria separated reeuporare
from vindicaro aid nunire, but it appears that he used the latter
two words synonomously. He always used the phrase bellua of'fensivum
for a war of real vindication.
A war of recovery is only de3cribabla as a war of defence
inasmuch as those who are in possession of the goods one has a
claim to resist by fighting. The initiative of both the injustice
arid the violence is in one sense with the enemy, on the other hand
the declaration of war as such is the responsibility of the
•defending* side. Such a war of recovery has therefore at least
the appearances of an aggressive war. But whether the enemy are
puMshable or not its aim was not, for Vitoria, punishment. He
reckoned, however, that it is permissible to take aH measures to
ensure victory and security, and also to exercise one's full
(1) 44 and 4&
(2) 5
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rights. It is not necessary to limit one's activities to recovering,
ill a narrow ea se, merely the goods taken by the enemy. Vitoria did
not oelieve that a war can be both objectively and subjectively just
or unjust on both sides, but be did believe that if the enemy truly
think themselves blameless, the war may be subjectively just on
both sides; this, iiowever, did not for him alter Its objective
justice.^1'' lie was the first to acknowledge that in war soldiers
on both sides may bo blameless, in that they act in complete good
(2)
faith, and he went so far as to say thai tills is so in the majority
(3}
of cases. ' The responsibility for moral fault in war amongst
Christians, ho thought, lies with the prince or other sovereign
authorities^ although sometimes both princes may be acting in good
faith. Whore such 3ubjactive innocence existed, no punishment
(5)
involving death or confiscation of property, could be carried out,'
but on the other hand, such innocence did not forodd the intentional
killing of innocent soldiers in an otherwise just cause for it is
legitimate to defeat thoa^.' here as elsewhere' Vitoria gave up
(8)
the traditional ban on intentional killing of the innocent.
However, he still held that guiltless persons may not be
killed to avoid future danger, it being intolerable that
(l) (2) 3W. (3) 4B. (4.) <2<4. (l>) 33* \^)48.'* T^ii 3"?* (' ) * jometiiaes
it is right, in virtue of collateral circumstances to slay the inno&eat
even knowingly. Ragout (p.173) admits, however, that in soma passages
Vitoria secria to aay it is wrong to kill innocents in any circumstances,
but he rpci:ona that these passages are vague and do not balance the
others whore such killing is admitted. But these passages remain, and
suggest that Vitoria never really reconciled the issues By the law of
nature he held it is murder to kill the innocent, uctension of empire
is not a juat cause, otherwise each of the belligerents would have an
equally just cause aid so both could be innocent ~ this in its turn
would involve the consequence that it would not be lawful to kill them
and 30 imply a contradiction because it would be a just war.
anyone should be killed for a fault that has not yet taken place.
VItaria thought that if a subject were convinced of the
injustice of a war he ought not to serve in it even on the co.aaard
(25
of his prince. boidlers are not excused when they fight in bad
(35
faith. Ji nevertheless he stipulated, rather contradictorily, that
although they ijure a right to do so, lesser people who have no
place or audience in the king's council have no obligation to
examine the justice of the war, but should serve in it in reliance
on their sovereign. And he held that even if those of the
lower orders perceived the injustice of a war they could not atop
it, aid their voice would not be heeded, so that any examination of
its righteousness would be useless.^ At one point he almost implied
that if subjects became too conscious of the justice of their cause
It would be unlauful to ld.ll them, so tiiat exa ination into the
justice of a war iai ht be undesirable. Unbelievers would then be
excused when they follow their chieftaina to war against Christians,
(55
and. it would be unlawful to kill them. If the injustice is flagrant,
ignorance is certainly no excuse.
Ke also tiiought tli&fc the prince is tinder no obli at ion to
give bis reasons for making war to his subjects, aid he did not think
subjects need be sure about the justice of a tar before agreeing to
(65
take part in it.* i-ftiere they are in doubt they should realise that
(1) 38. "... it is intolerable "that anyone should be kill-d for a future
fault«• .hence it follows Jjuj
M ..hj.'l S-lJteduJday ^E.g.. ,3 ioasamc>>
an what is t.iere enjoined is in the forte of a coanson law of war for all
future tlx...the Lord enjoined it. because ift ^ w&.tf
a<Hyrtt. .tow
(2) 22 - 3. (3) 22. (4) 2S. (5) 2d ar.d 26. (6) 25 and JL.
refusal to fight the enemy would be a greater evil than fighting
them, since it would involve the risk of betraying the state.&)
He thought that although one is not justified in doing anything
about wiiich one's conscience is in doubt, doubt about the justice
of a war is accompanied by a certainty that it is right to fight
for one's prince, and this in itself justifies participation.(2)
Regout thinks that during the sixteenth century the
consideration of probability, for which Vitoria was largely
responsible, introduced an element of corruption into the
traditional doctrine.
Vitoria*s opinion was that in a case of doubt, the side
which is in possession of the disputed property has the greater
right. If neither side i3 in possession there is no just cause
for war, and some amicable arrangement must be made. It is only
when the right of a prince to a certain territory is absolutely
determined that there is any real reason for war. The question
should be solved by the application of principles equally admitted
in a process of civil law, but some international court must
(3)
decide on the rights of possession."
Vitoria's main contribution to the doctrine of war, then, is
his firm belief that a situation which is only objectively unjust
is a sufficient cause of war. He 'was also the first consciously
to allow the deliberate killing of innocent soldiers as just.
——
(2) 31.
(35 27 - 9.
but he did this only by considering them as purely impersonal
elements, and their destruction as means to a desirable end.^
He followed earlier thinkers in separating the personal and
punishable elements from the actual process of war itself, as
(2)
more suitably dealt with after the war is over. ' Vitoria,
therefore, justified war only by depersonalising it. But war
is a thoroughly personal activity, so such a justification is
negligible.
The war of recovery makes quite clear the difficulty in
some cases of separating defence and aggression. Sometimes the
issue my be quite clear, but a war is part of a 4otal human
situation much wider than a battlefield or political relations.
Defence and aggression can look much the same, particularly today
when defence takes the form of psychological aggression, with
defensive weapons already aggressively pointed towards potential
enemies, and when literal aggression on a small front may be
regarded as defence against more dangerous menacing influences.
The permissibility of regarding recovery after an interval of time
as defensive action, particularly when the 'enemy' is innocent,
is dangerously subtle. If it were aggressive in the sense of
endangering and violating human life for the sake of property, it
(1) Ragout thinks that the putting to death which happens inevitably
in the midst of a just war against innocent adversaries is not
considered by Vitoria as 'occislo per se et ex intentions' and
is not, by consequence, necessarily illicit. (Regout,pp.172-3)
(2) He talked never of feellum vindieativun jut always of bollum ad
Vindication (Regout, p.169)
t) t) *L>
would seem quite unjust, for the condition that the means should
be proportionate to the end must mean that no human life should
ever be sacrificed for the sake of material goods or prosperity.
The separating of punishment from the act of killing and
maiming would also seera a little academic. To accept that one
can kill and injure without thereby in any sense punishing is
curious, as is the condition that punishment must be Mt until the
war is over, when, in fact, half the suspects will have been already
done to death. Even though the killing in war may not be
administered directly and individually in relation to individual
guilt, it must be seen as in fact a real punishment for at least
some objective crime, though as such it must be highly unjust.
liegout claims that Vitoria justified violence not in itself,
but only as a means, that ne did not see in the adversary the
punishable person who ought to be punished but the danger which
should be dissipated, the obstruction which must be removed. Out
to act in this way assumes the man is worthy only to be treated
as an impersonal and expendable thing.
The idea that war can be justified as a purely impersonal
means so that relatively blamless human lives can be used </
A
casually a3 mere things or weapons to put right a situation which
is only objectively unjust is itself most unjust, evai criminal.
(1) p.172
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War can never be rightly regarded as a merely mechanical method
of adjusting a situation, such reasoning is inhuman and clumsy
and more coldbloodedly cruel than any savage natural instinct.
Although Vitoria at one time allowed that even a defensive
war could not be waged satisfactorily were no vengeance taken on
enemies who have done, or tried to do, a wrong, he usually agreed
with most other writers that a war of defence should carry with
it less punitive rights than a war of aggression. This is
surprising, for nothing can be more blameworthy than an attack
on life.
Recognising as he did that it is quite usual for the soldiers
on both sides to be subjectively innocent, Vitoria must have
realised that one of the main causes of war is this misguided
innocence. One of the main cures of war must then be the greatest
possible degree of enlightenment of the ordinary soldier as to its
causes and the justice of them. It is strange that Vitoria did
not insist on such enlightenment, but was content to ignore individual
moral responsibility, placing the burden of the latter on the prince
alone. And yet when a subject is in doubt as to whether in
obeying the prince he is obeying God, he can still be completely
happy that 3heer obedience to the prince is in itself blameless.
There is here again a conflict between two principles which cannot
be solved by simply forgetting one of them*
Vitoria seems to have thought that Aquinas believed
that the Gospel law forbids nothing wiiich is allowed by
natural law. He assumed that armed defence of life is more
obviously allowable than defence of property, but ruled that
even if natural law should not allow the latter, it could be
rendered lawful by civil law, arid as long as no scandal were
caused, not only to laymen but to clerics and other persons.
He allowed considerable authority to both civil and
international law. By the law of nations he meant law3 between
them, of which natural lawvas the source. But reason, faced
with the problems of civilisation, would have to construct new ,
and perhaps changing and artificial, laws; when reason fell
short, revelation might supply the answers. In addition, habitual
use and custom, involving consent between private individuals
and groups and consent between peoples and nations, could help
to build up international law. Such consent is evident in the
change from common ownership to private property. The establishment
of human usage and custom as a law really means the acceptance
of majority opinion arid decision, and it is in this that for Vitoria,
the ius gentium differs from natural law. He pointed out that it
may be a written or unwritten law, and one wiJLch does not necessarily
bind all people.
He thought the ius gentium nearer to positive than to natural
law. In some cases, however, as in the law vitich guarantees the
(l) The following ±3 gleaned from J .3. Scott*s assessment of Vltoria's
view of natural law. (J.3. Jcott! Tho Spanish of Ir.tere.ational
nan. pp.137-172.)
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protection of ambassadors, it comes so close to natural law
and has such worldwide acceptance that natural law cannot be
observed without it. The ius gentium doe3 not necessarily
follow from natural law, however, or it would be natural law.
But if not wholly, it is nearly so and often necessary to
preserve the fundamental rights of human beings under the law
of nature. When dependent for its validity on common consent,
it would seem that it can only be abrogated by common consent.
But in itself it may change, as, for example, the custom of
putting prisoners to death changed into the habit of enslaving
them.
/itoria insisted that all laws, human, divine or natural,
should aim at the wellbeing and happiness of the individual,
and that governments are made for man and not man for governments.
He did not believe in a world empire for this could not be founded
on civil, international or human law. But he believed that war
is only justifiable in the absence of the court of a superior
between the contending parties to which if it existed, they would
be obliged to refer the dispute.
Vitoria's understating of international law had a
considerable influence. J.B. Scott sums up that
"His definition of Internationa)Law, its
nature, its origin and its application,
should not be looked upon as pedantry on
the part of the Spaniard} it goes to the
genesis of our international law, for the
first proof of this firt title of the
r> 5 d
third section of the Reading under
consideration was regarded by no less a
person than Grotlus, as a primal axiom of
the Law of i atior.s, and the second of
Vitoria13 proofs was, as expressly stated
by Grotius, the foundation of his tractate on
^'h^fr^ka which is regarded
by not a few as his greatest contribution
to international law. Indeed it need only be
said in passing that this entire section (Titles
1 - 7) is the source of that international law
u-. iah Grotiua set forth ir. Ms commentary on
the haw o Prise, and elaborated in his large
treatise upon which his reputation as an
international lawyer rests. * (1)
Galvtoli reckons, however, that in spite of new treads of
thought developed by humanists, politicians and theologians,
there was, in the sixteenth century, no clear notion of
international law, and war was still seen as a means of forcing
people into the way of justice. The theory of sovereignty meant
that the state was assarting itself against the chore.., feudalism
and the Lrapire. Renaissance French and Italian writers such
as dodin, macchiavelli, and Alciat rejected the superiority of
the hmperor and treated all states a3 equal, allowing every state
the right to wage war. This was Salvioll' s own view, that war is
necessary and therefore just, and international law unable to
judige it.
Although Vitoria used vindieare and r-unlre interchangeably,
Diegue Govarruvias (1512 - 1577) distinguished between helium
vindicative and bejlua cig]itj.vgn. Vindication was concerned
(i)"Analysis or,,t'
--i. W.B. Scott: The Snailsh Origin of International,
uaw. p.JL41.)
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with reparation, but not vengeance. Soto (1494 - 1560) raised
the question of whether attacking, as well as defence against,
an innocent soldier, is justified, and decided that if the
war is otherwise just, it is.
GuarezH1548 - 1617) fo nd no arguments against, but rather
support of, the justice of war in the Old and how Testaments. He
explained that when David was forbidden to build the Temple because
his hands were soiled by blood this referred to his murder of
Uriah, not to his warfare. He accepted Augustine's interpretation
of esus* words about the evil of taking the sword and hi3 belief
that fighting is not inconsistent with loving, in that it means
hating deeds, not person^ Kon-resistance, he thought, must be
held in mind as a possibility in some cases, but self-defence is
natural and neeessaryC^) Divine law, he thought, differs in no way
from natural law except in relation to faith and the sacraments,
and he condemned Luther's opinion that it is not im ossible to
oppose the chastisement of GodV*'ton-resistance was, he agreed,
recommended in the Gospel to individuals, but only in order to
curb their evil vengeance^''resistance was, however, regarded
as absolutely necessary and justifiable for public authority,
from Romans XIII. ^
Public authority, Suarez felt, may more easily than individual
(7)
avoid wrong feeling and self-interest and act with impartiality.' '
(1) The follovdng references are to sections of the translation of
Delia, in 'Zandercols ia i-ocl rlt u -ro.11 I?e hn-rre, pp.362-412.
(2)312. (3) 313. (4) 315. (5) 314. (6) 337-S. (7) 318-325.
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This is not necessarily true of course. His answer to the
objection that it is undesirable for the same person to be both
plaintiff and judge was that in war, neither nature nor humanity
had yet found a better solution and that the criminal has only
himself to blame if he finds himself in submission to the one
he has attacked or defended A sovereign, he thought, has
jurisdiction over foreigners by reason of their fault',"tut
vengeance, other thar. defence, carried out by private authority
was evil. He reckoned that a state lias absolute authority only
when it is perfectly independent and has above it no superior
tribunal to which it can appeal. He thought of the Pope as having
an indirect authority in temporal matters, and agreed with Soto
that war is rarely just among Christian princes because they have
(3)
open to them another way of solving their differences. He recognised
that the Pope might sometimes decide not to interfere, in order to
avoid greater evils, in which case the princes should keep their
own independent power ar.d jurisdiction, but whenever the Pope
prohibits a war a prince sins against justice if he enters into it,
and would be liable for the restitution of all damages suffered by
his opponent. (4)
Suarez approved the opinion of Sylvester that to wage a war,
(5)
however just its cause, without legitimate authority, is blameworthy.
(1) 338. (2) 318. (3) 323. (4) 325. (*) 340
The only just cause of war is a grave violation of justice which
can be revenged, or restored in no other manner/and which is
(2)
proportionate to the evils which the war will bring. Breach of
international law, such as the refusal of passage by public ways
or of mutual commerce, or injuries to friends and allies, can
provoke righteous war as long as the friends themselves have this
right and intention^ No sovereign has the right to pur-.iah injuries
whenever and wherever they occur, neither God nor reason give
this right Jar is above all allowed so that everyone can keep
(5)
what belongs to Mm. Punishment is a separate justification of
(6)
war and this is proved by the Scriptures.
A just cause by itself is not, however, sufficient. Suarez
gave many exam les of occasions where, although the cause may be
just, the evils that might result from the war wuld be so great
(7)
that it would not be justified. If, for instance, a state eould
not give satisfaction or return wiiat it had taken without serious
harm to many individuals, and if such satisfaction were not
indispensable to the prince who nad demanded it, the latter would
act against charity by insisting on it. Any sovereign engaging in
war should also, Suarez thought, have reasonable likelihood, if
(8)
not certitude of victory. Father stratmann attributes to Suarez
and Bellarmine the condition that the means of carrying out the
war must be just. ^
I 'u> 335'<5> 3*'<6) 337 "9'
And Suarez, he states, was the first to apply the principle
of distributive justice to war.^ Suarez noted that doubt can only
arise from a lack of speculative certainty, for absolute certainty
is never possible. The sovereign is justified, therefore, in
fighting if his rights appear most probabl^V Where probabilities
are equal aid one aide is in possession, the latter should have
preference.' Adrien and Soto ruled that where there is doubt the
property in question should be shared, but Suarez thought that
this would be just only if the one in possession had doubted his
claim from the first; if his doubts were more recent he might
remain in possession though, as Vitoria said, under the obligation
to seek for trutiu"' Where there are equal doubts and neither side
is in possession the property should bo shared in some manner
Where the justice of war is in doubt it should be brought to
(6)
arbitration.' Suarez thought it impossible that God has left human
things in sucli a state that issues between sovereigns and states
can be resolved only by war, for this would seem contrary to justice
and would mean the victory of sheer force. He deemed it preferable
for the arbitration to be agrBed upon by both sides, but acknowledged
(7)that this might be difficult arid rare. The king should at least
consult intelligent and wise counsellors and accept just pact3
when proposed to him, but he should be under no obligation to wait
(8)
for the arbitration of others.
U) Ibid., p.63. Suftra#. Up telle.
<2) 352. (3) 353. (4) 353. (5) 354. (6) 355. (7) 356, (a) 356
If the chief soldiers are not asked to give their advice
tney have no more obligation to do so than the majority of
soldiers^ they are put into action and do not put others into
action. lie noted that Vitoria claimed that charity obliges them
to enquire into the justice of a war in ord^r to give their advice
if it be needed. Common soldiers he certainly thought had no r.eed
to so enquire, but should simply obey unless the injustice of the
war be obvious. If they are in doubt they should obey their
superiors, and he quoted in support Uajetan, Soto, Vitoria and
Sylvester^'"Iriio added that soldiers who are in doubt about the
justice of a war should obtain all the information possible. Adrier
alone denied that they should fight, for he thought it a greater
evil ta kill and pillage than to disobeyC^
Suarez subtly argued that since the doubt must remain a
speculative one it need not make the conscience doubtful, so that
to obey would be the safest decision. Any negative doubt would be
covered by the autnority of the prince, any positive doubt should
involve the responsibility of searching for the trutiT.' Mercenaries
were regarded by some as being in a different category from other
soldiers. It was generally agreed that they should examine the
causes of war but Sylvester and Gaj'etan added that in cases of
doubt they ought not to take part in it. Suarez discussed the
point of view that no-one has the right to pledge himself to fight
in no matter which war, just or unjust, and compared this with the
(l)" 357^ (2) 358. (3) .359T U) 359,362, ~~~
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selling of arms, which might involve one in the danger of co¬
operating with the unjust, whose victims are innocent. In
selling his services, the mercenary, he considered, does
nothing unjust or wrong but simply makes use of a right of
which he is certainly not obliged to deprive himself to Ma
disadvantage. Suarez, therefore, considered, mercenaries as in
the same position as other subjects; if they have equal doubts,
they may regard the authority of the prince as outweigMng theml^
Stratmann regards Suarez's position as shewing 'the first
loosening of the old, strict war morality', and condemns Ms
acceptance of the sovereign's justice in going to war whan the
balance is only slightly on his side as 'most repulsive', especially
inasmuch as Suarez regarded the aggressor as punitive. Vanderpol
argues tliat such reasoning is not comparable to that in civil law
where Suarez himself insisted that in criminal matters there must
be adequate proof, and if the fault i3 not certain innocence must
be presumed. But Suarez's reasoning about war, Vanderpol argues,
may easily mean that both sides are both subjectively and
objectively equally justified in fighting, which is absurd. Vasquez
also objected on the ground that war should bo an act of vindictive
justice, and such an act should be preceded by judgement. A war
just on both sides, except where there is invincible ignorance, is
absurd. In cases of doubt he thought the judgement of a third
party essential.
(1) 360 - 362.
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Suarez also considered the position of clerics in relation
to war. Bishops and clerics he thought fully entitled to defend
themselves, and prelates and bishops by virtue of their position
as temporal sovereigns, might sanction any just war, for they
would not be directly advocating killing or mutilation but only
an act of forcii" Their right to do so is confirmed by their
civil power to constitute judges who pronounce legally on
criminal matters. Divine law, Suarez thought, contains nothing
to the contrary although ecclesiastical law does forbid the
participation of clerics in warfarin Suarez agreed that the
prince may not be able to authorise the cleric to fight without
commuting a fault, but that he can give him the peer of fighting
without injustici"^ Cajetan, Suarez noted, held that only in
defence of his life could a cleric kill 'with his own hand' wltnout
becoming irregular, and he understood Aquinas to hold the same
opinion, 'although one may say indeed perhaps that the clerics
about wiiom he was concerned were not limited by acts of personal
defence, '^liuarez's own position was one of 'almost certainty'
that a cleric who kill3 with his own hand is not thereay irregular
as long as the war is otherwise just and urgently necessary; or if
the Pope has authorised it. Similarly he accepted the idea that
in exhorting others to take part in a war clerics are exhorting to
(5)
courage and. justice, not homicide. He objected however, to the
idea that war can be waged against pagans on account of their
(1) 327. (2) 328. (3) 330. &) 331. (5) 332.
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idolatry or in order to defend Go<ipand gave sornd mundane
interpretations of the religious wars of the Old Testament.
Many infidels have more intelligence than certain Christians
and are more apt at governing themselvesj war might, however,
be just when waged against cannibals and men worse than brutes,
in order to give than human customs and good government. Suares
could find no just causes of war particular to Christian princes
which have not their foundation in natural law, and which would
(2)
not be applicable to infidels also.
He stressed that once he has undertaken a war, the prince
is obliged to explain its just cause to the enemy and demand a
reasonable reparation, which should include restitution of
what has been taken, repayment of all expenses caused by the
injustice of the enemy, punishment and everything necessary for
(3)
the assurance of future peace. Once war lias begun any means
short of killing of the innocent, may be taken to reach the desired
end of victory. ^
(5)
Molina (1536 - 1600) followed the general lines of thought
of his period. Gui.lt he felt not to be essential for a just war.
Objective injustice i3 sufficient, and he defined two types of it.
When something is innocently taken by the 'enemy' so that the
obligation of returning it proceeds from the thing itself, there
is a sufficient justification for war, but when the damage or
injustice is innocently caused in such conditions that the person
(1) 343. (2) 347* (35 #5. U) 366, 377. ~
(5) : logout: ia Doctrine de la Guerre Juste, pp.250 - 261.
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or nation which commits the harm does not become richer for it,
there is insufficient justification. Like most thinkers he agreed
that a war could be subjectively just on both sides, that arbitration
and resort to law were desirable but not essential, although he
feared .that if such matters were really looked into it would be
found that at least one of the two sides would not be guiltless,
in that they had omitted to examine and study the question most
impartially.
There is evidence then, even among the theologians, of a
(
growing lack of concern about the interior moral aspects of warfare,
and a greater concentration on external issues. A just intention
becomes no longer essential, and it is generally agreed that only
the king need really bother to do all he can to make sure that
his cause - let alone his intention - is just. There is a concession
^ that if the subject is certain that the war is un$ust he must not
fight, but a rather contradictory reassurance that if he is in
doubt his conscience is the responsibility of the king, so that
it would most likely be a waste of time or inappropriate for him
to enquire too deeply into the issue. This surely i3 a misplacing
of responsibility and shews little respect for the moral rights of
the individual. It is not true that the duty to obey compensates
morally for doubt about the justice of the command.
Vitoria and Suarez both assumed too readily that theis is no
divergence between the rulings of natural and divine law on the
question of war, arid that this was Aquinas*s position, but in fact
5 c; 9
accept only one of his interpretations of the command of
individual non-resistance, and ignore the other. They err also in
assuming that the state or public authority is necessarily sure
to act more justly and impartially than an individual, particularly
when the conscience of the state amounts to that of one or at
most a few men. Such a situation is in itself unjust. It is
going further away from tradition and Scripture to admit that
civil law alone can justify the morality of armed defence or
property, or that a mercenary can sell his services with his
conscience. The distinction between exhorting to courage and
exhorting to kill is unrealistic, as is that between killing
and punishing.
The killing and mutilation of persons in the cause of the
objective justice of a situation and for the sake of lands and
property must also be immoral, yet more and more the question of
the guilt of those so sacrificed becomes irelevant, tod the guilt
of those \ho sacrifice them cannot be ignored simply by wasiiing
ones hands of punishment. When it is admitted that war can take
place when the sovereign has only a slight degree of probable
preference on ids side, which means that theie may be almost equal
objective as well as subjective justice on both sides, it seems
superfluous to talk about the justice of war. The justice on
both sides must cancel itself out. The explanation that
conscience can be clear when its doubt is only speculative is
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over-subtle and not true. It should be admitted that in such
circumstances justice also is speculative and uncertain.
The most progressive element in the thought of this period
is the moreworldwide context in which war is considered. Scholars
are at least beginning to consider the question in terms of
international law ad an international court even though the latter
was not then in existence and eventoday is not entirely effective.
It is stressed that war should aim at the good of the whole world,
and there is constant reminding of the need for arbitration.
Among lawyers who were concerned with the justice of war
were Lignano, Lodi, Lupus, Belli, Gentili, Arias, Alvarez, Guerrero
and Ayala.^
The champions of Belli (1502-75)^ and Gentili (1552-1608)^
vie with each other in attributing to their respective favourites
the merit of having been the formative influence behind Grotius, or
ever; of leaving surpassed him in originality and treatment of some
aspects. In both Belli and Gentili there is a tendency to detach
international law from its theological premises, though Belli*a
(1) Salvioli. Grotius himself mentioned most of the writers, and
complained that they said very little, and that they confused natural
law, divine law, the law of nations, civil law, and canon law, and
filed to supply examples from history. Ayala and Gentili were recognised
as having made some valuaole contributions though Ayala, he noted, did
not discuss the causes of war, and Gentili gave only perfunctory treat¬
ment of many important questions, (Prol.38.)
(2) Arrigo Gavaglieri. Intro, to De He ilitari et hello Tractatus.bv
Pierino Belli, in The Glassies of International Law, ec.J.B.Scott, pp.,23a~
(3) Phillipson. Intro, to De lure Belli Bbri Tres. by Alberico
Gentili. The Glassies of International Law. ed.J.B.Scott, pp.5Ga-51a.
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Catholicism meant that in his work they are more strongly in
the background. &Ven so, Arrigo Cavaglieri gives Belli the credit
for being the first to attempt, in spite of traditional ideas
and formulas, to treat international law as an independent
scientific discipline, though based on natural law aid reason.
Belli made a distinction between offensive and defensive
war, Gentili a more detailed division. Both held that a war
waged without prior declaration is unjust, and recommended that
the conqueror be moderate in regard to conditions of peace. Belli
would have prisoners protected from every kind of cruelty.
Both denied the right of a prince to decide a war by 3ingle
combat, and ruled that a pact wnich would implicate an ally in
an onjust war must be null and void. The idea of arbitration
was important for both of them, and Belli held the belligerent
who refused to accept the suggestion of the opposing side to seek
arbitration, guilty of an unjust war.
Gentiii is particularly praised for his positivism and
practical common sense, his respect not merely for morality and
courtesy but for binding law, and his interest in the political
controversies of his day. Writing later than Belli, he paid no
tribute to him, though both acknowledge their debt to Vitoria.
Gontili, however, gave to himself the distinction of being the
first to treat fully the subject.
Certainly PMllipson is convinced that his contribution
was signifieant:-
"When we carefully weigh all these considerations
and bear in mind the differences of the epochs
of these two jurists, the greater difficulties
attending the pioneer woric of the earlier writer,
the remarkable systematizing powers, moral
force and enormous world-wide influence of the
later, we can safely conclude that on the whole
Gentili and Qrotius are the two greatest
contributors to the science of international
law down'to their day# It is unnecessary to
pronounce which occupies the foremost place,
but, whilst Grotius has been for some centuries
universally apotheosized, it is strange that
the earlier, dauntless, clear-eyed explorer and
builder should have been so long neglected."
CHAPTER ELEVEN
THE JUST WAR IK GRGTIUS.
fly the time of Grotius, the world picture was very
different from that of the time of Aquinas. There had arisen the
large nation states, ^jjigland, Prance, Spain Sweden and the
Netherlands. Any visible imperial authority over them or their
rulers had weakened or disappeared, and all reformed states had
repudiated the authority of the Pope. The doctrine of sovereignty
was developing and rules for international matters could no longer
be regarded as rules for the individual morality of princes
but had to regulate the intercourse of states, princes being
regarded in their capacity as rulers of states. There was need
and scope for something that could be called international law
in the modern sense. The great task of Grotius was to attempt
to construct such a system. There was no possible hope for a
world government under a single ruler, all that could be hoped for
was a set of rules which all rulers of states could commonly
accept and follow. The main purpose of his great work was to
persuade the world that there were 3uch rules and. thereby to
prevent anarchy, war and unnecessary bloodshed.
The sources of and the power behind international law are
many arid varied and the object of controversy. Many who think
that only the law of the state with its machinery of legislature,
judiciary and executive to enforce it is law properly so called
have often doubted and denied tliat international law is really law.
Psychological propoganda is an important source of power for laws
between nations and Grotius was indeed, a propogandist, but there
were other influences which inspired him. He was a devout
Protestant and although not, like Aquinas, a religious, he vra.3
concerned to shew the relevance of Ghristianity to the matters
under discussion. Aquinas's answer to the question of war was,
as has been seen, negligible and unsatisfactory. It was
uncreative and ultimately in terms of secular politics. Grotius
is renowned of course for his contribution to the science of
international law, but it might be said that his concern was
equally war, for he saw the former primarily perhaps as a means
of preventing, controlling or breaking the inhuman forces behind
the latter.
It is important to try and see the extent to which Grotius'
understanding of international law, his Christianity and his
ruling on war are related, and whether any differences between
his own and Aquinas'3 thought on the subject are due to his
Protestantism. Mot only was he, like Aquinas, a follower of
Christ's teaching, but he too inherited a belief in natural law
and sought to reconcile them.
In distinguishing between the law of nature and volitional
divine law Grotius however sometimes confounded them. One
difference he noted is that the law of nature or reason has its
direct authority in the intrinsic moral quality of any act, arid
so forbids, commands, judges or permits it, whereas volitional
divine law has its source and reason in the will of God, who by
forbidding or commanding certain things makes them wrong or
right.^
Both laws, however, are divine, aid are unanimous with
regard to what they command and forbid; both are recognised by
(2)
all good man as binding upon the conscience; ' both have their
origin in the will of God, since Ho has willed us to possess
these moral and rational principles and tendencies which shape
our assessment of what, according to the law of nature, is
obligatory or forbidden. And our reason tells us beyond all
cavil, that we must obey the will of God.
Both volitional divine and natural law must be in fact
essentially concerned with the intrinsic morality of human
actions, although in volitional divine law the goodness of
anything is more explicitly determined by the extent to which
it is in accordance with the will of God, ever though this
requirement is by no means lacking in assessing the intrinsic
morality approved by the law of nature. Since it would be
impossible to consider that God eould command a man to do
anything intrinsically bad, the fact that Grotius believed that
(1) Be I.ch.I.X.1-2; XV.lj Prol. 12.
(2) "All good men would agree that no-one should obey anyting
contrary to natural law 6r the divine precepts, for Plato and
the Apostels confirm that to obey God rather than man is an
undoubted rule written in the minds of all. And if such
obedience results in our Suffering injury we must endure it
rather than resist by force." (Be I. ch.IV.1.3.)
God could command 'homicide' or 'theft'^ shews that the
intrinsic goodness of an act ij3 its confirmity with the will of
God. This example emphasises that natural law, too, cannot be
merely concerned with the outward form of am act. If it were
it would be forced mechanically to condemn such apparent 'theft'
or 'homicide'. Natural law must, once it has recognised the
possibility of an overruling divine will, have as its primary
criterion the extent to which anything is in accordance with the
will of God. Natural law i3 bound to this condition and therefore
subordinate to the volitional divine law. Reason is thus dependent
on the will of God. The law of nature must also take circumstances
and relationships as well as motives, into account in 'judging'
an act, as it is as much concerned with moral quality as with
(2)
formal appearance. It flows from principles and results in virtues.
The confusion in Grotius's distinctions between natural law
(3)
and volitional divine law leads to difficulties in his under¬
standing of their working relationship. The root of the inconsistency
is probably that his conception of natural law was too perfectionist.
It3 self-consistent integrity is either the fruit of its limitations
or the easy, unreal perfection of an abstract conception, and
(1) Bk I.ch.I.X.6.
(2) rrol. 39} Bk I. ch.I.X.6.
(3) On the surface there appears to be analogy botweer, the relationship
of volitional and natural divine law, and the compromise of
positivism and naturalism in international law. The analogy has
significance.in so far as the will of men expressed in common consent
is at one with the will of God.
it is an integrity which is liable to be shattered wher. it
faces and attempts to measure the complex and uncertain elements
of human behaviour and experience, or when it is invaded by
the immeasurable dimension of the divine in human life. If
Grotius had admitted rather more imperfection in his definition
of natural law, if he had allowed It more humanity, inadequacy
and imperfection, he might have avoided certain inconsistencies
in his application of it, and thereby made a distinction between
natural law and divine law more significant and possible.
Ms understanding of human nature certainly allowed for this
imperfection.^ But natural law is absolutely unchangeable.^
God cannot alter that which is bad into that which is good,
and Grotius, like Aquinas, heldUwt natural law itself is proof
of this unchangeability.
Although the famous sentence:
'•What we have been saying could have a
degree of validity even if we should
concede that which cannot be conceded
without the utmost wickedness, that
there is no God, or that the affairs
of man are of no concern to Him."(3)
emphasises the independent perfection of natural law, it loses
(1) Gee pp 598-611 below.
(2) Ek I.ch.I.Xll.l; Bk I. en.I. X.5.
(3) Prol.ll. See Gregory of Rimini (d.1358): "si per impo3gibile
ratio divina slve Deus ipse non esset..." rotius probably took
the quotation, however, from Suarez who referred to it without
approving. (De Legibus. Lib.II.c.VI.3.)
some of its force as proof of the 'agnosticism1 of Grotius's
understanding of it when it is seen in the context of his whole
thought and religious attitude, which would have the force of
at least underlining 'a degree'.
Grotius did not suggest that any serious discrepancy
between the reason of God and of man is likely, and in this he
was nearer to Aquinas than to many Protestants. Man's reason
is limited, but the limitations do not affect the moral sense,
as he is reckoned able to grasp the natural law fully.
Yet Grotius admitted that the scope of natural law is
limited, as such inability to discriminate between the finer shades
(1)
of moral values is an obvious imperfection in a moral law.
For what the natural law registers as 'permissible' merely can
be altered by volitional divine or human law into commands or
prohibitions. The permissible is, as it were, neutral ground
(2)
which can be worked on or occupied by either divine or human law.
It was to Grotius outside the sphere of natural law, so that divine
(1) Sk I. ch.II. V.I.
(2) hven that which Grotius considers merely permissible according
to the law of nature might seem to some obligatory. He considers
that a warning declaration of war is not obligatory, although
honorable and praiseworthy. But surely it is the concern of the
law of nature to do all possible to avoid a war.
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and human law can never contradict it. But that which is
permissible to natural law is like the logical - consequential
child of its prohibitions and commands, and inseparable from
(1)
the body of natural law as a whole. Its being forbidden
by a higher or a human law does in a ■way contradict it. If
this prohibition can be accepted as the creation of a new natural
law, this seems inconsistent with the idea that natural law is
eternal and unchangeable. In one sense the principles of
natural law are the only absolute elements in it, commands,
prohibitions and permissions being equally conclusions from them.
Indeed elsewhere Grotius stated that the law of nature is
(2)
directly concerned with what is permissible and not only with
(3)
commands or prohibitions and certainly in relation to the
question under discussion, Grotius almost identified natural law
and permissibility:
"By entitling our Treatise 'On the Law of
War', we mean, in the first place, as
already said, to enquire whether any war
can be just, and then what is just in war.
For Law (jus), in this case, means iimply
what is just| and that in a sense negative
(1) And indeed Grotius himself does admit this when he agrees that
certain things are said to be according to this law not in a
proper sense but, as the Schoolmen say, by reduction, since the
law of nature is not in conflict with them - so that things free
from injustice are called just. See Bk I. ch.I. X.3«
(2)Hk.I. ch.II. 1.3.
(3) Bk I. X.X.
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rather than affirmative, namely that
that is lawful which is not unjust.(l)
It is much more difficult to maintain this distinction
between what is forbidden and what is permissible, which is
the only way Grotius can maintain the relationships of affinity
and difference between divine volitional law arid natural law,
if it be granted that both laws are essentially concerned with
quality of action. Quality, although it may admit of degrees,
is more fluid and cannot so easily be separated into rigid
categories of command, prohibition, permission.
The worst difficulty in reconciling these two laws of God
arises because Grotius admitted that the law of nature is often
morally inferior to the divine law as given for example in the
(2)
gospel. To say that one moral law is inferior to another
higher moral law seems to imply that it is less good, less moral,
indeed that it is by comparison, bad. One. way of escape from
this difficulty may be to take into account the different
potentialities of different persons. Celibacy and the contemplative
life may be higher than marriage and the practical life, but the
majority of men are not able to live successfully a celibate life of
contemplation; if they attempted they would fall into sin and
(1) Bk I. ch.i.III.I.
(2) Prol.50.
eventually into the sin of despair. It could thus be hazarded
that God gives two sets of laws, one for the morally strong,
the other for the weak.
It is similarly difficult to accept that God gives us
simultaneously two contradictory laws, one of which permits
something the other forbidsJ^ but the difficulty may be met
in the same way, by conceiving the commands as addressed to
■M: (2)
different classes of men. Or it may be met by regarding the
law of nature as a stage of moral evolution, to be entirely
replaced by the higher divine law once it has been given.
One might thus expect, on the hypothesis that man's moral
conscience evolves, that the natural law and the divine law, of
both old and new testaments, would each be appropriate for the
time at which it wa3 given, that the particular 'vocation' of
each would be relative to its historical context and to the
stage of moral evolution at the time. This does not appear to
be so, however, for although since 'the law i3 a tutor to lead
us to Christ' they might be harmonised into some evolutionary
pattern of individual spiritual development, they are not
similarly fitted into the moral development of the human race.
71) 'It is not to be wondered at that some things which are permitted
by the natural and the civil laws are forbidden by the divine law'.
(Bk ll.ch.XX.X.l.)
(2) Such an explanation, however, is not so relevant to the question of
war, because it would imply that a certain class of men is inclined by
nature to killing. Once a man's nature is allowed to condition ethics,
everything natural is justifiable. This i3 part of the strength and
the weakness of the natural law theory.
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(1)
For divine law has been with us from the beginning/ and is
the view of Grotius is binding on all men, so far as adequately known
by them. At times the first divine or natural law is described
(2)
as so embryonic as to be hardly deserving of the title law at all.
At other times, Adam is depicted as having a fairly detailed
( 3)
knowledge of virtue and vice. Elsewhere however it appears that
Grotius thought that the first divine law has not been given to
all mankind but only to the whole of mankind living at the time
of Adam, because many primitive peoples have never received a law
that they must worship God, and are to be excused for not doing 30.
Natural law, although coming from God does not invariably
(5)
have anything to say about the worship of God, ' else being
an innate, human law, it would be forced to condemn idolatry. But
it reckons as impious merely and not erroneous the worship of men
(1) 3k I.eh.I.XV .2.
(2) Bk II. ch.II.II.l. The simplicity of the first races of men was
proved by their nakedness. They were rather ignorant of vice than
acquainted with virtue.
(3) "Now these laws, and also the law that brothers and sisters
should not marry, the Jews think were given to Adam at the same time
with the laws to worship God, to administer justice, not to shed blood,
not to worship false gods, not to take what is another's." (Bk Il.ch.V.
XIII.5«)'These, as the Jewish doctors teach, were bound to obey the
laws given to Adam arid to Noah, to abstain from idols and from blood,
and some other matters...* (Bk I.eh.I.XVI.3.) 'And the Jews say
that among the laws givers to Noah, were precepts that not only homicide,
but adultery incest and robbery should be planished with death.' (Bk I.
ch.II- V.8.)
(4) Bk II. ch.XX.XLVII.4.
(5) Though the business of the first races is described as being
the worship of God in Bk II.II.II.I.
r~ C) *
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'whose life was marked with wicked deeds', ^and does not judge
such worshippers worthy of human punishment. It is not that
these men are ignorant of the law of nature because apart i*om
it being an innate and universal law they sometimes worship
the 'souls of those who have been pre-eminent for their virtue
and their ben factions to the human race'. God obviously must
desire and command the highest goodness for us, if only as an
incentive, though also He must prefer that which is better, even
if not best, rather than the worst. There is no compulsion in
the command of God, since God cannot will man's moral perfection,
He can only desire it, and He can surely not desire what is
morally inferior.
One of the dangers of having two moral laws is that
natural law, by professing to be 'divine' while permitting
certain things which are contrary to the true divine law, may
hinder obedience to it, by giving the sanction of law and
morality to something not utterly good, thus misleading and
wrongly satisfying the conscience. This adds to its own immorality,
for even natural law obliges us to strive for the highest good
and condemns anything which, even though lawful in itself, hinders
(2)
a greater moral good. '
(1) Bk II. Gh.XX. XLV11.4-.
(2) "Even if the thing promised be not unlawful, but something
impeding a greater moral good, the oath will not be valid} because
we are bound by God to aim at a moral progress} so that we may not
take this liberty for ourselves.1' (Bk Il.ch.XIII.VII.I.)
Grotius thought that by comprehending and morally over¬
whelming the Old Testament, the hew Testament has made the Old
as far as moral precepts and teaching are concerned, in a certain
sense redundant.
What was commanded by the Law of Moses, he regarded as
upheld by the Gospel, so the former stands in the same relation
to the Gospel as does the law of nature.^ The pari; of the law of
Koses which is different from the law of nature was that which was
(2)
of unique relevance to the Jews, ' and Grotius used the fact
that certain Mosaic laws regarding judgement and punishment were
still accepted during Jesus' lifetime and apparently tolerated by
him, as proof that similar human and political laws have equal
authority.And yet he allows that certain Mosaic Laws,
particularly those relating to punishment Christ did not tolerate
but contradicted, as in Matthew V.2., inasmuch as he enforced
what were recommendations to the Hebrews with greater breadth
and depth. Grotius was here not very consistent, though perhaps
it should be said that Christ himself appears not to be so.
Grotius, however, made a further distinction between what
divine law enjoins and what it recommends, although he stated
(1) Bk II. ch.XX.X.8. 'The Lew Testament... in its teaching respecting
the moral virtues enjoins the same as the Old Testament or even enjoins
greater precepts." (Prol.48) Bk I.ch.I.XVII.l - 4*
(2) Bk I. ch.I. XV1.7.
(3) Bk II.ch.XX.X.8.
W "The Hebrew Law permitted men to revenge the graver injuries, not
by their own hand, but be recourse to the judge. Christ, however, does
not permit the same to usj as appears by the opposition, "Ye have
heard it said - But I say unto you."(Bk II.ch.XX.X.2.) Also see Bk I.
oh.II.VI.3 - 5)
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also that he used the Hew Testament to explain what is (finally
no doubt( permissible to Christians. What divine law recommends,
however, was not reckoned by him as obligatory or punishable if
not followed,^ even though other disobedience or sin is more
(2)
heavily to be punished than before the Gospel was given. It
seems inconsistent and even unchristian that we are not to be held
seriously guilty for neglect of these laws which are formally
recommended rather than commanded. In the context of a relation¬
ship between God and man a distinction between what is recommended
and what is commanded is hardly possible, especially as the Gospel
*
contains the command 'Be ye perfect' which must comprehend all
•recommendations'. The idea that we may hope for praise if we
strive after the highest excellence, without expecting blame or
punishment if we fail to do so, is not only illogical but reveals
an inadequate realisation of the sinfulness of human nature, though
it is true that the civil power may not be the appropriate
administrator of such punishment. Christians are capable of and
achieve varying degrees of goodness, but all are called by Christ
to the same excellence of life, a peasant as much as a Pope or monk.
The distinction Grotius drew between what is 'merely Christian'
and what 'of conspicuous holiness' seems indeed unchristian.(3)
(1) Prol.50.
(2) Bk II. ch.XX.XI.I.
(3) Bk I.oh.II.X.9. (See p.595 below)
But here, of eovrse, he followed tradition.
Grotius gave examples of actions, such as second marriage,
which are 1 laudable, excellent, very agreeable to God, but are
(1)
not required of us by any law of necessity'. ' Kow according
erven to reason,anything can be very agreeable to God yet not
required of us is curious. The examples prove that once God has
been introduced into a human life even divine rules of command,
prohibition and permission are inadequate as guides for moral
conduct wiiich must flow from the total situation of the human being
in his unique relationship to God. Grotius made a point of
(2)
dissociating himself from those who claim that the Gospel adds
to the law of nature only ordinances relating to faith and
sacraments. He did not hesitate to point out how inferior to
Christian morality justice can be, and he resisted the idea that
we are not bound by the laws of Christ beyond the limits of
obligation imposed by the law of nature. He criticised those who
make an effort to prove that what the Gospel forbids is forbidden
also by the law of nature and pointed out how, for example, the
Gospel, though not the law of nature, enjoins vis to expose
ourselves to the danger of death for others, and approved the
quotation of Justin Martyr, that 'to live according to nature is
(3)
the condition of him who has not yet come to believe.'s '
(1) Hk I. ch.II. IX.3J Also see Bk III. ch.IV.II.I.
(2) 3k I. ch.II. VI.1.
(3) Bk I.ch.II. VI.2.
He admitted that the Gospel makes more demands upon us
than does the law of natures the latter, and even many theologians,
he stated, teach that we have a right to kill a man in defence
of property, but noted that the Gospel forbids this, and
how worthy of praise is the man who prefers to be killed rather
than to kill.
Similarly, he noted that the law of nations sometimes permits
capital punishment for the sake of individual or public good, but
thought this unsafe for a Christian, who should follow Christ's
teaching not to judge.^ It is a Christian, if not a human duty,
(2)
willingly and freely to forgive offences.
In discussing the relfcvance of Biblical revelation to the
questions of war Grotius was able to find much confirmation of
its justice in the Old Testament, which records many divine wars.
Deceit,^'1' both the slaughter of women and children^ and also
(5)the exempting of women, infants or virgins from such punishment '
(6)
the use of spies, and taking of spoil and retaining of booty
and the rendering of a portion of it to God* are all guarnateed
(1) 3k II.ch.XX. XVI.
(2) Bk II. eh.XXIV. III.I.
(3) Bk III ch.l.
(4) Bk III eh.IV. Psalm 137 is qixoted.
(5) Bk III. ch.XI.
{$) Bk III. eh.IV.
(7) Bk III.ch.XVI.
as good, as are pacts for mutual aid between religious and
pagan nations. Sod is revealed as punishing wicked men and
(1)
even rejoicing over their destruction, mocking and laughing,
although since the actions of God are different from those of
men the latter ought not to do each other harm except for the
sake of some good to be allowed. With God the case is different,
the action of God may depend on His Supreme Right and Authority.
The saying 'Whos© sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his
(2)
blood be shed1 proves, he reckoned, that God allows the
punishment of homicides and other criminals.
Grotius's most insistent argument for the permanent validity
of the Mosaic Law which established such punishment, was that it
continued during and after the life of Christ. He stressed that
although Christ gave different precepts, he did not destroy the
Law, and if Kis precepts could stand with the law of Moses which
accepted capital punishment, they could also stand with human
laws which do the same. He suggested that the great mercy of God
shown in the hew Covenant is especially applicable to those sins
(3)
committed without knowledge of the Gospel. 'Transgressions
committed after this are likely to bring upon sinners much more
severe judgements than those instituted by Ptoses. The Gospel, then,
he saw as occasioning the intensifying rather than the abolishing,
of punishment.
(1) Proverbs 1.26; Isaiah 1.24.
(2) Genesis IX.5 - 6.
(3) 3k II.ch.XX.X.8.
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Nowhere did Christ or His Apostles speak of the cessation
of the Mosaic Lav* Christ stated that He had come not to
destroy but to fulfil the law, but if Christ had forbidden
the capital punishment of murderers He would have destroyed the
law.^ Paul, indeed, explicitly stated that the High Priest
(2)
was appointed to judge persons according to the law.
Grotiua made a very significant point in stressing several
times that the absence of any clear and explicit teaching of
Jesus on such a grave issue as war suggests that He had nothing
original to sayj what is relevant in Ms teaching is either very
(l)
general or obscure.x '
Such teaching would have been particularly appropriate at
the conversion of Cornelius, but there is no proof that he was
instructed by Peter about the unchristian character of hi3
military life. Similarly Grotius argued that if fuller teaching
on war had been given orally to the apostles, some record of this
would have been established in the tradition of the church, w ich
would not universally have deserted it. He pointed out that of
all the bishops who had suffered intensely for their religion
at the time of Constantino, not one attempted to rebuke him for
condoning capital punishment or military service. The Church
(1) 8k I. oh.II. VII.8.
(2) Acts. XXIII.3.
(3) Bk I. ch.II. VII.6.
supported war, and although Tertullian and Origen sometimes
appeared to denounce Christian warfare, they were inconsistent
and in other sections of their work praised it. The denunciation,
he thought in any case referred more to the idolatrous practices
associated with militarism at that time, and such writers also
were very individualistic - they 'like to go in a path of their
own' ^
Grotius thought that it was because the early Christians
were animated by so ardent a desire for what was best that they
often accepted the divine counsels as if they had been commands.
Grotius himself accepted the ban on Christian participation in
(2)
warfare as 'laudable, excellent and very agreeable to God' y but
not as necessary or obligatory. And quoting Ambrose who writes in
his Seventh Sermon that 'It is not soldiering which is a sin but
soldfering for plunder' and in his Duties 'The courage which defends
our country from barbarians abroad or the helpless from harm at home,
or society from roboers, is complete justice* he concluded, 'This
(3)
argument seems to me so strong that I require nothing more.'
The fact that clerics were specially forbidden warfare only
proved, to him that non-cleriC3 were not so forbidden.^
(1) 8k, I. ch.II. IX.2.
(2) Bk I. ch.II. IX.4.
(3) I. ch.II. IX.9.
(4) Hk I. ch.II. IX.9.
On the other hand, Grotius honestly accepted and praised
the superiority of the Gospel's teachings, and recommendations.
One difference between the kingdom of Christ and other kingdoms
is that the former Cannot be defended by arms. He acknowledged
that it is our duty as Christians to forgive willingly and
freely all offences against us, as Christ forgave our offences.
He emphasised that even when we have a right to fi&ht a just war,
it is mostly more pious to give up one's rights for it is
particularly suitable for Christians to sacrifice even their
lives in order to further the lives and salvation of others and
in so doing to imitate the perfect example of Christ who died
for us while we were unwilling and hostile, which is a reason
why we should not pursue our rights or dues to the inconvenience
(l)
of others to so great an extent as is inevitable in warfare.
hisewhere he remarked that although Christ died for us not all the
acts of Chri3t are such as proceed from a law or make a law for us.
In some cases abstention from pursuing our rights is not
merely praiseworthy but a duty, and in some cases even if we are
attacked we should prefer the salvation of the assailant to our
own life because Christ requires that we love our enemies and
because the assailant may be a man who is of great value to the
(1) Bk II. ch.XXIV. He made another distinction later between that
wnich is legal and that which is just in international morality,
and although he did not consider Christian teaching as applicable
to states, he thought they should follow true justice. See pp. 623^
below.
community. Here he claimed that if Christ enjoins us to give
up some things in order to avoid strife, how much more must
he want us to give up greater things in order to avoid war.^
Elsewhere, though, in discussing the relevance of the Sermon
on the Mount, he followed the interpretation which stresses that
the teaching about non-resistance wa3 deliberately limited to
trivial injuries and to situations where non-resistance does not
involve much inconvenience. Otherwise Jesus would have specifically
said, "Resist not an injurious aggressor but give up your lives
rather tnan use arms." Jesus might have us walk the extra mile
but would not expect us to walk 100 miles. He might ask us to give
up a coat or cloak but not our means of livelihood. Such teaching
was he thought in any case addressed not to public authorities but
to individuals.^
The Hebrews too were asked to love their neighbours, but at
the same time their law pronounced capital punishment for murderers.
The Gospel does demand a greater love, but even such love should
discriminate in favour of the innocent. Even God, who sends His sun
and rain on the just and unjust alike, punishes, and it is this love
(3)of the innocent which occasions capital punishment and wars.
(1) 3k II.ch.XXrV.ll.3. Similarly he argued that since Christ commands
us not to hurt the person who strikes us, how much less may we kill him?
(Hk ll.ch.l.X.l.)
He alsc- said"...for if Christ directs us to give up our coat arid cloke,
and Paul, to suffer unjust loss, rather than have recourse to the
bloodless contest of lawj they would have directed us to give up things
of greater value, rather than put to death a man, the image of God, and




Grotius followed Aquinas in noting that Paul distinguished
between punishment for the sake of the public good, which the
magistrate inflicts in the place of God, and which is indeed
God's vengeance, and the passion of revenge, which He had always
condemned. God raised up Christian emperors for the defence of
His Church.
The 'powers that be' are ordained of God and government
is a pious office though held by impious men.^ Romans XIII
(2)
proves that taxes are right, and if taxes, arras. Paul, in
saying 'if I be an offender or have commited anything worthy of
death I refuse not to die', proves the goodness of capital punishment.
In Revelation the wars of the righteous against the wicked are
predicted with approval, and indeed punis raent and defensive war
(3)
come under the virtues of justice and well-doing. ' Paul accepted
the protection of soldiers, and John the Baptist approved of them.
Grotius went to lengths to prove the oneness of Jesu3 and John
on this point.
Such epistles as that of Leo w ich rule that one may not
return to a military life after an act of penitence, he thought
not really relevant, since penitents, like clerical persons and
ascetics were required to lead a life not only Christian but of
(1) Bk I. ch.II. VII.4.
(2) ik I. ch.II. VII.12
(3) Bk I. ch.II. VII.15
eminent purity.^
In discussing the relevance of Peter's sword he stated
that Jesus' command 'Buy a sword' is a proverbial saying and
that the remark shows merely what was customary in those days
and what the apostles thought lawful. When Jesus rebuked Peter
for using it, He was condemning revenge but not defence. Romans
XII. 17 similarly condemns vindictive but not self-defensive
conduct.^
Grotius did concede, however, that God, who has absolute
right over our lives, might have demanded from us forbearance
to such an extent that erven when brought privately into danger
we should be bound to allow ourselves to be killed rather than
to kill. Whether He did so intend seemed uncertain to Grotius,
though he thought such forbearance not obligatory, as in the
Gospel we are told to love our neighbours as ourselves, not better
(3)
than ourselves, and the Gospel does not forbid us putting our
own safety first when there is common danger.^
There is no doubt that Grotius thoroughly approved of the
right of consientious objection and thought that even when wars
are just, Christians who are unwilling to light should be excused.
(1) 3k I. ch.II. X.9. (Gee p. 586 above)
(2) 3k I. ch.III. III.6 - 7
(3) Bk 1. ch.III.III.3.
(4) 3k I. ch.III.III.1-3
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To abstain from lawful military service is particularly holy,
and traditionally followed by ecclesiastical persons and
penitentsj it is to be recommended to all others, and he noted
how Origan in Contra Gelsum, called all Christians priests,
following Revelation 1.6 and 1 Peter II.5.Christs kingdom
he reckoned as being of a different nature from earthly kingdoms.
It is accepted that the earthly king should use force, but in
(2)
this he is unlike a bishop. On the other hand the opinion that
arms are forbidden to all Christians, such as was held by John
Feru3 and Erasmus, he reckoned as quite extreme and although
motivated by a desire to balance the weight of evil, unwise.
War is, however, not one of the acts of life, it is essentially
inhuman, and so horrible that only the highest necessity or the
deepest charity could make it right.
The New Testament teaching on non-resistance was applied most
definitely by Grotius, as by Aquinas, to the duties of subjects
towards their rulers. Such non-resisting he reckoned as an
obligation, and absolute submission to the ruler as absolute
submission to God, even though this ruler be a tyrant.(3) The
early Christians he said did not deviate from this rule for they
never joined in any rebellion against the most wicked emperors.
Christ counselled flight to Christians who are in danger of death,
(1) Bk II. ch.XXVI. V.l-2
(2) Bk II. ch.XXIII. XIV.3
(3) Bk I. ch.IV. IV-Vii.
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Peter says that Christ has left us an example and we are to
rejoice if we suffer as Christians.^ By such patience the
Christian religion grew strong, as when the Theban legion refused
to resist and was decimated for refusing to sacrifice. He who
loses his life saves it.
The killing of the innocent was likewise forbidden by the
Gospel, and also the murder of him who is preparing to kill.
Christ commands us to take a buffet rather than to hurt our
(2)
adversary, so how much less may we kill him. Neither may we
kill in defence of our property unless it is something on which
thelife of ourselves or our family depends.
(1) I Peter II.21j I Feter 17.12 - 14
(2) Hk II. ch.I. X.I.
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In spite of his conceding superiority to the Gospel
recommendations of lover and non-resistance Grotius's own
standpoint, that some warfare can be right and just, was that
of natural law.^
Grotius's natural law teaching however rests on a questionable
understanding of human nature. It is not easy to follow his
distinctions between the spiritual rational and animal elements,
nor was he clearer about the relation of nature within man to nature
without. Moreover, he did not allow that sin touched and weakened
the power of reason, whose omniscience in moral matters he took
for granted, without marking its bounds or the danger of its
moving in a wrong direction. Without modern biological and
psychological knowledge Grotius could hardly have avoided what must
appear to us such vagueness in handling human nature and human
reason, and his wide and many-sided usages of the word nature only
shew how hard it was for him to deal with them within the scientific
framework and terminology of his own day. Although Grotius held
that clear-thoughted speech is one of man's distinguishing marks
he himself used nature to mean at different times the law of nature,
the good in human nature, the bad in human nature, and all of human
nature. But Grotius was only like Aquinas and other writers of the
past in that he had to use old fashined tools.
(1) See p. 593- above.
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For although Grotius defined natural law as that law
which is based on and in accord with what he considered as
the 'best' elements in man, that is, those which are distinctively
human, such as sociability, reason and moral sense, and not on
hman nature as a whole, since that contains bad elements, his
explicit statements often identified the law of nature with the
whole nature of man.^ At times he even singled out one of the
less worthy tendencies, such as ruthless self-assertion, as quite
in accord with natural law, and ruled that acts unavoidable to
human nature cannot be punished by men, noting that certain
(2)'
philosophers deem sin to be natural.
He did not try to explain how the fear, the allurement of
(3)
immediate pleasure and rash impulse ' which he acknowledged as
existing in man, could be truly part of man's rational nature
since they are obviously contrary to it. And since 'to God as our
Creator... we owe all that we are or have', Grotius should not
have used the fact that God is the creator of human nature as
guarantee of the perfection of its descendant, the law of nature,
because, presumably, the animal impulses and instinctive passions
(1) "For, as we have said in the beginning of this book, it is ,
enough, if anything i3 contrary to human nature, to prove it unlawful."
(fik 11.ch. V.X11.3.) "Per the Mother of Right, that is, of Natural
Law, is human nature". (?rol.l6.)
(2) 13k II. ch.XX.XIX.l.
(3) "... we may understand that it is congruous to human nature to
follow in such matters also, a judgement rightly framed; not to be
misledby fear or the temptation of present pleasures nor to be carried
away by blind and thoughltess impulse; and that what is plainly
repugnant to such judgement, is also contrary to Ius. that Is to
Natural Law." (Prol.9.)
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were created by Him too, and many of these are bad. He implied
that these bad tender.cies are solely man's responsibility, but
if this is so they might be described as no less essentially
and distinctively human than the moral and rational tendencies.
In any case, since the 'animal' passions are the worst human
elements, it is likely that man is as innocent of their origin
and existence as are animals, although he has the responsibility
of controlling them once his reason and moral sense tell him to.
And although Grotius's own opinion is not necessarily to be
identified with that of the writer he quoted, he seems to have
agreed that wrong may have a purely external origin, and that
(1)
morality is more or less the art of avoiding it. ' On such an
interpretation, therefore, sin as such, arises from the misuse of
reason. Freedom, he seemed to think no innate quality or
possession of man. Man is not a slave by nature, but he is not
by nature a creature that cannot be a 3lave. His position in
(2)
relation to freedom or slavery is neutral. '
It is not clear where Grotius drew the line between bad and
(1) "To return to the point whence I started, the truth is that some
virtues do tend to keep passions under control; but that is not because
such control is a proper and essential characteristic of every virtue.
Rather it is because right reason, which virtue everywhere follows, in
some things jr escribes the pursuing of a middle course, in other stimu¬
lates to the utmost degree... With truth, therefore, it was said by
Aulus Gollius, that there are some things of which the extent is limited
by no boundaries - the greater, the more ample they are, the more excellent
Lactantius, having discussed the passions at great length, says 'The
method of wisdom consistsin controlling not the passions, but their
causes, since they are stirred from without. And putting a check upon
the passions themselves ought not to be the chief concern, because they
may Be feeble in the greatest crime, and verv violent without leading to
(2) Bk II.ch.XXII.XI. crime.' "(Prol.A5)
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good. At one point it seems that he identified unselfishness
with what is good, and therefore in accord with the law of nature
and justice. But generally he seems to have thought a balance
between selfishness and unselfishness sufficiently just. At times
he even justified straightforward self-seeking. Grotius did not
dispute Camcades* reasoning that there can be no moral law of
nature where there i3 only self-seeking, but he tried to prove
that man, in fact, is both selfish and unselfish, and thought that
to answer Carneades he need only prove that he is not wholly
selfish.^ Justice, therefore, he thought really identifiable
not with unselfishness, but rather with a balance of selfishness
(O
and unselfishness. But Grotius did not say how such a balance
was to be aohieved, or remark on the dangers of such a theory.
Indeed, although a harmony of mutual interests in society is a
possibility, so too is open conflict, or a balance which is
nothing more than a stalemate. This use of sociability as a proof
that man is not self-seeking fits very awkwardly with lis other
belief that mutual self-seeking is of the nature of all human
(3)
social structures.
(1) "And among these properties which are peculiar to man, is a
desire for society, that is, a desire for a life spent in common with
fellow-men, and not merely spent somehow, but spent tranquilly, and
in a manner corresponding to the character of his intellect... And
therefore the assertion, that, by nature every animal is impelled only
to seek its own advantage or good, if stated so genera% as to
include man, cannot be conceded." (Prol.6.7.8.)
(2) Later he proved that justice is not folly because it serves the
interests of the self.
(3) "But Natural Law is reinforced by Utility. For the Authors of
Nature ordained that we should, as individuals, be weak, and in need
of many things to make life comfortable, in order that we might be
the more impelled to cling to society." (Prol.l6.)
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Sociability, therefore, may indeed be a mere cloak for
self-interest, and be more inspired by the desire of gain rather
than by the desire to give. And in man the gregarious instinct
may often be in conflict with his spiritual nature. Indeed it
seems that the law of nature to some extent, and human laws to
an even greater, are necessitated by the anti-social tendencies in
man, some of which impel him to seek and exploit society for his
own benefit, some of which spring out of the state of society,
too close proximity to others causing strife and immorality. As
Freud emphasised in Totem and Taboo the existence of any law is a
proof of a tendency to disobey it.
Grotius can hardly have believed that the social impulse in
itself necessarily leads to social harmony, nor that it is
sufficient to bring it about since he allowed the need for coercion:
"Truly we cannot doubt that generally we
do attain to this good (public tranquility)
through the agency of the powers of government,
for no-one wishes to bring harm upon himself,
and the good fortune of the ruler consists in
the good fortune of the subject. 'May there be
those whom you rule' one of the ancients said.
Among the Jews there is a proverb, 'If there were
no public Authority, men would swallow one another
alive'. The same thought is found in Ghrysostom,
in 'If there were no rulers of states, we should
be living a life more wild than the life of wild
beasts, not only biting one another, but
devouring one another' ".
Indeed, he often allowed that the nature of man is much more
self-seeking than altruistic,^ and that
right to be selfish. In darker he thought
to prefer one*s own life and interests to
it is therefore morally
it perfectly permissible
those of others.
The natural social tendencies, then, are not a reliable
source for a moral law, neither is man'3 self-centred individualism,
however much the latter may have appeared to Grotius to be based
on the right of the individual to life. The 'right of the
individual to life' is different from 'the right of the individual
to defend himself, for this may be done at the expense of the
right to life of others.^
That Grotius really meant perserving one's own life rather
than preserving life is proved by the fact that according to
'expletive justice', which is identifiable with the law of nature,
(3)
one may take life in order to recover stolen property. Here life
as such is no longer the first consideration. Grotius believed
(1) "And certainly if we only look at Nature that cares much less
for ties of society than the defense of the individual." (3k II.
ch.I.I?.)
(2) "And this right of defence arises from the natural right of
self-protection, not from the injustice or fault of another who
makes the danger. And therefore this right of self-protection
is not taken away, even if the aggressor be blameless." (3c II.
ch.I.III.)
(3) "If we regard corrective justice, I do not deny that in
order to preserve our good% the robber, if need be, may be killed:...
whence it follows that if we regard Natural Law alone, the thief
flying with his plunder may, if the goods cannot otherwise be
recovered, be slain with a missile." (3k II. ch.I.XI.)
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that slaying in self-defence is permissible by the law of
nature, and that death may be dealt even to ward off an
ominous, threatening assault.^ Nature lias its own ruthless
(2)
power and authority. '
The right and good of society, however, are allowed to
(3)
overrule individual reckonings on occasion. If this were
taken as a general principle it would limit or even negate
some individual rules elsewhere sanctioned. Grotius, indeed,
insisted that regard for society, as distinct from natural
instinct, is a qualifying principle of natural law.
In relating self-defence to self-preservation in general,
Grotius took the definition of the first principles of nature
from Cicero, who stressed the right of self-preservation} and
went on to outline the •organic relationship1 between this
primitive instinct and the law of nature.
The first principle of self-preservation 'commands us to
right reasons'. Yet reason ought to be more dear to us than the
in instinct of self-preservation, which implies that reason does
(1) "For although a buffet and death are very unequal yet he who
is about to do me an injury, thereby gives me a right, that is a
moral claim against him, in infinitum, so far as I cannot otherwise
repel the evil." (Bk II. ch.I.X.I.)
(2)"Nature is conceived to give a right to do everything without
which that cannot be obtained which nature demands." (I3k Il.Ch.V.V.)
(3) "On the other hand, it may happen that because the life of the
aggressor is useful to many, he cannot be killed without sin, and
that not only by the divine law, but by Natural Law."(Hk Il.ch.i.IX.I.)
not unconditionally support it. It seems that the law of nature
as understood by Grotius was really a compromise between primitive
natural instinct, and the moral demands of pure reason; although
not so precise or scrupulous as divine and human law, it was for
Grotius obviously superior to the authority of pure instinct.
All warp, for example, are justified by the first principles of
nature,^ whereas only those which are not in conflict with the
(2)
nature of society are justified by the law of nature. '
In the first case reason has not advanced beyond simple
approval of a more instinct, and from the point of view of a single
individual; as war is a social activity, it cannot be justified
from a purely individual outlook, for reason would show that only
those wars are justified which save more lives than would have been
saved if they had not been fought. Justification of this instinct
alone, apart from its relation to war, is only possible if nature
is considered ambiguously and non-rationally, for in nature a3 a
whole the instinct to preserve life is partly used to destroy life.
In war the end is not necessarily the preservation of life and
limb at all, but the preservation of one's own life and limbs,
(1) "In the first principles of nature there is nothing which is
repugnant to war; indeed all thing3 rather favour it: for the end of
war, the preservation of life and limb, and the retention or acquisition
of things useful to life, agrees entirely with that principle."(3k I.
Ch.II.1.4.) Professor Ilart aocs in the need and will to survive one
indisputable element of the law of nature, which depends on and
justifies human laws and social institutions.(H.L.A.Hart: The Concept
of Hav. p.187.)
(2) "As we have said abuve, that when we examine ooneeming Natural
Law we inquire whether, anything can be done not unjustly; and then that
is understood to be unjust, which has a necessary repugnance with a
rational and social nature." (Bk.I. ch.II.l.3.)
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which is not only a different aim, but one which may have
contradictory results. War has not only an aim but also a
result, and even though the former may be consistent with the
first principles of human nature, the latter may lead to the
very opposite of what is sought. The self may be killed or
hurt a3 well as or instead of others. As war involves the
intention of mutual killing, it can hardly be said that there
is nothing in it which opposes even self-preservation. Modern
psychology would hold that homicidal and suicidal tendencies
are very powerful, ard the desire for death present as well as
the desire for life. Man is both worse and better than the
animals and men do not always seek the preservation of their own
lives or even the life of others or life as a whole. They may
fight for ideals, property or a way of life. The preservation of
their own lives is to some, therefore, incidental.
Grotius did not think the law of nature prohibited war
unconditionally, but only those wars which are in conflict with
society and which attempt to remove human rights.^ He agreed,
however, that war can be fought against those who sin against nature
(1) "Again, right reason and the nature of society, which are next
to be considered, do not prohibit all force, but that only which is
repugnant to societyj that is, that which is used to attack the
rights of others." (Bk I. ch.II.l.$.)
: GOT
in contrast to the opinions of Vitoria, Vasquez, Azorius and
Molina*^
He said little about how the world outside man is governed,
although he believed it to be created by God. But in animals, and
in men who are not fully mature, it would seem that the 'extrinsic
reason', presumably of God, works only inconsistently; some
(2)
activities in the universe, are not governed by reason alone,v
which implies weakness in organisation or the human power to
understand it even in the world of nature. Sin or imperfection
outside the human mind seems not to have occimed to him.
GrotiU3 set too great store by reason alone. Man has, he
sait^ a power to estimate the consequences of his actions, which is
(3)the source of justice. ' But he did not allow for the unknow-
ability of the future, the many dilemmas caused by man's inability
to forecast consequences and his imperfect power to analyse moral
situations. The relation between reason and the moral sense he
asslimed rather than explained, and he nowhere thought out the
connection between the knowing and the doing of what is right in
(1) 3k II. ch.XX. XL.4.
(2) Indiscussing the objection of Garneades that justice is not to
be found in nature Grotius did not deny that animals are mainly
motivated by self-gratification, though he claimed that thi3 i3
tempered by a limited altruism which proceeds from extrinsic reason
but with other acts this is not so. (Prol.7.)
(3l £rol«9.
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moral terras. Although the inadequacy of the law of nature is
not explicitly emphasised, it is oft©:; revealed. It is inadequate
(1)
as a judge of many human actions, 'particularly of those sinful
acts inevitable to human nature. This is a human concession,
but it introduces a consideration which, if thoroughly applied
by the moral reason, would not only undermine its authority as
judge, but also its absoluteness of form, since any law or moral
judgement would then have to be relative to the uniqueness of the
individual.^
Human natureitself is a hindrance to the efficiency of the
law of nature, not only because of its intangibility of motive,
but because of the complexity of human action.^
Sometimes the law of nature is hardly rational at all,
cohabitation being sufficient to constitute a natural marriage.^
Grotius's understanding of human nature was awry when he
implied that polygamy but not polyandry is permissible according
to natural law. Apart from the fact that here 'natural law'
seems based purely on instinct rather than on reason, there is
(1) Bk II. ch.XX. mil, XIX, XX, Bk II. ch.IV, III.
(2) "Then again there are other acts which are inevitable, not to
human nature properly, but to this particular person at this moment, on
account of the constitution of the body affecting the mind, or
inveterate habit." (Bk II. ch.XX. XIX.)
(3) "... not everything which is contrary to the law of Nature is void
by Natural Law...* (Bk II. ch.V. X. I.)
U) 3k II. ch.V. VIII.2.
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no biological or psychological justification for the idea that
man is polygamous rather than monogamous by nature, or that even
if man is polygamous, woman is not polyandrous. ^1'
Sometimes the law of nature is in perfect accord with pure
(2)
instinct. ' let at times natural law is not wholly identified
with what is natural. For example, altnougn punishment in the
sense of vindication is permissible by natural law, the feeling tone
which accompanies it - Vengeance', i3 rejected as on animal passion.
Yet though it can be done in theory, it is not easy to separate
these psychologically, particularly since the feeling is sometimes
considered as the inspiring force of the act. Animals certainly
act vindictively, but we cannot measure their feelings. It is
probably man who is more liable to indulgein feelings of rervenge.
The distinctively bad is often the distinctively human, for human
nature is not a mere joining of animal nature and reason.
(3)
On the question of punishment, 'GrotiU3 was not always
consistent as to the ruling of the law of nature. Sometimes he
said punishment is only justified if it is preventive, or for
(1) Bk II. ch.V. VIII, See above p .273
(2) "Therefore, he who is the cause of a man's existance, ought, as
far as he can aid as far as is necessary, to provide him with
the things necessary to human life, that is, natural and social
life." (Bk II. ch.VII. IV. 1 - 2)
(3) Bk II. ch.XX.
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the fixture improvement of the offender, or for the good of
society and so on. Llsewhere he wrote
"... moreover among those things which nature
itself declares are permissible and not
sinful are those, that he who does evil shall
suffer evil." (1)
And he seemed to assert to this latter view more whole-heartedly
and often. Perhaps the paradox is be3t expressed in the statement
that 'uVery punishment... contains something which, viewed in
itself, is opposed, not indeed to justice, but to regard for
others'. He believed that even if the cause of war is not punishment
the just side should have the power of inflicting punishment in a
just war. Revenge itself is irrational and opposed to natural
(2)
law, but vindictive punishment even though it is an innate
power and not a rational opinion is not; it is 'that by which
in defence or vengeance we repel force and insult from us and those
(3)
who should be dear to us, and by which we punish offenders.'
Finally, Grotius's understanding of natural law wa3 weak
because he did not really reckon with 3ins of omission. It is,
as Grotius himself admitted, a mainly negative law. Yet
the essential evil of human nature is most manifest in sins of
tiJLs kind. We are. not to punish actions which are contrary
(1) 8k II. ch.XX.12.
(2) "... for anger is, in brutes as in man, a heat of the blood
arising from the desire of revenge, which appetite is irrational...
but such an appetite considered in itself, does not correspond
to oir rational pari;,.... and consequently, not to Natural Law..."
(3k II. ch.XX.V.1-2)
(3) Hk II. ch.XX.VIII.2.
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to the virtues in regard to which nature rejects all such
compulsion, such as mercy, liberality, gratitude,^ erven
presumably when the neglect of such virtues may lead to great
suffering or starvations
"Thou shalt not kill; but need'st not strive
Officiously to keep alivei" (2)
His idea of natural law was in theory sometimes too divine
(3)
and sometimes too human while in practice it was often too human,
although not, perhaps, in the sense that the fullness of human
nature, from its depths to its heights, has beer: included.^
(1) Sk II. ch.XX.XX.l.
(2) A.H. Glough: The Latest Oecalogue.And yet Grotius calls wrong
"... every fault, either of do -ing or of omission, which is at
variance with what men ought to do..." (Bk Il.dh.XVII.l.)
(3) "If anyone be in danger of receiving a buffet, or the like evil,
some hold that he lias a right to protect himself by killing his
enemy. If merely corrective justice be regarded, I do not
dissent." (Bk II. ch.I. XI.)
(4.) "Again, who can say that such a precept as that in I.John. III.16:
'We ought to lay down our lives for the brethren' is binding by
the Law of Nature?" (flk I.ch.II. VI. 1.2.)
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Human Lava and the Lav of Mature.
In spite of its weaknesses, however, natural law is the chief
moral power behind human laws.
Civil law, municipal law, positive law, international law
are all, according to Grotius, branches of 'human law'. However,
they have binding power only if in accordance with reason and nature,^
but they are not identifiable with the natural law, which is merely
their 'great grandmother', and which provides the obligation to abide
(2)
by her rules and also by those decisions of the state or community
( 3)
which are the fruit of expediency and mutual consents ' it would
seem from t, ese definitions then, that although a certain obligation
arises from mutual consent, if its decisions are not morally in
accordance with natural law they have no binding force. On the other
hand civil law may make many things void for the sake of utility which
would by natural law be obligatory.Natural law itself deals with
(5)
many things which result from an act of the human will. Rules
regulating both private and public contracts appear to be directly




(2) A state is a complete association of free men joined together
for the enjoyment of rights and for their common interest.
(3) Prol. 15. 17.
(A) Bk II.ch.XI.VIII.3— But see 3k II.ch.II.Vj'For the Civil Law
cannot ordain anything which the Natural law prohibits, nor
prohibit what that ordains.'
(5) Bk I.ch.i.X.4-.
(6) 3k II.ch.XII.XIII.2j 3k II.ch.XI.XIII.
It would indeed seem that any valid human law ought
to be an application, however deviating and indirect, of
reason and morality. Therefore human law, of any type,
might seem to be the perfection of natural law, inasmuch 3.3
by applying its principle to particular cases it becomes more
•complete', being more 'specialised* arid more meticulous in its
moral precision. Indeed the difference btween natural law and
human law cannot merely be that the latter is concerned with what
is amoral, or with wiiat is particular, local or temporary. For
human law deals more directly than natural law with such universal
questions as private ownership and slavery,^ while the law of
nature offers many pronouncements about particular problems.^
There should at least be thorough interdependence between
natural law and human law. All this surely points to the fact
that human law is ideally part of natural law, and, as its offspring,
proof of the creativity of the latter, and of man himself. It
reveals that the law of nature can not be merely a readymade law
which stands over man, advising and judging, but a law effectively
working and discovering itself in and through him.
Sometimes human law is whaLy concerned with the reinforcing
(1) "On the other hard, ownership and questions and problems relating
to it are rooted more fundamentally in natural law than in civil
or international law." (Bk II. ch.XI.)
(2) Bk II. ch.XII. XVIII.
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with its compelling power, the natural law.Sometimes human
(2)
is dependent on divine lawN ' According to Grotius's definitions,
there is often considerable discrepancy between natural and human
law, yet apparently the latter does not thereby lose all its
validity, but retains a certain force from its origin in mutual
agreement. Sometimes municipal has at least superior authority,
(3)
if not morality, to natural law. There would seem to be a
distinction between human laws which are a natural expression of
the law of nature working in man, and those which are purely derived
from human will.^
The act of creating and submitting to public tribunals although
not utterly natural, must receive the full approval of reason, and
although Grotius thought that their existence did not outlaw
(8)
private war, it should restrict it."
Grotius had stated that pacts of mutual obligation and the
civil power are the source of human law. Sovereignty, particularly
when it resides in one man, is not easily identifiable with either
of these, yet it is obvious from some of Grotius's remarks that
he thought that human law may in fact originate purely in the will
of the sovereign, irrespective of the desires of those who sire
(1) Bk II. ch.XIII. XVI. 2.
(2) Bk II. ch. I. XIV.
(3) 3k II. ch. II.V.
(4) 3k I. eh.I.
(5) Bk I. ch.III. I, 1-2- see pp. 626 below.
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(1)
governed, and this he appeared to think not unjust.
But that type of government which is constituted for the
superior, if not for the sole, benefit of a minority of one is
unjust, even if not necessarily tyrannical. And the implied
common consent which tolerates such a state of affairs is more
of an implication than true consent. There is here no mutual
pact or free association of men. Indeed, the lie is given to
this profession of consent by the plea that protests must be
ineffective. He allowed that anything which is manifestly wrong
should not be done simply because the king commands it, but
thought, nevertheless, that such a refusal im lied no curtailing
(2)of kingly power in its proper exercise of authority.
If sovereignty can be justified, as Grotius seems to have
thought it could be on account of its divine origin and vocation,
the human laws created by the sovereign, although not based on
mutual obligation or necessarily sanctioned by natural law, might
be expected to be manifestations of divine law, especially since
observance of the law of nature, divine law and the law of nations
(3)
is binding upon sovereigns, even if they have made no promises.
The divine power of the sovereign, however, may mean no more than
(1) Bk I. ch.III. VIII. 14*
(2) 3k I. ch.III. IX. I.
(3) Bk I. ch.III. XVI.
G I G
that God had appointed hia and left him free to err in hi3
interpretation of the law. It seems that husnar. laws relating
to political prosieas are lacking in that more discriminating
moral sens© previously attributed to them.
"The moral goodness or badness of an
action, especially in matters relating
to tiie state, is not suited to a division
into parts. Such qualities frequently are
obscure and difficult to analyse.3 (1)
It is perhaps in the question of ownership arid private
property that Grotius's view of the relationship between human law
and natural law is most intimately arid explicitly seen. According
to Grotiun private property is not derived from natural law, for
(2)
originally all men possessed everything in common. Private
property, he thought, followed by agreement. The right to
individual use with the corresponding prohibition of taking that
which is another's were necessary corollaries.
lot said Grotitis, the laiiversal right of everyone to have
what he needs, is a law of nature which should restrict unconditional
private ownership. There should be private ownership for Mi at least
of the necessities of life. Indeed at times Grotiua did base the
(1)
right to property aor© directly on the law of nature.
(1) 3k I ch.III# IX. 2.
(2) Sc II, ch.II.
(3) "For t ough a testaiaert, like other acts, may assume a certain form
by the Civil Laws yet its substance has a close association with owner¬
ship, and thua, is under Katurai Law. "(He II. eh.VI. XIV.)
"According to a law of nature, which has its origin in the very
character and essence of ownership, alienation takes place in 2 ways.#**
(He II. oh.VII. II. I.)
h I
The development of the human race which led to the
present mode of private ownership, Grotius thought, wa3 in part
a degeneration, in which the division of the world into
(1)
countries was the first 3tep.
In urgent need the primitsre right of common use survives
as if common ownership had remained, since in respect to all
human law, including the law of ownership, supreme necessity is
excepted. ^
In such cases however the injustice is not found in the
one who has more than his share, but in the external situation,
and even though he knows this he is not bound to take the
initiative in remedying it.
Gr >tius allowed that all things have been distributed to
individual owners with a benign reservation in favour of primitive
right, but that reservation would seem to equal the obligations
of the owner to give to him who lacks rather than, by neglecting
him, forcing him into a position where he has to steal. Grotius
agreed that every effort should be made by way of appeals in order
to avoid theft, but such would no doubt be more successful if the
owner felt obliged to give. However much mutuality may have
(1) Bk II. ch.II. II.3.
(2) Hk II. ch.II. VI.4..
existed at the origin of private ownership, it is no longer
held so essential, or mutual responsibility would be taken more
seriously.
This lack of mutuality is nowhere more evident than in
relation to the ownership of other human beings, that is, slavery.
The very right to mutuality was regarded as having been lost or
(l)
forfeited by certain crimes, and very often men have had to
sell themselves to secure their primitive right to the necessities
of life.
(1) Sk III. ch.XIV. 1 - 11.
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The Law of mature and Law of I ations.
The proof of the eid.ster.ee ax d validity of the law of
nations, as well as its efficiency, Grotius found in the
common consent of aany nations. In this the law of nations
differs from tho law of nature which is basedon the principles of
li&tur©. GrotiU3 claimed that he had cleared up tho confusion
a.joufc the difference ard to© relationship between the law of
nature and the law of nations which he found in earlier writers.
His distinctions, however, would seem to make the law of nations
to a large extent ansoral.
The law of nature is also to some extent proved by the
(2)
witness of common consent to it. ' If eomaors oonsent is thus
part of the evidence of the rationality and morality of the law
of nature, the common consent which justifies the law of nations,
(inasmuch as Grotiua did not mean what is obviously true, that
without common consent the law of nations is largely unworkable)
would seeox evidence of its morality and thus partly identify it
with the law of nature.
The fact that 'caramon consent' proves both see:as to imply
tiat the disti; ction between the laws of nature and nations breaks
(1) Grotius distinguished between the old soaring of lug; .gentium laws
common to many nations, and the modern usage, Iowa bettwna nations,
(die III. eh.VIII. 1-2)
(2) "... for rational Law, as we aave said, is in a certain measure,
to bo proved by such consent; and as to the Law of rations, there is
no other way of proving it." (. rol.Z.6.)
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down, or that we are left with a law of nature half unrelated
to reason, or with a law of nations which does not necessarily
have an ultimate sanction in morality, reason or God, but may
simply be founded in the amoral will of men and be on1^
applicable and workable as long as men agree.
What Grotius obviously desired was the coincidence of the
two. For him the law of nature and natural rights do lead to and
imply mutual obligations. International law relating to promises
and pacts, should be based on natural law and individual morality.^
Grotius shewed the variety of opinion and practice that
exists regarding the relationship between the law of nations and
the law of nature. Sometimes the irrationality and positivism
(2)of the law of nations is insisted, on, 'and yet 'in the Law of
(3)
Nations, Natural Law is included.' ' The Law of Nations may
prohibit many t ings permitted by nature.
(5)
Sometimes the law of nations and laws of nature coincide'
or the scope of the law of nature would seem to be greater than
that of the law of nations, when for example the mutual consent
(1) Hk II. ch.XI.
(2) Hk II. XVIII. IV.2.
(3) Hk II. XVIII. IV.I.
(4) Sk II. oh.III. X.3.
(5) Hk II. ch.XIX.I.I.
which is the basis of the law of nations cannot override the
natural rules of ownership.^
Sometimes the law of nations demands more than the law of
(2)
nature as when it demands a declaration of ■war. And according
to the law of nature just killing can be carried out in any manner
but according to the law of nations it is not lawful to kill by
poison, probably because kings are more susceptible to poisoning
(3)
than to any other death. '
Sometimes the law of nations demands less than the law of
nature. At least it permits things forbidden by the law of nature.
That which may be done to a slave with impunity for instance
according to the law of nations, differs widely from that which
natural reason permits. 'There is no suffering which may not be
inflicted on a slave with impunity', ^and the descendants of
the slave may be inher-ited by the master. Slavery, indeed,
(5)
Grotius regarded as against nature but not against natural justice.'
By the law of nations, all wars which are conducted on both
(1) Bk III. ch. XX.IX.
(2) Bk III, III. VI. 1-3.
(3) Bk III. ch.IV, XV.I.
(4) "the effects of this right are unlimited, sothat the master may
do anything lawfully to the slave, as Seneca says. There is no
suffering which may not be inflicted on such slaves with impunity...
•In all nations alike1 say3 Caius, 'we may see that the masters have
the power of life and death over slaves'(Bk III. ch.VII. III.I.)
(5) Bk III. ch.VII. I.I.
sides by authority of the sovereign power, are to be held
just wars as regards their external effects.^ *Perpetually to
(2)
slay is called the right of war'; but according to natural
law a war can be right for one side only.
It was agreed by the law of nations that hostages can be
(l)
put to death, but to Grotius this is not just.' Similarly,
according to the law of nations, private combats to end war are
lawful, but this conflicts with true reason and the precepts of
God. Indeed the suggestion is that to accept the right of
private combat is to treat the war too lightly.One condition
alone can render such a combat just and patriotic from the point
of view of the just side only arid that is the likely danger of
success of the unjust side. Here is revealed the tragic inadequacy
of the law of nations at the time of war. For quite apart from
the fact that it has been proved in itself morally if anything
inferior to the law of nature, it roay, even when sanctioned by
the latter in view of its expediency, only be capable of a
onesided application. To the just all things are just, to the
unjust all things unjust. And so the most fundamental criterion
for assessing the morality of an action is whether or not you
believe yourself to be in the right.
(1) Bk II. ch.XVII. XIX.
(2) Bk III.ch.17.V.I.
(3) Bk III. oh.XX.LIII.
U) Bk III. ch.XX.XLIII.3-4-. But c.f.p. 628 below and Bk II.
ch.XXIII.X.
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The law of nations also permits the silling of all the enemy
without distinction, by the sheer 'right of war' which belongs to
all who take part in a 'regular'^ war, just or unjust.^ But
according to internal justice killing is only justified in the
(3)
sheerly essential defence of life or property and is due punishment,
jven killing in defence of property is strictly against love.
Nevertheless, Grotius deemed the Innocent enemies who are
killed in any war as merely 'unfortunate'.^
The right of ownership of captured things is peculiar to a
regular war according to the law of nations. By international law
(5)
property taken from the enemy is legally held. ' The law of nations
is collective, and therefore admits injustice to individuals.
Distinction between True and Nominal Justice.
These distinctions between what was variously or commonly held valid
by international law and natural justice, were not only of idle
theoretical interest to Grotius. After having sometimes given the
impression that he had been in agreement with the various
(1) A 'regular' war is one on both sides public, and declared.
(2) Bk.III. ch.XX.XLIII.2.
(3) "What killing is just in war, according to international justice,
we may see from what lias been said. A man may be killed of purpose,
or not of purpose. No one can be justly killed of purpose, except either
as a just punishment, or so far as we cannot otherwise defend our life
arid property. And even this step, of killing a man for perishable,
human property, is at variance with the law of charity. In order that
punishment may be just, it is necessary that he who is killed should
have himself offended, and so offended, that a just judge would think




rulings of international law which, he had defined, in the
tenth chapter of the third book he made what, for a lawyer, must
be called a confession of faith. He 'retraced' his 3teps, made
a firm distinction between 'law' and 'right' and repeatedly
affirraedthe superiority of real and natural justice over legal
justice.^ There are many things which are said juris esse aut licere
but which exorbitant a recti regula. He thought that if the cause
of war is unjust, though the war be regular in manner, all acts
(2)
arising from it are unjust according to real internal justice.
And even justice can be transcended by humanity, earlier he had
(3)
written that Christians indeed should set love above justice.
He approved individual restraints of justice, and noted that among
good men the laws of war differ from the rights of war. A lot,
he said, of what is customary and conventional and passes for
international law, is not really good or just. There are of
course different 'laws of nations', and some are superior to
others, but in general they often allow things which violate
humanity. The agreed consent and will of nations is for Grotius,
obviously not sufficient justification.
There is no doubt then, that Qrotius intensely desired
that international law should firmly respect real subjective and
individual justice, and that he would base his international law
ideally on natural law.
(1) Bk III. ct.X-. ~7 *
(2) Bk III. ch.X.
(3) See above pp.STy-g7
Nevertheless he had carefully distinguished natural law
from international law, and did so on the basis of the common
consent underlying the latter. It seems important therefore to
ask what is the moral force of such consent in Grotius's
thinking. Common consent is of course implied in any system
of national as well as international law, and although in one
sense it might seem right that any joint activity whether national
or international should be based on a common will, in itself the
morality of this is separable from the morality of any particular
decision and action. A common ensent to worship the devil or
to plot a massacre could on no grounds bo considered moral, however
unanimous and united the worshippers or murderers. The morality of
any corporate action must be found and it is obvious that Grotius
so found it, in its intrinsic justice.
Perhaps the question of most consequence is whether such
intrinsic morality or justice of group activity differs in
itself from that of individual activity. The stress Grotius laid
on common consent actually emphasises the powor of tho individual
wills of which it is made up-
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The Ultimate Importance of the Individual in Grotius's
Specific Teaching on Wax*
In approaching the subject of war Grotius's chief aim
was to limit warfare. He first, therefore, made a distinction
between private and public war and ruled that the former was
only occasionally permissible. A Public war was one waged by
the sovereign power, and however just its cause it must not be
waged unless likely to be of more benefit than harm to the
major part of the nation. The legitimate methods of warfare
were his next concern, and he made a distinction between legal
requirements and temperamenta; throughout all these distinctions,
however, he stressed the individual responsibility of those who
•mingle in a warf^y His justification of war was mainly based on
the fundamental morality of self-defence; at times he drew an
almost complete analogy between individual and communal self-.
(2)
defer:ce, justice and punishment.% ' Self-defence, since it is a
matter or urgency, need not wait on law aid judgement, and self-
preservation thu3 justifies withdrawal from the stated normal
(3)
rules. He allowed that the individual Iras a right to defend
himself even if this means killing someone who is subjectively
innocent, since 'Nature... cares much less for ties of society
(1) Hk III oh.lj Bk 1. ch.ll.
(2) Hk 1. ch.ll.1.11.
(3) Bk 111.ch.xx.XXX 11.1.
than for the defence of the individual#1^ At the same time,
since even a just enemy has not a true and intrinsic right to
kill innocent subjects except in such defence, if they do
carelessly, needlessly or purposefully kill those who are
innocent on the unjust side these latter may righteously defend
themselves.^ Grotius took care to emphasise that this did
not mean that the war was thus jU3t on both sides, but it does
mean that for him the individual ruling and individual justice
transcended the collective. It was arecognition that there is
justice and injustice on both sides in a war, and indeed that
this mixture is within the individual himself.
Elsewhere Grotius stated explicitly that a war may be
subjectively but not objectively just on both sides^ and he
warned against making wars rashly even in a just cause. Even
if the justice of a war is assured, it is mostly more right and
(a)
pious, especially for Christians, to surrender their rights. *
Forgiveness rather than punishment is exhorted, and Grotius,
noted that Aristides commended thi3 to cities also.^ Christians
above all should forgive freely, and even our duty to ourselves
might teach us not to pursue our own rights. Anyone who undertakes
a war should be sure that he has strength a3 much as - or even
(1) Bk II. ch.I.III. and IV.I.
(2) Bk II. eh.XXVI. VI.I.
(3) Hk II. ch.XXVI. 71.2.
U) Hk II. ch.XXIII. XIII. 1-2
(5) Hk II. ch.XXIV. I.
(6) Bk II. ch.XXIV. II.3-4-
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more than - justice on his side,^ and the wars which may
not or ought not to be avoided, are rare. Indeed Grotius
stressed that rather than rejoicing in the justice of war, the
viae man will grieve about it, for since the justification of
war is its only sanction for good men, it is sad that it needs
to be justified. This attitude no doubt added to his insistence
that in doubtful case3 of war, the least unjust course of action
(2)
should be taken.v ' The best thing is to be wise oneself, the
next best is to be guided by others. In doubtful political
(3)
matters, the king should consult his wise counsellors. In
cases likely to lead to war, if one side agrees to arbitration,
it is wicked to fight. Christian kings and states esge cially are
bound to try this way of avoiding war, and congresses of
Christian powers should be held.^ And here Grotius seamed to
see in the practice of Single Combat a method of deciding a war
'the use of which does not appear to deserve altogether to be
repudiated1 and he quoted without comment the practice of kings
(K)
fighting out the issue.
In discussing whether or not a soldier who is in doubt
about the justice of his cause should fight, he noted that most
writers were of the opinion that he ought to obey, and he himself
(1) 'Then only is the time for war, when we have right on our side,
and, what is of the greatest consequence, strength also."(Bk II.
(2) Bk II. ch.XXIII. II.2. sh.XXI7.IX.)
(3) Bk II. ch.XXIII. IV.I.
(4) He II. ch.XXIII.VIII.3.
(5) Bk II. ch.XXIII.X. But c.f.p. 622 abovej aT]d gjjju ch.XX.XIIII.•
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gave many examples of the incomplete moral standing of the slave,
comparing the soldier with him. It has been aeon that Grotius
believed that subjects may be so innocent that a war can be
subjectively just on both sides. He himself preferred that subjects
in doubt should choose disobedience rather than the moral danger of
fithting unjustly. Disobedience in such circumstances is sinless
and a lesser evil than homicide. Here he acknowledged and followed
Adrian, 'our countryman, who was the last Cisalpine Pope1. ^
He thought that the individual should be well informed about the
causes aid circumstances of any war, since the people are the
(2)'executioner'. And he pointed to the Hebrew practice of making
(3)
witnesses begin ar execution. He did, on the other hand,
sanction the king's employment of morally bad subjects on the
ground that God makes use of the spontaneous acts of the devil and
of impious men.^
Grotius believed that the individual transcends the state by
virtue of God's ownership of his life^and although he thought
that citizens ought normally to obey their rul-ers in the time of
war, he upheld conscientious objection to warfare on the grounds
that, as not only the apostles but Socrates said, every individual
(6)
has the obligation to obey God rather than man.
(1) Bk II.ch.XXVI. IV.4.
(2) Ok II.ch.XXVI. IV.6-7.
(3) Ok II. ch.XXVI.IV.9.
U) Ok II. ch. XXVI.V.I.
(5) Ok III. XI. XVIII.I.
(6) Bk II. XXVI. III.I.
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The other main ethical question involved in war which Grotius
discussed was deceit, and here also he based his attitude on
individual morality. He despised mercenaries on the ground
of their immorality 'whose motto is the right is where the best
pay is', rather than acknowledging their usefulness to a just
side.*1)
In spite of his concern to preserve individual justice and
rights, he nevertheless stated that public is to be preferred to
private good, although he acknowledged that even in public wars the
(2)
main motive is likely to be self-concern, even though the wish
to help allies arid others be another inspiration. Although the
sovereign would appear to have the right to hand over any
subject to the enemy, if this will benefit the community, only
by the law of charity or goodwill and by no state law, can an
(3)
individual be called to voluntarily sacrifice himeslf, for a
man may reasonably prefer his own life and property to those
of others. As regards the degree of responsibility that we have
for the defence of others who are not our own compatriots or
allies, but friends to whom we have made no promises, Grotius's
position appears to be that a man is called upon to defend
others only as long as this does not greatly inconvenience
himself.*^) His respect for the freedom and rights of the
individual is therefore considerable.
(1) Bk II. ch.XXV.IX.I.
3) Bk II. oh.XX7.VII.
3) 13k II. ch.XXV.III.3.
U) 13k II. ch.XXV.VII.1-2.
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In spite of the fact that Grotius ruled that public autflority
was normally needed for a war to be just, he seems to have
realised that warfare involves so much individual activity that
a purely corporate ruling on it is not adequate. But Grotius did
have in a sense, a mystique of the state. He regarded a people as
a community which has one name, one habit, and one spirit which is
its *£1111 and perfect common participation of civil life, • and
which produces sovereignty, by which bond the state is held
together. A state is an artificial body. In a sense it is
temporary, for it may disappear either by destruction of the body
(.2)
or cessation of the form. ' But Grotius disagreed with Aristotle
in that he held that cliange of form need not alter the 3pirit,
and he pointed out that the itoman people were the same under
kings, consuls or emperors.^ The state really disappears if the
participation in common rights no longer continues. The jurist
is concerned with the common participation of right and authority
in a state, the politician with the relations between the
governing and the governed.^
Grotius drew an analogy between the state and natural bodies
and in certain circumstances natural organisms such as a large
family.^
(1) Bk II. ch.IX.III.1-2.
(2) Sk II. ch.IX.III.IV-V
(3) Bk II.ch.IX. VIII.1-2
U) Bk II. ch.IX.VIII.2.
(5) Bk II. ch.lX.III.2 and 3k III. ch.VIII, II.I.
Although the common spirit must persist, there is
allowance for the disappearance of individual members. National
boundaries, and thus state allegiance, are to an extent arbitrary,
and individuals have the freedom to transfer from one party or
state to another.^ The disadvantages of the artificial nature
of the state can be seen, for example, when the community
imposes a fal36 role on its citizens in that all those within
(2)
enemy boundaries during a war are 'enemies' by international law.
The existence of the state introduces a net/ type of morality.
It is acknowledged that there is something intrinsically good in
( 3)
mere adherence to one's own party. And raorehumarity and
justice are due to nations than to individuals, inasmuch as the
former are larger
"bquity, which is required, and humanity, which
is praised towards individuals, are the more
requisite and praiseworthy towards nations and
parts of nations, inasmuch as the injury or
kindness is greater with the number." (/+)
Peoples have the same rights as individuals, and are like
individuals inasmuch as they may concede rights to otners, but
kings have wider power than individuals. And the larger community
(5)has an overruling right over smaller concerns.
The constitution of the monarchy affects the relationship
(1) 2k UIch.XX.XLI.I.
(2) Bk III. eh.IV. V.T-2 and VI
(3) 3k III. oh.XI. XVI.4.
(4) 3k III. ch.XV.l.
(5) E8c III.
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between monarch and people*^ Sovereign power is in a sense
temporary, since it is conditional upon the power of the people,
a;id the otate is a voluntary entity, 'eeasund by its primeval
t
will , although those who unite to form a state contract a
certain 'perpetual and immortal society*# Public and private
consent are involved, (irotius considered them together on the
assumption that t ey have the same pattern# he thought
patriarchal society superior, and that status in a parti ership
is partly de: cedent on ownership ai.d property#
There is no doubt then tSiat Grotlua allowed considerable
influence to the part played by natural and municipal law in
shaping arid making effective international law. To the international
lawyer CJrotius is a middleman* lufeodorf for example allowed only
> atural haw and reason as the source of law, the positivists
only positive law# Grotiua took his argcraants from both sources#
riut he has been blamed for thus basing his international law,
either directly or indirectly by means of municipal law, on
natural law, arid making it only 'incidental' to the latter. He
has boon blamed, too, for having no conception of a 'natural law
(2)
of states* as distinct from a natural law of individuals#
If this is so, he was in loss dai ger of thinking of the
state as a personality in itself, as a organic being, and thereby
of allowing the state to engulf the 1. dividual both in himself
KnlgM's The Life and Works of Hugo Grotius. pp.199-201.
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and in his moral responsibility.
This does not mean that the state is not an organisation
in its own right, but it does mean that it cannot be taken for
granted that it is completely analogous to other organic entities,
such as the individual or the family. When a statesman attempts
to conduct a war by referring to his allies as brothers and
cousins, or when he explains national financial policy by the
example of a private bank account or a piece of cake, one must
be immediately suspicious of the ©notional implications of these
methods.
The morality of states must be different from that of
individuals, but that there should be no resemblance is surely
unreasonable. Individual opinions and attitudes on political
matters will surely be most influential.
Grotius certainly found a strong resemblance between the
organisation of an individual and a state. He often applied
a rule or related a question to 'private persons, or kintp, or
those whose mutual Rights (ar-d Obligations) resemble those of
(1)
kings, such as Rulers of peoples, or free Peoples themselves;1
(l) 3k I. ch.I.I. i-rol.l. "Add that all Christiana are members of one
Body; are commanded to hear each other's sufferings and sorrows:
arid a3 thi3 applies to individuals, so does it to peoples, as peoples,
and to kings, as kings. Each must serve Christ according to the
power given him." (Bk II. cli.XV.XII.)
"... that it might be clearly known that the war was "undertaken...
by the will of the two peoples or their heads.'HBklll. ch.III.XI.)
he acknowledged that society is based on individual needs and
intentions, and that distributive justice can be applied to and
by both private persons and states. An association of states he
regarded as analogous to a defensive association of individuals.
At every turn however, he shewed care to preserve the
rights of the individual. InstitutedjU3tice, he reckoned, did
not entirely do away with 'the old natural liberty.'^"' 'The
right of inflicting punishment is, by natural law, in the hands
(2)
of every man' and by the Law of hat lire, authority is given to
the just. He quoted with approval Aristotle's assessment of
(3)
justice as an essentially human rather than political virtue, w/
and was careful to distinguish between the collective punislunent
which was an inevitable corollary of geruinely collective guilt^
and that widen is quite unjust to individuals. He ruled that it
is quite unfair for a people to suffer for the crimes of its king,
and based this on analogy with the family, that it is not right
for children to suffer for the 3ins of their parents. God wasted
the people with pestilence as a punishment for the sin of David,
but this, as a matter of fact, was a punishment of David, since
the punishment of his people is the sharpest punishment of
(1) Bk II. ch.XX. VIII.5.
(2) Bk II. ch.XX.IX.2.
(3) "As Aristotle says, prudence is properly the virtue of a ruler,
but justice is a virtue which belongs to man as man".(Bkll.Gh.XXVI.
IV.VII.)
(4) Hk II. cVi .XXI.VII.I." There is ever a participation of
punishment by communication between the general body aid individuals;
for, as Augustine says, The general body consists of individuals."
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offending kings. But men may never lawfully execute it.^
In any corporate action which is criminal, 'the fault lies at
the door of the individuals who have consented to the act, not
(2)
of those outvoted by the others.'
Any sort of compulsion including political compulsion,
(3)
of anything immoral he deemed quite unlawful.
The power of the individual on the minority upon the
community can be strong. But he did accept that according to
natural law, the majority have the right to administer for the
whole community, unless previously arranged pacts or conventions
legislate against this.^ He noted how'God himself, who is the
supreme Lord of men, often spares the whole body, though large,
(5)
for the sake of a few good men.'
In wartime he thought the king has an overruling right
over property, that individual property and rights are subject
to the state and that individual property can be sacrificed for
(6)the state. Such deprivations, however, must be made good
when the war is over. For war is 'far removed from the nature
(7)
of a contract'. '
(1) Bk II. ch.XXI. VII-XVII.
(2) Hk II. ch.XXI. VII.2.
(3) Bk III. ch.I. XXI.
(4) Bk II. ch.V. XVII.
(5) Bk III. I.IV.3.
(6) Bk III. ch. XX.V.
(7) Bk III. V.I.
The whole people should give their consent to the king,
and in necessity sovereignty can be transferred to some of
the people. But sovereignty does not everywhere belong to the
people, but rather is shared by ruler andpeople.^ The
sovereign power is supreme and not subject to anyone else, the
special subject may be one or two persons, but the common subject
of sovereignty is the state. The whole legislative virtue
resides in the sovereignty, which is of a higher order than other
things. Certainly the sovereign authority does not exist in a
mere name.
The form of government and the distribution of power between
(2)
One and Many depends on circumstances. Complete and utter
equality in government is impossible, he thought, for the governed
cannot always govern, but the good of the governed is usually the
object of government, and God is directly responsible for those in
authority.
Grotius distinguished between the royal and private acts of
the king. In royal acts what the king does i3 held to be done by
(3)
the community. The people have some moral responsibility for
the actions of their kings and in any decision tlxe ruler must be
assured that the majority of Ms subjects will benefit. The king
(1) Bk I. ch.III. VIII.l.
(2) Hk I. ch.III. VIII.
(3) Be II. ch.XIV. 1.2.
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may share in the crimes of his people by condoning when he
(1)
should prevent them. 7 All kings are bound to observe natural,
(2)
divine and international law, but there can nevertheless be
slavery in government. There are many examples of mixed sovereignty,
where the people can choose the sovereign and decide the limits
of his power. The state has a superior right over us and this
prohibits any natural rebellion for the sake of peace. The state,
on the whole, furthers peace, even if its actions are partly selfish.
Evil, therefore, must be endured rather than such peace broken.
(3)
hVen public figures, such as magistrates, may not resist.
In all cases, particular respect is to be shewn to the king. This
more or less 'pacifist' position in relation to tyrants is in
accordance with tradition, and in Grotlus it ceid.air.ly seems to
be due partly to his understanding of the state as an extension of
the family. For he certainly entertained the idea that a foreign
nation can attack a tyrant even though his own subjects may not
do so.^
Kings, and rulers in general, have a responsibility not only
(5)for their own states but for human society in general. and at
the same time the king has a serious responsibility for the behaviour
(6)
of his own people,1 7 although not for every individual act. Rulers
(1)$k.ll. ch.XXI.II-III.
(2) 3k I. ch.III.XVI.I.
(3) hk I. ch.IV.VI.I.
U) ak II. ch.XXV.VIII.3-4.
(5) Sk II.ch.XX. XLIV.I.
(6) Bk II. ch.XX.
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share in the crimes of their peoples by permitting and allowing
them, or commanding ill deeds. The general body consists of
individuals and therefore theremust be a relationship between
communal and individual guilt and punisnment. But in any majority
decision or act, the fault lies with unwilling or 'outvoted1
individuals; and they should not be punished for it.
SUMMARY OF GRuTIUS'S POSITION.
It would seem, then, that Grotiu3*s position was in many
ways realistic. He took notice of the individual and the
corporate aspects of a political community, and, as cleanliness
is next to godliness, he accepted common consent as neat to
justice. He was anxious, however, that just as mutual agreement
and any common action arising from it must be respected, such
should be in line with justice and righteousness. In the
context of community decisions and life he was concerned to
allow the fullest individual liberty, freedom of conscience arid
respect for individual rights.
He was, however, sometimes a little too willing, as in
hi3 acceptance of the power of the king, to accept implied for
real consent, iiovereignty, as well as common consent to something
wrong, can breed injustice.
qn
He was,,evangelist for the rule of justice in international
relations. In spite of his professing to distinguish clearly
between the law of nature and law of nations, he confused them in
theory, and proved that in practice it is often very difficult to
distinguish between them. He was so enthusiastic for the
potentiality and value of international law that he was eager to
G 41
acknowledge it wherever it existed. But at the same time he
obviously did not reckon 'common consent' as guaranteeing adequate
moral foundation, or existing international law as necessarily
satisfactory.
He made a rigid distinction between what was legal and what
was just, and many times shewed their contradiction and upheld
justice. It is this, no doubt, which partly causes Knight's
statement that he was establishing a Protestant ethic as a
foundation for a theory of world unity.^ But it is doubtful
whether his understanding of justice and natural law was
distinctively Protestant. As Knight himself points out, Grotius
was indebted to 'Aristotle, Cicero and the Stoics, Augustine,
(2)
Aquinas, Soto, Molina and Suarez for his conception of justice
V/-.
and was thus 'in line with the sholastic succession.' He was,
A
in fact,
•one who was handing down the moral treasures
of the past guaranteeing their infinite and
proved value and pointing, as he did, to the
place wherein they have rested and ever been
available and actually drawn upon, during all
ages.' (3)
It is unfair, Knight thinks, to call Grotius an originator.
Del Vecchio agrees, and reckons that Grotius is no longer
(1) W.H.M. Knight. The Life and '/fork3 of hugo Grotiua. pp.211-212
(2) Grotius admired Suarez. In his letter of 15.10.1633 to J.Cordesius,
in ed. of the ^pistolae of Grotius, Amsterdam, 1687, p.118, h<3
referred to him as 'home in Philosophiae tantae subtilitatis ut
vix quernquam habeat parem'.
(3) Ibid., p.202.
acclaimed as an original thinker of any outstanding theoretical
interest but is rightly recognised for his power of systeaatising
(1)
ar.d his great influence.
The natural law tneory of Grotius, although not so
elaborately worked out as that of the scholastics, was none the
less largely inher-ited from them. Grotius had the same belief
that reason is a divine gift to man and that by its use man
participates in the eternal Law, and he seemed as optimistic
as the Thomists aoout its moral utility and man's ability to know
and obey it. Indeed his theory of natural law seemed at times
even more naturalistic. He had the same blindness to the
frequent discrepancies between that which is natural and that
which is rational or moral. He did not take fully enough into
account the extent to which the 'natural' in man is savage or
stupid, and he seemed quite unaware of the burden of reconciling
that which is bad in nature, inside and outside man, with a good
Creator. The natural sociability of man, on wnich his natural
law is largely grounded, is morally ambiguous, and although there
is a sense in which a natural right can outline a natural duty,
society makes for a conflict as much as for a satisfaction of
mutual rights. And a higher than a natural law may alone be able
(1) Del Vecchf; Philosophy of Law, pp.66-72 (an American Translation
of Lezionl:Pi Fiiosfia Del Diritto.)
to transcend such a situation. Grotius soiaetimes, for example,
accepted selfishness as completely in accord with natural law,
as when^ he said a man has an 'unlimited moral right' over
anyone who threatens him, and when he agreed that it is perfectly
natural and just to save oneself at the expense of others.
It is doubtful whether these aspects of his natural law
morality can ho put forward as distinctively Christian, whether
Catholic or Protestant. Indeed, Grotius's distinction between
and harmonising of natural law and divine law is in theory arid
(2)
practice somewhat doubtful. ' Far more willingly than Aquinas
did he recognise the superiority of revealed to natural ethics,
and their superior claims on men, for he did not, in fact, relegate
all Christian morality which transcends natural law to counsels
(3)
which are mere recommendations rather than commands. He did
on the other hand, still accept the difference between counsels
and commands.
His consideration of the relevance of Christianity to war
was indeed far more detailed and thorough than was Aquinas's, and
he was moreinsistent on the Christian's right, if not duty, to
absent himself from such activity. At the same time, he noticed,
a3 Aquinas did not, that Jesus gave no specific teaching on war
(1) See p».604. above.
(2) See pp. 575-588 above.
(3) See p. 587 above.
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itself. let he accepted Aquinas1a interpretation of the
prohibition of individual self-defence as a prohibition of
anarchic vengeance which should more properly be carried out
by public authority.
Hiw own attitude thus seems a little ambiguous. At times
he spoke as if Jesus' teaching on non-resistance was commanded
rather than counselled, at other times he used such powerless
facts as that the old Jewish laws of judgement and punishment were
in existence during the life of Jesus to prove, somewhat
unjustifiably, that war and retaliation can therefore exist
parallel to His very different teaching and way of life.
It is by hi3 allowing the individual a greater importance,
morefreedom and a more active part to play that Grotius's thinking
is most strongly marked off from that of Aquinas. It has been
seen that the ultimate supremacy of the individual wa3 allowed for,
in theory by Aquinas, but it never became so practically significant,
or pointed, and it was certainly not allowed much scope in his
war articles. Grotius's concern for individual justice was perhaps
most explicit when he emphasised that nature only permits retaliation
against the offender himself, and any le ss accurate punishment is
not excused by the fact that '... the enemy is, by a sort of
fiction, conceived as forming one body. *^
(1) Bk III, ch. XI. XVI.2
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Grotius was writing at a time of transition from the medieval
to the modern period, a time when the authority of Empire and
Church, and their alliance, had ended. The hierarchical conception
of society was giving way to the contractual and this in itself,
in theory, distributed individual rights more widely than before.
This no doubt partly accounts for Grotius*s making the individual
central even in the situation of war between states, (war is
proved to be the breakdown of communities 'morally* and in other
ways) and for his so largely basing his state and interstate morality
on individual natural law.
Dr. Oppenheim firmly upholds the significance of individual
morality even for relations between states. International law, he
thinks, although primarily concerned with relations between states
i3 nevertheless indirectly concerned with the actions of individuals
who represent these states.^ He quotes Westlake's opinion that
■the duties and rights of states are only the duties and rights of
the men who compose them', and concludes that international law
must inevitably be founded on rinciples of morality and law which
(2)
are relevant to individuals. Individuals have international
rights and duties made plain to them by the municipal law of the
state.
(1) International Law. Vol.l.p.2G.
(2) This seems to be the current Catholic position.A.C.F.Jeales, who
bases his summary of the principles of international order on Taparelli,
the Peace note of Benedict XV in 1917, the Fribourg and the Anglo-Irish-
American Resolutions of 1931, and the Five Peace Points of Pius XII in
1939, states that '... since society exists for man, it follows that
communities and states are subject, as moral persons, to the same moral
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Customary and conventional rules, wirtten and unwritten,
treaties, decisions of courts and tribunals, arbitration, comity,
are all sources of international behaviour and law, but all
these 'corporate* manifestations are ultimately derived from
municipal and individual sources.
hnforceaent of international law has to be effected by
the separate municipal law of every individual state. This
is the weakness of international law at the moment, but it do03
show how very significant for the standard and effectivness of
. international law is the municipal law of each state. Rules of
international law are part of the municipal law and are themselves
ultimately concerned with and addressed to individual human beings.
Behind municipal law is the common consent, implicit or explicit,
of the people, and such common consent cannot be divorced from
com on morality. And here is the justification for the enthusiastic
•evangelism' of Grotius.
And it is in this and in his Christian individualism that
his Protestantism is most obvious. The hierarchical system has
survived in the Roman church, but historically Protestantism has
allowed a wider freedom of individual interpretation and standpoint.
It is true that Grotius, though he would have believed in the
laws as are individual men. Public conduct, social and national andy
international, must be judged by the same canons as private conduct.
(The Catholic Church and International Order, p.170.
f* * i*?
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priesthood of all believers, did not use the fact that clerics
have always been forbidden warfare to prove that such is forbidden
to all Christians, but he did not make such a rigid distinction
a3 did Aquinas between an ethic for clerics only and an ethic for
all Christians.
Grotius was both a realist and an idealist. As a realist he
accepted the human situation and human law as it existed, whether
righteous or not; as an idealist he started from there and
pleaded that in every state and interstate relationship justice should
be done and humanity fulfilled. But he stopped short there and
did not sufficiently plead that the Christian virtues of forgiveness,
repentance, tolerance, mercy and love be expressed in international
relations. He did not apparently consider that Christian morality
was appropriate to states, but he should have so considered this
in so much as he regarded individual morality relevant. His
whole theme was a plan that international relations should be
based on righteousness and morality, and yet he did not complete
his own syllogism.
Yet it could be fairly claimed that Christian morality
is more fimly based on an understanding of the realities of
human situations arid human nature than is his teaching on natural
law.
CHAPTER TWELVE
A BRIEF 3M1ARI OF THE RULING
ON WAR FROM GROTIUS TO THE
PRESENT DAY
Grotius did hold that the distinction between just and
unjust war had some legal consequences in that neutrals should
favour the just against the unjust belligerent. But this idea
was not taken up by later legal writers or in International practice.
Moreover at the end of a war the rights of the parties depend on
military victory, not in the least upon whose cause had been just.
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Therefore the idea of just war became of little interest
to the international lawyer. War was simply war. There were
eertain rights and duties for belligerents and neutrals arising
out of the fact of war (ius in bello) but these were unaffected
by any question of which side was in the right.^ So in all
nineteenth century text books on international law there were
elaborate discussions about the circumstances in which it was legal
for one state to use against another measuresof force short of war
but not about the legality of resort to war. Use of force short
of war might be an international wrong of which the victim could
complain: resort to actual war was not. This acceptance in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries of the state's unlimited
right to go to war meant that it was impossible to establish a
specific right of self-defence in international law. Dr Bowett
points out that the paradox of the positivist doctrine was that any
state could on its own authority choose to interpret the pacific
use of force in self-defence of another state as an act of war, and
would thus 'transform the legal privilege of self-defence into
(2)
conduct legally indistinguishable from its own.' The positivist
denial of the doctrine of just war as established by Aquinas and by
Grotius on the basis of natural law meant that war was acknowledged
to be beyond legal control.
(1) Commercial interests ruled that in the nineteenth century the
neutral state must refrain from giving direct military help to either
side, but the neutral subjects could at their own risk sell arras or
otherwise trade with belligerents.
(2) D.W.Bowett: Self-defence in International Law, p.118.
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Regarding the general relation of natural law to international
law later eighteenth century and nineteenth century writers were
practically unanimous in the positivist doctrine that the only
source of international law lay in treaties and in the actml practice
of states. They scorned earlier attempts to deduce international
law from universal principles. The weakness of natural law ruling
on defence, was Br Bowett thinks that it was based on the right of
self-preservation and this was limited only by the equal rights of
others. The only correlation between the right of self-defence
of one state and the rights and obligations of others was that the
aggressive state must be at fault. Such a fault was looked on as
mainly moral rather than legal, and was too subjectively determined.
Dr. Bowett thinks that the decline of the Church and of universally
accepted morality encouraged the tendency to think of self-defence
as justifiable against any aggression rather than against objectively
determined breaking of the law.^
From the later nineteenth century on there were many treaties
between pairs and groups of states agreeing to resort to arbitration
or other peaceful means of settlement of certain types of disputes.
Resort to war in breach of such a treaty would be an international
wrong but there was no-one to punish it. The Covenant of the League
of Nations first attempted to provide for sanctions against a state
resorting to war in specified circumstances in defiance of the
(1) Ibid, p.7.
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covenant. It did not cover all cases of states resorting to ■war,
or even war in breach of a treaty.
The wars of the twentieth century arid the Nazi abominations
led to a reaction against positivism and a feeling even among
international lawyers that a thing is not justified merely because
it exists, and that some attempt should be made to establish the
principles of what international law ought to be. Hence some aspects
of the Nuremberg decisions, the statement of fundamental principles
in the Preamble of the United Nations Charter, arid the movement for
international guarantee of 'fundamental human rights'. The Nuremberg
and Tokyo trials introduced an important novelty In accusing and
condemning individual German and Japanese leaders for waging aggressive
war in defiance of treaties. This is a revival of the idea of
illegal war with a new addition, an international court imposing
punishment on the guilty individual. The Nure berg Judgement, however,
illustrates only to some extent the present trend towards imposing
responsibility on individuals for acts wliich, if done by a state,
(l)
would involve state responsibility. ' The individuals judged at
Nuremberg and Tokyo were acting for their states, but the problem
with which international law now has to deal is that of the
international responsibility of individuals not acting on the
authority of the state. Recent development of international society
(1) The Tribunal for the Far East stated »A conspiracy to wage aggressive
or unlawful war arises when two or more persons enter into an agreement
to commit that crime.' (C.A.Forages torressive War on International Crime.
p.226)
has promoted an increasing economic interdependence between states,
wiich occasions opportunities for harming them which cannot yet be
regulated by international law.
"The new techniques of subversive activities
and ideological propaganda, for example,
call for a specific regulation..."
and
"... afford to individuals an unprecedented
power of endangering a state's security." (l)
The Nuremberg trials also introduced the charge of 'crimes against
humanity* which could apply to things done by the German leaders
to German subjects in Germany, an assertion of the supremacy of
international law over national law, and of an international law
based not on existing practice but on moral principle. This idea,
influential also in the Mandate provisions of the Covenant of the
League of Nations and the Trusteeship provisions of the Charter of
the United Nations has also inspired the Declaration of Htmian
Rights (194-8) and the setting up of the European Commission and
Court of Human Rights.
The Charter of the United Nations provides an elaborate system
under which it is almost impossible for a member state legally to
use force (the Charter refers to 'force' in order to avoid quibbling
about whether in any particular case there has been war in the
technical sense) save in self-defence or under the auspices of the
United Nations. The laws of war (ius in bello) relating to types of
(1) Bowett: Self-Defence in International haw, p.271.
weapons, bombardment of towns and treatment of prisoners, depend, S,
on treaties such as the Hague and Geneva Conventions, and the
interpretations of these.
In the twentieth century there has thus been a revival of
the idea of the iustum bellum. at least inasmuch as, on the basis
of defence being a lesser sin than aggression, one side could be
considered as more right than the other. Self-defence is indeed
X
the only use of violence now allowed by international law. The
analogy between persons and states in medieval natural law meant
that territory was analogous to the body of an individual. Territorial
integrity was therefore the right acove all, and indeed it still
is a fundamental and essential basis of state relations, though
lately the right to defend political and economic independence has
developed. Any right to self-defence should be determined objectively
by an impartial organ or tribunal which is representative of the
international community as a whole, since it is relative to delictual
conduct. Insistence on the fault of the enemy is thus essential for
lawful exercise of self-defence today and Dr. Bowett remarks that
"This insistence upon fault on the part
of the state against which self-defence
is directed, the 'propter aliquam culpam
impugnat-ionem mereantur* of Aquinas, is
perhaps, the most important contribution
to the concept of self-defence made by those
early writers." (l)
Self-defence wiiich is self-help against a specific violation
of the law is at the same time an exception to the general international
(1) Ibid., p.6
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legal proiiibition of force, and is thus counted as a privilege,
which justifies action otherwise not legal, and is allowable
only as an urgent and absolute necessity, where there is no
alternative. The Covenant, however, not only did not prohibit
self-defence but made it obligatory outside the League, in the
United States a movement developed for the complete prohibition
of war but self-defence was still allowed. The Kellogg Pact did
not restrict this right and United Nations Charter established it
not as an absolute but as a legal right relative to the protection
of similar rights in other states. At the same time the primary purpose
of maintaining peace and security has 'oershadowed the problem of
allocating legal responsibility for a conflict.• Dr. Bowett points
out that the Security Council and the General Assembly are political
not legal organisations, but if international law is to have proper
authority, and self-defence is to be recognised as a legal concept,
this question of legal responsibility must be determined.
The rules are now established, but the 3till outstanding
difficulty is that of 'providing a tribunal with compulsory jurisdiction
over states and, since individual responsibility may be involved,
(1)
over individuals.'
The work of the United Nations is not to support any defence
against any aggression but to prevent or act against any 'threat to ^
the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression', and this may
(1) Ibid., p.275
lead to action against a state which la exercising its right
of self-defence* 4s bovett emphasises,
Mit has b«e too rarely observed that
the fui ctlon of a definition of aggression
for the purpose of an organ empowered to
Intervene In the Interests of intorr.atio:.ai
peace and security is quite different trm
the ftaaetior. of * definition of aggression
or self-defence for the purpo o of allocating
legal responsibility.(t 1&
In the twu.tieth ecntury also economic warfare means that
there can no longer be such a clear distinction between the acta
of governments and of individuals* 'Total1 war in wuieh all the
resources of a country are mobilised for war almost obliterates
the distinctio: between Arsaad Forces directly engaged in war and
civilian population, on wrick auen of the ius in hullo before 1914
had depended.
In theological circles, a like awareness of common sinfulness
has leuto a hesitation about withdrawing, in the sense in which it
is felt that pacifism does, • from war involvement. At the ease time
the consciousness of common responsibility and air has not prevented
tl^e possibility of distinguishing between the relatively good and
just and tit© relatively bad and unjust sides ard the necessity of
associating oneself with the former.
"" »"* ..... ...... ** J leu iii I ■. ,J > ■ »«-■««-
(1) 1 id», p.254.
Protestants have on the whole professed abandonment of the
precisions of the just war doctrine, but its usefulness in roughly
distinguishing between just and unjust warfare lias been retained.
Concentration on methods of warfare has gained a new
significance because of the advent of atomic and hydrogen weapons.
The difference in degree of these weapons is thought by some to
amount to a difference in kind so that modern war constitutes a new
phenomenon or problem. There is an increasing tendency to reject
outright atomic weapons and the allout war they bring about, but
to retain and approve limited warfare. Conventional weapons are
accepted as being sufficiently discriminative to be used as instruments
of justice, whefeas atomic weapons are condemned as too wholesale in
their destructiveness. Aggressive war, even for a justifiable cause,
has been generally outlawed.
Christian pacifism is still a minority movement within the
Catholic arid Protestant churches, but its growth during this century
indicates another theological reaction. Many ♦situation1 pacifists
are of the opinion that although war in itself is not inevitably
wrong, any war today is likely to spark off atomic conflagrations,
and i3 therefore unjustifiable. The 'Christological1 pacifist feels
that the horror of atomic warfare is the logical development of
man's acceptance of war in any form and that it only magnifies its
intrinsic evil and stupidity.
COKLUSIOft
In spite of his ruling that defence against public
evil is obligatory Aquinas might, since he believed in the
supremacy of the individual conscience, have been persuaded
to agree with Grotius that it is permissible and reasonable
for anyone to take ultimately an individual moral or religious
stand on the question of war, as long as the individual tries
to understand and take into account the context of collective
relationships in which he stands. The moral aspects of such
relationships cannot be ignored either by the individual or
by the group, state or church, but both morality and religion
are, however social their results, rooted in the individual.
The question of participation in an actual war seems particularly
to call for an individual decision, and the present tendency in
international law to underline and rule for the power and
responsibility of the individual is a realistic and healthy one.
Aggressive warfare has now been generally outlawed by
both lawyers and theologians, for both states arid individuals.
The basic ethical question, therefore, about which there
is dispute is that of self-defence. It is the same problem
for both individuals and groups except that the individual may
feel a conflict between his own. private answer and that of
the nearest group to which he is in other ways most intimately
related. The collective answer will, however, be correspondingly
dependent on that of individuals within the group.
3oth Aquinas and Grotius would agree, though Aquinas
again with greater reluctance, that the perfect Christian answer
is that of non-resistance, a love of whatsoever enemy which
precludes killing him. Such a decision must be given from a
deep personal level, for an ideal which includes sacrificing
one's life for the preservation of an apparent murderer must
seem to many irrational, stupid and socially dangerous, unless
it is truly part of an interpretative pattern of existence w: ioh
accepts the spiritual as basic and creative and self-sacrificial
love as the pro foundeel" power to which any lesser values might
in their turn have to be sacrificed. If there is a unique
Christian answer to participation in warfare this must be it.
Kon-Ghristian pacifiem goes along with it at least part of the
way, but the Christian will believe that the apparent impotence
of pacifism is redeemed inasmuch as it is at one with the power
of Godj both non-Christian and Christian pacifists must feel
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that saying 'no' to war involves much more than refusing to
fight.
iuven so, the difficulties of holding this as anything
but an individual ethic are manifest, as political life and
activity necessarily involve adegree of compulsion and of
corporate agreement. Self-sacrificial love cannot of its
nature be compelled, and is not likely to be the will of more
than a minority. If any group should be capable of expressing
it, it is surely the Church, arid if the pacifism of the Church
could become multilateral and evangelistic it might indeed be
effective. This is why Grotius and Aquinas accepted natural
law as the highest ideal which can shape national and political
policies on war; where life is at stake revenge and resistance
are more natural than self-sacrifice and more acceptable to the
majority.
Analysis of the teaching on natural law in Aquinas and
Grotius, however, throws into relief certain basic problems. In
both thinkers its morality is harmonised or identified with
Christianity so closely as to shew up conflict. The identification
is on the grounds that man's nature is the gift and guarantee of
God, the Creator, but the evidence of this Creator which can be
found by looking into nature within and outside man is not so easy
to reconcile with Christ. There is in some ways a serious and
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direct contradiction between the apparent ways of the
Creator and the apparent ways of Jesus, a contradiction made c k
only too plain by this disagreement between the attitude to
war of the natural thinking man and that of the person who
follows the teaching and example of Jesus literally.
Man is a creature forged by immense and mysterious forces
of life and nature which have built up his being through millions
of eras not only by nurturing him protectively but by challenging
him to conflict and struggle and developing in him a bitter will
to exist. He has earned his survival by toil and endurance, a
ruthless love of life and often desperate selfishness, as well
as by the exercise of nobler virtues. He is charged with this
powerful impetus to continue Ids destiny, and it is not surprising
if, however altruistic and public-spirited he lias become, in the
last resort, at the last ditch, a desire to survive is a deeper
instinct within him than self-sacrifice. To learn a new way
at an advanced age is hard aid the religious ideal that he should
take no thought for his life but if necessary sacrifice it for
the unworthy is out of keeping with his history, with what lies
behind and around him. It may be a law of biological life that
a corn of wheat has to die in order to yield fruit. Jesus chose
an accurate analogy to describe the spiritual dying unto self
which is abundantly fruitful. But it is a one-sided, a chance
and not an ontological analogy between the natural and
supernatural. It may be Infallibly true of the spiritual
realm but no implication that this is the normal way of things
in the natural world can be gathered from it. The survival
of the fittest may apply to the spiritual as to the natural
world, but the ways of surviving are different. Sheer physical
power and selfish will to live win in nature, conflict and cruelty
are part of the natural pattern. Even the Creator allows, although
He may not will, cosmic actions and occurrences which cannot be
called incarnations of love and mercy, inasmuch as they cannot
be contained within a meaningful human understanding of these
qualities. For the incarnation must mean that the human is a
legitimate measure and interpreation of the divine a3 well as
its expressions. Aquinas®s doctrine of analogy need indeed
amount to no more than an uninteli-igble similarity between God
and manj that the creative process responsible for fashioning
the malaria parasite to kill of millions of men that its own mean
prosperity may abound is identifiable with the man who warned
that he who calls his fellow a fool is in danger of hell fire,
seems as elusive a piece of reasoning, however faith may be able
to comprehend it. Cosmic as well as man-made atomic radiations,
kill.
The relevance of tills difficulty to the matter under
discussion is plain. War is a dramatic problem which uncovers
many fundamental questions. The traditional attitude of the
Church seems to betray that, whatever its confessions of faith,
it has at such times placed its real trust in natural rather
than spiritual power, and that it has partly closed its eyes to
the differences between them. Any solution must attempt to
meet these difficulties in terms of the Incarnation. Canon
Raven approves such syntheses as he believes to be found in
Th.:. relevance of this <3iff cult
Aquinas's systeiaatising for in them God, Christ and man, nature
and grace are brought together. Thj natural and the spiritual
ha.*monise, mid Christ so reconciles God and man that his
perfection is and through Christ is made humanly possible.
Pacifism, so often condemned as unrealistic perfectionism becomes
a practicable possibility through the radiating, spiritualising
and integrating power of Jesus. Jesus, Canon Raven believes, not
only gives practical power but reveals the hidden but already
existent harmony between God and nature and makes possible a
similar harmony within man, resulting in redemption and resurrection.
He is the key to the mysteries of the creative process, he proves
beyond doubt that his way of suffering love and self-giving goes
with the grain of the universe and lias all the power of God on its
side.
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In fact, however, it appears that the synthesis of
Aquinas is not entirely satisfactory, certainly that aspect
of it so central to the question of war harbours a contradiction.
The alternatives 3eem to be that either Ganon Ravan is wrong in
thinking that Christ must be proved one with the heart, of
creation in order to be fully effective in human lifej or that
he is as misled in mistaking Aquinas's apparent synthesis for a
real one as is his optimism about any possibility of a working
harmony between nature and grace. Ke may, nonetheless be right
in his faith in the ultimate synthesis and only wrong in
believing in Aquinas*s achievement of it with the implication
that Aquinas's harmony would have been more complete if he had
seen in suffering love the central creative and integrating power.
Certainly the law of nature has not proved an entirely
satisfactory harmonising principle or meeting ground between
the sacred and the secular, it has not been necessarily a stepping
stone to the aivine spiritual realm or to higher morality but
sometimes a stumbling block. All the difficulties and uneasiness
in the attempts to identify and reconcile even on the abstract
level the laws of nan's animal nature with more specifically
rational activities and the divine law, make that only too clear.
Such attempts in Aquinas and in earlier writers led. to a confounding
and contradicting.
Grotius, although he refusal to allow the title of
law to purely animal instincts nevertheless allowed much that
is only too human into his natural law teaching yet at the
same time made it one with divine law. The difficulty of
mailing the Two hersons, the Creator and the Redeemer really
relevant to human justice only results in an imperfect paradox.
Outside the Catholic Church the specifically religious nature
of natural law lias of course now been generally given up, and
even the belief in a natural law of secular morality has been
shaken and fragmented. The classic traditions of natural law
drew too close an analogy between the natural law3 which the
science of earlier days interpreted teleologically and the laws
of human moral and spiritual development which were also thought
to be of a predestined uniform patten aimed at an end man did
not have to create but only discover and follow. Modem science
no longer labels observed laws of development and growth with
any moral significance, or the maturity of a thing as its highest
good. The older science identified too closely what does with
what ought to happen, the normal as the right, and indeed had
to do this as everything was thought to happen according to the
will of the Divine Creator; it also identified too closely the
non-human and the human. Modern science does not, however,
evaluate natural processes in terms of divinity or morality.
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God and moral purposiveness have been left out of nature
and moral principles were for a time left out of human laws
which strove to realise the remaining aim of mere expediency.
Nevertheless, the recent return toa new search for some
universal principles as a basis for morality and law
proves the inescapable consciousness of man that whatever
mysteries shroud God and nature, he himself is a moral being
by nature and that his nature is a clue to his morality. This
in spite of or because of the battle within him. The
(1)
contradiction within him acted as an incentive to St. Paul
and the tragic conflict without him does not lessen but increases
the urgency which inspires Schweitzer to strive to fulfil the
unique potentiality of his humanity.
Whatever conflict lives within him it is as unwise for
man to ignore the noblest and unexpectedly heroic elements in
his make up as to gloss over his worst characteristics. The
law of nature has in the past tended to explain man in terms of
L
a reasonably low estimate of his abilities, it has called a law
of mediocrity rather than of heroism divine. Whatever his
natural background man may be more ultimately explicable in terms
not of his origins but of his spiritual destiny. He must be
true to his finest insights and those who believe, on the
(1) "I discover this principle, thenj that when I want to do the right,
only the wrong is within my reach. In my inmost self I delight in the
law of God, but I perceive that there i3 in my bodily members a
different law, fighting against the law that my reason approves and
making me a prisoner under the law that is in my members, the law of
sin. Miserable creature that I am, who is there to rescue me out of
this body doomed to death? God alone, through Jesus Christ our Lord!
6 6 6
evidence of experience, that only by making Christ central
can man grasp the absolute and know the deepest laws and
realities of his nature, must be allowed to follow their faith.
hot everyone has such experience and conviction. The
disorder and uncertainty in law and ethics today which are
interpreted as due to man's los3 of a generally accepted picture
of himself which can help to pattern his behaviour, at least
shew along what lines research has to continue. Meanwhile it
is interesting in view of its direct relevance to the problem
of war that the modest aim of survival is recognised by a
modern professor of jurisprudence*'1''as that element in natural
law which remains central and indisputable. It is only a minimum
content in the midst of other important but controversial aims
but the fact that we do normally want to go on living is
reflected in all our thought and language! we call anything which
furthers survival good and anything which hinders it bad.
The nded for legal as well as moral rules comes about
because we have always with us the weak, the wicked and the
parasitic, who will wish to take advantage of and at the same
time to exploit social organisations! human vulnerability,
Thanks be to GodI In a word then, I myself, subject to God's law
as a rational being, am yet, in my unspiritual nature, a slave to
the law of sin" (Romans 7. 21-25)
■ (1) See H.L.A.Iiart: The Gonce: t of haw. ch.IX
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approximate equality, limited altruism and other elements of
mutual interdependence occasioned by the finitenes3 and
weaiin.ess of human understanding and will, make 3uch legal
safeguards possible. It is the lack of approximate equality
between states, with their great differences in strength and
vulnerability which makes international law different from and
more difficult to apply than national law. Atomic and technological
weapons might create a balanceof power which would make international
law workable and prove incidentally that physical force is
ultimately more important to peace than law and justice.^ The
recognition of the right of self-defence as the one exception
to the international legal ban on violence also proves how
fundamental it is. This is not surprising for existence is
basic to everything.
Chritianity can go a long way towards accepting the
furthering of life as an ideal. 'I have come that mar. may have
life and may have it in all its fulness.* Any system of human law
which is inspired by the aim of protecting and preserving human
life should be fitted into a perspective which appreciates the
true dimensions of human responsibility. Law mainly prohibits
from obvious harm but if a man is to go beyond this mere
prohibition, following the ideal of the promotion of survival
(l) x-Ven Grotius said that it is more important to have strength
rather than justice on one's side in war.
to its logical conclusions cannot but lead to the dedicated
reverence for life of a Schweitzer. There is no clear limit
to human potentiality and responsibility. ♦Anything less than
perfect love is destructive of life* and if we are not giving
all our resources to the furthering of spiritual and physical
life in a world where thousands die daily of starvation and
emotional sickness, we are so far guilty. Svery man and not
only the criminal is vulnerable and dangerous, an anonymous
friend or enemy of others, even, such is the dialectical logic
of human relationships, guilty of the enmity of his friend.
.Everyone is a power for life or death, this is a matter of fact
and not a histrionic statement. There is an invisible crime
of murder by neglect, and our own right to life becomes perhaps
a little more negligible if we accept this seriously.
Although a Christian is committed to the ideal of
promoting the lives and health of others, he is not allowed it
as an aim for himself. This may be because, however wholesome
and legitimate in itself, it is dangerous in that it is bound
to be in deadly competition with the lives of others. Certainly
the collective force of this instinct and the fear of death are
encouraging us to accumulate the building materials for a
holocaust. Possession by all states of the latest nuclear weapons
may, it is true, prevent a stronger state from overwhelming the
weaker, but such protection from a probable, however imminent,
danger is expensive since it already costs the lf-ves and
health of thousands who need to essentials of existence.
The tragedy is that in one sense most men are largely
ignorant or innocent of their involvement. The majority of
men are content to live and let live, at least in that they
have no intention or desire directly to harm others. Such
vast precautions are felt to be essential because of the
wickedness of a powerful minority. The most hopeful possibility
is that the sanity of both the selfish and the saintly will outlaw
war as lunacy. The law of nature, inspired by reason and the
desire to survive will then have come full circle.
International law in any case will have an indispensable
part to play in achieving this end. Its task of promoting
security and justice among nations should have the strongest
support of all Christians. Those Christians who refuse to fight
believe that their right to life must be surrendered in the
interests of peace, and in this they come close to the position
of an international organisation which may have to overrule the
right to national self-defence in the interests of the peace and
security of mankind. True they meet here only to continue in
different directions. International law desires a military
backing, at least as a last resort, to ensure its policies,
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whereas the Christian pacifist believes that spiritual power
will in the long run be more successful and is more immediately
right.
let at present international law is regarded by many as
Weakened and crippled - indeed as not properly law - because it
has not this required backing of physical power, and because it
has not yet received the blessing of all nations. Those who
answer this challenge often argue that although international law
is in its infancy it lias already built up a remarkable authority
and dignity and a quickly growing tradition, because it springs
from those sources of custom and morality and respect for order
which are the wellspring of all law. Although so far unarmed
international law has often been a power for good and for peace.
The Christian pacifist or the person who follows a policy of
non-violent resistance is somewhat in the same position. He has
been attacked and criticised because his position is physically
powerless and the privilege of only some nations, for in other
conscientious objection is still outlawed a3 an eccentricity.
Both international law. Christian pacifism and non-violent
resistance are pioneer movements but progress has often come about
through ideals which have started in the defeatist position of
being the possession of a minority. It does not need prophetic
/■» r»»» •
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insight to see that both an international legal system
which goes a tremendously long way - as far as it believes
safe - in saying no to war, and the Christian who believes
that he must keep fresh the ideal of an absolute refusal, have
a part to play in its final conquest, and that they have history
on their side, Neither is guaranteed immediate practical
success, but it is imperative that though they may disagree
at some vital points, they 3hould respect and as far as they can
support each other. Law has done much to protect the right
of conscience in some though not yet in all states.
If we consider human nature in its wholeness it may indeed
3eera realistic to believe that it needs tremendous restraints.
The extreme Christian position may seem remote from these
realities but if we consider the present international situation
it doe3 not seem so unrealistic to believe that finally an
absolute love may alone be able to conquer the conflict. In
the last war death and destruction were wrought at both Coventry
and Kiel by the natural instincts of both agression and defence.
In the Chapel of Unity in the new cathedral at Coventry aid
in the church of St Nicholas at Kiel, relics of the destruction
sent from the enemy countries witness to a measure of reeoneiliation
r»
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which has resulted from the desecration. Man's spirit
can survive the worst of human evils but may be able to do
so 'only by remembering that the true man is not one on the
warpath for rervenge. The true man is One on a cross, forgiving
ever to the last deadly insult.'
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